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A B S T R A C T
This study explores the policy options for health 
insurance in Thailand, considering the present structure of 
the country and taking account of international experiences.
The development of health insurance in Thailand is 
analysed from the supply side i.e. health services. The 
problem of inefficiency and inequity in the health care system 
has led to the search for better alternatives for organizing 
and financing. This coincides with the overall growth in the 
country's socio-economic situation and the policy of health 
insurance laid down in the Sixth Five Year Health Development 
Plan (1987-1991). These factors provide positive conditions 
for establishing health insurance in Thailand.
The demand for health insurance from employers who are 
likely to join the scheme is investigated. A survey of 200 
private establishments in Thailand was conducted. This 
investigation provides essential national baseline data for 
the organization of health insurance, particularly on the 
health care fringe benefits provided by employers, and the 
methods of paying health care providers.
Methods of organizing health insurance are formulated 
from international experience. The historical development of 
voluntary health insurance and its modified forms, as well as 
that of compulsory health insurance, are examined. The 
arguments for and against each form of health insurance are 
analysed. The study also highlights salient issues of health 
care reforms which attract the world's attention. 
International experience has shown that methods of paying 
providers is a major issue in providing viable health 
insurance. The study comprehensively analyses the advantages 
and disadvantages of each method of paying the doctor and the 
hospital under health insurance systems. Finally, it explores 
the policy options for the future development of national 
health insurance in Thailand.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................... 1
LIST OF TABLES.................................... 2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS............................. 10
INTRODUCTION...................................... 11
PART ONE: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THAILAND 17
Chapter
1. GENERAL COUNTRY INFORMATION................  18
2. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM..........................  51
3. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ......................  75
4. HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM.....................  105
5. THE SURVEY OF HEALTH BENEFITS..............  153
6. COST OF HEALTH BENEFITS....................  204
PART TWO: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 256
7. FORMS OF HEALTH INSURANCE..................  257
8. PAYING THE DOCTOR...........................  316
9. PAYING THE HOSPITAL.........................  354
POLICY OPTIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE IN THAILAND  393
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................... 431
Appendix
1. MAP OF THAILAND............................. 449
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.......................  450
3. QUESTIONNAIRES.............................  473
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author expresses her greatest gratitude to Professor Dr. Brian 
Abel-Smith for his continuous support, stimulated feedback, and determined 
guidance throughout the preparation of this thesis. Gratitude goes 
particularly towards Dr. Damrong Boonyoen for his valuable support from the 
beginning and throughout the study. The author is also grateful to 
Professor Dr. Thienchay Kiranandina of Chulalongkorn University f>r his 
thoughtful criticism on an early version of the survey results. Discussion 
with Dr. Supachai Kunaratanapruk and his criticism on an early draft of a 
particular chapter, was also a great help. For the final revision of the 
thesis, the author gives her gratitute to Andrew Green and Dr. Anne Mills 
for their constructive criticism.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Section of the British Council 
is thanked for giving the author financial support throughout her time in 
England and for allowing a short study visit to The Netherlands. The World 
Health Organisation is acknowledged for financing the field research 
carried out in Thailand, in 1988. Thanks also go to the Health Planning 
Division of The Ministry of Public Health, Thailand, for giving study leave 
from 1987 to 1991 to pursue these studies at the London School of 
Economics. Appreciation also goes to Kobkul Lertkasat for retrieving data 
on industrial relations, and Lily Ingsrisawang and her friend for computing 
the survey data collected. For arranging meetings with establishment owners 
outside of Bangkok, thanks go to the provincial Health Planning Officers 
of the provinces surveyed.
Special word for thanks is owed to Dr. Suwit Wibulpolprasert for his 
support before and during the course of the field study. Friends in the 
Health Planning Division, to name a few; Nuananun Tantigate, Wanpen 
Sukhotanung, Ngamjit Jandarasatit, Sumaporn Saelim, Burarak Kaewnooch, 
and the interviewers, are thanked for their contributions in the field 
research.
The author is also indebted to Porntip Ngamkasem, Sukanya 
Pattarawimon, Orasa Kowinta, Pat Kasikam, Dr. Somsak Chunharas, Dr. Sanugan 
Nittayarampong, Dr. Petsri Sirinirund, Dr. Apinan Aramrat, Dr. Kamnuan 
Ungchusak, Dr. Porntep Sirivanarungsun, Krongkarn and Seksan Singkaew, 
Sangud Tansittipat and others who have not been specifically named for 
furnishing the author with valuable materials during the course of writing 
this document.
Michael Franks receives the author's special thanks for his 
invaluable help in computer technical matters and for enthusiastically 
reading and making grammatical corrections to the manuscript. Bernice 
Gummer also receives the author's thanks for her grammatical corrections 
to the manuscript. The author is indebted to Dr. Supasit Pannarunothai for 
his invaluable help with further statistical analysis for the final 
revision and printing of the thesis. Finally, the author alone is 
responsible for all remaining errors.
1
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1.1 The number and average population size of each
administrative level in Thailand...........  22
1.2 GDP, GDP per capita and Growth rate of GDP,
1970-1989 ................................. 28
1.3 The income distribution accruing to quintile
groups of household ranked by total household 
income, 1975/6, 1980/1 and 1985/6..........  29
1.4 Characteristics of the Thai population, 1947-80. 32
1.5 Trend of death from non-communicable diseases
and communicable diseases, 1981-85..........  36
1.6 Comparing the ten leading causes of death in
1985 between the two sources of data.......  37
1.7 Major causes of death in urban and rural
populations, 1985.......................... 38
1.8 Estimated crude death rate and infant
mortality rate............................. 40
1.9 Morbidity rate of the six leading groups of
illnesses in Thailand, according to 
out-patient reports, 1987..................  42
1.10 Per cent and morbidity rate of in-patients by
ten major causes of disease, 1983-4........  43
1.11 Incidence rate of the top ten leading causes
of illness per month, 1985.................  44
1.12 Prevalent rate of illness or injury, and
hospitalization in Thailand, 1985..........  45
1.13 Episodes of illness and hospitalization
per person per year by region of usual 
residence, 1985............................ 46
1.14 Age - sex differences in episodes of illness
or injury, and episodes of hospital
admission in Thailand, 1985................  47
1.15 The occupational differences in the prevalent
rate of illness or injury of persons aged 
10 years and over, per month..............  48
2
61
62
64
64
67
70
71
72
73
76
77
78
80
81
82
83
86
87
88
89
92
Health care facilities in Thailand, 1989-90....
Health care facilities in Thailand, classified 
by administrative level, 1989..............
The number of total beds in Thailand, 1987....
The population per bed by region, 1987........
Number of traditional medicine facilities in 
Thailand, 1989.............................
The number of health personnel completing
training by educational institution, 1988...
Number and percentage of health manpower in
Thailand, 1986.............................
Regional distribution of health personnel in 
Thailand, 1986.............................
Population per one health personnel by region, 
1986.......................................
Expenditure on health expenses and health
services...................................
Total public expenditure and total expenditure 
on health..................................
Percentage of health service expenditure in
Thailand by sources of finance.............
Sources of government revenue, fiscal year
1983-6.....................................
Public expenditure on health, 1978-87.........
MOPH expenditure as a percentage of total 
public expenditure, public expenditure on 
health, GNP and MOPH expenditure per capita.
Distribution of MOPH expenditure, 1978-89.....
MOPH expenditure by level of services,1977-89..
Percentage of MOPH expenditure by activity,
1977-89....................................
MOPH capital and recurrent expenditures,
1976-89....................................
Comparing the 1989 with 1990 MOPH expenditures 
by sub-sector and programme................
Health expenditure of other ministries........
3
3.13 Foreign aid to the health sector.............. 94
3.14 Percentage of utilization of health services
by household, 1970, 1979 and 1985..........  97
3.15 Percentage of cost recovery by user charges in
public health services in developing
countries..............................   101
3.16 Fee structures in different types of hospitals. 102
4.1 Geographical distribution of Free Medical care
expenditure, 1982-88 ...................... Ill
4.2 Expenditure per beneficiary in 1982-89.......  112
4.3 Utilization rate of the Free Medical Care
Project, 1987.............................. 114
4.4 Free Medical Care expenditure per card holder
and per beneficiary........................ 116
4.5 MOPH expenditure under the scheme for the
privileged groups of the population, 1987-88 119
4.6 Medical expenditures for government employees
and state pensioners in 1980-87............  122
4.7 Medical expenditure for government employees
and state pensioners, per beneficiary......  124
4.8 Medical benefits for state enterprise employees 126
4.9 Reported occupational accidents, illnesses and
deaths, 1986-87............................ 131
4.10 Contributions and expenditure of The Workmen's
Compensation Fund, 1981-87.................  133
4.11 Summary of health insurance system in Thailand,
and cost per beneficiary...................  149
5.1 Location of establishment classified by
province................................... 157
5.2 Formal status of establishment...............  157
5.3 Characteristics of establishments............  158
5.4 Owners of establishments.....................  158
5.5 Main activities of the establishment.........  159
5.6 Nature of working practices in establishments.. 160
5.7 Frequency of wage or salary payment..........  160
4
5.8 Fringe benefits in the establishments........  163
5.9 The employers perception of the most popular
benefit as seen by employees...............  165
5.10 The employer's perception of satisfying such
benefit.................................... 166
5.11 Members of trade unions in the establishment... 167
5.12 Proportion of full-time employees who were
members of a union ........    168
5.13 Trade union recognition by management for
negotiating pay and conditions of work.....  168
5.14 The joint committee to consider pay and
conditions of work......................... 169
5.15 Description of the joint committee............  169
5.16 Distribution in the work force, by sex........  170
5.17 Proportion of employees, classified by type of
working practice........................... 171
5.18 Proportion of employees, classified by type
of employee................................ 171
5.19 Average monthly income of employees...........  172
5.20 Frequency of health benefits, classified by
rank....................................... 174
5.21 Reasons why employees should receive
industrial injury benefit..................  175
5.22 Limitation on industrial injury benefits......  175
5.23 Type of limitation on industrial injury
benefit.......................    176
5.24 Total accidents and poisonings of employees
in 1987.................................... 177
5.25 Employers' perception of the reasons for
industrial accidents in 1987...............  177
5.26 Reasons why employees should receive ordinary
sickness benefit.........    178
5.27 Limitations on ordinary sickness benefits.....  179
5.28 Frequency of provision of particular health
benefits, classified by rank...............  180
5
5.29 Employers' perception of the reason for
accidents not related to work in 1987......  181
5.30 Type of health care facilities from which
employees are entitled to receive medical 
benefits................................... 182
5.31 Limitations on in-patient care because of
accidents not related to work..............  182
5.32 Frequency of premium payment to the insurance
company.................................... 184
5.33 Cash sickness benefit period for which a
medical certificate is required............  185
5.34 The total cash sickness benefit period per year 186
5.35 The total cash maternity benefit period.......  187
5.36 Additional maternal leave without pay per year. 188
5.37 Number of children for which female employees
are entitled to receive maternity grant  188
5.38 Change of job or duties because of diminishing
capacity for work due to employee's
pregnancy............    189
5.39 Advantages of providing health benefits
according to employers.....................  190
5.4 0 Disadvantages of providing health benefits by
employers................................. 191
5.41 The number of eligible employees for health
benefits................................... 192
5.42 The level or position of some employees who
are eligible to get health benefits........  192
5.43 The level of health benefit coverage amongst
the eligible employees.....................  193
5.44 Discriminating factors for health benefits  193
5.45 Coverage of health benefits...................  194
5.4 6 Dependents of employees who are eligible to
obtain health benefits.....................  194
5.47 The maximum number of children for which health
benefits can be obtained..............   194
5.4 8 The maximum number of persons eligible to
receive health benefits in each family  195
6
5.49 Levels of health benefit which dependents of
the employees are entitled to receive.....  195
5.50 The waiting time before a new employee becomes
entitled to health benefits................  196
5.51 Methods of paying the general practitioner  198
5.52 Methods of paying the specialist..............  199
5.53 Methods of paying the nurse...................  200
5.54 Methods of paying the hospital................  201
5.55 The frequency of paying the hospital by
employer................................... 202
6.1 Median total expenditure on health benefits by
establishments ............................ 210
6.2 Median total expenditure on health benefits
as a percentage of other expenditures......  211
6.3 Median expenditure on health benefits and
median percentage of pay-roll spent on
health benefit by size of establishments 214
6.4 Compare the mean rank of total expenditure on
health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
by location........ .......................  216
6.5 Compare the mean rank of total expenditure on
health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test,
by type..................................... 217
6.6 Compare the mean rank of total expenditure on
health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test,
by size..................................... 218
6.7 Compare the mean rank of percent of pay-roll
spent on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, classified by location ................  219
6.8 Compare the mean ranks of percent of pay-roll
spent on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis
Test, classified by type....................  220
6.9 Compare the mean ranks of percent of pay-roll
spent on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis
Test, classified by size....................  221
6.10 Comparison of the average monthly income of
non-manual employees by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by location of establishment  223
7
6.11 Comparison of the average monthly income of
non-manual employees by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by type of establishment........  224
6.12 Comparison of the average monthly income of
non-manual employees by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by size of establishment........  225
6.13 Comparison of the average monthly income of
manual employees by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by location of establishment.... 226
6.14 Comparisons of the average monthly income of
manual employees by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by types of establishment.......  227
6.15 Comparison of the average monthly income of
manual employees by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by size of establishment........  228
6.16 Accessibility of the nearest health care......  231
6.17 The availability of the nearest means of
transportation............................. 233
6.18 The average time spent during a visit to the
nearest doctor when using the customary
means of transport....... *.................  234
6.19 Frequency of illness of the employees as
reported by employers...................... 236
6.20 Position of respondents in the establishment... 237
6.21 Sex of the respondents........................ 237
6.22 Compare the differences of respondents'attitude
towards a national health insurance scheme
for all employees, by location............  238
6.23 Compare the differences of respondents'attitude
towards a national health insurance scheme
for all employees, by type.................  239
6.24 Compare the differences of respondents'attitude
towards a national health insurance scheme
for all employees, by size...........   240
6.25 Compare levels of respondents' attitude with
the percent of pay-roll spent on health 
benefits, classified by location............  242
6.26 Character of establishment likely to support
the scheme, by location....................  243
8
6.27 Compare levels of respondents' attitude with
the percent of pay-roll spent on health 
benefits, classified by type................  244
6.28 Compare levels of respondents' attitude with
the percent of pay-roll spent on health 
benefits, classified by size................  245
6.29 Character of establishment likely to support
the scheme, by size........................ 245
6.30 Attitude towards who should provide health care. 247
6.31 Attitude towards the government unit which
should be responsible for organizing
the scheme................................. 248
6.32 Attitude towards who should pay for the scheme.. 249
6.32 Attitude towards who should be covered by
the scheme ................................. 250
6.34 Attitude towards which dependents should be
covered by the scheme...................... 250
6.35 Attitude towards the average percentages of
pay-roll which employers and employees
should pay for the insurance contribution... 252
6.36 Compare the actual expenditure on health
benefits as a percentage of pay-roll with
the opinion figures by t-test..............  253
9
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BMA Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
DHSS Department of Health and Social Security
DRGs Diagnosis Related Groups
FPCs Family Practitioner Committees
GP General Practitioner
GTZ The German Agency for Technical Coorperation
HMOs Health Maintenance Organizations
IPA Individual Practice Association
IPD In-patient Department
MOD Ministry of Defence
MOI Ministry of the Interior
MOPH Ministry of Public Health
MOU Ministry of University Affairs
NESDB National Economic and Social Development
Board
NHS National Health Service
NICs Newly Industrialized Countries
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development
OPD Out-patient Department
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
PCMO Provincial Chief Medical Officer
PGP Prepaid Group Practice
PHC Primary Health Care
PPOs Preferred Provider Organization
RAWP Resource Allocation Working Party
VHCs Village Health Communicators
VHVs Village Health Volunteers
10
INTRODUCTION
The health service system in Thailand has not previously 
been analysed in the context of the possibility of a statutory 
health insurance scheme. This thesis attempts to explore the 
policy options for organising a statutory health insurance for 
private employees. A situational analysis of the present 
health care system is presented as this is the context for 
any health insurance arrangements. Demand for health insurance 
is evident from political demonstrations, seminars, and 
articles in journals and newspapers. However, the extent to 
which employers are willing to join the scheme, has not 
previously been identified. Nor has the pattern and amount of 
health benefits which they already arrange for their 
employees.
OBJECTIVES.
The objectives of this thesis are to answer the 
following policy questions.
1. What is the pattern of the existing provision of 
health benefits in private establishments and how much does it 
cost ?
2. What is the opinion of employers towards compulsory 
health insurance ? At what level would they be prepared to 
make their contributions ?
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3. What are the types, size and geographical locations of 
firms or establishments likely to join the scheme ?
4. Who should be the providers of health insurance?
5. What are the options for the form of health 
insurance, and particularly what should be the method of 
paying the providers of health services ?
APPROACHES.
In order to answer these fundamentally important 
policy questions for organising a statutory health insurance 
for employees in Thailand, this thesis combines two 
approaches; survey research, and documentary research. The 
survey of health benefits provided by employers, and their 
opinions on a statutory health insurance was designed to meet 
objectives 1 - 4  outlined above. However, policy questions on 
options for organising health insurance remain unanswered by 
the survey. Therefore, the second approach of documentary 
research is needed for a comparative study in order to fulfil 
objective 5. In analysing the survey data and making a 
comparative study, an inter-disciplinary perspective is used.
AUDIENCE.
The audience for this thesis includes those with 
policy-making responsibility who are seeking to find the best 
options for health insurance in the future. They are the 
health planners, health professionals, researchers, academics
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and students in fields related to health insurance. Employers 
and employees who have some background and concern for these 
issues may also find it is not too difficult to follow. Those 
who are not familiar with Thailand should begin with part 1. 
For readers who are not acquainted with the concept and 
different forms of health insurance may start with part 2 and 
follow this by part 1 before reading the policy options. 
Specialist readers may prefer to begin with policy options for 
health insurance in Thailand and return to each chapter to 
explore the details of particular themes. This thesis is 
particularly useful for a country which is about to start or 
has just started a statutory health insurance system.
THE PLAN OF THE THESIS.
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part deals 
with the country's situation while the second part is based on 
international experience and concludes with policy options for 
health insurance in Thailand. It is organised as follows. 
Chapter 1 describes, in brief, how the country has developed 
somewhat towards industrialization and achieved economic 
growth but points out that the distribution of income is very 
unequal. Generally, the health status of the population has 
improved but the pattern of illness and death has changed into 
a combination of diseases of poverty and diseases of 
modernization. Key facts and figures of geographical data, 
socio-political data, economic data, demographic data, and 
health status data, are examined.
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Chapter 2 provides information on the health care system 
in Thailand which is based on market competition. The chapter 
traces the historical development of the health service since 
the country had parliamentary democracy in 1932 and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Public Health in 1942. 
Particular attention is placed on its present structure 
resulting from reorganization in 1974. Details of health care 
resources, namely facilities and manpower, are also discussed.
In chapter 3 and 4, an analysis of the health care 
financing system in Thailand is made, classified by sources of 
health care expenditure. An emphasis is given to the problem 
of inequality of health care. Chapter 3 concentrates on public 
expenditure, foreign aid and direct private payment. In sum, 
total expenditure on health care has grown sharply. Public 
expenditure has tended to decrease while direct private 
payment has tended to increase. Foreign aid has a minor share.
Chapter 4 focuses on the existing health insurance system 
which consists of several schemes for different population 
groups with differing levels of benefits and limits. However, 
only 54.4 % of the population are protected by some form of 
health insurance, while the remaining 45.6% of the population 
are unprotected. The chapter analyses the problems and effects 
of the four types of health insurance in Thailand at the 
moment, namely; social assistance, statutory insurance, 
employers' liability and voluntary insurance.
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The next two chapters investigate the employer's demand 
for health insurance. This is derived from the survey of 
health benefits conducted in 1988. Chapter 5 presents the 
finding that there are 32 types of welfare and health fringe 
benefits in Thailand. The type and coverage of health benefits 
is also included in the survey. Finally, fee-for-service is 
found as the predominant method of paying the doctor and 
itemized billing, the method for paying the hospital.
Chapter 6 examines the actual cost of health benefits 
compared with the cost derived from the willingness to pay 
approach. Accessibility and availability of medical care is 
identified, as well as the employees' patterns of illness. In 
addition, the employers' opinion about a compulsory health 
insurance is ascertained.
The second part of the thesis focuses on health insurance 
in the international context, both in principle and practice. 
Chapter 7 explores forms of health insurance. Arguments for 
and against each type of health insurance are analysed. The 
historical development of different types of health insurance 
in different political structures is also examined. It is 
concluded that internal politics play a primary role in the 
development of a statutory health insurance. Other factors 
such as economics, the political structure of the country, and 
the number of regular workers in the modern sector of the 
economy, are of secondary importance.
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The following two chapters look at the method of paying 
providers of health insurance. Chapter 8 deals with paying the 
doctor and chapter 9, with paying the hospital. The 
operational experiences of several countries are presented. 
Strengths and weaknesses of each method are critically 
analysed.
Next, policy options for health insurance for private 
employees in Thailand, are discussed. There are nine possible 
options regarding paying health care providers. This chapter 
offers criteria to determine the most suitable option. Then, 
the advantages and disadvantages of each option are critically 
analysed, before a conclusion is reached on the recommended 
option for Thailand in 1991.
Finally, there are three appendices which provide 
additional background information. These are a map of 
Thailand, the research methodology and the questionnaires 
(numbers 1-3), used during the course of the survey.
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PART ONE
A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THAILAND
17
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL COUNTRY INFORMATION
1. GEOGRAPHIC DATA.
Thailand, or Siam as it was previously known, is located 
in the centre of Southeast Asia between 5-21 degrees north and 
97-106 degrees longitude, It has the shape of a profile axe. 
It is bordered by Cambodia in the southeast, Laos in the 
northeast, Burma in the north, northwest and west, and 
Malaysia in the south (as illustrated in Appendix 1). The area 
of the country is approximately 200,000 square miles (514,000 
square kilometres) while the total population is about 54.5 
million with a growth rate of 1.4 per cent per year. (Health 
Planning Division, 1990, p.43)
The country is divided by natural barriers into four 
regions. The central region is the most fertile, the fruit and 
rice-growing areas, being in the basin of the Chao Phraya 
River. Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, where the main 
industrial establishments are concentrated, is located in this 
region. The northern region is mountainous and forested. Most 
of the land is cultivated. The northeast region, a plateau 
sloping down to the Mekong River, is the least developed area. 
Agricultural production in this region is limited by low soil 
fertility and a lack of water supply for cultivation from its
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semi-arid climate. However, it is where about one-third of 
Thailand's population lives. The southern region, a 
peninsula, is the only region which does not grow rice for 
export: rubber cultivation, tin mining and fishing are the 
major products instead.
The climate is usually warm and humid. The tropical 
monsoon climate produces a three-season cycle: summer from 
March to May; rainy from June to October; winter from November 
to February. The average temperature in Bangkok is about 27 
degrees centigrade, ranging from 29 degrees centigrade in 
April to 25 degrees centigrade in December (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1985, p.10)
2. SOCIO-POLITICAL DATA.
A) History.
The history of Thai society has been traced back to the 
Sukhothai period (1257-1438). Since then Thailand has been 
governed by a monarch for centuries; the Sukhothai dynasty 
was succeeded by the Ayutthaya (1350-1767), Taksin (1767- 
1782), and the present Chakri dynasty (1782-present). The long 
term successive absolute monarchy came to an end in a 1932 
coup d'etat (Caldwell, M., 1976) by a mixed military-civilian 
group. It is noted that this coup and ones to follows are 
always referred to as revolutions, in Thailand. The post-1932 
constitutional governments have usually been controlled by the
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military. The monarch is under the constitution. The present 
King Bhumipol Adulyadej (Rama IX) acceded to the throne in 
1946. Thailand has never been colonized but has maintained 
independence and a strong national identity through adroit 
diplomacy and the interplay of politics amongst the western 
countries for the checks and balances of power in this region.
Before the second world war Britain had the greatest 
influence on Thailand. Since the 1940s, the dominance of 
Britain over Thailand was substituted by that of the United 
States of America. The USA military intervention began in 
about 1947-8 by supporting the Phibun coup government. Since 
then, America has thrown massive technical and military help 
at Thailand. Not too long after that, Thailand became the 
first Asian nation to take part in supporting the USA in the 
Korean war. In 1954, Thailand joined the anti-communist 
military pact, the so-called SEATO, which subsequently 
transferred its headquarters to Bangkok. Later, USA air bases 
were built up in Thailand for the USA operation in the 
Indochina war. In addition, the Thai regime was fighting for 
the USA imperialists in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (Morrow, 
M., 1972). In 1958, Tanarat, S. seized power with a bloodless 
coup. The USA strongly supported the regime again. Tanarat was 
strengthening the role of the monarch, side by side with the 
military. Thus, Thailand since the Tanarat period has been 
controlled by the Tri-alliance power of the military, monarchy 
and religion.
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B) Politics.
The political structure of the country, since the 1932 
coup, is that of a multi-party system of ’Thai style quasi­
democracy" with military domination. The parliament has two 
houses; The Senate house with members of the military in it, 
and the House of Representatives, dominated by the capitalist 
class. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed 
by the king, not necessarily by the electorate. However, at 
present, Mr. (Former General) Chatichai Choonhavan is the 
first elected Prime Minister in 12 years. The government is 
not very stable due to sporadic military coups. Thailand has 
had 16 attempted military coups in 58 years since the end of 
the absolute monarchy, the latest occurring in 1985 
(Economist, 1990, p.78).
The administrative pattern of Thailand is divided into a 
strongly centralized administration and 72 provincial 
administrations. There are 14 functional ministries including 
the Office of the Prime Minister. The provincial 
administration is directly controlled by the Ministry of 
Interior which appoints a governor for each of Thailand's 73 
Provinces. Each province is divided into districts and 
subdistricts (Tambons). The Tambon is further divided into 
villages. The number and average population size of each 
administrative level are presented in table 1.1.
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Table 1.1 s The number and average population size of 
each administrative level in Thailand.
Level Mumber(1) Average population size(2>
Central (Bangkok)
Provinces
Districts
Sub-districts
1
72
735
6,754
6,108,651
634,550
64,897
6,563
(Tambons) 
Villages 61,411 725
Sources : (1) Department of Local Administration,
Ministry of Interior, 1989.
(2) Department of Civil Registration,
Ministry of Interior, 1989.
There are a total of 124 municipalities and 219 sanitary 
districts in the urban areas of Thailand. The local self 
governments of municipalities and sanitary districts are 
elected by the local people. Similarly, in rural areas at 
Tambon and village levels, the Tambon chief and the village 
headman are also elected directly by the villagers. However, 
the local organization of Tambon councils and village 
committees is tied up with the National Rural Development 
Committee which is chaired by the Prime Minister. In addition, 
the budget to support Tambon and village activities is 
channelled through the ministries concerned with rural 
development.
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C) Education.
The education system is based on the western style 
curriculum, compulsorily with six years of formal training in 
primary school and optionally, staying in school until the age 
of fifteen. Altogether, the standard curriculum is customarily 
comprised of six years of primary education and six years of 
secondary education, either in public or private schools. In 
1987, there were 95 per cent of the eligible age group 
enrolled in primary education, compared with 78 per cent in 
1965 (World Bank, 1990).
At secondary school, there are two education channels; 
the academic, preparing students for higher education at 
university level and the vocational, preparing children for 
the skilled labour market. However, emphasis is placed on 
entering university, rather than preparing a skilled labour 
force to suit the needs of the country through vocational 
education. Moreover, most families cannot afford to let their 
children go beyond the primary level, although the secondary 
school age-group enrolment has doubled from 14 to 28 per cent 
between 1965 and 1987 (World Bank, 1990). Nevertheless, the 
secondary enrolment rate in Thailand is amongst the lowest in 
Southeast Asia, and much lower than that of the Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries (Sussangkarn, C. et al, 1988).
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The literacy rate of the population aged 10 years and 
over, was 89.5 per cent in 1980 compared with 70.8 per cent in 
1960 (National Statistical Office; 1960, 1980). As in most 
developing countries, the Thai female's illiteracy rate is 
higher than that of the national average. In 1985, the 
female 's illiteracy rate was 12 per cent while the total 
illiteracy rate was only 9 per cent (World Bank, 1990). In 
addition, in 1980, there were 3.5 million people of the age of 
10 years and over who were illiterate, of whom 66.8 per cent 
were women (National Statistical Office, 1980).
D) Religion.
Theravada Buddhism is the predominant religion which has 
long been adhered to by 92.4 % of the Thai population. After 
the Indian emperor Asoka (267-227 B.C.) dispatched Buddhist 
monks as missionaries to Southeast Asia to propagate the newly 
established faith, Buddhism has had a profound influence over 
Thai culture, arts, tradition, and learning for centuries. The 
Buddhist way of life is an integral part of national life. The 
institution of Buddhist monks remains a major social 
institution in Thailand. Thai temples have traditionally 
served as village hostelries, village news centres, employment 
and information agencies, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, 
and community centres. The other religious groups are Muslim 
(3.8%), Christian (0.50%), Hindu, and Sikh with others (3.30%) 
being free to practice their respective faiths in the society.
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E) Language.
Thai is the national and official language which has its 
own alphabet. English is the second language, which is taught 
in secondary school, and is used in urban, government and 
business circles.
3. ECONOMIC DATA.
Thailand was classified by the World Bank as a lower 
middle income developing country with a Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita of 1,000 US Dollars in 1988 (World Bank, 
1990). Basically, Thailand is an agricultural, developing 
country. Agriculture has long been the biggest earner for the 
Thai economy. However, the agricultural economy is declining 
and gradually being replaced by industry, especially in the 
late 1980s. In terms of employment, the agriculture sector has 
decreased from 78.9 per cent in 1971 to 66.7 per cent of the 
total work-force in 1986. In the same period, the share of GDP 
originating from the agricultural sector was reduced from 28.2 
to 16.7 per cent. The result was that the GDP per capita of 
the non-agricultural sector was increasing in relation to that 
of the agricultural sector (Hutaserani, S. and Jitsuchon, S., 
1988, p.21-22).
The country is also endowed with substantial natural 
resources, for instance; fluorite, wolfram and tungsten in the 
north; fluorite and gems in the west, sapphires from the
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southeast, potash in the northeast, tin in the south and 
natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand. Recently, petroleum has 
been found in many provinces in the north (Ministry of Public 
Health, 1985, p.1-2). Mining and light industry have become 
increasingly important in their contribution to the Thai 
economy. Tin is the most significant mineral and is the 
largest foreign exchange earner.
Thailand's tourism is quite a well developed and fast 
growing sector of the economy. It became one of Thailand's 
major foreign exchange earners in 1983. And since then, there 
has been an increasing number of foreigners who come to enjoy 
their holidays in the mountains, beach resorts, and 
archaeological sites. In 1989, there were around 4.8 million 
tourists visiting Thailand, 13.6 per cent more than in 1988 
(Tourism Authority of Thailand, 1990). In 1988, the income 
from tourism was 5.4 per cent of GDP, compared with 4.1 per 
cent in 1987 and 3.4 per cent in 1986.
The basic unit of Thai currency is the Baht, divided into 
100 Stangs. The Baht is worth approximately 0.021 Pounds 
Sterling or 0.041 US Dollars (in early 1991). In 1983, there 
were 16 Thai commercial banks with 1,706 branches, and 14 
foreign banks with 18 branches throughout Thailand. There are 
also several government banks operating, including the Bank of 
Thailand, the Government Savings Bank, the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives and the Government 
Housing Bank. In most cases, mutually advantageous foreign
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investment is welcomed in Thailand. The Board of Investment 
(BOI) provides guarantees, tax exemption, income tax relief 
and temporary tariff protection. As a rule, the projects which 
provide foreign exchange earnings or savings and generate 
local employment are eligible for investment incentives.
Thailand's economic strength is also complemented by 
regional alliances and relationships with neighbouring
countries, the most important of which is the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is dedicated to economic 
and cultural development amongst the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.
The process of industrialization in Thailand began
gradually after General Tanarat, S. seized power and created 
a national Economic Board in 1959, as recommended by the World 
Bank. Thailand has increased her real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) more than fivefold, and GDP per capita 2.6 times
(Kiranandana, T. et al, 1989, pp.184-5). Particularly between 
1979 and 1989, Thailand has doubled her real GDP from 277 
Billion Baht (at 1972 prices) to 554 Billion Baht. Meanwhile, 
the GDP per capita has expanded 1.7 times from 5,956 Baht in 
1979 (at 1972 prices) to 9,931 Baht in 1989. In addition, the 
growth rate of GDP was averaging about 6.8 per cent a year in 
real terms (or 12.8 per cent a year in current prices) with a 
rapid growth of 12 and 10 per cent in 1988 and 1989,
respectively (see table 1.2).
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Table 1.2 t Gross Domestic Product, GDP per capita and
Growth rate of GDP, 1970-1989 (selected years).
Year GDP GDP IQDP per Growth Rate Growth Rate
(1) (2) capita(3) of GDP(4) of GDP(5)
1979 277 556 5,956 6.1 18.4
1980 293 684 6,141 5.8 23.0
1981 311 786 6,366 6.1 14.9
1982 324 846 6,466 4.2 7.6
1983 343 910 6,679 5.9 9.9
1984 381 973 7,507 7.1 6.9
1985 394 1,014 7,626 3.5 4.2
1986 412 1,095 7,821 4.5 8.0
1987 446 1,234 8,327 8.4 12.7
1988 500 1,456 9,136 12.0 18.0
1989 554 1,703 9,931 10.8 17.0
Average 6.8 12.8
Notes : (1) Billion Baht at 1972 prices.
(2) Billion Baht at current prices •
(3) Baht at 1972 prices.
(4) Per cent at 1972 prices.
(5) Per cent at current price.
48 Baht = 1 Pound in 1988-89.
Sources : National Accounts Division, NESDB, Thailand, 1990.
Department of Economic Research, Bank of Thailand, 
1990.
Although the average income level of the Thai population 
has risen considerably, the distribution of the benefits of 
economic growth became more unequal over the period between 
1975/6 and 1985/6. The top quintile group of households 
accumulated wealth while the rest became poorer. Income of the 
top quintile group of households has risen from 49.26 per cent 
of the total household income in 1975/6 to 55.63 per cent in 
1985/6. When the figure is broken down into percentile, the 
disposable income of the top percentile group has increased
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considerably from 33.40 percent of total to 39.15 per cent. 
Table 1.3 compares the distribution of total disposable income 
accruing to quintile groups of household from 1975/6 to 
1985/6.
Table 1.3 : The income distribution accruing to quintile
groups of household ranked by total household 
income, 1975/6, 1980/1 and 1985/6.
Quintile group Percentage share
of household of :household income
1975/6 1980/1 1985/6
Top 49.26 51.47 55.63
(Top 10 % 33.40 35.44 39.15)
(Second top 10% 15.86 16.04 16.48)
Fourth 20.96 20.64 19.86
Third 14.00 13.38 12.09
Second 9.73 9.10 7.87
Bottom 6.05 5.41 4.55
(Second bottom 10% 3.62 3.28 2.75)
(Bottom 10 % 2.43 2.13 1.80)
Total 100 100 100
Gini Coefficient 0.426 0.453 0.500
Variance of logarithm 0.530 0.602 0.737
of income
Source : Socio-Economic Surveys 1975/6. 1980/1 and 1985/6.
National Statistical Office, Office of the 
Prime Minister, Bangkok, Thailand.
In addition, income disparities have become larger 
amongst the different regions. The gaps between urban and 
rural areas have also been widening. Per capita income of 
those who live in the northeast which is the poorest region of 
the country, is about one-sixth of those who live in Bangkok 
(Royal Thai Government, 1988a, p.12). Moreover, in 1985/86 
there were 29.51 per cent of the country's population still
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remaining in absolute poverty, and 94.1 per cent of this 
population live in rural areas (National Statistical Office, 
1985/86). Between 1975/6 and 1985/6, the population under the 
poverty line in the northeast region increased from 44.92 per 
cent of the total number of absolutely poor in the country to 
48.17 per cent. By contrast, during the same period, the 
absolute poverty population in Bangkok and all municipal areas 
decreased by half from 7.75 to 3.89 per cent in Bangkok, and 
from 12.53 to 5.90 in all municipal areas (National 
Statistical Office; 1975/76, 1985/86). The problem of poverty 
and other social problems related to poverty, especially in 
rural areas, is largely a result of the past emphasis on 
economic growth and failure to recognize the close and complex 
links between economic and other aspects of development. 
(Royal Thai Government, 1988a, p*12-13). In addition,
Sussangkarn, et al (1988) explained that the main causes of 
income inequality in Thailand are from the high share of 
agricultural employment and the low secondary education 
enrolment. An alternative explanation is that higher income 
households have the ability to save a larger proportion of 
their income than the smaller income household due to the 
regressive structure of the country's taxation (Krongkaew, M., 
1979).
4. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA.
On 31 December 1987, the population of Thailand was 
53.873 million (Division of Civil Registration, 1988). The
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rate of growth is 1.4 % per year (Health Planning Division, 
1990) and this rate is expected to decrease gradually. 
However, the growth rate of some minority groups such as hill 
tribes and Thai Muslims of the five southern provinces might 
remain higher than the national growth rate (Health Planning 
Division, 1987, p.1-2 ).
The characteristics of the Thai population from 1947-80 
which are shown in table 1.4, indicate that the percentage of 
children aged 0 - 5  years old decreased, resulting from the 
success of the family planning programme at a national level. 
The dependency ratio has also declined over the last two 
decades. By contrast, there is a tendency for an increasing 
population of the elderly, aged over 60 years old. Similarly, 
the percentage of the urban population is rising rapidly which 
is resulting from migration. Furthermore, it is estimated that 
about 25 per cent of the population will migrate from rural 
areas to industrial areas during the sixth development plan 
(1987-1991). In addition, youths and working people (aged 
between 15-45 years old) have tended to increase in proportion 
from 46.5% in 1980 to 56 % in 1991. Moreover, the number of 
women of reproductive age which declined in 1970 but increased 
in 1980, will continue to grow at a more rapid rate (Health 
Planning Division, 1987, p.7-8).
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Table 1.4 : Characteristics of Thai population, 1947-80.
Characteristics 1947
Total population 17,433
(In thousands)
Male 8,722
Female 8,721
Sex ratio 100.01
Dependency ratio n.a.
Population aged 0-5 (%) n.a. 
Population aged 60 and n.a.
over (%)
Population aged 15-60(%)n.a. 
Urban population (%) n.a. 
Population density 34
(person per square kilometre
1960 1970 1980 1990
26,260 34,397 44,825 56,340
13,154 17,124 22,329 28,197
13,104 17,274 22,496 28,143
100.40 99.10 99.30 100.19
92 85 75 59.5
16.2 16.4 12.1 11.1
4.5 5.1 5.3 6.1
52.2 49.8 56.4 60.5
12.5 13.2 17.0 18.7
51 70 87 109
Sources s (1) Population and Housing censuses 1960. 1970.
1980., National Statistical Office, Office 
of the Prime Minister, Bangkok, Thailand.
(2) Health In Thailand. Health Planning Division, 
Ministry of Public Health, Bangkok, 1990.
Some selected demographic information in 1988-89 
(reported) are as follows;
Crude birth rate 
Crude death rate 
Growth rate 
Infant mortality rate 
Maternal mortality rate 
Life expectancy at birth
male
female
16.0 per 1,000 population.
4.2 per 1,000 population.
1.4 %
35 per 1,000 livebirths
0.4 per 1,000 population.
62.24 years.
66.19 years.
Source Health In Thailand. Health Planning Division, 
Ministry of Public Health, Bangkok, 1990.
The rural population is 81.3 % of the whole population. 
From the total of 60,169 villages, 17 % have a population of 
over 2,000, 62 % have between 500 and 2,000 inhabitants, while
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the remaining 21 % have less than 500 villagers (Division of 
Civil Registration , 1988).
The urban population is about 18.7% of the whole 
country's population. The urban area includes areas which have 
a population of over 30,000 and a minimum density of 2,000 
persons per square kilometre. The capital of Thailand, 
Bangkok, has about 5.6 million inhabitants whereas the second 
ranking municipal area of Nakornratchasima province has a 
population of only 276,184 persons or about 20 times less 
than that of the Bangkok metropolis. Similarly, the third 
rank municipal area of Chiangmai has merely 157,405 
inhabitants, or 35 times less than that of Bangkok, whereas 
the smallest municipal area of Maehongson province has a 
population of only 6,752, which is 800 times smaller than that 
of Bangkok.
Ethnic minority groups consist of several hill tribes in 
the north and Muslims in the five provinces of the south, 
around the Malaysian border. A large number of Chinese 
immigrants, who have been assimilated into the Thai race, at 
present, are those who control the major businesses in 
Thailand.
By the end of 1989, the number of employed persons were
29.4 million out of the total labour force of 30.9 million 
(Bank of Thailand, 1990), representing 95.1 per cent of total 
employment. In 1989, data from the Labour Force Survey
33
(National Statistical Office, 1989) revealed that self- 
employed persons accounted for 71.6 per cent of the total 
employment or around 21 million. They were:- unpaid family 
workers (42.6% of the total employed persons), own-account 
workers (29.0%) and employers (1.2%). The number of 
unemployed persons was 3.1 per cent of the current labour 
force. Only about 26.4 % of the total unemployed were looking 
for work. The remaining 73.6% were not looking for work.
5. HEALTH STATUS DATA.
Food and nutrition have an influence on health status, 
especially for the low income population. The daily calorie 
supply per capita of the Thai population has increased 
slightly from 2,101 calories in 1965 to 2,331 calories in 1986 
(World Bank, 1990, p.232). However, the increase in total food 
availability takes no account of other factors such as the 
pattern of food distribution. Thus, a birth weight of less 
than 2,500 grams, and the weight-for-age of young children 
were used as indicators of the health status. In 1985, the 
number of babies born weighing less than 2,500 grames was 120 
per 1,000 live-births (World Bank, 1990, p.232). In 1988, 
there were 2.3 million infants and pre-school children aged 0- 
5 years old who were under nutritional surveillance. When 
taking weight-for-age into account; the first, second, and 
third degrees of malnutrition in children of all age groups 
are 19.69, 1.49, and 0.02 per cent respectively. (Health
Planning Division, 1989a, p.19 ).
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Since mortality is the main indicator to determine the 
health status of the population, in Thailand, the disease- 
specific mortality rates are compiled from death registration 
data and hospital records and classified according to the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes. There 
have been several changes in definition and coding of certain 
diseases. However, the ninth revision of the ICD has been used 
since 1979. In the last two decades, the pattern and magnitude 
of the leading causes of death has changed remarkably. In 
1968, communicable diseases such as diarrhoeal diseases, 
respiratory infections especially tuberculosis and pneumonia 
ranked as the top causes of mortality, while the non- 
communicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, 
accidents, and cancer had the lower rank. By contrast, since 
1983 the non-communicable diseases have become top rank as 
the leading cause of death while the communicable diseases 
have taken the lower rank (Institution for Population and 
Social Research, 1988, p.106). In broad agreement with these 
findings,the data from the Health Statistics Division, 
Ministry of Public Health indicates that between 1981-85 the 
death rate from non-communicable diseases has increased, but 
the death rate from communicable diseases has decreased. Table
1.5 below shows the number of deaths from non-communicable 
diseases and communicable diseases as a percentage of all 
deaths, and the death rate per 100,000 population from 1981- 
85.
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Table 1.5 s Trend of death from non-communicable diseases 
and communicable diseases, 1981 - 85,
Year
Cause of death 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Non-communicable diseases
Percentage of all deaths 17.98 18.37 18.81 20.86 21.22
Death rate per 100,000 30.20 31.20 32.00 31.10 30.80
population
Communicable diseases
Percentage of all deaths 8.77 8.30 7.75 6.94 6.71
Death rate per 100,000 14.70 14.10 13.20 10.30 9.70
population
Total death rate(1) 504.20 510.20 510.70 447.00 435.50
(per 100,000 population)
Notes s Calculations are based on the ten major causes of 
death only.
(1) Includes other causes of death which do not 
appear in the table.
Source j Health Statistics Division, Ministry of Public 
Health, Bangkok.
In 1985 a mortality survey was undertaken by the 
Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol 
University, to measure the correct levels of current mortality 
rates and to estimate the degree of under-registration of 
deaths by making retrospective inquiries from household 
members. The survey found that the condition of "senility 
without psychosis" cause of death, came into the first rank, 
while this was previously classified under the title of "ill 
defined symptoms", or "unknown cause of death", or "others" in 
the data from death certificates. However, the survey 
confirmed that non-communicable diseases such as accident, 
suicide, homicide, malignancy, and heart disease are amongst 
the major leading causes of death. Similarly, the 
communicable diseases of pneumonia, conditions originating
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during the perinatal period, pulmonary tuberculosis, and 
diarrhoeal diseases are ranked amongst the ten leading causes 
from both sources of data. It is interesting that, from the 
survey data, the other two non-communicable diseases namely; 
cardio vascular accidents (CVA), and cirrhosis of the liver or 
hepatitis, are amongst the ten leading causes of death instead 
of malaria and nutrition deficiencies as appeared in the 
registered data of the same year. Table 1.6, following, 
compares the ten leading causes of death in 1985 between the 
two sources of data.
Table 1.6 : Comparing the ten leading causes of death in
1985 between the two sources of data (rate per 
100,000 population)
Rank Reported death rate(i) Survey death rate(2>
1 Disease of the 36.4 Senility without 69.8
heart psychosis
2 Accident and 28.9 Accident, suicide, 68.5
poisoning homicide
3 Malignant neoplasm 27.0 Malignancy (all forms) 44.1
4 Tuberculosis 10.3 Heart diseases 39.0
5 Pneumonia 7.4 Pneumonia, bronchitis, 29.8
asthma
6 Malaria 3.5 CVA 25.7
7 Diarrhoeal diseases 3.5 Conditions originating 19.2
during perinatal period
8 Diseases of the 2.9 Tuberculosis 18.1
stomach and duodenum (pulmonary)
9 Diseases of 0.8 Cirrhosis of the 15.4
pregnancy,child-birth liver, hepatitis
and puerpermum
10 Nutritional 0.7 Diarrhoeal diseases 14.0
deficiencies
Sources s (1) Health Statistics Division, Ministry of Public
Health, Bangkok.
(2) The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials, 
Institute for Population and Social 
Research, Mahidol University, Bangkok, 1988.
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Moreover, the morbidity survey (1985) found the major 
causes of death between urban and rural populations had a 
slightly different pattern. In urban areas, heart diseases 
were a higher cause of death than in rural areas, while other 
causes of deaths such as accident, senility, malignancy, and 
pneumonia had a lower rate. In addition, cardio vascular 
accidents (CVA) were the major killer amongst the urban 
residents. By contrast, in rural areas the conditions 
originating during the perinatal period prevailed as the major 
cause of death amongst the rural poor. Table 1.7 compares the 
differences between major causes of death for urban and rural 
populations in 1985.
Table 1.7 s Major causes of death in urban and rural 
populations, 1985. (Rate per 100,000 
population)
Urban Rural
Rank Causes of deaths Rate Causes of deaths Rate
1 Accidents, suicide 54.8 Senility without 98.0
homicide psychosis
2 Senility without 42.1 Accidents, suicide 78.6
psychosis homicide
3 Heart diseases 40.7 Malignancy 52.4
4 Malignancy 36.0 Pneumonia 42.1
5 CVA 27.8 Heart diseases 37.3
6 Pneumonia, bronchitis 17.7 Conditions originating 35.2
during perinatal period
Source : The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials.
1988, p.113.
In order to estimate the future mortality profile in Thai 
society up to the year 2000, the mortality pattern of the Thai
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population during the past three decades has been analysed 
and projected by using econometric modelling and mathematical 
modelling techniques (Mortality Profile of the Thai 
Population, 1989). An econometric model is based on the 
mortality rate being a logistic function of real per capita 
income and a mathematical model is based on mortality rate 
being an approximate exponential function of time. Two data 
files were created, namely ; "Data base I" and the alternate 
"Data base II". Data base I was obtained by adjusting the 
Annual Health Statistic Report, using the method suggested by 
Prasithrathsint, S. and Boonpuang, C. (1987). Data base II was 
based on the exceptionally high infant mortality rate in 1985 
as maintained by Mahidol University and the Health Statistics 
Division (1988). Both regression models provided consistent 
results. It is found that the change in real per capita income 
accounted for over 97 per cent of the variation in the 
mortality rate during 1960-86, while time change accounted for 
over 98 per cent of variation in mortality rate. The study 
assumes that the previous mortality pattern will continue to 
hold in the future and the real per capita income will grow at 
the rate of 4 per cent per year. Therefore, the mortality 
rates by sex, by age-group, by region and by certain causes of 
death are estimated up to the year 2000. The estimated crude 
death rate and infant mortality rate per 1,000 population are 
shown below in table 10. The study found that the decline in 
mortality rates is expected to continue. However, it revealed 
that concern should be centred on the south and the north 
regions of Thailand which expect the highest death rates by
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the year 2000. A trend of a sharp increase in the cause-
specific death rate also calls for special attention, 
especially in sickness and death due to neoplasms, diseases of 
the circulatory system and accidents, poisoning and violence 
(Mortality Profile of the Thai Population, 1989)#
Table 1.8 : Estimated crude death rate and infant mortality 
rate ( per 1,000 population ).
Year Crude death 
EE
rate<l)
ME
Infant mortality 
EE
rate(2)
ME
1960 14.71 14.58 91.33 100.67
1965 10.96 12.00 72.83 82.26
1970 9.48 9.88 64.44 67.22
1975 8.54 8.13 58.62 54.92
1980 6.76 6.70 46.77 44.88
1985 5.58 5.51 38.00 36.67
1990 4.80 4.54 31.78 29.97
1995 4.18 3.74 26.43 24.49
2000 3.70 3.08 22.01 20.01
Notes : (1) Database I.
(2) Database II.
EE = Econometric estimation; ME=Mathematic estimation.
Source s Mortality Profile of the Thai Population. Country 
Report No. 24, Thailand, WHO Interregional 
Seminar on Financing Human Resources for 
Health, Bangkok, 6-10 March 1989, Table 1.
The mortality rate demonstrates some improvement in 
communicable disease control and envisages an increase in the 
death rate from non-communicable diseases, but it does not 
adequately measure the health status of the Thai population. 
Although out-patient reports (report no.504) compiled by 
Health Statistics Division are incomplete and of poor quality, 
an analysis of morbidity based on them reveals that a large 
number of the Thai population, including those in rural and in
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Bangkok areas still suffer from a high rate of preventable 
diseases such as diseases of the respiratory system, the 
digestive system and from infectious diseases. There are no 
sharp regional differences in morbidity rates according to 
data obtained from out-patient reports. However, the 
Bangkokian has a slightly different morbidity rate from those 
living in the rest of Thailand. Having the highest morbidity 
rate of the respiratory system, with the lowest prevalence of 
infectious and parasitic diseases in Bangkok, results from the 
worse environment, but better sanitation, personal hygiene and 
coverage of health services than in the rest of the country. 
The following are morbidity rates per 1,000 population of the 
six leading groups of illnesses according to the out- patient 
reports (see table 1.9).
41
Table 1.9 : Morbidity rate of the six leading groups of
illnesses in Thailand, according to out-patient 
reports, 1987 (per 1,000 population).
Rank Cause of Whole Bangkok North Northeast Central(1>South 
illness country
1 Respiratory 172.7 
system
206.5 190.5 156.9 191.2 157.4
2 Digestive 100.6 
system
97.4 108.2 106.4 98.2 77.2
3 Infectious 77.4 
and parasitic 
diseases
59.1 79.5 82.2 68.5 76.4
4 Accident, 50.2 48.0 50.6 40.9 65.1 49.6
poisoning, & violence
5 Skin and 42.0 
subcutaneous tissue
61.5 47.3 32.5 48.2 49.0
6 Musculo- 33.9 54.1 47.2 29.3 32.1 29.1
skeletal system 
and connective tissue
Total(2) 735.5 n.a. 838.0 684.7 766.5 665.3
Notes j (1) Excludes Bangkok.
(2) Includes other causes of illness which do not 
appear in the table.
Source : Health Statistics Division, Ministry of Public
Health, Bangkok, 1988.
The morbidity rate calculated from out-patient reports 
does not reveal the burden of ill-health in the major 
hospitals. Thus, it is important to take the in-patient 
reports into account in order to provide the relevant 
magnitude of the disease incidence. According to the National 
Epidemiology Board of Thailand (1987), the mortality from 
leading diseases between 1983 and 1984 derived from the 
hospital in-patient reports (report no.505), are shown in 
table 1.10. From the table, enteritis and other diarrhoeal 
diseases, non-motor vehicle accidents, motor vehicle
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accidents, and malaria are the four major causes of hospital 
admission.
Table 1.10 : Per cent and morbidity rate (per 1,000 
population) of in-patients by ten major 
causes of disease, 1983-4.
1983 1984
Rank Cause of disease % Rate % Rate
1 Enteritis and other 
diarrhoeal diseases
7.4 3.46 6.0 3.07
2 Other accidents 4.2 1.96 4.1 2.07
3 Motor vehicle accidents 3.5 1.66 3.5 1.78
4 Malaria 2.9 1.38 3.5 1.78
5 All other infective
and parasitic diseases
3.4 1.59 2.9 1.50
6 Bronchitis, emphysema 
and asthma
2.5 1.18 2.5 1.29
7 Haemorrhagic fever 1.0 0.45 2.5 1.29
8 Peptic ulcers 2.4 1.12 2.3 1.19
9 Pneumonia 2.5 1.16 2.2 1.10
10 Abortions 2.0 0.93 2.1 1.04
Total(1) 100.0 47.11 100.0 51.01
Note : (1) Including other causes of illness which do not 
appear in the table.
Source : Review of the Health Situation in Thailand.
Priority Ranking of Diseases, National 
Epidemiology Board of Thailand, Bangkok, 
1987, Table 2.11.
The remaining problem of assessing the morbidity rate of 
Thai people by using the reported data, apart from the 
inaccuracy of diagnosis, is that the chronically sick may not 
visit health care facilities. The morbidity survey was 
conducted in parallel with the 1985 mortality survey by the 
same institute, in an attempt to understand better the 
morbidity pattern of the Thai population. The survey data was 
based on incidents during one month prior to the survey date.
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The top leading causes of illness, from the survey findings, 
are infectious diseases, diseases of the respiratory system, 
ill-defined symptoms, diseases of the digestive system and 
other diseases (see table 1.11)
Table 1.11 s Incidence rate of the top ten leading causes of 
illness (per 1,000 population) per month(1), 
1985.
Rank Cause of Whole Bangkok North Northeast Central(2>South 
illness country
1 Infectious
diseases
41.5 25.5 30.9 53.2 46.5 35.8
2 Diseases of 
respiratory 
system
30.4 30.7 27.4 21.4 38.1 39.9
3 Ill-defined
symptoms
21.6 9.7 21.0 20.6 21.6 30.1
4 Diseases of 
digestive 
system
20.9 20.7 18.6 19.6 29.2 13.6
5 Diseases of 
circulatory 
system
10.5 20.7 17.2 4.3 12.5 3.2
6 Diseases of 
skin and 
subcutaneous 
tissue
5.9 6.1 4.3 6.8 5.6 6.2
7 Diseases of 
eye and ear
5.5 3.2 6.8 4.4 8.9 2.8
8 Diseases of 5.1 
urinary tract 
and sex
2.6 5.2 6.0 5.7 4.4
9 Endocrine
disturbance
5.0 9.2 10.6 2.1 4.6 1.9
10 Accidents / 
injuries / 
violence
4.9 3.7 5.0 2.4 9.8 3.6
Notes : (1) Incidence during one month prior to the survey
date ( April - May, 1985 ).
(2) Excludes Bangkok.
Source : The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials. 
1988, Table 3.15.
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Focusing on the prevalent rate of illness or injury, and 
hospitalization, the morbidity survey found 156.4 cases per 
1,000 population within one month. The prevalent rate of 
hospitalization, which refers only to in-patients, was 51.3 
per 1,000 population per year (see table 1.12). It is worth 
noting that the Bangkokian has the lowest prevalent rate of 
illness or injury (139.5 per 1,000 population) but a very high 
rate of hospitalization (65.2 per 1,000 population). The very 
high prevalent rate of hospitalization in Bangkok is due to 
the best availability and accessibility of health services in 
the capital of Thailand, a case of supply creating demand.
Table 1.12
Region
Whole country
Bangkok
North
Northeast
Central<3)
South
Prevalent rate of illness or injury, and 
hospitalization per 1,000 population in 
Thailand, 1985.
Illness or injury
156.4
139.5
154.2
144.6
184.7
151.6
(i) Hospitalization
51.3
65.2
65.6
38.9
59.9
34.1
(2)
Notes
Source
(1) Illness or injury occurring within one
month prior to the survey date.
(2) Hospitalization occurring within one year
prior to the survey date.
(3) Excludes Bangkok.
The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials. 
1988, Table 3.5.
Regarding episodes of illness, the morbidity survey 
(1985) discovered that on average the Thai population had 2.1 
episodes per person per year, ranging from 1.9 in Bangkok to
2.6 in the central region (excluding Bangkok). In addition,
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hospitalization per person per year also had a similar pattern 
to the hospitalization per 1,000 population as mentioned
earlier in table 14. That is, the Bangkokian, with the lowest
incidence of illness, had the highest rate of hospital
admissions per year, at 0.07 (see table 1.13).
Table 1.13 s Episodes of illness and hospitalization
per person per year by region of usual 
residence, 1985.
Residence Illness Hospitalization
Whole country 2.1 0.05
Bangkok 1.9 0.07
North 2.0 0.07
Northeast 1.9 0.04
Central(1) 2.6 0.06
South 2.0 0.04
Note : (1) Excludes Bangkok.
Source s The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials. 
1988, Table 3.8.
Regarding age - sex differences in the episodes of 
illness or injury and episodes of hospital admission, the 
morbidity survey indicated that to some extent males had a 
lower incidence of illness or injury, and a lower incidence of 
hospital admissions than females. The one exception was males 
aged 1-14 years old who had the higher incidence of illness or 
injury. Similarly, males aged 4 years or less, and those aged 
60 and over, had higher episodes of hospitalization than 
females (see table 1.14).
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Table 1.14 s Age - sex differences in episodes of illness 
or injury, and episodes of hospital admission 
in Thailand, 1985.
Illness or injury(1> Hospitalization*3*
Age group (year) Male Female Male Female
Less than 1 3.7 4.0 42 38
1 - 4 3.9 3.2 5 4
5 - 9 1.8 1.6 3 3
10 - 14 1.2 1.1 2 2
15 - 24 1.0 1.1 4 8
25 - 49 1.9 2.2 5 6
50 - 59 2.8 3.8 5 6
60 and over 4.2 4.2 8 6
All age 2.0 2.2 5 6
Age-Standardized 2.0 2.1 5 6
rates(3)
Notes s (1) Rate per person per year.
(2) Rate per 100 persons per year.
(3) 1980 Population Census was adopted as base
population for age-standardized rates.
Source j The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials. 
1988, Tables 3.9, 3.10.
As far as occupational differences in prevalence of 
illness or injury are concerned, from the morbidity survey 
findings there is an inverse relationship between labour force 
participation and morbidity. Persons in work are likely to 
have a lower prevalent rate of illness or injury than those 
not in work (except for students). The student group, which 
was not classified under the labour force group, has the 
lowest prevalent rate of illness or injury. By contrast, the 
"no occupation" group including housewives and those looking 
for jobs had the highest prevalent rate in both sexes. Amongst 
those who are in work, the highest prevalent rate belonged to 
the male service worker, and female clerical and sales
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workers. While the lowest prevalent rate was found in male 
professional and administrative workers, and female transport 
workers respectively. In some categories, such as professional 
and administrative workers, and service workers, female had a 
higher age-standardized prevalence rate, while in some other 
categories, such as transport workers, and farmers, male 
workers have a higher rate. However, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the sexes (see table 1.15).
Table 1.15 : The occupational differences in the prevalent
rate of illness or injury per 1,000 population 
age 10 years and over, per month.
Occupation Prevalence rate of persons age 10 years
and over (per 1,000 population) per 
month(l)
Age-Standardized 
Prevalence rate<2> 
Male Female Male Female
Professional and 117 139 82 125
administrative
workers
Clerical and sales 121 158 109 143
workers
Service workers 173 156 108 205
Farmers 150 154 136 114
Transport workers 129 111 102 75
Manual labourers 123 137 111 145
Students 75 77 82 66
No occupation(3) 274 228 225 184
Notes : (1) Prevalence rate during one month prior to the
survey date.
(2) 1980 Population Census was adopted as base
population for age-standardized rates.
(3) No occupation includes housewives and those
looking for a job.
Source s The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials.
1988, Tables 3.13.
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6. CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, Thailand has transformed from an 
agriculture based to an agro-industrial based economy. The 
industrialization process has been developed steadily in the 
period between 1960-87 with real growth rates of around 7.02 
per cent a year, accelerating to around 10.0 per cent between 
1988-89. There were high expectations that in the 1990s 
Thailand may repeat the Asian Newly Industrialized countries 
(NICs) rapid industrialization of the 1960s and 70s 
(Sussangkarn et al, 1988). There is also an influx of labour, 
mainly from the northeast region, coming to find jobs in 
Bangkok and five neighbouring provinces where the industrial 
factories are established.
However, the effect of economic growth over the past 
decade or two, was not in favour of the poor. The distribution 
of income after taxes and benefits became more unequal. The 
top percentile and top quintile groups of householders were 
the greatest beneficiaries of the economic growth of the 
country. By contrast, the poor became worse off. Similarly, 
the income disparity between urban and rural areas became 
wider during the same period.
In general, the level of education and health status of 
the Thai population has improved resulting from the change in 
overall lifestyle toward modernization, better housing, 
sanitation, and food. The pattern of illness and causes of
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death have gradually changed from communicable diseases 
towards the diseases of modernization, namely cancer, heart 
diseases, accident, and so forth. At the same time some 
communicable diseases remain, such as; infectious diseases, 
diseases of the respiratory system, diseases of the digestive 
system.
In parallel with the economic development and the 
movement towards democracy, health service provision, in 
Thailand, has improved tremendously. Medical intervention 
under early capitalism was useful and played a major role in 
the improvement of the health status of the Thai population. 
The next chapter deals with the health care system in Thailand 
and its development.
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CHAPTER 2
THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION.
Until Thailand signed the religious treaty with French 
missionaries in the 1660s, traditional medicine was the only 
means of health care in Thailand. It was not until King Rama 
V's period (1868-1910) when Thailand modernized its 
administration that western medicine increased its status in 
Thai society. Subsequently, the Thai medical school was set up 
and organized along a western standard model with help from 
the Rockefeller Foundation. Since then, Thailand's medical 
curriculum and technology have been transferred from the 
American system. The industrialization process, which began in 
1962 when the first planned development period started, has 
helped the rapid transfer of medical technology. The 
increasing influence of the American health care system, with 
the declining role of traditional medicine, is still seen in 
Thai society.
2. DEVELOPMENT FROM 1932 TO 1941.
Since the country turned to Thai style democracy in 1932, 
a total of 10 Health Acts have been promulgated as follows;
1. The 1932 Act for the Control of Diseases and 
Toxins from Dangerous Animals
2. The 1934 Marijuana Act.
3. The 1934 Infectious Disease Act.
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4. The 1936 Act for the Control of the Practice of the
Art of Healing (substituted for the 1923 Medical
Profession Act)
5. The 1937 Act for the Control of the Use of Human 
Excreta as Fertilizer.
6. The 1938 Act for the Control of Cemeteries and 
Crematoria.
7. The 1940 Act for the Standard Control of Biological 
Materials
8. The 1941 Medical Premises Act.
9. The 1941 Public Health Act.
10. The 1941 Drug Act.
Moreover, in 1937 the Division of Pharmaceuticals was 
founded under the Department of Science, Ministry of
Economics. During one decade under the new regime, several new 
hospitals were constructed in the provinces while health
centres were created in rural areas as part of the plan for
modernization. These health care facilities were financed
mainly by local donations and topped up from the government 
budget (Jansorn, V.,1988, p.12).
3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH.
Since the Public Health Act of 1941 was promulgated, 
there was increasing concern for the importance of a unified 
health service. Thus, on 10th March 1942 the Ministry of 
Public Health (MOPH) was established. All of the health 
services previously administered by the Ministry of the 
Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Economics 
including 15 provincial hospitals and 343 health centres were 
transferred to the new Ministry. In addition, the Ministry of 
Public Health was responsible for providing public welfare
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services and controlling the Red Cross services. Since the 
duties were numerous, there were some problems which emerged, 
especially for the integration of welfare services and public 
health services. Therefore, some adjustments were made in the 
early stages of development of the MOPH, as follows;
1944: The Department of Public welfare was transferred 
back to the Ministry of Interior.
1956: There was one provincial hospital operating in
every province.
1959: The Department of Medical Schools was transferred 
to be administered under the Office of the Prime Minister.
1966: Concerning drug supply, the Government
Pharmaceutical Organization was created to integrate the 
pharmaceutical services of the Pharmaceutical Factory and the 
Department of Medical Sciences. It is still the only state 
enterprise under the MOPH. Its responsibility is the provision 
and distribution of pharmaceutical and biological products, to 
the MOPH's hospitals and health centres in particular.
1972: The government announced a new role for the
Ministry of Public Health which is still current;
" The function of the Ministry of Public Health is to 
provide the services of and the services related to, 
medical care, public health, food and drugs including 
toxic and narcotic substance control, and control of the 
Red Cross. "
(The Announcement of the Revolutionary 
Party, Number 216, Section 11, Item 25,
Dated 29 September 1972.)
In the same year, the Department of Medical Sciences and 
the Department of Health were merged into one large
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organization, and renamed the Department of Medical Sciences 
and Health. The main reason was to integrate the curative and 
preventive services and administer them under a single 
administration.
4. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH.
There were some problems resulting from the merged 
organization partly from the highly centralized system and 
partly from the dominant role of the curative service. The 
integration of curative and preventive services failed to 
come into practice at the central administrative level. Thus, 
in 1974 - two years after Thailand had her first experience of 
the health planning technique called "the project system 
analysis" introduced by WHO - the Ministry of Public Health 
had a major reorganization in order to put the integration of 
promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative care into 
practice. The office of the Permanent Secretary and the Health 
Planning Division were set up, in an attempt to integrate and 
coordinate health services. At this time it was thought that 
the provincial level was the best place for integrating health 
and health-related activities. Therefore, for the first time, 
the Provincial Chief Medical Officers (PCMOs) had more 
responsibilities for their own provincial health services with 
technical support at the central level.
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5. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC
HEALTH.
The organizational structure of the Ministry of Public 
Health from 1974 up until now is divided into six major 
departments.
At the provincial level, the Provincial Chief Medical 
Officer (PCMO) is appointed by the Permanent Secretary of 
State for Public Health. Finance is provided by the same 
Office. Obviously, he reports to this office and receives 
technical support from the other MOPH departments. But in 
fact, under the Thai public administrative structure, the PCMO 
firstly reports to the governor who coordinates the 
multidisciplinary activities in the province and later conveys 
the message to the MOPH. The main duty of the PCMO is planning 
and management of provincial health services which must match 
with both the department's plan and the provincial plan. 
Moreover, the PCMO is responsible for supervising and 
supporting the regional, provincial, and district hospitals. 
In practice, because of the long history of medical autonomy 
in the regional and provincial hospitals, the PCMO does not 
usually come to supervise the hospital in detail but leaves 
the day to day management of the hospital entirely in the 
hands of its director. Generally, the provincial hospital has 
150-500 beds, but some provinces contain a regional hospital 
with 501 to 1000 beds which provide training for medical and 
paramedical professionals as well as providing health
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services. The district hospitals have four sizes; 10, 30, 60, 
and 90 beds, depending on the size of population they serve. 
Attached to the provincial health office, there is the Office 
of the Technical and Health Promotion (OTHP) which sometimes 
works as the deputy of the PCMO. Its main duty is to support 
and supervise health care facilities on a technical basis.
Alongside the provincial health office, there are 
regional specialized institutions of departments or divisions 
(from central level) situated in some provinces. In this case, 
the specialized institutions do not report to the governor. 
Rather, they are administered and controlled directly by 
central departments in Bangkok. These institutions not only 
give specialized services but also support and supervise the 
local staff technically as well as conduct their own research 
and development activities. In addition, some of them provide 
pre-service training for nurses, midwives, sanitarian and PHC 
workers as well as conduct in-service training for public 
health staff. These institutions are the Malaria, T.B., 
Leprosy, Health Promotion (including family planning, school 
health, dental health, nutrition and MCH), Environmental 
Health, Maintenance and Repair Regional Centres, Nurse 
Colleges, Public Health Colleges, PHC Training and Development 
Centres, and many more.
Beneath the provincial level, there is the District 
Health Office operating at the district level. The public 
administrative structure of the district health office is a
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replica of that at the provincial level. They report to the 
District Chief Officer, who is the Ministry of the Interior's 
staff, but receive funding and technical support from the 
provincial health office. Their main job is to administer, 
supervise and support the health centres and village health 
posts.
The Health Centre is the lowest tier of the service 
operated by the public health officers. It is sited at Sub­
district (Tambon) level. But in some special areas such as 
hill tribe villages, self defence villages, and villages along 
the border of the country, there is a community health sub­
centre set up in a cluster of two or three villages. Each 
health centre is normally staffed by one midwife and one 
sanitarian who has had two years training from the MOPH's 
training institution while the health sub-centre is staffed by 
a community health worker who has a special MOPH's six month 
training course after grade 10. Recently, only in some health 
centres, there is also a technical nurse and/or a family 
planning junior worker. Moreover, some health centres which 
are located in districts with no community hospital, also 
serve as the extended OPD of the provincial hospital, which 
sends a medical team to provide the daily service there. In 
theory, health centres provide a limited treatment for 
emergencies and minor illnesses and then refer the serious 
cases to the district or provincial hospitals. In practice, 
all of the health services from the six departments are 
integrated into the tasks of the two health workers. Moreover,
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they are responsible for supporting the primary health care 
workers including the provision of home visits as well as 
doing their routine administrative work. Their tasks are 
enormous and the problem of understaffing results in the 
health service which they provide having no appeal for the 
villagers. Kiranandana, T. (1988, p.16) pointed out that a 
large number of the rural population tend to bypass the health 
centre and district hospital and go directly to the provincial 
hospitals, even with minor illnesses. His view is that there 
is an improper utilization of resources. Furthermore, the 
under-utilization of health centres creates another problem of 
over-utilization at the provincial and regional hospitals.
The village health post is in fact the primary health 
care station. It is usually located in the house of a village 
health volunteer. The health post provides some essential 
drugs and basic primary health care services. The drugs sold 
here are supplied by the Government Pharmaceutical 
Organization so that the cost of drugs are kept below market 
price. Generally, a small percentage of the drug's profit is 
given to the village health volunteer and the rest goes to the 
village drug cooperative fund which is supposed to exist for 
every health post. At the moment, however, the drug 
cooperatives are only to be found in around 60% of all health 
posts. At the village health post, there are two types of 
village health worker. They comprise the village health 
communicators (VHCs) and the village health volunteers (VHVs) 
who have additional duties for the curative aspects. The
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former, receive a five day orientation course from Tambon 
health personnel and receive continuing education through the 
46 self-learning modules. Their functions are focused on 
health education and dissemination of health information in 
the village. The latter are chosen from the VHCs who have 
already worked about 6 months, receiving an additional five 
days training and 21 more self learning packages than the 
former. Although the village health volunteer works on a 
voluntary basis and receives no remuneration from the 
government, he receives incentives in cash from the profit of 
selling essential drugs and incentives in kind from the free 
medical care services as well as receiving social recognition 
from the government and fellow villagers (Office of the 
Primary Health Care, 1985, pp. 32-40).
6. HEALTH CARE RESOURCES.
A). Health care facilities.
This section deals only with the western medical care 
facilities. The health care delivery system in Thailand is 
comprised of two parts; the public providers and private 
providers. The public providers play the major role in 
providing health care services. The major source of health 
care facilities for the entire nation is the Ministry of 
Public Health (MOPH). In 1990, the MOPH had the biggest share 
of hospitals (61.1%) while private hospitals had the second 
rank share of 31.2%, and the non-MOPH hospitals had a share of
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5.6%, coining third in rank. In the case of beds, however, the 
largest ownership remains the MOPH's which had a total of 
58,897 beds or 65.2% of the total number of beds in Thailand, 
in 1989. The non-MOPH public hospitals including the 
university hospitals, the Ministry of Defence's hospitals, and 
the others constitute 17.4%, while the private hospitals have 
14.2% of the total beds in Thailand. Service in western 
clinics is rendered by doctors. The private clinics represent 
96.0% of the total, and are the most common service providers 
in this category. Most of them are run by solo-practice 
doctors who are at the same time working as salaried doctors 
for the government during office hours, and providing their 
private practices in their own premises in non-official hours. 
Most of the clinics of municipalities, which are 2.3% of the 
total clinics, are run by part-time doctors. The MOPH's 
clinics, namely the extended OPD, shared only 1.1% of the 
total clinics in 1989. At the Tambon and village levels, all 
health centres and community health sub-centres belong to the 
MOPH. It is noted here that the health centres in the 
municipal areas are classified as clinics because part-time 
doctors work there, while the MOPH's health centres are 
basically run by para-professional health workers (see table 
2.1) .
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Table 2.1; Health care facilities in Thailand, 1989-90.
Facility MOPH Non-MOPH State
Enterprise
Munici­
palities
private total
Hospitals 692 63 18 6 354 1,133
(61.1) (5.6) (1.6) (0.5) (31.2) (100.0)
Beds 58,897 15,681 951 1,867 12,777 90,173
(65.2) (17.4) (1.1) (2.1) (14.2) (100.0)
Clinics 89,l>
(1.1)
- 53
(0.6)
187(2)
(2.3)
7,880<3) 
(96.0)
8,209
(100.0)
Health
centres
7,764
(100.0)
- - - - 7,764
(100.0)
Com. hlth 478 
subcenters(100.0)
- - - - 478
(100.0)
Notes: (1) Extended OPD of MOPH.
(2) Including health centres of municipalities 
which provide services by part-time doctors.
(3) Most of the private clinics are run by part- 
time doctors who are officially government 
employees.
Sources: Public Health Diary 1990, Health Association of 
Thailand, Bangkok, 1990.
Basic Health Statistics 1987-89. Health Statistics 
Division, Bangkok, 1989.
Health in Thailand. Health Panning Division, 
Bangkok, 1990.
Medical Registration Division, MOPH.
Focusing on the facilities for health services which are 
classified at administrative level, it is found in Bangkok 
that several public organizations are complementarily 
responsible for providing health care services. The majority 
of public providers in Bangkok are the university hospitals 
and the Ministry of Defence's hospitals with 8,138 (42.9%) of 
Bangkok's beds which provide training for medical 
professionals and para-professionals. They are well staffed 
and well equipped, provide sophisticated services and attract 
most of the people who can afford to pay for the services
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without referral being necessary. These hospitals are over­
utilized and have long waiting times. However, they are still 
popular because of the better quality of service and the 
relatively low charges as described in the next chapter. The 
MOPH, with 4 general hospitals, 16 specialized hospitals, and 
4 specialized institutions, has the second largest number of 
beds in Bangkok. They take account of 4,562 beds or 24.0% of 
the total of Bangkok's beds. The total number of 110 private 
hospitals in Bangkok provide 3,889 beds or 20.5% of the total 
beds in Bangkok. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) 
- the local authority - with 4 general hospitals and 2 
community hospitals of 30 beds, had a total of 1,837 beds or 
9.7% of the total of Bangkok's beds for its own inhabitants. 
The four state enterprise hospitals with 548 beds (2.9% of the 
available beds in Bangkok in 1989) not only provide health 
care services for their own employees but also provide 
health care for the general public (see table 2.2 and 2.3).
Table 2.2; Health care facilities in Thailand, classified by 
administrative level, 1989.
Administrative Type of facility Number Responsible 
level agencies
Bangkok Teaching hospitals 7
MOD 2 Army, Air Force
General hospitals 13
BMA 4 Local Authority
MOPH 4 Dpt. of Medical
services, MOPH. 
State enterprise 4 The State Railways,
Port Authorities, 
Tobacco Monopoly, 
Metropolitan 
Electricity.
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Table 2.2 - Continued.
Administrative Type of facility Number Responsible
level agencies
Bangkok MOI 1 Police
Specialized hospitals 16 MOPH
Specialized institutions 4 MOPH
Private hospitals 110 Private
Community hospitals 2 BMA
General clinics 57 BMA
Specialized clinics 17 MOPH
Private clinics 3,339 Private
4 Regions Teaching hospitals 3 Universities, MOU.
Regional hospitals 17 MOPH
Specialized hospitals 
Specialized
16 MOPH
institutions(1> 537 MOPH
72 Provinces General hospitals 74
MOPH 72 Office of the 
Permanent Secretary
MOD 2 MOD
Military regiment 
hospitals
32 MOD
Private hospitals 220 Private
Private clinics 4,541 Private
735 Districts Community hospitals 603 MOPH
Clinics 129 Municipalities
Extended OPD 89 MOPH
6,754 Tambon Health centres 
(Sub-district)
7,764 MOPH
61,411 Villages Community health 
sub-centres
478 MOPH
Village health 
posts
64,182 Community*21
Drug co-operatives 38,744 Community*21
Nutrition funds 25,450 Community*2>
Sanitation funds 20,643 Community*21
Health card funds 19,030 Community *2)
Notes : (1) Excludes training institutions.
(2) Supported by the MOPH.
BMA = Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
MOD = Ministry of Defence,
MOI = Ministry of the Interior,
MOPH = Ministry of Public Health,
MOU = Ministry of University Affairs,
Sources : Basic Health Statistics 1987-89, 1989
Health in Thailand. 1990
Public Health Diary 1990. 1990.
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Table 2.3; The number of total beds in Thailand, 1987.
Facility Bangkok Other provinces
No. of beds % No. of beds %
MOPH hospitals 4,562 24.0 53,188 81.4
Non-MOPH hospitals 8,138 42.9 7,543 11.5
State enterprise 54 2.9 403 0.6
hospitals
BMA and other 1,837 9.7 30 0.1
municipal hospitals
Private hospitals 3,889 20.5 4,215 6.4
Total 18,974 100.0 65,379 100.0
Source : Proceedings of the First Thai Health
Assembly, Royal Thai Government, Bangkok, 
1988b, tables 4.20.
Considering the distribution of the total beds in 
different regions of Thailand, both public and private, 
Bangkok and the central region has a higher ratio of beds to 
population than the other regions. In 1987, there were only 
343 persons per bed in Bangkok, and 446 persons per bed in the 
central region (this excludes Bangkok). The worst bed 
distributed area is the northeastern region, where there are
1,148 people per one available hospital bed (see table 2.4).
Table 2.4: The population per bed by region, 1987.
Region
Bangkok
Central(1)
South
North
Northeast
Total
Note : (1)
No. of beds %
19,059 22.6
23,978 28.4
11,003 13.0
14,168 16.8
16,230 19.2
84,438 100.0
Excludes Bangkok.
Population per bed
343
446
557
770
1,148
629
Source : Proceedings of the First Thai Health
Assembly, 1988a, table 4.2.
Outside Bangkok, the MOPH facilities including Regional 
hospitals, general (provincial) hospitals, specialized 
hospitals, community (district) hospitals, health centres, 
community health sub-centres and the PHC network at the 
village level, play the major role in providing health 
services throughout the country. The total number of beds in 
the MOPH hospitals outside Bangkok is 53,188 beds - 81.4% of 
all non-BMA beds (see table 2.3). In parallel with the MOPH's 
hospitals, there are 3 university hospitals located in 
Chiangmai, Khonkean and Songkhla provinces. A total of 2 
general hospitals and 32 military hospitals of the Ministry of 
Defence, situated in some provinces, also serve the general 
public. These non-MOPH hospitals have 7,543 beds or 11.5% of 
the total beds outside Bangkok. The private hospitals in non- 
Bangkok provinces have a total of 4,215 beds (or of 52.0% of 
private beds), while there were 48.0% of private beds in 
Bangkok in 1987 .
Around two-thirds of private hospitals are small, with 
only 25 beds or less. In 1986, there were only 18 hospitals, 
or 6.8% of the total private hospitals, which had more than 
100 beds. Moreover, most of the large private hospitals are 
located in Bangkok. The majority of private hospitals are 
owned by a doctor or a group of doctors. Since 1974, the 
Thailand Board of Investment - a government body - has a 
policy of private investment promotion. It has expanded its 
activities to cover hospital investment, as if medical care is 
an ordinary commodity in the market place, by giving a
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privilege of tax exemption on imported medical appliances. One 
result was a rapid expansion of private hospitals from 171 
hospitals in 1977 to 330 hospitals in 1990, with a growth rate 
of 8.4 per cent a year in the last five years. Another reason 
for the rapid growth is the frofit potential. However, at 
present, the policy of promoting private hospital investment 
is confined to outside of Bangkok only.
The drug store is one of the major sources of private 
health care in Thailand. There are 2 types of drug store; the 
western drug store and the traditional drug store. In 1987, 
the number of western drug stores was 8,835 or 57.19% of the 
total number of drug stores. The rest of the drug stores were 
those of traditional medicine. The distribution of drug stores 
in Thailand is in favour of Bangkok, where 53% of western drug 
stores are to be found, serving only about 10% of the entire 
population. Only 7.8% of drug stores are scattered in the poor 
northeastern region which has one-third of the total 
population of Thailand. Recently, the government regulated 
that every western medicine dispensary must have a qualified 
pharmacist working in it. This is because Thailand has no 
existing prescription system to restrict the purchase of 
dangerous drugs. Although previously the selling of dangerous 
drugs must be registered by a licensed pharmacist, in 
practice, the selling of any drugs in Thailand is like the 
selling of any ordinary commodity and is bought according to 
income, price and taste. There were 25,483 types of drugs 
available in the market, 46% of them are combination drugs
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(Jaidee, S. et al, 1986). Unfortunately, in 1989, there were 
only 3,551 (or 39.4%) of western drug stores with pharmacists, 
while there were 5,451 of them without (Health Planning 
Division, 1990).
Parallel to the western health care system, the 
traditional system of medicine plays a subordinate role in 
providing health care services in Thailand. All of the 
traditional medicine facilities are privately owned. They 
consist of general clinics and a minority of MCH clinics. In 
1989, the proportion of general clinics to MCH clinics was 
31.8:1. In addition, most of them provide only out-patient 
care. Only a few provide in-patient care. The proportion of 
OPD and IPD clinics was 23.4:1 in 1989. Amongst them, the 
majority, 64.9% of the total facilities, were located in 
Bangkok, resulting in a large number of general OPD clinics 
being situated there. However, the majority of the traditional 
MCH clinics of both IPD and OPD types were serving the Non- 
Bangkok population (see table 2.5).
Table 2.5: Number of traditional medicine facilities in
Thailand, 1989.
Facility Bangkok Other provinces total
Number % Number % Number %
General clinics 615 66.5 310 33.5 925 100.0
IPD 8 40.0 9 60.0 15 100.0
OPD 607 66.9 301 33.1 908 100.0
MCH clinics 4 13.8 25 86.2 29 100.0
IPD 2 8.3 22 91.7 24 100.0
OPD 2 40.0 3 60.0 5 100.0
Total 619 64.9 335 35.1 954 100.0
Source : Medical Registration Division, MOPH.
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B). Health manpower.
In the health sector, it is very important to consider 
health manpower resources because health care is a labour 
intensive industry. Hospitals and health centres can be built 
in months or a few years but training of a general
practitioner and a specialist to work in them takes between 
six to ten years. Some countries have already faced the 
problem of overproduction of doctors because of the popularity 
of medicine, with its high income and higher social status, 
attracting students to study in this field. By contrast, there 
is frequently found a shortage of trained nurses and
paramedics. Thus, the matching of the future supply and
effective demand must be considered both for the needs of the 
country and for the availability of resources to support them 
(Abel-Smith, B., 1986a).
In Thailand, there are three types of health personnel. 
The first group are the western health personnel who graduate 
from the modern universities and colleges with a specific 
curriculum. These personnel include the doctor, dentist, 
pharmacist, nurse and many more. The second group are
traditional medicine health personnel who are registered with 
the government, although there is no formal education for 
them. Only recently, a school of applied traditional medicine 
was set up to teach the applied scientific knowledge of modern 
(western) medicine to traditional medicine practitioners. The 
third group are the trained primary health care workers and
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the folk health personnel at the local level who are at 
present looking after themselves and their neighbourhood along 
the lines of the WHO health for all by the year 2000 (Royal 
Thai Government, 1988b, pp. 23-24).
The first group of health personnel are the group which 
should be taken note of because they dominate and control the 
present health care system. They not only are large in number 
but they are also costly to society. These western types of 
health personnel can be further divided into 3 subgroups. They 
are;
1) professional health workers who have at least 4 years 
of training from educational institutions, for example; the 
doctor, dentist, pharmacist, professional nurse and so on;
2) assistant health workers, who receive two years of 
formal education. Amongst them are the practical nurse, 
laboratory technician, X-ray technician, midwife, and 
sanitarian, for instance;
3) aide health workers who have six months to one year of 
training. This subgroup comprises the laboratory assistant, 
dental aide, community health worker and so on.
Training for all types of western health personnel, 
nurses excepted, are a matter of public responsibility. Until 
recently, because of a lack of nurses, and for political 
reasons, a total of 6 private nursing schools were 
established. The Ministry of University Affairs is the major 
training institution for the professional health personnel
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while the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for 
training the professional nurses, assistants and aide health 
workers. The number of health personnel completing training by 
educational institutions in 1988 is presented in table 2.6.
Table 2.6: The number of health personnel completing
training, by educational institution, 1988.
Type of health Total Educational No. of
personnel per year institution completing
training
M.D. (specialist) 490 Medical council(1) 490
Doctor (GP) 698
MOU 665
MOD 33
Dentist 187 MOU 187
Pharmacist 407 MOU 407
Professional nurse 3,155
MOPH 1,500
MOU 780
MOD 185
MOI 250
Private 290
Red cross 150
Practical nurse 1,115
MOPH 940
MOD 175
Midwife 400 MOPH 400
Sanitarian 800 MOPH 800
Note: (1) Licensing institution.
MOD = Ministry of Defence,
MOI = Ministry of Interior,
MOPH = Ministry of Public Health.
MOU = Ministry of University Affairs,
Source : Proceedings of the First Thai Health Assembly. 
1988a, table 2.7.
Concerning the amount of health manpower in Thailand, the 
MOPH has the most health personnel working in it. The second 
largest employer of large numbers of all types of health 
personnel are the non-MOPH public hospitals. In 1986, the
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majority (50,3%) of the total doctors were MOPH employees, and 
33.5% of them were employees of non-MOPH public agencies (see 
table 2.7). Most of them have their own private clinics or 
private hospitals. So far, only around 10 per cent of doctors 
work wholly in private practice (Health Planning Division, 
1990, p.29). Besides, 39.8% of dentists, 65.6% of nurses and 
93.3% of midwives in 1986 worked for the MOPH. However, the 
biggest group of pharmacists (48.9% of them) worked wholly in 
the private sector which includes retailers for the drug 
companies.
Table 2.7; Number and percentage of health manpower in 
Thailand, 1986. (Selected categories.)
Health
personnel
MOPH Non-MOPH State
Enterprise
Munici- private total 
palities
Doctor 4,757 3,172 235 408 892 9,464
(50.3) (33.5) (2.5) (4.3) (9.4) (100.0)
Dentist 555 481 73 137 149 1,395
(38.9) (34.5) (5.2) (9.8) (10.4) (100.0)
Pharmacist 1,064 373 213 64 1,642 3,356
(31.7) (11.1) (6.4) (1.9) (48.9) (100.0)
Nurse 26,846 7,989 936 2,286 2,895 40,952
(65.6) (19.5) (2.3) (5.6) (7.1) (100.0)
Midwife 5,943 47 54 158 171 6,373
(93.3) (0.7) (0.8) (2.5) (2.7) (100.0)
Source : Health Statistics Division, Bangkok , 1988.
Focusing on the regional distribution of health 
personnel, 43.8% of doctors, 63.3% of dentists and 82.3% of 
pharmacists work in Bangkok. The population per doctor in 
Bangkok is 8.6 times less than the proportion in the north­
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eastern region of Thailand, which had a population per doctor 
of 13,564, in 1986. Moreover, the northeastern region has the 
poorest ratio of health personnel in most categories (see 
tables 2.8 and 2.9).
To cope with the maldistribution of health personnel, the 
government regulates that all newly graduated doctors from 
1972 must compulsorily work for the government for at least 
three years. Similarly, the same rule will be applied to 
dentists and pharmacists from 1989 onwards.
Table 2.8: Regional distribution of health personnel in
Thailand, 1986.
Health
personnel Bangkok Central (1) North
Region
South Northeast Total
Doctor 4,142 1,670 1,321 920 1,411 9,464
(43.8) (17.6) (14.0) (9.7) (14.9) (100.0)
Dentist 883 227 126 62 97 1,395
(63.3) (16.3) (9.0) (4.4) (7.0) (100.0)
Pharmacist 2,763 208 158 100 127 3,356
(82.3) (6.2) (4.7) (3.0) (3.8) (100.0)
Nurse 13,151 9,213 6,338 5,042 7,208 40,952
(32.1) (22.5) (15.5) (12.3) (17.6) (100.0)
Midwife 388 1,604 1,128 1,271 1,982 6,373
(6.1) (25.2) (17.7) (19.9) (31.1) (100.0)
Note : (1) Excludes Bangkok.
Sources : Health Statistic Division, Bangkok, 1988.
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Table 2.9; Population per one health personnel by region, 
1986.
Health
personnel Bangkok Central(1>
Region
North South Northeast Total
Doctor 1,577 6,444 9,227 7,080 13,564 5,739
Dentist 7,399 47,154 86,556 102,435 192,000 37,745
Pharmacist 2,144 48,663 65,253 62,270 140,268 15,828
Nurse 450 1,099 1,627 1,235 2,471 1,297
Midwife 15,265 6,310 9,140 4,899 8,988 8,335
Note s (1) Excludes Bangkok.
Source : Proceedings of the First Thai Health Assembly. 
1988a, tables 4.1, 4.8.
The second group of health personnel are the licensed 
traditional healers who are registered with the MOPH. In 1990, 
the total number of registered traditional healers was 29,724 
(Thailand Public Health Association, 1991). They comprises- 
Traditional doctors 13,347 persons.
Traditional pharmacists 14,233 persons.
Traditional midwives 2,093 persons.
Modified traditional doctors 51 persons,
(general practices)
However, the actual number of licensed traditional 
healers who are still in practice is probably less than these 
figures. The licensing agency of the MOPH lacks an adequate 
mechanism for removing those who stop practising as a result 
of migration, retirement or death.
Information on the third group of health personnel who 
work at the PHC level is kept only on the trained PHC workers. 
There were 63,060 village health volunteers and 599,070
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village health communicators throughout the country in 1989 
(Health Statistic Division, 1989). However, the estimated 
figure of non-licensed traditional healers, calculated from 
the survey in Nakornratchasima province, found that the 
average number of non-registered traditional healers was 3.85 
persons per village or about two million of them for the whole 
country. (Royal Thai Government, 1988b).
7. CONCLUSION.
Since Thailand moved towards modernisation with planned 
development in 1962, the country started on the path towards 
industrialization. The American influence on the health care 
system has extended not only to medical education, but also to 
the system of health care provision which is based on market 
competition between health care providers which is in favour 
of the rich who have a greater ability to pay. The public 
health service system tends to protect the poor and the people 
living outside Bangkok, while private provision benefits the 
better off. The people in Bangkok have more choice of health 
service systems from the university hospitals to the small, 
cozy private hospitals and clinics. The next chapter deals 
with the financing of the health care system in Thailand which 
also reflects, in part, the American style of services based 
to a considerable extent on the patient's ability to pay with 
some protection for the poor.
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CHAPTER 3
HEALTH CARE FINANCING
1. INTRODUCTION.
In the previous chapter, the character of health care 
delivery systems in Thailand, based on the American system of 
market competition, was described. The situation results in 
the number and distribution of health care facilities and 
health manpower being skewed towards the rich and urban 
populations. Health care financing, described in this chapter 
also reflects the same trend. This chapter gives the picture 
of overall health care financing in Thailand with a special 
emphasis placed on public expenditure, foreign aid and direct 
private payment. However, health insurance as a major source 
of finance will be described in detail in the next chapter.
2. GENERAL CHARACTER.
The financing of the health care system in Thailand has 
a pluralistic character. Direct private payment is the major 
source of health care expenditure. Private consumption 
expenditure on health care expenses is estimated to have 
increased 5.9 times, from 2,020 million Baht in 1960 to 11,927 
million Baht in 1986, while the real GDP increased only 5.2
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times. Meanwhile, real public expenditure on health has 
increased elevenfold from 183 to 2,020 million Baht, while 
total public expenditure was increased only sevenfold 
(Kiranandana, T. et al, 1989). During the same period, the 
cost of imported drugs have risen 2.5 times in real terms 
(1960 prices), from 286 million Baht to 706 millions Baht (see 
table 3.1).
Table 3.1 : Expenditure on health expenses and health
services. ( Million Baht at 1960 prices )
Private % of total Public % of total Imported
consumption private expenditure public Drugs
Year on health consumption on health expenditure
1960 2,020 5.85 183 3.90 286
1965 2,655 4.59 260 3.70 346
1970 3,680 5.63 398 3.64 519
1975 4,502 5.70 498 4.08 472
1980 6,406 5.83 1,019 5.07 522
1981 6,937 5.88 1,201 5.61 532
1982 8,064 6.35 1,345 5.47 554
1983 8,955 6.48 1,439 5.49 606
1984 10,189 6.78 1,768 6.04 613
1985 11,261 7.07 1,957 6.11 689
1986 11,927 7.16 2,020 6.06 706
Source : Kiranandana, T. et al, Morbiditv and Mortalitv
Patterns of Thai Population, 1989, table 6.3
From 1978 to 1987, total health care expenditure in 
Thailand increased sharply from 30,174 million Baht to 67,771 
million Baht, in 1978 prices. The increase from 3.43 per cent 
of GDP in 1978 to 5.65 per cent in 1987, or 680 Baht per 
capita to 1,282 Baht per capita shows the rate of increase per 
capita to be around 7-8 % per year (see table 3.2). This rate 
of increase in health expenditure per capita is higher than
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the average of industrialized countries (Myers et al, 1985, 
p.10) and higher than the rate of increase in GNP per capita 
(Royal Thai Government, 1988b, p.221). Myers et al (1985, 
p.10) estimated that, if this trend continues, by 1991 total 
health care expenditure would reach between 6.4 to 7.9 per 
cent of GNP or around 1,660 Baht per capita (at 1983 prices). 
Table 3.2 also shows total expenditure on health as an 
increasing proportion of total public expenditure from 21.35 
to 29.79 per cent, between 1978 and 1987.
Table 3.2 s Total public expenditure and total expenditure 
on health (Baht at 1987 prices).
Total public expenditure Total expenditure on health
Amount % of Per Amount % of Per % of public 
Year(Billion) GDP capita(Billion) GDP capita expenditure
1978 141.3 17.36 3,185 30.2 3.43 680 21.35
1980 144.6 16.25 64.89 34.3 3.85 738 23.69
1982 180.1 19.68 77.40 41.9 4.58 864 23.26
1984 205.2 20.05 82.32 53.0 5.18 1.052 25.85
1986 216.1 19.85 87.34 62.1 5.70 1,192 28.73
1987 227.5 18.87 89.66 67.8 5.62 1,282 29.79
Sources : Proceedings of the First Thai Health 
Assembly. 1988b, Table 6.1.
Health Planning Division, Ministry of Public 
Health, Bangkok.
3. SOURCES OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE.
The most important sources of expenditure in Thai health 
care are? direct private payment, the Ministry of Public 
Health, other ministries, and the medical scheme for 
government employees. The trend from 1978 to 1987 shows that 
direct private payment has been increasing while public
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expenditure has been a slightly declining proportion of total 
health care expenditure. However, it is interesting that, 
within the public sources the medical schemes for government 
employees and state enterprise employees has been growing 
rapidly. The other sources of expenditure such as the 
workmen's compensation fund have been expanding gradually, 
while private insurance and foreign aid have been declining 
slightly (see table 3.3).
Table 3.3 : Percentage of health service expenditure in
Thailand by sources of finance.
Source 1978
.. Public
1980 1982 1984 1986 1987
(a).MOPH 19.86 16.78 16.78 16.06 14.11 13.02
(b).Other 8.47 
ministries
8.50 7.72 6.93 6.47 5.96
. Foreign aid 0.98 1.40 1.03 0.79 0.83 0.74
Direct 66.69 68.96 
private payment
. Health insurance (1)
67.63 69.23 71.23 73.22
(a) Social (2) 
assistance
(2) 1.29 1.33 1.21 1.04
(b) Statutory 2.40 
insurance
3.13 4.15 4.35 5.09 4.96
(c) Employers 0.36 
liability
0.37 0.41 0.50 0.36 0.40
(d) Voluntary 1.24 
insurance
0.86 0.99 0.81 0.70 0.66
Total<3) 30,174 34,263 41,890 53,033 62,100 67,771
( = 100 % )
Notes; (1) See detail in chapter 4.
(2) Included in the MOPH expenditure.
(3) Million Baht, at 1987 prices.
Sources: Proceedings of the First Thai Health 
Assembly, 1988b, Table 6.3.
Kiranandana,S., Health insurance and medical 
schemes for civil servants and state
enterprise employees, 1988, tables 1 and 6.
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A. PUBLIC SOURCES.
As mentioned earlier (table 2.1), publicly owned 
facilities accounted for 66.8% of the total hospitals and 
85.8% of total beds in 1990. This large proportion of public 
ownership would contribute to some extent to make the Thai 
health system emulate efficiency and equity. When considering 
sources of public revenue, around 65-70% of the total revenue 
comes from general taxation. Unfortunately most of this is 
from indirect taxation on consumer goods which has a 
regressive nature. Direct taxes which have a progressive 
nature, account for only around 16-17% of the total (see table 
3.4). In general, the regressive structure of taxation in 
Thailand (Chayapong, D. 1975; Krongkaew, M., 1979) is not
different from that of many other developing countries which 
heavily tax the poor. Between 1983 and 1986, total tax revenue 
was around 13 per cent of GDP while all government revenue 
was around 14-18 per cent of GDP. These figures are quite low 
by international standards.
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Table 3.4 : Sources of government revenue, 
fiscal year 1983-6.
Percent of <government revenue
Sources 1983 1984 1985 1986
Taxes and duties 69.55 69.76 65.64 68.18
Direct taxes 15.66 16.87 16.18 16.89
Business taxes 14.91 16.33 14.55 13.71
and stamp duties
Specific sales taxes 19.02 18.54 19.03 20.60
Import-export duties 16.34 17.61 15.08 14.44
Other taxes and duties 3.62 0.41 0.80 2.54
Sales of assets and 2.39 2.26 2.18 2.30
services
State enterprise charges 3.66 3.39 4.27 3.99
Other services 4.43 8.50 5.64 4.03
Deficit financing 19.97 16.09 22.27 21.50
Total ( ■= 100%) 183 ,893 147,907 220,172 218,427
( Million Baht 
at 1987 prices.)
Source : The Comptroller - General's Department, Ministry
of Finance.
The proportion of public expenditure for health in 
Thailand is also low by international standards. The World 
Bank (1984, p.268) indicated that Thailand spent 45% below 
what would be expected. In fact, public spending for health 
has gradually risen from 6.56 to 7.44 per cent of total public 
spending from 1978 to 1987. In the same period, total public 
expenditure on health per capita in 1978 was 208 Baht compared 
to 320 Baht in 1987 (in 1987 prices). However, the share of 
public expenditure on health to total health expenditure has 
declined steadily from 30.73% to 24.98% due to the structural 
adjustment reforms with the slow down of public spending and 
rapid expansion of the private sector (see table 3.5).
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Table 3,5 : Public expenditure*a) on health, 1978-87 
selected years (Baht at 1987 prices).
Year Total % of health % of public % of Per
(Millions) expenditure expenditure GNP capita
1978 9,273 30.73 6.56 1.14 208
1980 9,978 28.41 6.90 1.12 215
1982 12,539 29.94 6.96 1.37 258
1984 15,202 28.67 7.63 1.49 301
1986 16,700 26.88 7.65 1.53 320
1987 16,927 24.98 7.44 1.40 320
Source : Proceedings of the First Thai Health 
Assembly, 1988b, Table 6.3.
Note : (1) Includes recurrent and capital/development
expenditures.
a). The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH).
The Ministry of Public Health has the biggest share in 
total public spending on health. Although this proportion has 
declined from 64.64% in 1978 to 56.28% in 1987, in real terms 
the total MOPH expenditure has increased from 5,949 million 
Baht to 9,525 millions. The MOPH expenditure per capita has 
also risen from 135 Baht to 180 Baht in the same period. 
However, the proportion of MOPH expenditure to total public 
expenditure as well as the proportion to GNP has changed 
minimally (see table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: MOPH expenditure*1 ] as a percentage of total
public expenditure, public expenditure on health, 
GNP and MOPH expenditure per capita 
(at 1987 prices).
Total % of % of public % Per
Year (Million public expenditure of capita
Baht) expenditure on health GNP (Baht)
1978 5,994 4.20 64.64 0.73 135
1980 5,892 4.12 59.06 0.67 127
1982 7,570 4.13 60.37 0.81 156
1984 9,220 4.49 60.65 0.90 183
1986 9,515 4.38 57.00 0.87 183
1987 9,525 4.19 56.28 0.79 180
Source : Health Planning Division, MOPH.
Note s (1) Includes recurrent and capital/development 
expenditures.
In this section, the social inequalities in health from 
the distribution of MOPH expenditure is outlined. It looks in 
turn at the distribution of the MOPH budget by geographical 
area, level of service, activity, type of budget, and MOPH 
programme. There is evidence that over the past decade, the 
inequality in health from the distribution of the MOPH budget 
remains urban biased and curative based. The programme 
budgeting shows a trend of increasing its expenditure towards 
technological development, environmental health and non- 
communicable disease control. However, data is not available 
to analyse further which groups of clients, or which social 
class groups benefit most from the MOPH expenditure.
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HOPH expenditure by geographical distribution.
The inequality between urban and rural, in terms of 
opportunity to receive health care from the MOPH is presented. 
Although 79.2% of the 1989 budget was spent outside Bangkok, 
20.8% was spent inside (Sirivanarungsun, P. et al, 1989, p.4). 
When taking the urban (Municipal areas) and rural distribution 
into consideration, the MOPH expenditure per capita for the 
urban population was 4.43 times higher than that for the rural 
population. Table 3.7 shows the per capita MOPH expenditure 
between 1978 to 1989. For urban areas, it ranged from 379 to 
582 Baht while in rural areas the range was between 71.5 to 
132 Baht.
Table 3.7 : Distribution of MOPH expenditure, 1978-89.
(Baht per capita, at 1987 constant prices).
Year Urban Rural Total Proportion
1978 392 78.7 134.9 4.98 1
1980 379 71.5 126.7 5.29 1
1982 445 89.8 156.0 4.96 1
1984 481 117.6 182.9 4.09 1
1985 483 118.1 180.5 4.08 1
1986 474 117.6 182.9 4.02 1
1987 496 111.8 180.5 4.43 1
1988 527 118.6 191.0 4.45 1
1989 582 132.0 212.2 4.41 1
Source : Health Planning Division, MOPH.
In addition , a study by the Office of the Perma
Secretary for Public Health, which spent 72% of the total MOPH 
budget in 1982, revealed a geographical pattern of inequitable 
distribution (Health Planning Division, MOPH, 1985). The per 
capita health expenditure allocated by the Office was in
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favour of the southern and the eastern regions which are known 
as rich regions with a low population. By contrast, the 
northeast region with the highest number of people and ranked 
as the poorest region in the country received the lowest 
amount of health expenditure per capita (see figure 3.1). This 
study also indicated that while the government advocated a 
policy towards 1 poverty alleviation " (began in 1982), the 
Office of the Permanent Secretary for Public Health, as the 
functionary organization of the government, spent its 1982 
budget inconsistently with this policy direction. Rather, the 
Office spent an average of 140.48 Baht per capita in the non­
poverty provinces but spent only 95.62 Baht per capita in the 
so-called 1 poverty stricken area " provinces. The reason for 
this was because the criteria for budget allocation was always 
based on the existing number of facilities in the province 
without taking the population criteria into consideration. 
Therefore, the poorest area of the northeastern region with 
the lowest number of health care facilities but more 
population has the lowest health expenditure per capita. It is 
clear that in order to obtain a more efficient and equitable 
distribution, more resources should be spent on the northeast 
region, taking account of the population criteria as well.
However, the effective distribution of MOPH resources in 
favour of those who live outside Bangkok and of the rural 
population was argued for by Myers, C. et al (1985) when they 
looked specifically at the major programmes; medical care, 
disease control and health promotion between 1981-5. The MOPH
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expenditures for these programmes were actually increased in 
rural areas and decreased in urban areas in accordance with 
the policy direction of the Fifth Plan (1982-86).
MOPH expenditure by level of service.
Focusing on the MOPH expenditure by level of service, 
during the Fourth Plan (1977-81), priority was given to 
secondary medical care and primary medical care. Primary 
health care services became the focus of attention during the 
Fifth Plan (1982-86). Table 3.8 shows that PHC expenditure 
which includes health services at village and Tambon levels 
has increased sharply between 1980 to 1986 but declined 
slightly at the beginning of the Sixth Plan (1987-91). 
Expenditure on primary medical care which consists mainly of 
services at community (District) hospitals, has steadily risen 
between 1982 and 1986 and has decreased slightly since 1987. 
By contrast, expenditure on secondary medical care and 
tertiary medical care including services at general 
(Provincial) and specialized (Regional) hospitals, which 
declined during the Fifth Plan, has been increasing from the 
beginning of the Sixth Plan. This reflects the shift of 
emphasis of policy direction towards the improvement in the 
quality of hospital services particularly by increasing the 
amount of high technology equipment to cope with the 
increasing diseases of modernization, for example; cancers, 
heart diseases and accidents.
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Table 3.8 s MOPH expenditure by level of service,
1977-89. (Million Baht at 1987 prices.)
Year PHC PMC SMC TMC Non-allocated Total
( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % ) ( % )
(1)
(-100%)
(2)
1977 21.69 29.61 30.19 12.33 6.18 6,603
1978 21.74 27.44 30.22 13.58 7.02 5,995
1979 21.87 27.62 29.74 13.34 7.33 6,595
1980 20.17 28.02 30.47 13.57 7.77 5,894
1981 20.41 28.10 30.39 13.72 7.38 6,734
1982 23.04 28.77 29.53 12.50 6.16 7,570
1983 23.48 29.53 28.47 11.07 7.43 8,672
1984 24.88 29.46 27.49 10.36 7.81 9,220
1985 25.28 30.24 26.95 10.18 7.35 9,391
1986 25.31 30.59 26.85 10.11 7.14 9,420
1987 24.94 29.79 27.92 10.57 6.78 9,525
1988 24.74 29.77 27.94 10.71 6.84 10,214
1989 25.13 29.69 27.75 10.79 6.64 11,403
Notes: (1) Includes general administration and consumer 
protection.
(2) Million Baht at 1987 prices.
PHC = Primary health care.
PMC = Primary medical care.
SMC = Secondary medical care,
TMC = Tertiary medical care.
Source : Health Planning Division, MOPH.
MOPH expenditure by activity.
Turning to MOPH expenditure by activity, there has long 
been a heavy emphasis on curative services. This accounted for 
60.67% of expenditure in 1977 with a slightly lower proportion 
of 57.13%, in 1989. Expenditure on disease control and 
preventive care increased slightly between 1977-79 and 
remained constant at around 12%, in 1980-89. Health promotion 
expenditure with an 8-9% share in the Fourth Plan (1977-81) 
rose to 11.21% at the beginning of the Fifth Plan (1982-86) 
and remains unchanged, now. Training and manpower development
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has also received more attention from the MOPH. Its funding 
has steadily increased from 5.16% in 1977 to 7.33% in 1984 and 
then declined gradually to 6.64% in 1989. Expenditure on re­
search and laboratory development, general administration and 
supplementary programmes, and consumer protection remains 
stable (see table 3.9).
Table 3.9 2 Percentage of total MOPH expenditure 
by activity, 1977-89.
Year Cura Promo Preven Train- Consumer Re- Admini- 
-tive -tive -tive ing protection search stration
1977 60.67 9.23 13.65 5.16 1.78 4.45 5.02
1978 58.75 9.72 14.40 5.54 1.80 4.63 5.24
1979 58.61 9.62 14.14 5.41 1.90 4.77 5.51
1980 59.77 8.97 12.92 5.36 2.03 5.11 5.81
1981 60.02 8.89 12.65 5.36 2.11 4.92 6.01
1982 57.99 11.21 12.65 •5.88 1.94 4.44 5.86
1983 59.10 10.87 12.32 6.91 2.00 4.51 5.78
1984 56.16 11.69 12.58 7.33 1.99 4.56 5.68
1985 56.25 11.90 12.72 7.03 2.01 4.56 5.50
1986 56.20 12.07 12.82 6.86 2.00 4.55 5.46
1987 57.08 11.23 12.48 6.75 1.98 4.73 5.72
1988 57.25 11.04 12.56 6.77 1.96 4.74 5.63
1989 57.13 11.40 12.87 6.64 1.84 4.81 5.30
Source : Health planning Division, MOPH.
MOPH expenditure by type of budget.
Over the same period, the MOPH had an increasing share of 
personnel expenditure which rose sharply, by around threefold 
in real terms from 1,750 million Baht in 1976 to 5,753 million 
Baht in 1989. This represents an increase from 31.70% of the 
total MOPH expenditure in 1976 to 50.55% in 1989 (see table 
3.10). The cause of the increased personnel expenditure in
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1987 was the implementation of the first three-year health 
manpower plan (1987-89) which in fact was mainly a career 
ladder improvement which coincided with the overall civil 
servant pay structure review. Meanwhile, capital expenditure 
increased from 19.80% in 1976 to 29.26% in 1977 because of the 
massive expansion of community hospitals but it has declined 
gradually to 11.30% in 1987. In 1988-89, the improvement in 
hospital quality, with high medical technology in provincial 
and regional hospitals, signals a high proportion of capital 
expenditure which will need more recurrent costs in the 
future. Other recurrent expenditure, apart from personnel 
costs, was high in 1976 because of the first implementation of 
the Free Medical Care Project. (This project will be described 
in the next chapter. ) In future, the MOPH has to examine 
alternative methods of financing its services if standards are 
to be maintained.
?able 3.10 : MOPH capital and recurrent expenditures,
1976--89, (at 1987 prices).
Capital Recurrent expenditure Total
Year expenditure Personnel Other recurrent (* 100%)
( % ) ( % ) ( % ) (Million Bah
1976 19.80 31.70 48.50 5,521
1977 29.26 32.16 38.58 6,603
1979 22.61 38.05 39.34 6,595
1981 21.09 46.16 32.75 6,734
1983 18.70 44.83 36.47 8,672
1985 16.33 45.33 38.34 9,391
1987 11.30 52.50 36.20 9,525
1988 11.67 52.17 36.16 10,214
1989 14.19 50.55 35.26 11,403
Source : Health planning Division, MOPH.
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HOPH expenditure by programmes.
With the restriction of potential spending for major 
change, inevitably the MOPH had to spend its 1990 budget by 
improving its efficiency. This is done by reducing its 
administrative cost and cutting back from large programmes 
such as Health Services, Health Manpower Production and 
Development, and Communicable Diseases Control in order to 
support the new policy changes towards technological 
development. These priority Programmes namely, Laboratory 
Development, Sanitation and Environmental Health, and Non- 
Communicable Diseases Control, received a noticeable budget 
increase. Table 3.11 compares the 1989 with 1990 MOPH 
expenditures by sub-sector and programme under the programme 
structure of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1987-91).
Table 3.11 : Comparing the 1989 with 1990 MOPH
expenditures by sub-sector and programme.
Sub-sector Programme 1989 1990
( % ) < % )
I. Health Administration 2.2 1.9
1. Health Administration 2.2 1.9
II. Health Services 80.6 80.2
2. Health Services 76.9 76.6
3. Health Manpower 3.3 3.1
Production and Development
4. Laboratory Development 0.3 0.4
5. Drugs and Biological 0.1 0.1
Products
III.Community Participation in PHC 1.0 1.0
6. Primary Health Care 0.8 0.8
7. Health Education 0.2 0.2
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Table 3.11 - Continued.
Sub-sector Programme 1989 1990
( % ) ( % )
IV. Technology Development for Diseases 15.6 16.2
Control and Health Promotion
8. Family Health 4.3 4.0
9. Nutrition 0.5 0.5
10. Dental Health 0.2 0.2
11. Sanitation and 2.4 3.7
Environmental Health
12. Occupational Health 0.1 0.1
13. Communicable 7.8 7.3
Diseases Control
14. Non-communicable 0.1 0.2
Diseases Control
15. Health System Research 0.2 0.2
V. Health Consumer Protection 0.6 0.6
16. Health Consumer 0.6 0.6
Protection
Source : Health planning Division, MOPH.
b). Other Ministries.
The other ministries provide health and health-related 
activities. These include services provided by the Ministry of 
University Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of 
Defence, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the 
Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Justice.
The other ministries have a similar expenditure pattern 
to the MOPH's. Their total spending has risen in real terms, 
from 2,554 million Baht in 1978, to 4,036 million in 1987. 
However, their share of all health care expenditure decreased 
from 8.47% in 1978 to 5.96% in 1987 (see table 3.3). Amongst 
them, the Ministry of University Affairs was a major spender.
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Its largest responsibility is for the training of doctors and 
other health personnel. The total expenditure of the Ministry 
of University Affairs has grown sharply, in real terms, from 
1,989 million in 1978 to 3,210 million Baht in 1986 (see table
3.12). There are five university hospitals in Bangkok and 
three hospitals in the region. The high spending came from the 
sophisticated services they provided for the training of 
doctors and other health personnel.
The Ministry of the Interior is the second largest 
spender amongst other ministries. It is responsible for some 
health services in Bangkok and in the municipalities. Its 
expenditure was roughly constant at around 17% of the total of 
other ministries expenditure from 1980 onwards, although the 
real expenditure has increased only slightly. The Ministry of 
the Interior allocated about 15% of the total of other 
ministries' expenditure, to the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration which provides health services through its 6 
general hospitals and 58 clinics. Only 2% of the total of 
other ministries' expenditure went to support the police 
hospital in Bangkok and general health services (mainly school 
health and preventive care) in 129 Municipalities outside 
Bangkok.
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for providing 
health services to military personnel, veterans and their 
families. It has its own medical school and training centre 
for para-professionals. Their two training hospitals in
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Bangkok also provide health services to the general public. 
There is no clear trend in the spending pattern. In 1986 it 
had 1.56% of the share of the other ministries expenditure. 
Similarly, the rest of the other ministries had a total share 
of less than one percent, with no clear change in the pattern 
of spending over time (see table 3.12). It is worth noting 
that the figures for the Ministry of Defence's spending on 
health were likely to be underestimated because of the 
confidentiality of the information, for reasons pertinent to 
national security.
Table 3.12 : Health expenditure of other ministries. 
(Million Baht at 1987 prices).
Ministry 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
University Affairs 1,989 2,405 2,604 2,948 3,210
(77.88) (80.53) (80.50) (80.21) (79.84)
Interior 496 507 566 649 720
(19.40) (16.96) (17.50) (17.65) (17.90)
Defence 52.1 65.4 41.4 50.7 62.7
(2.04) (2.19) (1.28) (1.38) (1.56)
Agriculture and 9.2 4.9 9.7 11.0 10.9
Cooperatives (0.36) (0.16) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27)
Communication 8.2 4.7 8.4 11.4 11.7
(0.32) (0.16) (0.26) (0.31) (0.29)
Justice — — 5.2 5.5 5.6
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
Total ■ 100 % 2,554 2,986 3,234 3,675 4,021
Source : Health Planning Division, MOPH.
B. FOREIGN AID.
Foreign assistance for health in Thailand is one source 
of health care expenditure about which it is difficult to 
obtain information because several agencies are involved. For
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receipt of the assistance, the Department of Technical and 
Economic Co-operation under the Office of the Prime Minister 
is responsible for coordinating general loans or grants, part 
of which go to the health sector. However, foreign aid may be 
channelled directly to the ministries, institutions, or 
operating agencies. On the donor side, external aid agencies 
can be classified into official and non-official agencies. 
Amongst the official health donors are multilateral agencies 
such as UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, FAO, EEC, etc. and bilateral 
agencies such as the government of Japan, Canada, the U.K., 
France and so on. The non-official agencies include private 
organizations, foundations, institutions, medical 
associations, etc. for instance; the Leprosy Relief 
Association, the Save the Children Fund, the Sasakawa Memorial 
Health Foundation, the Association for International Cancer 
Research, and so on.
The amount of foreign aid for the health sector is more 
or less one percent of total health expenditure, or about 
three percent of public expenditure on health, and 
approximately 0.2-0.3% of total public expenditure (see table
3.13).
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Table 3,13 : Foreign aid to the health sector.
(At 1987 prices.)
Total aid 
Year (Million 
Baht)
% of total % of total % of public 
health public health
expenditure expenditure expenditure
1978 294.6
1980 492.8
1982 433.5
1984 417.1
1986 513.0
1987 500.0
0.98
1.40
1.03
0.79
0.83
0.73
0.21
0.34
0.24
0.20
0.27
0.22
3.18
4.94 
3.46 
2.74 
3.07
2.95
Source : Proceedings of the First Thai Health 
Assembly, 1988b, Table 6.3.
C. DIRECT PRIVATE PAYMENT
Direct household payment for health care is a major com­
ponent of health sector expenditure. Direct private payment 
constituted 66.69 per cent of total health expenditure in 1978 
and increased to 73.22 per cent in 1987 (see table 3). In 
Thailand, direct household payments are paid for health serv­
ices received from traditional healers, drug stores, private 
and public clinics, health centres and hospitals.
The relationships between patients and providers of 
health services through direct purchase, are close. By 
direct payment the provider's responsibility is direct to his 
patient. In addition, direct personal payment supports 
traditional healers throughout the developing world because 
their fees are typically low (Roemer, M.I. 1976, pp.15- 20).
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However, direct payment at the point of consumption is a 
financial burden on the poor who cannot afford to purchase the 
services. In Thailand, although it is not very well 
documented, it is believed that some families are forced to 
sell farmland in order to pay for medical bills. Direct 
private payments to health services in Thailand are operated 
to support the private market mechanism. It encourages people 
to purchase the service like ordinary commodities. In fact, 
the patient knows very little about his need for health care, 
nor does he know about the conditions and prices of health 
services. It is left to the providers to control the market, 
in general, the failure of the private market in health care 
being due to the uncertainty of demand, asymmetric 
information, and imperfect competition, are well documented by 
several authors such as Abel- Smith, B. (1976), Le Grand, J. 
and Robinson, R. (1984) and Barr, N.( 1987).
In Thailand, in fact, it is extremely difficult to find 
reliable data for private expenditure on health care. During 
the course of the WHO consultancy by Prof. Abel-Smith, B. in 
1985, after interviewing several authorities, he concludes:
" no reasonably reliable data is available on 
private expenditure on health care. The Ministry of 
Public Health needs more reliable information broken 
down into its component parts for planning the 
future development of the health sector as a 
whole..."
(Abel-Smith, B., 1985a, p.20.)
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Based on the limited information, however, the utiliza­
tion pattern of health services at the household level is as­
certained from three sets of data: the 1970, and 1979 com­
munity household surveys and a 1985 morbidity and mortality 
survey. The three surveys asked respondents the same question; 
whether anyone in the household had been sick in the month 
prior to the survey date. If so, respondents were asked what 
was done and what types of service providers they visited. The 
1970 and 1979 surveys asked them further to quantify the 
expenditure on health services they used. One problem with 
these two surveys was that only cash spent on health care was 
reported. They omitted payments in kind, and the cost of 
travel time and waiting time. However, the under-estimated 
costs from the surveys are probably not very large because of 
relatively low opportunity cost due to the high rate of 
unemployment and under-employment in Thailand, as in other 
developing countries. Table 3.14 compares the utilization of 
health services by household, amongst the three sets of data. 
A difficulty of comparison occurs when the classification of 
types of service are not the same but in broad terms, they are 
comparable.
96
Table 3.14: Percentage of utilization of health services
by household, 1970, 1979 and 1985.
Type of health services 1970 1979 1985
Self treatment 51.4 44.2 28.6
Traditional healers 10.4 6.5 2.4
Health centres 4.4 16.9 14.7
Public hospitals 11.1 11.1 32.5
Private hospitals 
and clinics
22.7 21.3 21.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Community Household Survey 1970, 1979, MOPH.
The Morbidity and Mortality Differentials, 1987.
From table 3.14, it can be seen that the number of people 
opting for self-treatment, in other words to buy drugs from 
drug-stores, reduced from 51.4% in 1970 to 28.6% in 1985. By 
contrast, there are growing drug supplies in the market from 
185 local pharmaceutical manufacturers and 2 state-owned 
manufacturers accounting for 3,000 million Baht per year in 
addition to the imported drugs costing around 800 million Baht 
yearly. This falling of self-treatment but rise in expenditure 
on drugs can be explained by most of the drugs used being 
under prescription or being used heavily in hospitals and 
clinics. In Thailand, the misuse and overuse of drugs is well 
reported in Jaidee, S. et al. (1986, pp.71-89). They estimated 
that total drug consumption expenditure increased from 2,662 
million Baht in 1970 to 25,119 million in 1984. In fact, the 
rural poor population still rely on self-treatment while the 
urban population visit clinics or hospitals. Visits to 
traditional healers and totally unqualified injection doctors 
have fallen, from 10.4% in 1970 to 2.4% in 1985, due to the
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availability of health centres and hospitals. The 1985 survey 
found a decline in the use of health centres, from 16.9% in 
1979 to 14.7% in 1985, and an increase in visits to clinics or 
hospitals staffed by doctors. Visits to government hospitals, 
from the 1970 and 1979 surveys, remained unchanged at 11.1%, 
but rapidly increased to 32.5% in 1985. The 1979 survey breaks 
down the data by visit to private hospitals and to private 
clinics. It is interesting to note that visits to private 
clinics constituted 19.72% while visits to private hospitals 
were only 1.62% of total visits.
The pattern of visits to health care providers is not as 
simple as seen by the results of the three surveys. Health 
care seeking behaviour of patients in the Khun Han District, 
Sisaket Province reveals that patients, in fact, consult more 
than one provider for advice or treatment. A large number of 
the patients in the study (50.5%) have two stages of
treatment. During the first attempt to cure illness, patients 
rely on self-treatment and/or visits to health centres. The 
second attempt involves visits to health centres or hospitals 
(Khumthong, N. et al, 1989). Another important finding of 
this study is that distance, price and quality of care are the
most important determinants of health seeking behaviour.
Distance is regarded as one of the most important factors 
influencing health care utilization in Thailand. The
availability of drug-stores, which sell western drugs without 
prescription on every street corner in urban Thailand attract
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people to make a "quick" visit. Similarly, the rural poor 
population can buy drugs from their local stores and from vil­
lage drug co-operatives. Travelling cost and opportunity costs 
from travelling time and waiting time are factors to determine 
the place of visits to drug-stores, health centres, clinics 
and hospitals. The relatively low travel costs make rural 
people visit health centres. Government hospitals are the most 
expensive places to visit in terms of waiting time. This is 
the main reason for the unchanged percentages of visits to 
government hospitals from the 1970 and 1979 surveys. By 
contrast, patients wait shorter times in a solo private clinic 
operated by a doctor who works as a salaried doctor during 
government office hours. Thus, the importance of opportunity 
costs for health care utilization should not be undervalued. 
Subsequently, the large rise of visits to government hospitals 
by 1985 was dued to the major expansion of District hospitals 
resulting from the Fifth Plan (1982-86) for hospitals to be 
available and accessible in the whole of the country.
The prices of health services are a key determinant of 
health care utilization. Thai people have long been paying for 
health services under the fee-for-service method of payment 
for every type and every level of service, even in public 
providers. However, payment to traditional healers may be in 
cash or in kind but no study has been made to quantify the 
price of services. Presumably, it is quite low but the 
availability of drugs at the price patients can afford results 
in declining services. From Khumthong, N. et al. (1989, p.16),
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the average cost of self-treatment is 15-17 Baht. The cost 
incurred when visiting the health centre is 20-25 Baht per 
visit, compared with the cash paid to private clinics of 50-60 
Baht per visit. A study of Pichaisanit, P. et al. (1984) gave 
the medical care cost patients met when visiting government 
hospitals. For IPD visits, patients paid 15.59 Baht, 59.62 
Baht, 138.78 Baht, and 126.99 Baht in district, provincial, 
regional and university hospitals. Average daily charges, if 
the patient was admitted to the hospital, were 63.90, 72.92, 
144.54, and 249.74 Baht respectively. Overall, the average 
cost to a patient visiting a government hospital was 153.6 
Baht while he/she paid 1,183.5 Baht to visit a private 
hospital. Moreover, this study revealed that private hospitals 
kept patients one day longer than the public ones.
On the supply side, the cost per OPD visit falling on a 
district hospital is 68.25 Baht and 121.75 Baht in a 
provincial hospital. The cost per day of IPD visits to 
district and provincial hospitals are 507.25 Baht and 387.25 
Baht respectively. The cost per IPD case are 1,203.25 Baht at 
the district hospital and 2,295.25 Baht at the provincial 
hospital. Cost recovery in the district hospital amounts to 
36.39% of total cost (or 76.18% of operating cost) compared 
with 39.79% of total cost (or 84.99% of operating cost) in the 
provincial hospital (Health Planning Division, 1989b). These 
percentages of cost recovery in the MOPH hospitals in Thailand 
are very high when compared to those of other developing 
countries, as presented in table 3.15. In addition, Griffin,
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C. C. (1988, table 1) presented cost recovery in public health 
facilities in 23 selected developing countries which was 
generally less than 15 percent of total recurrent government 
expenditure. At present, the relatively high cost recovery of 
hospitals in Thailand as presented in Health Planning Division 
(1989b) and Myers, C. et al (1985), was not able to reflect a 
true figure of direct private payment. This was because these 
studies had included the transfer payment from other 
government budgets in their charges such as from the medical 
care scheme of government employees, and other reimbursement 
schemes. Thus, at this point, there is no reliable information 
of direct private payment to public hospitals.
Table 3.15; Percentage of cost recovery by user charges in 
public health services in developing countries.
Country Level of Services
Hong Kong 
India 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Papua New Guinea 
Phillippines 
Thailand
Ethiopia
Togo 
Zimbabwe 
China
Hospital 
Hospital 
Hospital 
Hospital 
Hospital 
Hospital 
District Hospital 
Provincial Hospital 
Regional Hospital 
Rural Hospital 
University Hospital 
Parirenyatna Hospital 
County Hospital 
(Yexian County)
Percentage Recovered
1.8 % of total cost 
5 to 10 % of total cost
37 % of total cost
5 % of operating cost
2.5 % of operating cost
6 to 10 % of total cost 
36.39 % of total cost 
39.79 % of total cost 
18 % of total cost
21 % of total cost
24 % of total cost
28 % of total cost
74 % of total cost
Sources; " Report of Group II - User Charges ", Regional 
Seminar on Health Care Financing, Manila, 
1987.
Griffin, C.C. User Charges for Health Care in 
Principle and Practice. World Bank, 1988, 
table 2.
Development of Financial and Managerial 
Information System by the Supplementary 
Cost-Accounting System , Health Planning 
Division, MOPH, 1989b.
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How user charges in Thailand are set varies according to 
the level and type of health service. Fees for services in 
private hospitals are higher than public ones. University 
hospitals have detailed fee schedules which are easy to follow 
with relative value scales attached to them. In 1988 the MOPH 
issued a revision of an official fee schedule for its 
hospitals and health centres with a flexible range of prices. 
The following are the examples of fee structures in different 
types of hospitals (see table 3.16).
Table 3.16: Fee structures in different types of hospitals. 
(Baht)
Accommodation 
3 or more beds 
1 bed
Special room 
VIP room 
I.C.U. room 
Meal
MOPH
hospital
175
Subject to 
local conditions
University
hospital
(Chiangmai)
275
500-600
1,100
700
80-120
Operating room not specified
Anaesthetic
Hysterectomy
Hemorrhoidectomy
Thyroidectomy
Tonsillectomy
not specified
1.000-4,000 
500-1,500
1.000-4,000
1.000-4,000
500/lst hour 
250 for 
subsequent 
hours 
20-30 % of 
surgical fee
3.000
2.000
3.000
1.000
Private
hospital
(Phyathai)
n/a 
675 
1,640
3,000 
700 
included 
in the room 
prices 
600/lst hour 
200 for 
subsequent 
hours 
20-25 % of 
surgical fee
3.000-6,000 
1,800-3,000
3.000-5,400 
900-1,800
Sources; Fee Schedules in MOPH Hospitals and Health 
Centres. MOPH, 1988.
Fee Schedules in Chanqmai University Hospital. 
Changmai University, 1989.
"Private Hospital Charges", Group Insurance Dpt., 
AIA Co., Ltd., Bangkok, November 1984.
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The quality of services and the perceived efficacy of 
care are important determining factors in selecting a health 
care provider. In principle, patients are encouraged to visit 
health centres and be referred to district and provincial 
hospitals if needed. In practice, many patients in Thailand 
tend to bypass health centres to visit hospitals even with 
minor illnesses because their perception of the quality of 
care there, is that it is poor. They prefer to visit hospitals 
because of the better treatment and better drugs provided. In 
a similar pattern to rural behaviour, the urban middle class 
prefer to visit university hospitals. They are prepared to 
travel a long distance to university hospitals - bypassing the 
BMA health clinics or general hospitals because the quality 
of care provided in university hospitals is better. The 
utilization of university hospitals is influenced by the 
quality of care, especially when one considers that the prices 
at university hospitals are not prohibitively expensive.
There is an "income effect" for the poor who cannot 
obtain any type of assistance from the state and cannot afford 
to pay for the institutionalized health services. The system 
of user-charges reduces the number of visits to health centres 
and hospitals. The poor rely on self-treatment or buy drugs 
from local shops or drugstores which are plentifully 
available, as are food stores. They visit hospitals when their 
conditions are severe or when an accident occurs. There are no 
free services for emergencies and accidents which require 
expensive treatment. The patient has to pay for the services
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from his personal income. This is a great financial burden on 
the poor. It is clear that those most affected from the user- 
charged health service system in Thailand are the poorer 
amongst the population. However, there is a free medical care 
scheme which has reduced the impact of fees on the poor (to be 
referred to in the next chapter).
4. CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, information on the financing of the health 
care system in Thailand needs to be further developed. But it 
is clear that total expenditure for health care has grown 
rapidly in recent years with a trend for public sources of 
finance to decline and private sources to grow. The inequality 
in health care expenditure from the distribution of public 
expenditure on health, needs to be corrected. At the same 
time, alternative sources of finance for the health sector 
need to be developed. To mobilize and organize direct 
individual private payment through a collective insurance 
scheme supported by the state is the most equitable 
alternative. It would help the redistribution of income from 
the well to the sick and probably from the rich to the poor. 
A detailed analysis of the present health insurance system in 
Thailand is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 
HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION.
The Thai health insurance system consists of various 
schemes for different groups of the population with differing 
conditions and benefits. User charges have long been 
implemented in every type and level of health care facility, 
both public and private. The growth of user charges can lead 
to financial burdens or even catastrophe, especially in the 
case of the poor. The MOPH and GTZ (1989, p.2) gave an example 
of a man who began to borrow money amounting to 1,500 Baht to 
pay for his sickness, but ended up with a debt of 20,000 Baht 
in the fifth year and had to sell farmland at the end. 
However, there can be special arrangements which insure 
individuals against sickness or loss of income because of 
invalidity. The costs of such arrangements may be borne by the 
government, the employer, the persons covered or a combination 
of them. To define simply their existence in Thailand, there 
are four elements of health insurance in the context of social 
insurance, namely; social assistance, statutory insurance, 
employers liability, and voluntary insurance.
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2. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE.
A) Free Medical Care Project
Publicly operated health care systems are not only 
financed from general government revenues, but also impose 
modest user charges with slightly different fee schedules 
between the MOPH and other ministries. Around 30 per cent of 
total health costs are collected through user charges in MOPH 
hospitals (Myers et al, 1985). Historically, the rich bought 
themselves out of illness but the poor who could not afford to 
pay may have been exempt from paying fees arbitrarily at the 
discretion of the hospital director or other responsible 
person. The director of the hospital, therefore, had to 
mobilize local resources mainly from donations to cover budget 
deficits. In-kind payments in the form of voluntary labour for 
the hospital from time to time after the patient was 
discharged was also encouraged, but this work was limited to 
that which unskilled labour could do.
At the early stage of hospital development, the problem 
of underfunding was not very severe, because hospitals were 
not very popular. Only relatively few Thais could afford to 
pay to make use of the available western medical facilities. 
Boesch, E.E. (1972, pp.24-33), who studied the relationship 
between doctors and patients in Thailand between 1970-71, 
found that there was a social distance between the doctor and
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patient, and that a hospital induced several forms of anxiety, 
so that the patient tended to avoid contact with the hospital 
for as long as he could. After the reorganization of the MOPH 
in 1974 along with the improvement in general hospitals, the 
financial burden has been increasing. In 1975, the civilian 
government advocated a policy of free medical care to the 
indigent at the same time as free public transport and rural 
job creation projects. Many directors of public hospitals were 
not very pleased with a free medical care project as its 
allocative budget might not be sufficient and create more 
financial burdens for the hospital. Some of them worried about 
the future consequences in terms of the overutilization of 
free care.
The first Free Medical Care budget for the poor was made 
in 1976. It was channelled through the MOPH which then 
reallocated it to several providers including other Ministries 
and the BMA. But the major project spending is administered by 
the Office of the Permanent Secretary for Public Health which 
holds around 75 % of the total project's budget each year for 
spending in areas outside Bangkok. The project has three 
components; free medical care , mobile health units and radio 
communications. It finances the cost of drugs and medical 
supplies, laboratory tests, operations, deliveries, family 
planning, and food, etc. The main objectives of the project 
were to create equity as well as to improve the health status 
of the poor. However, in practice, the mechanism to identify 
eligible persons has been problematic since the beginning of
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the project. It was arbitrarily decided by the director of the 
hospital or officer in charge at the health centre at the 
point of service who could receive this benefit, from the 
patient's appearance. Only in Bangkok, in 1976, was a free 
medical care card issued with loose criteria to define 
poverty. Later on, the eligibility cards in Bangkok proved to 
be impracticable and were no longer used. However, 
Tansiriratanakul, C. (1978) found that the judgement of the 
director of the hospital as the final deciding factor for 
receiving care was not appropriate and the free care card 
should be re-introduced. Meanwhile, criteria to define 
poverty was systematically developed. As a result, income 
level was used as the means-test for eligibility. From 1978, 
a single person aged 20 or over with a monthly income of 1,000 
Baht or less and a family with a monthly income of 2,000 Baht 
or below were entitled to receive the free medical care 
benefit. Furthermore, Mills, A. (1980) - a WHO short-term
consultant, found that the poverty criteria of 1,000 Baht and
2,000 Baht across the board was unfair and geographical 
distribution of the project's expenditure was inequitable. The 
northeastern region of high social need and deprivation was in 
receipt of the lowest level of the project's benefit.
In September 1981, however, free-medical care cards were 
re-introduced nationwide. They were valid for three years 
(1982-84). The means-tested income level was changed to 1,500 
Baht for individuals but the household income level has 
remained unchanged at 2,000 Baht across the board, while
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inflation between 1976 and 1981 was around 22%, leading to 
worse maldistribution of the benefit. This time the Ministry 
of the Interior chief-officers at the district level were 
responsible for issuing the certificates to the medically 
indigent with screening from the village headman and Tambon 
headman. The mechanism of issuing the free-care card failed to 
guarantee that only needy persons could obtain the benefit. By 
contrast, some of the real indigents did not receive the card 
(Wibulpolprasert, S. et al, 1987, p. 53). During the first 
phase (1982-84), there was no restriction attached to the 
card. The card holder could visit any public service provider 
as many times as they wanted. As a result, the referral system 
collapsed and the total cost was very high because of over 
utilization.
During the second phase of implementing the card (1985- 
87), the poverty criteria of the project were not changed but 
the process of issuing the card was reviewed. Local committee 
and community leaders i.e. Buddhist monks, teachers and 
village health volunteers were recruited to take part in the 
process. In addition, a limitation for using the card was 
imposed to reduce the excessive demand for free care. However, 
it was a very loose restriction. It specified the nearest two 
health service providers (one health centre and one district 
hospital) as the first point to be contacted. But this time, 
the card holder was limited to visit either a health centre or 
a district hospital only once a day (to prevent the problem of 
moral hazard) with the exception of an accident or emergency
109
care (Office of Permanent Secretary for Public Health, 1984). 
Usually, the card holder would prefer to visit the district 
hospital rather than the health centre. This brought about a 
still greater financial burden for the district hospital than 
in the previous period.
When the third stage (1988-90) came into operation, the 
level of income for means-testing remained at 1,500 and 2,000 
Baht regardless of inflation of 40.8 % between 1981 and 1989. 
A slight change was that only one nearest health centre was 
specified as the first point of contact. In practice, health 
centres are not very well accepted by the villagers. A recent 
study in Sisaket province (Khumthong, N. et al, 1989, p.13.) 
gives the reasons as being that villagers do not trust the 
knowledge of the health personnel, nor the quality of the 
drugs they prescribe, rather than for social distance reasons 
as found in hospitals in the previous study of Boesch, 
E,E.(1972). Another study in Chiangmai province by the MOPH 
and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (1989, p.13) 
confirms the unpopularity of health centres staffed by 
persons with low qualifications and reveals that, under Thai 
culture, health centre officers are unable to refuse to write 
a referral letter for the patient. Nowadays, it is quite 
common to find the card holder walking into a health centre 
mainly to collect a referral letter to the district hospital, 
even with a minor illness. Thus, for the success of the Free 
Medical Care project in the future what is urgently needed is
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an improvement in the quality and quantity of staff at the 
health centres.
The distribution of service benefit under the free medi­
cal care project is indicated by its per capita expenditure. 
The inequitable and inefficient distribution of the project's 
expenditure has changed slightly . For decades, the north­
eastern region with the highest social deprivation received 
the lowest per capita expenditure. But in 1988, the lowest per 
capita expenditure went to the central region while the 
northeastern region ranked as the second lowest (see table 
4.1).
Table 4.1 s Geographical distribution of Free Medical care 
expenditure, 1982-88 selected years,
(at 1987 prices).
Per capita (Baht)
Region 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988
Central 12.31 15.20 14.48 11.88 11.70
Northeast 7.20 12.37 11.38 11.80 12.37
North 9.87 12.96 12.53 13.30 13.47
South 9.57 14.23 13.24 13.89 13.26
Kingdom 9.73 13.85 12.83 13.10 13.03
Source : Rural Health Division, MOPH.
However, the criterion of per capita expenditure does not 
really give an accurate picture when compared to the criterion 
of the expenditure per poor person in each region. However, 
the criterion used to define who is poor are problematical and 
need to be reviewed. At this stage, assume the beneficiaries 
of the project are used as a proxy indicator of the poor in
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the region, the expenditure per beneficiary can display a 
better picture of the regional distribution. As a result, the 
northeastern region still receives the lowest expenditure 
every year. The expenditure per beneficiary has always been 
allocated in favour of the central region with an exception of 
the year 1989 when the project released funds to help the 
flood victims in the south (see table 4.2). However, below the 
regional level, the provincial inequity of distribution has 
remained unchanged because of the criteria for budget 
allocations relying mainly on the previous utilization 
records or workload. Clearly, to improve the equitable effect 
of the project, at least two criteria for budget allocation 
need to be reviewed and adjusted accordingly, by using data 
from the recent socio-economic survey and other sources. These 
criteria are; 1. a "population basis", for budget allocations 
(for example; the number of the poor, the age and sex 
structure, mortality, morbidity, fertility rate of the poor, 
etc.) and 2. the income level as determined by means-testing 
with its regional variations.
Table 4.2 : Expenditure per beneficiary in 1982-89, 
selected years (at 1987 prices).
Per capita (Baht)
Region 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989
Central 57.50 92.81 107.67 94.44 90.21 90.21
Northeast 24.59 48.34 59.80 57.45 60.07 70.81
North 33.26 49.13 71.07 63.97 62.04 72.75
South 53.41 72.94 88.28 77.59 72.87 119.31
Kingdom 38.12 58.81 74.31 67.89 65.00 88.27
Note : Represents only the figures of the Office of
the Permanent Secretary for Public Health.
Source : Rural Health Division, MOPH.
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Regarding the utilization of this project by eligible 
persons, in 1987 the utilization rate from the northeastern 
beneficiaries was 68.27% accounting for 2,388,225 visits. The 
North, in contrast, has the highest utilization rate of 
125.68% of the total beneficiaries. The central and the south 
has a similar utilization rate of 96.73% and 95.63% respec­
tively making the national average of 90.55% of the total card 
holders (see table 4.3). However, these statistics cannot 
reveal precisely how many eligible persons used the services. 
The 125.68% of utilization rate in the North does not mean 
that the take up rate in that region was 100% because each 
patient may have 2 visits per year, making a take up rate of 
only 62.84%. But it is explicit that all other regions of the 
country have a take up rate of less than 100%. The lowest 
utilization rate in the North-Eastern Region can be explained 
because of stigma or the lowest opportunity for access (see 
the highest population per bed and per health personnel in 
chapter 2, tables 2.4 and 2.9). By contrast, table 4.3 reveals 
the number of free care visits from non-card holders which 
includes the poor who cannot afford to pay the fees and the 
privileged group of the population (referred to on page 117 in 
this chapter). It is interesting to note that the northeastern 
region has the highest proportion of free-care visits without 
cards in the country and accounts for 66.50% of the total free 
care visits in the region. This utilization behaviour of the 
northeastern patients suggests two possible explanations. 
Firstly, the beneficiary may feel stigmatized by receiving the 
poverty-related card, therefore reducing its utility.
113
Secondly, this project has a gap because it fails to cover all 
of the sick poor who are really in need and have to visit the 
public facilities without money and without any card. The MOPH 
expenditure on free care for people without cards in 1984 was 
533.18 million Baht (at 1987 prices) for their 625,986 in­
patient visits and 6,121,741 out-patient visits (Health Card 
Centre, 1986, p.1/10), compared with the spending of 799.14 
million Baht for a total of 9,205,197 visits in 1987 (Rural 
Health Division, 1988). Obviously, the user charges and 
donations play a great role, again, in this situation.
Table 4.3 : Utilization rate of the Free Medical Care
Project, 1987.
Region Total Free care visits Visit as Non-card holder
Free Cards by card holders % of free care visits
(thousands) (thousands) Beneficiaries (thousands)(1)(2)
Central 1,293 1,251 96.73 2,402
(34.25%) (65.75%)
Northeast 3,498 2,389 68.27 4,741
(33.50%) (66.50%)
North 1,849 2,324 125.68 2,613
(47.08%) (52.92%)
South 977 935 95.63 1,436
(39.42%) (60.58%)
Kingdom 7,617 6,899 90.55 11,192
(38.13%) (61.87%)
Notes : (1) Includes in-patient and out-patient visits.
(2) Includes visits from eligible persons under 
medical care for the privileged groups of 
the population and visits from the poor 
without cards.
Source : Rural Health Division, MOPH.
The total cost of the project has increased remarkably, 
in real terms, from 475.2 million Baht in 1982 to 706.1
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million Baht in 1987. In the same period, the expenditure per 
card holder has risen from 154.8 Baht to 406.5 Baht and the 
expenditure per beneficiary has grown to more than double from
43.6 Baht to 92.7 Baht (see table 4.4). Moreover, every three 
years there is an administrative cost for issuing and renewing 
cards which accounts for around 1 -2 % of the total project 
expenditure, regardless of the social cost of identifying the 
eligible persons. Since 1985, the local committee and a number 
of local leaders have participated in the process without any 
compensation from the project. Their tasks are complicated and 
time-consuming especially, in measuring the level of income 
of their fellow villagers. This complex process needs to be 
paid for to prevent the leakages of the benefit going to those 
who do not really need them. Evidence from a study by Adeyi, 
0.0.(1988, pp.42-4) showed that 23.1% of low income cards went 
to those with the "average" income and 17.3% of them belonged 
to the "wealthy". Clearly, this made the project even more 
costly. In 1987 the total expenditure for issuing cards, 
without taking the social cost into account, was 7.2 million 
Baht with an addition of 6.7 million Baht in 1988 - at 1987 
prices. (Rural Health Division, 1989, table 2). Overall, the 
project's expenditure gets higher and higher but the benefit 
of the project is going in the opposite direction. Table 4.4 
illustrates how 3,069,000 cards were issued in 1982 compared 
with 1,737,000 cards in 1987. Similarly, the number of 
beneficiaries was also reduced from 10.8 million persons to
7.6 million persons during the same period. The coverage in 
the project of the total population was reduced sharply from
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22.47% to 14.41% because of unchanged income limits in a 
period of inflation and economic growth. This phenomenon 
demonstrates that rising health care expenditure does not 
guarantee an increasing number of beneficiaries of the health 
services.
Table 4.4 : Free Medical Care expenditure per card holder
and per beneficiary, (at 1987 prices).
1982 1984 1987
Free medical care 542.5 705.8 706.1
expenditure (Million Baht)
No. of cards issued 3,069 2,300 1,737
(Thousands)
No. of persons per card 3.5 4.4 4.4
No. of beneficiaries 10,892 10,122 7,617
(Thousands)
Total population 22.47 20.08 14.41
coverage (%)
Expenditure per card 176.8 306.9 406.5
holder (Baht)
Expenditure per 49.8 69.7 92.7
beneficiary (Baht)
Expenditure per visit n/a n/a 102.4
Source : Rural Health Division, MOPH.
Note : Excludes free care visits from non-card holders.
3. STATUTORY INSURANCE.
A) Medical care for the privileged groups of the 
population.
The Ministry of Public Health has a responsibility to 
provide health care to special groups of the population. There
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are 4 privileged groups who are eligible for free medical 
care or for cost-sharing at some percentage of the MOPH's fees 
under the 1982 MOPH Regulation for Medical Assistance. The 
level of benefit differs according to which group they belong 
to, ranging from free medical care to 75% cost-sharing. The 
family of the privileged person (their spouse, children and 
parents) are usually protected by the same level of benefit , 
unless otherwise stated. Details of the 4 groups are as 
follow; (Thailand Public Health Association, 1991, pp.200- 
203) .
Group I. There are 14 types of person who belong to this 
group, for example; the veterans type 1, Islamic Provincial 
Committee members, Buddhist monks, village health volunteers, 
village health communicators, malaria health volunteers, etc. 
Only 5 types have their families covered by the same level of 
the benefit. The benefits include free drugs, doctor's fee, 
diagnostic tests and food and hotel costs. The beneficiaries 
have to pay 50 % of the cost for a private room.
Group II. There are 5 types of privileged people in this 
group. They are; The Tambon headman, Deputy Tambon headman, 
Village headman, Deputy Village headman and Tambon doctor who 
is working under the control of the Ministry of Interior. 
Their families are entitled to the same level of benefits. The 
beneficiaries of this group must pay 50 % of all hospital 
user fees, including a private room. The remainder is sub­
sidised by the MOPH. Recently, the government considered
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upgrading Tambon headmen and Village headmen into the 
beneficiary group I to obtain the same level of benefits as 
village health volunteers.
Group III. There are altogether 18 types of people who 
are entitled to receive these benefits. These include civil 
servants, government pensioners, members of Parliament, 
members of the Senate, members of local government, members of 
the Red-Cross Society, veterans type 2, and so on. In only two 
of these types are the families not protected. The beneficiary 
receives the option of using a private room at 50 % of the 
user charge. They have to pay all of the other fees in full. 
However, Some of them for example, civil servants and private 
school teachers, are protected by their own schemes. If that 
is the case, the hospital will send the bills to their funds, 
but the beneficiaries are responsible for the payment of 50 % 
of the charge for a private room.
Group IV. The members of this group number only four 
types of privileged persons. They are; members of the 
teacher's council, veterans types 3 and 4, and the folk boy 
scout. The families of the teacher and the veterans are 
entitled to receive the benefit but those of the folk boy 
scouts are not. The benefit provides only 25% of the charge 
for a private room.
In addition, since 1985, the MOPH has encouraged 
donations from the rich by giving the same benefit as the
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beneficiary group I, to those who donated land or medical 
equipment worth more than one million Baht. For the donation 
of more than two million Baht, their family is also protected.
The total number of beneficiaries under all these 
arrangements number around 2 million people. In 1987, they 
made nearly 2 million visits to the hospitals and health 
centres under the Office of the Permanent Secretary for Public 
Health. The figure increased to 2,432,134 visits in 1988. The 
expenditure per visit has decreased in real terms from 96.87 
Baht in 1987 to 85.05 Baht in 1988. By contrast, the 
expenditure per beneficiary has risen from 96.16 Baht to 
103.42 Baht (see table 4.5).
Table 4.5 : MOPH expenditure(1)under the scheme for the
privileged groups of the population, 1987-88 
(at 1987 prices).
1987 1988
No. of beneficiaries 2,000 2,000
(Thousands)
No. of visits 1,985 2,432
(Thousands)
Total expenditure 192.48 206.88
(Million Baht)
Expenditure per visit 96.87 85.05
(Baht)
Expenditure per 96.16 103.42
beneficiary (Baht)
Notes : (1) Represents only the figures of the Office of
Permanent Secretary for Public Health, financed 
from the regular MOPH budget.
Source : Rural Health Division, MOPH.
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B) Medical scheme for government employees and state
pensioners.
The Thai government provides a non-contributory medical 
benefit for its employees as a fringe benefit. The 
beneficiaries include military personnel, policemen, civil 
servants, and state pensioners. Their families including the 
spouse, children and parents are also covered. The total 
number of beneficiaries in 1987 were 6.08 million people. This 
scheme is financed from general taxation and is controlled by 
the Ministry of Finance. The beneficiaries receive free com­
prehensive medical care when in a public hospital. When visit­
ing out-patient departments, the beneficiaries have to go 
only to public providers. For their in-patient visit, they can 
go to private hospitals but a cost-sharing of 50% is required 
with a maximum of 3,000 Baht for a hospital stay of up to 30 
days. These service benefits are provided through the 
reimbursement system. The beneficiary has to pay for the 
itemized fees for services for an out-patient visit to the 
public hospital or for in-patient care in a private hospital, 
and send the bills to the Ministry of Finance which will 
reimburse according to the rules. For in-patient stays in 
public hospital, the hospital will send the bills directly to 
the Ministry of Finance.
Measures to control the cost of this scheme have been in­
troduced. Only three children per family can obtain the 
benefit. The maximum rates for appliances, prostheses, and the
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daily rate for food and private room are standardized and ap­
plied in both public and private hospitals. In addition, in 
private hospitals, patients must pay 50% in cost-sharing for 
their itemized charges for services with an upper limit of 
3,000 Baht for the first 30 days of hospitalization. For 
private hospital stays exceeding 30 days, a maximum rate of 
100 Baht per day is payable in addition to the standard daily 
charge. If the beneficiary stays in a public hospital, there 
is no cost-sharing and no ceiling for itemized charges for 
services.
However, there is a trend of rapidly increasing medical 
expenditure for government employees and state pensioners. The 
total expenditure in 1978 was 595.20 million Baht (at 1987 
prices) compared with 2,801.10 million Baht in 1987. The 
share of total health expenditure has risen by more than 
double, from 1.97% of the total in 1978 to 4.13% in 1987. 
Likewise, it was only 0.42% of total public expenditure in 
1978 but it had increased to 1.23% in 1987 . When compared 
with government payroll, a slightly different trend is found. 
In 1978 medical expenditure for government employees and 
pensioners was 3.10% of government payroll. It had decreased 
to 2.27% in 1980 but gradually increased to 4.00% in 1987 (see 
table 4.6).
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Table 4.6 2 Medical expenditures for government employees
and state pensioners in 1980-87.
Total % of total % of total % of
Year (Million Baht health public government
at 1987 prices) expenditure expenditure pay-roll
1978 595.20 1.97 0.42 3.10
1980 856.75 2.50 0.57 2.27
1981 1,176.19 n.a. 0.71 2.33
1982 1,380.39 3.30 0.77 2.35
1983 1,629.21 n.a. 0.87 2.61
1984 1,899.15 3.58 1.00 2.90
1985 2,182.99 n.a. 1.03 3.35
1986 2,630.82 4.24 1.23 3.91
1987 2,801.10 4.13 1.23 4.00
Sources : Computed from Kiranandana, S." Health Insurance
and Medical Schemes for Civil Servants and 
State Enterprise Employees", 1988, table 1 
and la.
Proceedings of the First Thai Health 
Assembly. 1988b, Table 6.3 and 6.7.
Major reasons for the high cost of medical care in this 
scheme were due to false claims, excessive claims and 
unnecessary services provided by the private sector (Abel- 
Smith, B., 1985a). The abuses were often found in private
providers while they were rarely found in public providers 
because of tight control and the non-profit nature of public 
provision (Kiranandana, S., 1988). Because cost-sharing for 
50% of the charge is regulated for in-patient care in private 
hospitals, double billing was the most common abuse to 
compensate for half payment by the user.
Table 4.7 illustrates the medical expenditure of this 
scheme, excluding policemen and military officers for whom 
data is not obtainable because of security reasons. The total 
medical expenditure per person (government employees and
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pensioners) was 1,157,3 Baht in real terms in 1982, increasing 
sharply to 2,051.0 Baht in 1987. Medical expenditure per 
beneficiary (state employees) rose from 251.5 Baht to 445.9 
Baht. Similarly, the pensioners spent 408.5 Baht per 
beneficiary in 1982, increasing sharply to 850.1 Baht in 
1987. Overall, the national average of medical expenditure per 
beneficiary of this scheme was 256.3 Baht in 1982 and 460.8 
Baht in 1987. From the cost escalation of this scheme, there­
fore, special attention should be paid to financing with 
reference to efficiency and equity. In the future, the method 
of paying private providers should be reviewed as well as 
introducing contributions or cost-sharing from the 
beneficiaries of this scheme. However, the very low salary of 
public servants may be a prohibiting factor in doing this, 
unless the government is prepared to increase the government 
pay scale.
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Table 4.7 : Medical expenditure for government employees
and state pensioners(1). (Baht at 1987 prices).
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Government employees.
Total medical 1,314 1,547 1,800
expenditure 
(millions)
Total number 1,086 1,130 1,160
of employees 
(thousands)
Total number 5,222 5,431 5,577
of beneficiaries 
(thousands)<a>
Expenditure 1,211 1,369 1,552
per employee 
Expenditure 251 285 323
per beneficiary 
State's pensioners.
Total medical 65.8 80.2 99.4
expenditure 
(millions)
Total number 107.3 117.4 125.6
of pensioners 
(thousands)
Total number 161.0
of beneficiaries 
(thousands)(3>
Expenditure 613 683 792
per pensioner 
Expenditure 409 360 528
per beneficiary 
Total
Expenditure 1,157 1,305 1,477
per person 
Expenditure 256 290 329
per beneficiary
2,087 2,477 2,613
1,181 1,201 1,218
5,679 5,773 5,856
1,768 2,064 2,146
368 429 445
121.9 153.1 188.6
134.0 142.0 148.0
176.1 188.4 201.0 213.0 222.0
910 1,078 1,275
607 719 850
1,681 1,959 2,051
380 439 461
Notes : (1) Excludes policemen and military officers.
(2) Includes their spouse, children, and parents.
Calculation based on the National Socioeconomic 
Survey data that 68.7% of employees are married.
(3) Includes their spouse and assumes that 50% of
pensioners live with their spouse.
Source : Kiranandana, S., 1988, table 2.
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C) State enterprise employees scheme»
Employees of state enterprises are one of the privileged 
group who are given non-contributory medical benefits. Most of 
the state enterprise revenue comes from user charges and is 
partly subsidized by the government. The reimbursement system 
and regulations are similar to the scheme for state employees. 
The standard daily rate is higher than in the government 
employees scheme but it differs from one enterprise to 
another. The number of children protected also varies; most of 
them have no limit to the number of children protected and 
some of them give the benefit to adopted children as well. The 
major difference from the government employees' scheme, with 
the exception of four enterprises, is that most of them do not 
provide medical benefits to their retired employees.
The expenditure on this scheme has been estimated by 
Kiranandana, S. (1988) using figures from 19 enterprises. It 
was found that the total medical expenditure in real terms was 
354.7 million Baht in 1982 and had risen to 564.0 million Baht 
in 1987. The medical expenditure per employee increased 
steadily from 1,482.2 Baht in 1982 to 2,190.2 Baht in 1987. 
When taking the employees' dependents into account, the 
medical expenditure per beneficiary was 308.2 in 1982 compared 
to 455.5 Baht in 1987 (see table 4.8).
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Table 4.8 : Medical benefits for state enterprise
employees. (Baht at 1987 prices).
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total medical 354.7 381.1 407.0 499.2 527.0 564.0
expenditure 
(Millions)(l)
Total number 239.3 240.6 246.3 252.7 251.8 257.5
of employees 
(thousands)
Total number 1,151 1,158 1,185 1,216 1,211 1,239
of beneficiaries 
(thousands)<2)
Expenditure 1,482.2 1,584.0 1,652.2 1,975.7 2,092.8 2,190.2
per employee
Expenditure 308.2 329.3 343.7 410.9 435.4 455.5
per beneficiary(1>
Notes : (1) Estimated figures.
(2) Includes their spouse, children, and parents. 
Calculation based on the National 
Socioeconomic Survey data that 68.7% of 
them are married.
Source : Kiranandana, S., 1988, table 6.
The problem with this scheme is its highly curative 
nature. Preventive and promotive care, for example; 
immunization and regular medical check-ups, are not included. 
Measures to contain the cost and to raise cost-consciousness 
need to be introduced. Finally, similar to the government 
employees scheme, the enterprises should be well aware of the 
inequity of the benefits as well.
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4. EMPLOYERS LIABILITY.
A) Workmen's Compensation Fund.
This is a scheme for employees of industrial and commer­
cial firms with 20 or more workers throughout the whole 
country. This scheme is required by the Announcement of the 
Revolutionary Party, Number 103, dated 16 March 1972 that the 
employer must pay compensation for work-connected injuries and 
occupational illnesses. To avoid the problem of employers not 
being able to meet the costs of compensation or avoiding pay­
ment of it, the Thai government requires employers to insure 
themselves with a public carrier. A central public fund, 
namely the "Workmen's Compensation Fund" has operated since 
1974. All employers excluding those in agriculture, fisheries, 
public services, state enterprise services, domestic services 
and private schools are required by law to pay regular 
contributions to the Fund. The basic rates of employer's 
contributions vary from 0.2% to 4.5% of the payroll, according 
to the risk of the industry. In practice, the annual rates of 
contribution of each firm are adjusted annually according to 
the past three years experience of claims. (Workmen's 
Compensation Fund Office, 1985). It is a non-contributory 
benefit from the employees' side because this scheme is based 
on the employer's liability approach, enacted upon the 
principle that the cost of compensating work-connected 
injuries and occupational illnesses should be borne totally 
by employers. Although government employees are not protected
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by the scheme, the government pays an annual subsidy to this 
fund. The governmental subsidy is an arrangement to support 
the fund from the beginning, and it has continued paying to 
the fund although the fund is now self-sustaining with 
substantial reserves. In real terms, the government subsidized 
the fund by 1.78 million Baht in 1986 and 1.74 million Baht in 
1987 while the total unused reserved fund was 1,464.5 million 
Baht in 1986, increasing to 1,654.6 million Baht in 1987 
(Workmen's Compensation Fund Office, 1986 and 1987). Because 
it is a public carrier, in addition to an annual subsidy, the 
government is paying the administrative costs of the Workmen's 
Compensation Fund Office and the Ministry of the Interior 
network, at the provincial level .
The scheme provides both benefits in kind and cash. 
Benefits are provided in the case of occupational accidents 
and illnesses, invalidity and death. The benefit in kind con­
sists of medical and hospital services, including rehabilita­
tion services. The service benefits are provided through the 
retrospective reimbursement mechanism. The beneficiary is en­
titled to go to contracted hospitals (public and private) and 
clinics which send the bills directly to the fund. The 
beneficiary or his employer must pay the cost of hospitaliza­
tion if using the non-contracted hospitals or clinics and must 
send his receipts to collect his money from the fund within 90 
days. There is no cost-sharing from the patient if the cost of 
hospitalization is lower than 30,000 Baht. If the cost is 
beyond the maximum limit of 30,000 Baht, the patient must pay
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the rest. The standard daily charge for food and private room 
is imposed at 250 Baht per day.
For rehabilitation, employees who are entitled to receive 
rehabilitation care can obtain the full cost of rehabilitation 
medical benefit up to a maximum amount of 20,000 Baht. In 
1985, the Japan International Co-operation Agency donated some 
money and technical assistance to help in the establishment of 
the Rehabilitation Centre in Pathumthani Province (Department 
of Labour, 1988a). Although there is a large amount in the 
reserves, rehabilitation services are still minimal. 
Thailand, as in most developing countries, values labour 
forces and rehabilitation services less than those of 
developed countries because there is an excess of unskilled 
labour in the society. Also, most of the jobs are for 
unskilled workers. Therefore, in the past, there was no policy 
towards rehabilitation services. But in the future, the more 
the country develops, the more rehabilitation services are 
needed.
The cash benefits are divided into three types; temporary 
disability, permanent disability, and death benefits. Cash 
benefits usually pay 60% of the average monthly income ranging 
from 1,000 Baht to 6,000 Baht, payable after a waiting period 
of three days and continuing for a certain period. "Temporary" 
disability benefit is payable up to 52 weeks, "permanent" dis­
ability benefits are payable for up to 10 years according to 
the type and degree of invalidity, and survivor pension is
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payable to eligible survivors for up to 5 years. In addition 
to the survivor pension, a funeral grant is payable as a lump 
sum of 3 months' average income between a minimum of 5,000 
Baht and a maximum of 10,000 Baht. For the permanent 
disability benefit and survivor pension, the beneficiary can 
choose to receive either a lump sum payment or monthly 
payments (Department of Labour, 1988b).
This scheme has its fundamental problems. Firstly, there 
are gaps in the benefit. This comes from the eligibility rules 
which exclude all employees in agriculture, fishery and domes­
tic services, and employees in industrial and commercial firms 
with less than 20 employees. Moreover, the legislation fails 
to cover all firms with 20 or more employees (Petprasert, N., 
1986, p.97 ; Boonyoen, D., 1988, p. 11). In these
circumstances, the employer is supposed to provide com­
pensation directly to the employee according to the Thai 
Labour Acts but in fact the majority of them are not doing so. 
Moreover, not all of those eligible for benefits claim them 
(Petprasert, N., 1986, pp.97-99). Table 4.9 shows the number 
and rate of those who claim the benefits from the Workmen's 
Compensation Fund 1986-87. Non-take-up of this benefit arises 
partly from the beneficiary's lack of information and partly 
from the incentive attached to the "experience rate" setting 
which induces employers to prevent employees from claiming, 
for example; by finding a healthy, replacement employee from 
the excessively cheap labourer available in the market, to 
substitute for an unhealthy one. Moreover, the difficulty in
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administrative arrangements and the time consumed deters 
employees from claiming their benefits..
Table 4.9 : Reported occupational accidents, illnesses and
death, 1986-87.
1986
Number Rate(1>
1987
Number Rate(1
Sickness for 3 days 19,739 16.73 23,146 18.78
or less
Sickness for more 17,066 14.47 18,182 14.75
than 3 days
Temporary 1,206 1.02 1,158 1.94
disablement
Permanent 36 0.03 10 0.01
disablement
Death 363 0.31 315 0.26
Total 38,410 32.56 42,811 34.73
Note ; (1) Per 1,000 employees covered.
Source : Annual Report 1986, 1987., Workmen's Compensation
Fund Office, The Ministry of Interior.
Secondly, the level of cash benefits of 60% of the 
average monthly earnings are too low and not enough to enable 
the purchase of consumption goods for a standard family with 
two children, especially for employees of small firms because 
their earnings are already lower than subsistence level 
(Petprasert, N., 1986, p.99). In urban areas, when using a
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poverty line of 5,834 Baht per person per year in 1986,
(Hutaserani, S. and Jitsuchon, S., 1988), to define
subsistence level, the national minimum wage standard was 
only 1,800 Baht a month per employee. Thus, per capita income 
in a family of four was 434 Baht below the poverty line.
Thirdly, the benefit once paid is not increased with
inflation so after five years the real level of benefit can 
become lower still.
Fourthly, there are no strict referral rules built into 
this scheme, and the beneficiary tends to use designated
private providers up to the maximum limits and use the public 
provider later (Schwefel, D., 1988, p.32). This contributes to 
a high total cost of medical care. Table 4.10 illustrates the 
cost per protected employee and cost per case from 1981-87 (at 
1987 prices).
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Table 4.10 : Contribution and expenditure of The Workmen's
Compensation Fund, 1981-87.
(Baht at 1987 prices.)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Employer's 225.6 231.8 250.1 266.4 278.4 289.4 303.8
contribution 
(millions)
No.of firms 8,465 9,286 10,047 11,133 10,421 11,004 11,760
No.of 30 33 33 36 56 66 70
Provinces
No.of 798 825 874 995 1,092 1,180 1,233
employees 
(thousands)
No.of cases 28.4 30.0 34.3 39.8 39.6 39.4 43.4
(injured, death)
(thousands)
Compensation 179.0 172.3 225.6 264.5 241.4 221.8 267.8
from WCF(1)
(millions)
Cost per 224.6 208.8 258.2 265.9 221.3 188.2 217.4
protected 
employee
Cost per 6,312 5,750 6,586 6,648 6,106 5,626 6,178
case
Note : (1) Includes benefits in cash and in kind.
Source : Annual Report 1987.. Workmen's Compensation Fund 
Office, The Ministry of Interior, Table 1.
In addition, there is a scheme for private school 
teachers which is also subsidized by the government. Employers 
and employees pay 3% of the payroll each, while the government 
subsidizes at 6% of payroll. This scheme is the combination of 
a sickness and a provident fund because the employees' 
contribution can be refunded on retirement. However, there is 
no available data for further analysis of this scheme. There 
are about 0.5 million protected persons under this scheme.
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Recently, there is a scheme for students in primary 
education which is mainly for preventive and promotive 
services in the rural areas. In 1990, the budget for the 
student scheme was 72 million Baht to protect 6.7 million 
students in primary schools in rural areas.
5. VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE
There are two types of voluntary health insurance in Thai 
society. First, private (commercial) health insurance deals 
with the urban self-employed individuals or groups with middle 
or high incomes and the employees of some private firms. 
Second, the community (and development) health insurance; 
namely the " Health Card Scheme"; protecting mainly rural 
self-employed individuals or families. The MOPH is subsidizing 
the cost of health cards so that the poor can afford to buy 
them.
A) Private (Commercial) Health Insurance
Private health insurance evolved in Thai society as part 
of life-insurance or general insurance policies. The first 
five private health insurance companies were registered in 
1979, followed by the sixth insurance company for cancer, 
registered in 1983 (Kritayakirana, K. et al, 1986, p.149). At 
present, there are 31 commercial health insurance carriers in 
Thailand (Kolakul, J., 1988). They are as follows;
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1. There are 12 out of 67 life insurance companies which 
offer health insurance policies as a supplementary contract to 
life insurance policies to their customers. In this category, 
only three major companies have the biggest share in terms of 
the number of people covered.
2. There are only 6 health insurance companies which are 
registered to offer only policies against sicknesses and acci­
dents (as earlier mentioned). However, they are categorized by 
the Thai Trade law as general insurance companies. Between 
1984 and 1986, there were in total, 7,080 contracts for 
sickness and accident insurance.
3. There are thirteen general insurance companies out of 
57 companies of this type which offer a health insurance 
policy as an option amongst 17 options to be chosen from. 
There is no information available about the total number of 
people covered or the number of contracts. Only information 
from a new company shows that it had only 100 subscribers in 
1987.
Generally, there are three basic types of subscriber to 
private health insurance; the individual, occupational, and 
group (Maynard, A., 1982, p. 137). It is estimated that 50 % to 
80 % of the well-to-do self-employed persons who buy
individual subscriptions for life insurance are paying for 
their health insurance too. This accounts for around 170,000 
persons in 1985. The occupational subscribers are groups of 
professionals, associations or companies (for example; 
journalists, solicitors, etc.) who pay their own premium. It
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is not possible to obtain information on the number of insured 
persons in this category: presumably they are few. Finally, 
the group subscriber means a group of individuals whose 
premium is paid for partly or totally by their employers. In 
Thailand, some foreign and large local companies such as 
financial institutions and large manufacturers have this kind 
of arrangement for their employees (Kritayakirana, K. et al, 
1986, p.187). The estimated figure for the number of insured 
persons belonging to this group from Kolakul, J. (1988) was 
about 70,000 persons (excluding their dependents), making the 
total estimated number of those privately insured in 1985 
about 236,100 persons (excluding their dependents).
There are two main approaches for calculating premiums, 
risk-rating and pooling. Risk-rating means the insurer will 
charge different premiums on the basis of differing risks. In 
Thailand, there are four discriminating factors for low-risk 
and high risk; age, sex, occupation and health status. A 
younger individual pays a lower premium than an older person. 
Women at the same age as men pay a higher premium. The occupa­
tion type 3 (those whose working conditions put them at high 
risk, for example; mechanical workers, builders, lorry 
drivers, etc.) pay about 30 % higher rates than type 1 (office 
workers) and type 2 (business persons, journalists, solicitors 
and so on). Persons whose health statuses are classified as 
substandard, for instance; diabetics, and the obese, are 
subject to pay premiums at a higher rate. Lastly, the "bad-
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risks" - those with chronic illnesses and the elderly (aged 60 
years and over) - are excluded.
In contrast, the pooling approach charges the insured 
person at a standard rate across the board based on average 
experience. This method enables individuals to pool risks. 
Thus, positive redistribution (from the healthy members to the 
sick members) is possibles the bad-risk can be treated like 
anybody else. In group insurance and occupational insurance, 
individuals pay the flat rate average premium into a pool, 
agreeing that each will receive benefits from the insurer. In 
practice, insurance companies are interested in the working 
population more than the non-working population because they 
have already excluded the bad-risks. In addition, two more 
contributory factors for premium setting in Thailand are, ex­
perience rating and taxation. Experience rates adjusts the 
premium charged by taking into account the past claim 
experiences of insured persons. If the insured person has had 
a high claim in the previous year, inevitably his premium for 
the next year will go up to more than the standard rate. 
Regarding taxation in Thailand, those who buy only a health 
insurance policy as a major policy from a general insurance 
company have to pay tax and duties at 3.70% of the premium, 
while those who buy health insurance as a supplement to life 
insurance, are exempt from tax. Therefore, premiums paid to 
the latter are cheaper from the consumer's point of view.
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In general, the commercial private health insurance com­
panies in Thailand do not provide cash benefits. They provide 
only medical benefits. The type and level of benefits differ 
in detail, according to the arrangements which the insured 
person chooses and is willing to pay for. However, the general 
benefit offered in the market is for in-patient care. The 
benefit options to be chosen break down into 8 basic items. 
Each item has a ceiling attached to it. If the insured person 
wants to add benefits for in-patient visits or wants his 
dependents to be protected he can, but must pay accordingly. 
Usually, the benefits do not provide for preventive and 
promotive care, including maternity care, family planning and 
immunization. The benefits are provided through reimbursement 
with cost containment measures attached to them, for example; 
a limit of duration of stay in hospital for 30-31 days, a 
limit on the number of out-patient visits per year, a maximum 
limit per item, a standard daily charge, a maximum limit per 
case, a maximum limit per year, and so on. Under the 
reimbursement mechanism, patients must pay medical bills in 
full and send their receipts to the private insurers. After 
checking conditions of benefits and limits of an individual 
beneficiary, the insurer sends a cheque to the insured person 
accordingly. The cash reimbursement, therefore, may be less 
than the total medical bills.
The private insurance industry in Thailand, in general, 
has not been very successful in terms of its share of the 
market. It has decreased from 1.24 % of total health
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expenditure in 1978 to 0.66 % in 1987 (see table 3.3, chapter 
3). Health insurance in the six insurance companies which 
offered only health policies ran deficits of 12, 30, 11, 10 
and 7 million Baht in the years from 1982 to 1986 (Kolakul, 
J., 1988, p.24). This may be due to the high transaction cost 
resulting from two main factors. First, individual insured 
persons have to pay 3.70 % tax and duties on their premiums. 
Second, health insurance companies are small and their 
administrative costs are quite high at around 20-30% of the 
total expenditure. In the first year of business it is as high 
as 40-50% but it reduces gradually by 10% and 5% in the second 
and third years, respectively. Only companies which sell 
health insurance combined with life insurance can survive, 
partly, because their operating costs are relatively low 
because of the joint use of resources with the non-health 
section and partly because of the exemption from tax and 
duties which attracts more customers. At this point the 
principles of economies of scale can be applied. Also, they 
can transfer some costs to the non-health section.
The two major problems of private health insurance are 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Barr, N., 1987, pp.108- 
123). Adverse selection occurs when the insurer can distin­
guish good-risk and bad-risk customers and then reject the 
bad-risk ones. As mentioned earlier, the chronically ill and 
the aged are examples of this problem. Therefore, private 
insurance leads to inequitable coverage. Moral hazard can 
arise in two ways; insured persons may be able to influence
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either the probability of requiring medical treatment, or its 
cost. Therefore, some of the insurance companies in Thailand 
have a limitation on the number of out-patient visits per year 
and exclude the cost of normal child delivery in their 
policies because both conditions are controlled by individual 
choice. The second type of moral hazard, namely the third 
party payment problem, occurs when the insured person and the 
doctor are not concerned about the cost when health care is 
free at the point of consumption. The result is over 
consumption because both the insured person and his doctor 
have no financial incentive to constrain consumption. This may 
provide some explanation why commercial health insurance in 
Thailand is not a profitable business. However, they continue 
to offer policies because they hope to get more subscribers 
and run more cheaply in the future.
B) The Health Card Scheme
The Health Card Project in Thailand developed from the 
community financing activities of Primary Health Care. In 
1979, revolving drug funds were initiated and supported by the 
MOPH in parallel with the training of Village Health Volun­
teers. Subsequently, village funds for nutrition, sanitation 
and multi-purpose village development followed. In 1983, the 
health card project started in 18 rural villages with a 
particular emphasis on maternal and child health (MCH) and 
family planning (FP) services. The prime objectives of the
140
project were as follows? (Ministry Of Public Health, 1985, 
p.44 ? Boonyoen, D., 1988, p.12)
1. To develop the basic services of MCH/FP immunization 
and general medical treatment for health card holders.
2. To reorient the role of the people and health person­
nel to be in line with PHC strategy.
3. To improve the standard and quality of health services 
with a referral system to reduce OPD cases at provincial 
hospitals or at large hospitals.
4. To develop a new process of financial management by 
mobilizing the money from healthy people to help the 
sick.
5. To raise capital by loans or other income generation 
to finance health services and other community 
development efforts.
At present, the project is subject to debate to try to 
shift the emphasis towards health insurance, rather than a 
community development which was its original concept. There 
were 3 phases of development of the project?
Phase 1. (June 1983 - June 1984). The project of the 
health card fund with special emphasis on MCH, was set up 
as an experiment by the Department of Health of pre-paid 
health insurance. A total of 18 villages in 7 provinces 
were covered by the project as a pilot study.
Phase 2. (1984 - 1985). It was renamed the "Health Card 
Project, MOPH" and expanded to cover every province. Each
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province selected at least two villages located in the 
same Tambon for the project to be implemented as an ex­
periment. One of the main criteria to choose the village 
was that at least 70 % of the people wanted to
"voluntarily" buy the card. Later on, this criterion 
faded out.
Phase 3. (1985 - 1987). Study and adjust the prices and 
conditions of utilising the card. The project was aimed 
at setting up the funds in every Tambon in 1987.
However, the rapid expansion of the project proved to be 
impracticable. Thus, from 1988 to 1991 the project reduced its 
target to 8 Tambons in one province. Each Tambon tried to set 
up at least 3 village health card funds. Since 1988, the 
project was accepted as a part of the Sixth Five Year National 
Health Development Plan (1987-1991). The Health Card Centre of 
the MOPH was established to administer the project. The MOPH 
allocates its budget of around 5 million Baht annually to 
support the administrative costs of this centre.
There are three types of health cards for different risks 
and different benefits. They are the family card, individual 
card and MCH card. The prices of the cards are kept below the 
real cost so that poor people can afford to purchase them. 
Their prices are 300, 200 and 100 Baht respectively (Health 
Card Centre, 1985, p.34). However, the card prices are viewed 
as too low relative to the benefits provided and relative to 
the actual household direct payment for health services.
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Therefore, the cards are affordable by most households (Myers, 
C. et al, 1985). Although the price of cards was adjusted once 
at phase 3 of the project, it is a standard price for the 
whole country. A WHO short-term consultant, Abel-Smith, B. 
(1985a, pp.9-11) suggested that the price of the card should 
vary according to the geographical area, because some regions 
are much poorer than others.
After the cards are sold, the premia collected are kept 
in the village health card fund in order to raise capital or 
to develop the community for one year. Next year, 15% of the 
premiums are kept in the village health card fund but the 
remaining 85% is sent to the MOPH providers. The allocative 
formula has been developed and adjusted from time to time. At 
the moment, it allocates 75% of the premium from the previous 
year's collection to the MOPH facilities - 30% to provincial 
level, 30% to district level and 15% to the health centre 
level. The remaining 10% is sent to compensate the government 
health personnel - 2% at provincial, 3% at district and 5% at 
Tambon level (Health Card Centre, 1985, p.37). Hongvivatana, 
T. et al (1986, p.69) argued that this allocation was unfair 
for district hospitals because the highest work-load fell on 
district hospitals due to the improper referral of cases from 
health centres. They suggested more money should be given to 
district hospitals.
Variations in the coverage and benefits amongst the funds 
are found in different provinces. Since 1988, each province
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has its own regulations for benefits and restrictions. 
Previously, there were standard coverage, benefits, and 
limitations nation-wide. For instance; the family card 
protected up to 5 family members. The maximum utilization was 
up to 6 episodes of illness per year for a family card holder 
and 4 illness episodes for an individual card holder etc. 
However, the maximum limit of 2,000 Baht per episode of 
illness is still imposed everywhere. Also, there is a 10% 
discount on user charges for health card holders if MOPH 
facilities are used beyond this limit. This is the case all 
over Thailand.
To strengthen the referral system, only one health centre 
is designated as the first point of contact. The card holder 
must get a referral letter from the health centre for hospital 
visits except in an emergency. Once referred to the hospital, 
the card holder is entitled to use a " green channel" or 1 
express way". The reduction of waiting time is reported to be 
an important incentive to purchase the card but keeping this 
benefit will have cost and cost recovery implications (Myers, 
C. et al, 1985, p.125). In practice, the referral system fails 
to fulfil its objectives. The card holders go to the health 
centre specified as the first point of contact, not for treat­
ment but to demand a referral letter to district hospitals . 
A study of MOPH and GTZ (1989, p. 13) found only 15% of the 
referred patients with health cards visit hospitals with 
medical relevance, compared with 20% of non-card holders. 
There is evidence that health card holders have over-utilized
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medical services. In addition, Kitprapaiampoon T., (1988,
p.122) found the health card holders have shifted their 
medical care utilization from private health care providers to 
the MOPH providers specified in the card and over-utilized the 
services. To reduce unnecessary visits, charging the card 
holders who live near the hospital for their OPD visits (as 
suggested by Abel-Smith, 1985a, p. 10) and imposition of cost- 
sharing measures (as recommended by Hongvivatana, T. et al., 
1986, p.66) are technically correct and should be implemented 
accordingly. In fact, Abel-Smith emphasized the inequity of 
prices and utilization between those who live near the 
hospital and the poor who live in the remote villages.
The card is valid for one year with a start time varying 
according to the administrative and managerial conditions of 
each fund. Most of them start after the harvest season when 
the full cost of the card can be paid, while the other funds 
may allow instalments. At the beginning stages of the 
project's development, unused cards could be renewed without 
new payment but this condition has now been withdrawn. As a 
result, health card holders over-utilize medical services 
shortly before the card expires (Kitprapaiampoon, T., 1988,
p.122) .
An adverse selection problem of this scheme is envisaged. 
During the first and second phases of the project, it was said 
that the chronically ill were excluded. However, in practice, 
there was no physical check-up required before buying the card
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as in private commercial insurance. Some of the bad-risks can 
buy the card easily while others cannot. The result was that 
some funds were faced with financial losses as only those with 
bad-health risks bought the cards. Taking the equity principle 
into consideration, this precondition has been withdrawn since 
the beginning of the third phase. At the moment, they are the 
major client groups who make use of the services. At the same 
time, the funds failed to expand to protect the majority of 
the healthy population but reduced the target members from 
70% of the total villagers to somewhere between 35% to 50%. 
Inevitably, the service providers for health card holders 
faced the problem of financial loss everywhere. This is 
responsible for the unpopularity of the project. To prevent 
these problems, the number of insured persons must be large 
enough to share the risk. Hence the decision that whole 
villages should join or no residents of it.
At present, the number of health card holders is around
2.5 million people, or 22.6 % of the population in project- 
implemented areas (Schwefel, D., 1988, p.36). By the end of 
1991, the health card scheme is targeted to cover around 35% 
of all rural villages.
The scheme is viewed as innovative and conceptually cor­
rect (Myers, C. et al, 1985, p. 130). The most challenging 
idea is that it links prepaid and self-administered voluntary 
health insurance with local development efforts (Schwefel, D., 
1988, p.47). The insurance principle of this scheme can
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eliminate the financial burden of the card holder when sick. 
The positive redistribution (from the well to the sick) needs 
to be emphasized.
However, the disadvantages of this scheme are the over­
utilization of the medical services and adverse selection. At 
the initial stage of development, under-use was a problem 
because of incentive attached to the renewal card, but once 
the incentive was removed over-use became a problem instead. 
For further development of this scheme, the use of preventive 
health care rather than curative care should be encouraged. 
The cost recovery and the allocative proportion to health 
service providers, should be analysed and adjusted (as 
suggested by Hongvivatana,T. et al, 1986). The relationship 
between health cards and low income cards should also be 
studied. Moreover, the understanding of the health personnel 
and the villagers supporting this project, is a most critical 
issue. In addition, several measures for financial incentives 
must be built in to promote the sale of the card (as suggested 
by Abel-Smith, 1985a). Finally, international experiences from 
the historical development of both developed and developing 
countries are well worth examining.
Overall, the problem of health insurance in Thailand is 
about who gets what benefits and at what cost. The effect of 
the insurance arrangements at present, which rely on the 
market mechanism of competition amongst health care providers, 
are to favour the financially and politically stronger groups
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in the society. The highest income group of the country may 
not bother to buy any type of insurance or may purchase 
commercial private insurance at the premium of around 1,855 
Baht per person a year. However, the private insurers exclude 
the poorer and the chronically ill population because these 
group can bring financial loss to their business from the 
uncontrollable fee-for-service medical bills. Thus, a public 
insurer would be in a better position to protect the higher 
risk groups of the population.
However, when comparing different schemes, the results of 
public arrangement schemes in Thailand are still far from 
being either equitable or efficient. The comparison of costs 
per beneficiary in different schemes is shown in table 4.11. 
It is noted that these costs were only part of operating costs 
which were directly channelled through each scheme. They are 
not total costs due to the exclusion of the other operating 
costs: investment costs and labour costs which are carried by 
the regular budget of the public sector. As a result, as in 
most developing countries, government employees are the most 
favoured group. In Thailand, on a non-contributory basis, 
government employees receive the highest health benefit at a 
cost of 460.8 Baht per beneficiary in 1987. Likewise, public 
enterprise employees, the spearhead of the labour movement 
which every military and civilian Thai government needs for 
their political support, received a non-contributory health 
benefit of 455.5 Baht per beneficiary. In addition, the 
Workmen's Compensation Fund beneficiary received 217.4 Baht
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by his/her employer's contribution only. Next, the 
beneficiary of the Free Medical Care Project obtained free 
care at 92.7 Baht per person out of the money collected from 
tax payers. However, there is no reliable information about 
the cost of the Health Card Project. The figures which show 
that beneficiaries of the Health Card Project had to pay 73.2 
Baht per person per year were based on the cost of cards sold 
(Tantiserani, P. and Prompakdee, S., 1989, p.93). Finally, a 
primary school pupil received care from the government budget, 
at the lowest cost of only 11.7 Baht per person.
Table 4.11 : Summary of health insurance system in 
Thailand, and cost per beneficiary. 
(Baht at 1987 prices.)
Scheme Population
coverage
Number
(Million)
Cost per 
beneficiary
1.Free Medical 
Care
2.Privileged 
Group
3.Government 
Employees
4.State
Enterprise
Employees
5.Workmen's 
Compensation 
Fund
6.Private 
Insurance
7.Health Card
The Poor 8.5
Privileged groups 2.0
Government employees, 6.0
pensioners, and 
their families 
State enterprise 1.2
employees and 
their families 
Employees
Self-employed 
(urban)
Self-employed 
(rural)
1.2
0.2
2.5
92.7
103.2
460.8
455.5
217.4
1,855.0
73.2
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Table 4.11 - Continued.
Scheme Population Number Cost per
coverage (Million) beneficiary
8.Pupils Primary school 6.7 11.7
pupils(rural)
9.Others Military personnel 1.0 n.a.
and their families,
Policemen, Private 
school teachers
Total 29.3
(% of population 54.4)
Sources : Proceedings of the First Thai Health 
Assembly, 1988b.
Annual Report 1987, Workmen's Compensation 
Fund Office, Ministry of Interior.
Health Planning Division, MOPH.
Rural Health Division, MOPH.
Kiranandana, S., 1988.
6. CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, health insurance in Thailand has developed 
on different principles for different groups of the 
population. A solution is needed to make it more equitable and 
efficient. The conditions of use and the limits of each 
scheme, including the cost per beneficiary, need to be 
standardized. Moving further towards the social assistance 
concept by expanding the free medical care project is 
ideologically attractive and could gain political support. 
Regardless of the inequity impact, however, it has a limited
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and inadequate amount of financial backing. Thus, to extend 
the social assistance scheme for the entire population is not 
financially feasible. However, to review the means-tested 
criteria as well as set the standard of a minimum of care 
seems to be the right policy direction for this project.
Another possibility of health development is to 
introduce, organize and expand statutory health insurance 
schemes. These would increase health expenditure on the 
organized health care system and could create greater 
efficiency and equity than leaving it to the private market. 
The existing schemes for various groups of privileged persons 
need to be provided efficiently with a decline in support from 
the government by making the beneficiary pay contributions. At 
the same time, a scheme for regularly employed personnel in 
private firms urgently needs to be implemented. The most 
important issue for a statutory scheme is the potential for 
expansion in the future. Therefore, government needs to 
coordinate all of the parties concerned and set the standards. 
A benefit which allows the use of the government facilities 
but offers also a choice of private hospitals/doctors seems 
to fit the existing situation, but is rather expensive. 
However, a serious review of payment methods (with substantial 
co-payment) is urgently needed. Lastly, voluntary health 
insurance in the framework of primary health care and com­
munity development needs to be kept alive with strong support 
from the government. In the future, this would allow for the
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health card scheme and the statutory scheme to be standardised 
and/or unified.
While this study was being made, the House of 
Representatives agreed to pass a bill in July 1989 to extend 
health insurance to private employees in firms with 20 or more 
employees. This bill was rejected by the Senate on 6 July 
1990, but under the Thai Constitution become law when it was 
agreed by the House of Representatives on 11 July 1990. It is 
to be implemented in March 1991.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SURVEY OF HEALTH BENEFITS
1. INTRODUCTION
The demand for health insurance amongst employees is not 
known to any great extent, nor is the extent to which 
employers would want to join such a scheme. This chapter 
describes a survey carried out in 1988 on the existing 
provision of private employers' health care fringe benefits, 
their costs, and the methods of paying the providers. The 
focus was on the attitude of employers towards compulsory 
health insurance, which has now become law. It provides 
valuable information on how far health insurance will increase 
or decrease the costs falling on employers. It also ascertains 
to what extent employers already paid for the employee's 
health and welfare provision.
The most important questions are concerned with the 
structure of the existing health care fringe benefits - what 
they cost, and the method of paying providers. All of these 
are important policy questions which need to be answered 
before introducing a statutory health insurance scheme. This 
study does not include employees as they will gain from this 
policy. They will receive benefits, and pay contributions at
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only part of the total cost, while the other parts are paid by 
their employers and by the state, as well.
Thus, it was decided in 1988 to conduct a social survey 
to answer these policy questions. The reason for applying the 
social survey method instead of conducting a written census 
was because of its lower cost and its ability to provide 
information in greater depth from the interviews and provide 
relevant, reliable and up-to-date information. It was 
thought that the results of the survey would help to ascertain 
the various options for organizing health insurance in 
Thailand.
2. OBJECTIVES
1. To ascertain the existing employers' arrangements for 
medical and sickness fringe benefits for employees.
2. To analyse the existing costs of health fringe 
benefits to compare with the costs derived from what employers 
say they are willing to pay for a potential statutory health 
insurance.
3. To investigate the characteristics of employers, types 
of business, attitude and their preparedness to pay for 
statutory health insurance.
4. To find out the methods of paying the doctor and the 
hospital.
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5. To examine accessibility to health services and the 
causes of illness of employees.
3. THE SURVEY DESIGN
With the general aim of finding the cost of the existing 
provision of health care fringe benefits and employers 
opinion on statutory health insurance, the sampling adopted 
was quota sampling. This technique is well accepted by the 
marketing business sector and widely used by the groups who 
conduct political opinion polls, such as Lou Harris, 
Associates, and the Gallup Poll. Other reasons for the choice 
of quota sampling are its ease of use, its reliability, and 
its lower cost (Moser, C.A., 1952; Moser, C.A.and Stuart, A., 
1953; Sudman, S., 1966; Stuart, A., 1968; Kidder, L.H. and
Judd. C.M., 1986). The sampling frame was the census of
employment obtained from the Ministry of the Interior. The 
targeted quota, classified by type, size and geographical 
location are presented in Table A 1-3 of Appendix 2.
The survey was designed to have four key features:
a) The unit of analysis was at the establishment level.
b) The interviews were conducted with the employer 
himself or with a senior representative. In some cases, 
several respondents from one establishment were interviewed 
together in order to provide full information for the detailed 
questions.
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c) The coverage of the survey was nationwide. The sample 
consists of establishments of every type and size from the 
four regions of the country, Bangkok and the five surrounding 
provinces of Bangkok.
d) The survey content was designed to be more 
comprehensive than that of any previous survey on health 
benefits for private employees of the country. The survey 
covered the method of providing health benefits, coverage, 
constraints and the cost of providing the health benefits.
4. THE SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This survey is comprised of six parts. Part one deals 
with the general characteristics of the establishment or 
workplace. Part two is about the details of health fringe 
benefits for private employees in Thailand. Part three 
presents the cost of the health fringe benefits. Part four 
focuses on the accessibility and availability of the existing 
health services for employees in so far as this was known by 
employers. Part five reveals the common causes of illnesses of 
employees. Finally, it examines the attitude of employers and 
their preparedness to pay contributions to a statutory health 
insurance scheme. Also, the relationship between the cost of 
the existing health care fringe benefit provision and 
employers' opinions have been explored.
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A. General characteristics of establishments.
1). General character.
The sample of study establishments was located in 10 
provinces of Thailand, with the largest percentage of 31.5, 
16.5, and 14.0 in Bangkok, Ubonratchathani, and Chiangmai, 
respectively (see table 5.1).
Table 5.1; Location of establishment classified by 
province.
Province number %
Bangkok 63 31.5
Samutprakan 14 7.0
Phathumthani 8 4.0
Chonburi 24 12.0
Nakornpathom 1 0.5
Chachaengsao 2 1.0
Chiangmai 28 14.0
Ubonratchathani 33 16.5
Khonkaen 1 0.5
Songkhla 26 13.0
Total 200 100.0
On the formal status of the establishment, it was found 
that 98.5 % of the sample were private businesses while only
1.5 % were private non-profit organizations (see table 5.2).
Table 5.2; Formal status of establishment.
Type Number %
Private business 197 98.5
Non-profit organization 3 1.5
Total 200 100.0
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Most of the sample (71.2%) were single independent 
organizations. There were 15.2 % headquarters with branches 
and 12.1 of branches of national companies ( see table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Characteristic of establishments.
Characteristic Number %
Headquarter with branches 30 15.2
Single independent organization 141 70.2
Branch of multinational company 3 1.5
Branch of national company 24 12.1
Total 198 100.0
Most of the establishment owners (88.5%) in the sample 
are Thai. Of these, most are of Chinese parentage. The next 
largest group (7%) in the sample are 51% Thai and 49% foreign 
owned. Only 4.5% in the sample are totally foreign-owned (see 
table 5.4). Amongst the foreign investors, most of them are 
Japanese, with Americans ranking second.
Table 5.4; Owner of the establishment.
Owner Number %
Thai owned 177 88.5
Owned by foreigners 9 4.5
51% Thai, 49 % foreigners 14 7.0
Total 200 100.0
The main activities of the establishments were classified 
according to 15 types. Amongst them, distribution, wholesale,
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and retail trades, accounted for 24.5 % of the sample,
miscellaneous services for 13.5 %, and Food, drink and tobacco 
for 8.5 % (see table 5.5).
Table 5.5; Main activities of the establishment.
Main activities Number %
Manufacturing sector
Food, drink and tobacco 17 8.5
Textiles, clothing and leather 16 8.0
Woodworking and construction 9 4.5
Paper, printing and publishing 6 3.0
Chemical and allied industries 6 3.0
Metals and non-metals manufacture 15 7.5
Mining and quarrying 6 3.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 10 5.0
Service sector
Transport and communication 5 2.5
Energy and water supply 7 3.5
Business, finance and banking 7 3.5
Professional and scientific 6 3.0
services
Tourist services and hotels 14 7.0
Distribution trades, wholesale 49 24.5
and retail
Miscellaneous services 27 13.5
Total 200 100.0
The working practices in establishments were:- full-time 
working (68%), day-working (21%), and piece-working (5%). More 
detail is shown in table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Nature of working practices in establishments.
Working practices Number %
Pieceworking 10 5.0
Hourworking 7 3.5
Shiftworking 3 1.5
Daily working 42 21.0
Full-time working 136 68.0
Contracting 2 1.0
Total 200 100.0
Wage or salary payments were paid monthly (47.5%), every 
2 weeks or 15 days (35.0%), and weekly (8.0%). - see table 
5.7.
Table 5.7; Frequency of wage or salary payment.
Frequency of payment Number %
Weekly 16 8.0
Every 15 days or 2 weeks 70 35.0
Monthly 95 47.5
Daily 5 2.5
Every 10 days 6 3.0
Irregular 8 4.0
Total 200 100.0
2). Welfare fringe benefits provision.
Some employers have been providing some types of fringe 
benefits to their employees since they were relatively low 
paid and employers would like to keep good employees working 
for them. These welfare fringe benefits were largely 
voluntarily provided for employees without tax privileges or 
compulsion from the state. Only the occupational illness and
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industrial injury benefits were a compulsory provision. There 
were a total of 32 types of welfare fringe benefits provided 
for employees (see table 5.8), with as many as 10 kinds of 
fringe benefit found in more than half of the establishment 
sample. The most widely provided fringe benefit (80.5 %) was 
bonus, which was paid once a year at the new year or the 
Chinese new year, since many employers were of Chinese origin.
A proportion of employers offer medical care fringe 
benefits by way of reimbursement for the use of public 
hospitals (80% of employers), private hospitals (69%), and 
private clinics (67.5%). Only 65.0 % of employers provided 
industrial injuries benefit. For the death of an employee or 
a member of his family, 59.5 % of employers paid a lump sum 
amount. This payment is made partly from Thai culture and 
partly from legislation in the case of death caused by 
occupational illness or accident related to work.
A few of the big companies arranged and paid for social 
activities and recreational facilities such as sport 
facilities, new year dinner parties, week-end holidays and 
religious/day-out festivals. These provisions reflect Thai 
culture and, in some cases, adopted western values. The 
arrangements vary according to the size and owner of the 
establishment. For the small establishments belonging to Thai 
nationals (where most are of Chinese origin), a Chinese new 
year dinner along with an annual bonus and a holiday were 
customarily provided. Those establishments having Thai and/or
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Japanese owners, such as textile factories, were likely to 
organize and pay for a New Year or a cultural day out 
festival. The big establishments, such as finance and banking 
businesses, and those totally or partially belonging to 
western investors such as hotel, oil and drinking companies, 
may combine a New year and a Christmas dinner party. Other big 
Organizations were likely to provide a week-end holiday which 
may or may not have cultural origins but may arise from modern 
management of team spirit and education. These arrangements 
for cultural day-out festivals or week-end holidays were 
separate from paid holiday for regular employees.
Accommodation and meal benefits were found at 54.0 % and
51.0 % of establishments, respectively. Many employees did not 
have their own home in the same province as their workplace as 
most of them migrate from other provinces or from rural areas. 
The accommodation benefit was useful for reducing rent and 
transportation cost, as the accommodation would be attached to 
or be close to the place of work. The accommodation provision 
was found mostly in textile and clothing factories with a 
large number of employees. However, the standards were not 
high, usually with over-crowding. The meal benefit provision 
varied. Some establishments provided food vouchers or 
subsidized employees' canteens. The most common practice was 
to provide free boiled rice leaving employees to buy their own 
meal at a low cost. In a very small establishment, employees 
may have to stay in their place of work. If this was the case,
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the employer had to pay for the accommodation and food, while 
employees received relatively low pay.
There was a cheap loan provided in 50.5 % of the
establishment sample. Some establishments provided an 
emergency loan with free interest of not more than one month 
of the employee's salary and to be returned within the next 
few months. This interest free or cheap loan was of great 
help, particularly in the case of the employee or a member of 
his family having an accident, or being ill, and for 
children's education. In some cases, employees in a small 
establishment which runs on a family basis may have work 
without pay for a period of time. This was because the first 
six months or the first year's income was drawn by the 
employee's parents. This was the case with female employees 
who had to work to support the whole family.
Table 5.8: Fringe benefits in the establishments
Fringes Yes No Total
Number % Number % Number %
1 Meal benefits 102 51.0 98 49.0 200 100
2 Clothing 97 48.5 103 51.5 200 100
3 Accommodation 108 54.0 92 46.0 200 100
4 Social and 131 65.5 69 34.5 200 100
recreational facilities
5 Transportation 44 22.0 156 78.0 200 100
6 Bonus 161 80.5 39 19.5 200 100
7 Productivity bonus 74 37.0 126 63.0 200 100
8 Cheap loans 101 50.5 99 49.5 200 100
9 Pension 23 11.5 177 88.5 200 100
10 Provident 41 20.5 159 79.5 200 100
11 Funeral benefit 119 59.5 81 40.5 200 100
12 Children's 24 12.0 176 88.0 200 100
education support
13 Child benefit 6 u> * o 194 97.0 200 100
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Table 5.8 - Continued.
Fringes Yes No Total
Number % Number % Number %
14 Wedding gift 90 45.0 110 55.0 200 100
15 Religious support 73 36.5 127 63.5 200 100
16 Industrial 130 
injuries benefit
65.0 70 35.0 200 100
17 Maternity benefits 24 12.0 176 88.0 200 100
18 Routine physical 58 
check-up
29.0 142 71.0 200 100
19 Physical check-up 44 
for new employee
22.1 155 77.9 199 100
20 Life assurance 55 
and accident insurance
27.5 145 72.5 200 100
21 Medical insurance 18 9.0 182 91.0 200 100
22 Contracted doctor 35 17.5 165 82.5 200 100
23 Contracted 42 
hospital
21.0 158 79.0 200 100
24 Reimbursement if 160 
use public hospital
80.0 40 20.0 200 100
25 Reimbursement if 138 
use private hospital
69.0 62 31.0 200 100
26 Reimbursement if 135 
use private clinic
67.5 65 32.5 200 100
27 Full-time doctor 7 
services
3.5 193 96.5 200 100
28 Part-time (public) 10 
doctor services
5.0 190 95.0 200 100
29 Part-time (private)13 
doctor services
6.5 187 93.5 200 100
30 Sick room with 30 
full-time nurse
15.0 170 85.0 200 100
31 Sick room with 14 
part-time nurse
7.0 186 93.0 200 100
32 Hospital in the 5 
business premises
2.5 195 97.5 200 100
3). The employers' perception of fringe benefits.
Employers considered that the most popular benefits 
amongst employees were cash benefits, such as annual bonus, 
productivity bonus, sick pay, maternity pay, provident, 
pension and so on. There were, however, apart from an annual
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bonus (provided by 80.5% of employers - see table 5.8), sick 
pay (78.0%, see table 5.33), and maternity pay (64.5 %, see 
table 5.35), only a small number of establishments providing 
a wide variety of cash benefits. This was because it increased 
operating and production costs. There were 34.5 % of employers 
who thought that employees preferred benefit in* kind to 
benefit in cash. A total of 20.5 % of employers specified 
that, in their opinion, health benefits were the most popular 
amongst the employees. Nevertheless, there were 8.5% of 
employers who observed that employees would be satisfied with 
anything available, benefits in cash and/or in kind, as 
compared with receiving nothing (see table 5.9).
Table 5.9: The employers perception of the most popular
benefit as seen by employees.
Fringes Number %
Cash benefits 107 53.5
Health benefit 41 20.5
Meal benefit 7 3.5
Accommodation 14 7.0
Recreation 4 2.0
Other benefits in kind (clothing, 
tools, transportation)
3 1.5
Everything available 17 8.5
No answer 7 3.5
Total 200 100
The employer's perception of the employee's reasons for 
being satisfied with a particular benefit was because it 
helped income support (55.7 % of those who answered the
question). The evidence of relatively low paid employees in 
Thailand is noticeable, especially when compared to
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neighbouring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, There were
20.0 % of employers who answered the question and thought that 
fringe benefit provision encouraged people to work. Where the 
health benefits were concerned, some employers felt that the 
employees enjoyed the security of being provided for (16.2 %). 
For other benefits in kind such as transportation, clothing 
and tools, the employers viewed them as a convenience for 
working (5.4%). Finally, when recreational and social 
activities were arranged, the employers noticed that the 
employees expressed pleasure and enjoyed sociability (2.7%) 
(see table 5.10).
Table 5.10; The employer's perception of satisfying such 
benefit.
Reasons Number %
Income support 103 55.7
Security to be healthy 30 16.2
Encouraging to work 37 20.0
Convenience to work 10 5.4
Pleasure, sociability 5 2.7
Total 185 100
4). Trade unions.
Trade unions in private establishments, in Thailand, as 
found in this survey, were very small in number but had 
considerable bargaining power. However, it is noted that, most 
of the large and more active trade unions were organized in 
the public enterprises which are not within the scope of this
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survey. The number of employers in the sample whose work force 
were members of trade unions was as low as 4.0%. The 
majority, or 96.0 %, of the sample did not have a union (see 
table 5.11).
Table 5.11: Members of trade unions in the establishment.
Member of trade union Number %
Yes 8 4.0
No members of trade unions 192 96.0
Total 200 100
Among 8 establishments which had trade union membership 
in their workforce, the trade union density was sought. The 
union density is a key feature in determining the employer- 
employee relationship in modern industrial relation terms. It 
is classified according to the proportion of full-time 
employees who are members of a union. Trade union density is 
low when one third of the total workforce or less, are 
members; medium when between one third and two thirds are 
members; and high when there are two-thirds or more members of 
the workforce in a union. From the survey, the employers 
reported that the trade union density was low in 2 
establishments, medium in 1 establishment and high in 3 
establishments. There were 2 employers that did not answer 
this question (see table 5.12).
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Table 5.12; Proportion of full-time employees who were 
members of a union .
Union density Number %
Low (less than 1/3 of the total) 2 25.0
Medium (1/3 to 2/3 of the total) 1 12.5
High (2/3 of the total or more) 3 37.5
No answer 2 25.0
Total 8 100.0
Where there were trade unions in the establishment, their 
role for negotiating pay and conditions of work (including 
health benefits) was questioned. The recognition by employers 
of the role of trade unions is a key indicator of how much the 
employer is willing to allow them to represent the views of 
all employees. It was found in this survey that the trade 
unions were recognized in 6 establishments out of a total of 
8 establishments (see table 5.13).
Table 5.13: Trade union recognition by management for 
negotiating pay and conditions of work.
Trade union recognition Number %
Trade union recognized 6 75.0
Trade union not recognized 1 12.5
Don't know 1 12.5
Total 8 100.0
In some cases, where there were no trade union 
representatives, there was a joint committee between employer 
and employee to consider pay and conditions of work (including 
health benefits). The employee representatives on the 
committee may be elected by their colleagues or appointed by
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the manager. However, this survey found that only 3.5 % of the 
establishments had a joint committee (see table 5.14).
Table 5.14; The joint committee between employer/manager 
and employees to consider pay and conditions
of work.
Joint committee Number %
Yes 7 3.5
No 193 96.5
Total 200 100
In the situation of there being a joint committee in the 
establishment, the description of the joint committee was 
asked for. All in all, the employers were able to describe the 
composition of the committee although only 5 out of 7 
employers could specify the official name of the committee 
(see table 5.15).
Table 5.15: Description of the joint committee.
Description Number %
Give the name of the committee 5 71.4
Give the composition of the committee 7 100.0
Total 7 100.0
5. Employees.
Three Employee aspects of the establishments were 
examined; sex, type of working practice, and type of employee. 
There were 55.5 % of establishments which employed more male
169
workers than female, or entirely male workers. The proportion 
of workplaces where females dominated, or were employed only, 
was 39.0% compared with 2.5% of establishments that employed 
the sexes in equal number ( see table 5.16).
Table 5.16: Distribution of sex in the work force.
Proportion of employees Number %
Female more than male 78 39.0
Male more than female 111 55.5
Equal 11 5.5
Total 200 100.0
Regarding working practice, part-time employees were 
classed as those who work less than a customary standard 
number of working hours. Full-time employees were protected by 
an industrial relation law giving a maximum number of hours 
that could be worked. For example employees in transportation 
services had a maximum of 8 hours per day. Mine workers, 
industrial workers, and construction workers had a maximum of 
48 hours per week, while commercial employees worked as long 
as a maximum of 54 hours per week. In practice, most employees 
worked as long as the maximum number of hours determined by 
the law. Some of them worked longer hours in order to obtain 
overtime payment to support their family since their wages 
were relatively low. However, this study was not concerned 
with this topic in detail. It did find that 81.0% of 
establishments employed mostly full-time employees. Those who 
employed mostly part-time employees were 16.5 % of the total. 
Finally, the employment of equal numbers of full-time and
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part-time employees accounted for 2.5 % of the sample
establishments (see table 5.17).
Table 5.17; Proportion of employees, classified by type of 
working practice.
Proportion of employees Number %
Mostly full-time employees 162 81.0
Mostly part-time employees 33 16.5
Equal 5 2.5
Total 200 100.0
With regard to manual and non-manual employees, amongst 
198 employers who answered this question, there were 56.6% of 
them employing mostly manual employees, 40.9% with mostly non- 
manual employees, and 2.5% with equal numbers of each (see 
table 5.18).
Table 5.18: Proportion of employees, classified by type 
of employees.
Proportion of employees Number %
Mostly manual employees 112 56.6
Mostly non-manual employees 81 40.9
Equal numbers 5 2.5
Total 198 100.0
The average (median) monthly income of employees, 
according to this survey, was 3,000 Baht for non-manual 
employees and 1,800 Baht for manual employees. This analysis 
was based on the median rather than the mean because the 
distribution of the data was highly skewed (see table 5.19).
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During the course of the survey, the national daily minimum 
wage was 78 Baht in Bangkok and 5 surrounding provinces of 
Bangkok. It was 75 Baht in Ranong, Phangnga, and Phuket 
compared with 70 Baht in Chonburi, Saraburi, Korat and 
Chiangmai. Finally, the minimum wages in the rest of the 
country was 65 Baht. When multiplying the minimum wage (using 
the lowest figure of 65 Baht) by the number of working days 
per month, say 28 days, the monthly income from the minimum 
wage is calculated to be 1,820 Baht. Comparing this figure to 
the median monthly income derived from the survey, half of the 
manual employees receive monthly income below the national 
minimum wage.
Table 5.19 : Average monthly income of employees.
Type of Median Mean Mode Skewness Kurtosis S.D. Range 
employee (Baht) (Baht)(Baht) (Baht) (Baht)
Non- 3,000 4,393 3,000 8 84 7,173 83,280
manual
Manual 1,800 1,932 1,000 3 12 1,293 8,600
B. Health benefits provision for employees.
1). Type of health benefits.
There were 15 types of health benefit which employers 
arranged for employees (see table 5.20). The most widely
provided health benefit was industrial injury benefit. It was 
found in 92.0% of the establishments. The second largest 
provision was occupational illness benefit (89.0%), and
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thirdly, ordinary sickness benefit (80.5%). According to the 
Announcement of the Revolutionary Party Number 103, 1972, (6), 
employers must pay industrial injury benefit which includes 
accidents from work and occupational illnesses. A total of
92.0 % of employers provided the benefit for accidents
related to work while the remaining 8% of establishments did 
not. Furthermore, when the benefit provision for occupational 
illness was looked at closely, it was three percent lower than 
that for industrial injury benefit, albeit not so obvious and 
more difficult to determine with accuracy.
Ordinary sickness benefit, although not compulsory, came 
third in rank. Three explanations can be given for this; 
firstly, the development of welfare provision around family 
values has become the norms of society. Some employers may 
adopt the view that their employees were part of their family, 
therefore they voluntarily provided care when the employees 
were sick. Secondly, some employers had already employed 
nurses or contracted doctors for accident and occupational 
illness, but, in practice care for ordinary sickness was also 
provided. Thirdly, even when the employer did not want to pay 
for ordinary sickness, it might be rather difficult for the 
employer to distinguish between occupational illness and 
ordinary sickness. This situation was likely to happen all the 
more when a doctor felt sympathy with an employee and provided 
a certificate specifying occupational illness rather than 
ordinary sickness.
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By contrast, the least provision in health benefits was 
for family planning (5.5%), perinatal care (6.5%), complicated 
delivery (12.5%) and normal delivery (13.0%). This was because 
the employer perceived that family planning and maternity care 
were a personal issue. However, there was a case of family 
planning benefit provided for female sterilisation only, after 
a second child's delivery (see table 5.20).
Table 5.20: Frequency of health benefits, classified by
rank.
Rank Health benefits Yes No Total
Number % Number % Number %
1. Industrial injury 184 92.0 16 8.0 200 100
2. Occupational illness 178 89.0 22 11.0 200 100
3. Ordinary sickness 161 80.5 39 19.5 200 100
4. Drug, medical supply 152 76.0 48 24.0 200 100
5. Rehabilitation related 125 62.5 75 37.5 200 100
to work
6. Accident not related 80 40.0 120 60.0 200 100
to work
7. Medical check-up 76 38.0 124 62.0 200 100
8. Eye test 73 36.5 127 63.5 200 100
9. Rehabilitation not 52 26.0 148 74.0 200 100
related to work
10. Dental care 50 25.0 150 75.0 200 100
11. Mental care 44 22.0 156 78.0 200 100
12. Normal delivery 26 13.0 174 87.0 200 100
13. Complicated delivery 25 12.5 175 87.5 200 100
14. Perinatal care 13 6.5 187 93.5 200 100
15. Family planning 11 5.5 189 94.5 200 100
a). Occupational illness and industrial injury.
The survey asked employers for reasons as to why 
employees should receive industrial injury and occupational 
illness benefit . There were 44.9 % of employers who answered 
this question, stating that it was compelled by law. Provision 
made for humanitarian reasons accounted for 36.9 % of all
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answers, for employees' morale and security, 11.8%, and 
finally, to encourage employees to work better, leading to 
higher productivity, accounted for 6.4% of all answers (see 
table 5.21).
Table 5.21: Reasons why employees should receive 
industrial injury benefit.
Reasons Number %
Humanitarian reasons 69 36.9
It is compulsory by law 84 44.9
For employees' morale and security 22 11.8
Encourage employee to work, leading 
to company's higher productivity
12 6.4
Total 187 100.0
Limits on industrial injury benefit were found in 29.2% 
of the total of 178 establishments whose employers answered 
this question. The majority of 70.8% of the participating 
employers perceived that there were no limits (see table 
5.22) .
Table 5.22: Limitation on industrial injury benefits.
Limitation Number %
There is a limit 52 29.2
No limits 126 70.8
Total 178 100.0
Of those 52 establishments where there were limits on 
industrial injury benefit, six types of limit were identified. 
These were a limit on the type of illness in 25 cases, or
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48.1% of the 52 establishments, an upper limit per case or 
episode of illness in 15 establishments (28.9%), and an upper 
limit per case per year in 4 establishments (7.7%). There were 
4 employers who did not specify the limits but understood that 
it was based on the limits of the Workmen's Compensation Fund. 
A limit on the duration of sickness and on the type of 
facilities on offer was also specified (see table 5.23).
Table 5.23s Type of limitation on industrial injury 
benefits.
Type of limitation Number %
An upper limit per case 15 28.9
An upper limit per year 4 7.7
Limit of duration of sickness 2 3.8
Limit on type of facilities 2 3.8
Based on the limitation of 4 7.7
Workmen's Compensation Fund 
Limit on type of illness 25 48.1
Total 52 100.0
In 1987, accidents and the poisoning of employees, 
including accidents and poisonings not related to work, as 
reported by employers, were known of in only 33.5% of the 
total number of establishments. The remaining majority of 
66.5%, as stated by employers, had neither accidents related 
to work nor accidents not-related to work (see table 5.24).
176
Table 5.24: Total accidents and poisonings(1)of employees
in 1987.
Accident and/or poisoning Number %
Yes 67 33.5
No 133 66.5
Total 200 100.0
Note s (1) Including accident and poisoning not related 
to work.
The reason for industrial accidents that had occurred in 
1987, as perceived by 140 employers who answered this 
question, was because of employees' carelessness (82.9%). 
There were 12.9 % of employers who thought that the accidents 
happened because of the employee's bad luck or by chance. A 
total of 2.8% of employers were of the opinion that the
accidents took place because the employee was drunk or 
unhealthy. Lastly, only 2 employers or 1.4% of them 
acknowledged that there were machinery failures. These were 
the cases where there was a written report of the accidents 
sent to the Ministry of Interior (see table 5.25).
Table 5.25: Employers' perception of the reasons for 
industrial accidents in 1987.
Reason for industrial accidents Number %
Employee's carelessness 116 82.9
Machinery failure 2 1.4
Drinking alcohol, unhealthy 4 2.8
Bad luck 18 12.9
Total 140 100.0
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b). Ordinary sickness.
The reasons given to explain why employees should receive 
ordinary sickness benefits are presented in table 5.26. 
Amongst 114 employers who answered this question, 33.3% of 
them said it was for humanitarian reasons that this benefit 
was provided. Some 28.1% of them perceived that the benefit 
would give the employees job security and encourage them to 
stay working with the same employer. There were 19.3% of 
employers who thought that to provide ordinary sickness 
benefit was inevitable and unavoidable. Lastly, 6.1% of the 
participating employers said that it was a duty to provide 
ordinary sickness benefit.
Table 5.26: Reasons why employees should receive ordinary 
sickness benefit.
Reasons
For employees' job security 
Increase work efficiency 
Humanitarian reasons 
The ordinary sickness benefit 
will be provided in some 
circumstances 
It is their duty
Total
Number %
32 28.1
15 13.2
38 33.3
22 19.3
7 6.1
114 100.0
The survey went on to explore the conditions of use and 
limitations of ordinary sickness benefits, if provided. There 
were 40.6% of 160 establishments where employees can be 
reimbursed if they use public hospitals, compared to 38.8% of 
establishments if private hospitals are used, and 31.9% of
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establishments, if a "positive list" of hospitals is used. An 
upper limit per employee per year was applied in 40.3% of the
159 establishments that answered this question. An upper limit 
was also applicable per OPD visit (28.1% of establishments) 
and per case (26.3%). For in-patient care, there were 28.7% of
160 establishments controlling the cost by paying a fixed 
daily rate. Finally, there were 20.5% of 161 establishments 
where the employees could be reimbursed if they went to G.P. 
clinics on the "positive list" (see table 5.27).
Table 5.27; Limitations on ordinary sickness benefits.
Limitation Yes No Total
Number % Number % Number %
An upper limit per year 64 40.3 95 59.7 159 100
An upper limit per OPD visit 45 28.1 115 71.9 160 100
An upper limit per case 42 26.3 118 73.7 160 100
A fixed daily rate 46 28.7 114 71.3 160 100
Reimbursement for using 65 40.6 95 59.4 160 100
public hospitals
Reimbursement for using 62 38.8 98 61.2 160 100
private hospitals
Reimbursement for using 51 31.9 109 68.1 160 100
positive list hospitals
Reimbursement for using 33 20.5 128 79.5 161 100
positive list clinics
Table 5.28 illustrates the frequency of provision of 
particular items of ordinary sickness benefit. The survey 
found that the most widely provided were drugs (51.0% of 
establishments). The second and third widest provisions were 
out-patient care (49.5%) and in-patient care (46.0%). By 
contrast, the lowest and the second lowest provisions were 
family planning (5.5%) and maternity care (11.0%).
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Table 5.28: Frequency of provision of particular health 
benefits, classified by rank.
Rank Item/activity Yes No Total
Number % Number % Number %
1. Drugs 102 51.0 98 49.0 200 100
2. Out-patient care 99 49.5 101 50.5 200 100
3. In-patient care 92 46.0 108 54.0 20C 100
4. Laboratory test 81 40.5 119 59.5 200 100
5. Doctor's fees 78 39.0 122 61.0 200 100
6. Room 78 39.0 122 61.0 200 100
7. Meals 78 39.0 122 61.0 200 100
8. Physical check-ups 57 28.5 143 71.5 200 100
9. Appliances 50 25.0 150 75.0 200 100
10. Eye-tests 49 24.5 151 75.5 200 100
11. Specialist's fees 45 22.5 155 77.5 200 100
12. Dental care 34 17.0 166 83.0 200 100
13. Prosthesis 26 13.0 174 87.0 200 100
14. Transportation 24 12.0 176 88.0 200 100
15. Maternity care 22 11.0 178 89.0 200 100
16. Family planning 11 5.5 189 94.5 200 100
c). Accidents not related to work.
The Employers' perception of the reasons for accidents 
not related to work in 1987 were that they were due to the 
employee's carelessness (73.0% of 115 employers). The major 
type of accident, according to the employer, were road 
accidents. There were 12.2 % of employers who perceived that 
these accidents were because of the employee's bad luck. Next, 
at 7.8% are employers who perceive, quarrels between employees 
to be the cause of accidents. Lastly, 7.0% of the 115 
employers thought that the accidents were due to employees 
drinking alcohol or being unhealthy (see table 5.29).
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Table 5.29: Employers' perception of the reason for
accidents not related to work in 1987.
Reason for accidents Number %
Employee's carelessness 84 73.0
Drinking alcohol, unhealthy 8 7.0
Bad luck 14 12.2
Quarrel between employees 9 7.8
Total 115 100.0
Table 5.30 presents the type of health care facilities 
which employees are entitled to receive for ordinary sickness. 
Employees in 29.8% of 198 establishments were entitled to 
visit public hospitals, private hospitals and private clinics 
for both in-patient and out-patient care. Employees in 9.1%, 
4.0% and 3.0% of establishments were entitled to use only 
public hospitals, private hospitals and private clinics 
respectively. Only 6.6% of establishments permitted employees 
to visit public and private hospitals. Those who permitted 
visits to both public hospitals and private clinics were 1.5% 
and to both private hospitals and private clinics were very 
small in number at 0.5%
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Table 5,30; Type of health care facilities from which 
employees are entitled to receive medical 
benefits.
Type of facilities Number %
This benefit is not provided 90 45.5
Public hospitals only 18 9.1
Private hospitals only 8 4.0
Private clinics only 6 3.0
Public and private hospitals 13 6.6
Public hospitals and clinics 3 1.5
Private hospitals and clinics 1 0.5
Public hospitals, private 59 29.8
hospitals and clinics
Total 198 100.0
Limitations on in-patient care in the event of accidents 
not related to work are illustrated in table 5.31. Amongst 80 
establishments which provide benefit for hospitalization, the 
most popular measure to control cost was a limit on the type 
of service (21.2% of the 80 establishments). There were 11.3% 
of the 80 which reimbursed only a certain percentage of the 
total cost and 10.0% of them which had a maximum cost limit 
per episode of illness.
Table 5.31; Limitations on in-patient care because of 
accidents not related to work.
Limitations Number %
An upper limit per year 7 8.7
An upper limit per case 5 6.2
A certain per cent of total cost 9 11.3
Limit on type of service 17 21.2
Limit on kind of facilities 6 7.5
(public hospitals only)
Limit on duration of stay 1 1.3
Limit on level of employee 3 3.8
An upper limit per episode of 8 10.0
illness
No answer 24 30.0
Total 80 100.0
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d). Private insurance.
Group insurance with a commercial insurance company was 
a method which had been arranged and paid for by the 
employers. The advantage of this arrangement was that the 
employer knew the exact amount of money he/she had to pay each 
year without worrying about overspending of the budget. Nor 
did they need to bother about the administrative procedure and 
its reimbursement of individual employees because these things 
were done by the insurer.
This survey found that only 18 of the big establishments 
or 9.0% of the total establishments bought medical insurance 
for their employees (see table 5.8). The cost of the premium 
per capita, per year ranged from 200 Baht to 12,000 Baht. The 
average (median) cost of the premium was 1,000 Baht per 
employee per year. When comparing this figure (1,000 Baht) to 
the average annual income of manual employees (12 x 1,800 
baht), as calculated from table 5.19 of this survey, the 
average premium was equal to 4.63 % of their average income or 
4.58% of the annual income calculated from the national 
minimum wage.
When dependents of employees were protected by the 
private insurance provided by employers, the average premium 
per family per year was 2,470 Baht. The dependents included 
the employees' spouse and their children. Although it was
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customary not to limit the number of their children, their 
ages had not to be more than 20-25 years.
Considering the frequency of premium payment to the 
insurance company, 14 out of 18 establishments paid annually. 
One establishment paid every six months and two establishments 
paid quarterly (see table 5.32).
Table 5.32: Frequency of premium payment to the insurance
company.
Frequency Number %
Every 3 months 2 11.1
Every 6 months 1 5.6
Every 12 months 14 77.7
No answer 1 5.6
Total 18 100.0
e). Cash sickness benefits.
In general, cash sickness benefit is paid to employees 
who had to stop working in the short-term because of illness. 
This cash benefit, therefore, prevented employees from losing 
income while not being able to go to work. This survey 
examined the cash sickness benefit period for which a medical 
certificate was required, as presented in table 5.33. In most 
cases, accounting for 56.0% of the total, a medical 
certificate was required to be presented to the employer in 
order to receive the benefit. As specified in the Thai 
industrial relations law, if the employees were off sick for 
3 consecutive days or more, they had to justify their cause
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of illness and may have had to present a medical certificate 
as well. The survey found that 45.5% of the total 
establishments requested a medical certificate for a cash 
sickness benefit period of 3 consecutive days or more. There 
were 10.5% of establishments for which a medical certificate 
was needed for sick pay of one day or two consecutive days. 
Those establishments without cash sickness benefit provision 
were 21.0% of the total. There were 22.0% of establishments 
with no specific regulation.
Table 5.33: Cash sickness benefit period for which a 
medical certificate is required.
Cash sickness benefit period Number %
This benefit is not provided 42 21.0
1 - 2  Consecutive days 21 10.5
3 Consecutive days or more 91 45.5
No regulation 44 22.0
No answer 2 1.0
Total 200 100.0
With or without a requirement for a medical certificate, 
the total number of cash sickness benefit days were 30 per 
year, as defined by the Thai industrial relations law. This 
survey found that there were 49.5% of establishments which 
provided the total cash sickness benefit period of 30 days per 
year, per employee. Employees in 16.0% of establishments 
received cash sickness benefit for more than 30 days per year. 
There were 13.0% of establishments providing less than 30 days 
of cash sickness benefit per year. Finally, there were 21.0%
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of establishments not providing this benefit to their 
employees at all (see table 5.34).
Table 5.34; The total cash sickness benefit period 
per year.
Number of days per year Number %
This benefit is not provided 42 21.0
Less than 30 days 26 13.0
30 Days 99 49.5
More than 30 days 32 16.0
No answer 1 0.5
Total 200 100.0
f). Cash maternity benefits.
Similar to cash sickness benefit, some establishments 
provide cash maternity benefit for their employees for a 
period before and after the confinement. This survey found 
that 52.0% and 10.0% of establishments provided cash maternity 
benefit for a period of 30 days and for more than 30 days, 
respectively (see table 5.35). According to Thai Law, cash 
maternity benefit was provided to ensure that a working mother 
has a substantial income for herself and her baby for a period 
of 30 days. From table 5.35, it can be seen that the provision 
of cash maternity benefit for a period of 30 days or more, was 
made by 62.0% of establishments. There were 2.5% of 
establishments providing this benefit for a period of less 
than 30 days. This study found that 21.5% of establishments 
did not provide this benefit for their female employees at 
all. A further 12.5% of establishments did not provide
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maternity benefit as they had no female employees. These 
establishments were those, such as; garages, ice mills, and 
rice mills.
Table 5.35; The total cash maternity benefit period.
Cash maternity benefit period Number %
This benefit is not provided 43 21.5
Less than 30 days 5 2.5
30 Days 104 52.0
More than 30 days 20 10.0
No female employees 25 12.5
No answer 3 1.5
Total 200 100.0
Some employees were entitled to have additional maternity 
leave without pay for a period of time. This was because a 
working mother may have a complicated delivery and need more 
time. Only one establishment, or 0.5% of the sample allowed 
employees to take maternity leave without pay for 61-90 days 
in addition to the regular 30 paid days. There were 21.5% of 
establishments providing additional maternity leave of 30 - 60 
days and 5.0% provided less than 15 days. The majority of 
establishments (59.5%) did not provide the opportunity for 
working mothers to continue working for them if they had to 
take time off for 30 days or more for whatever reasons (see 
table 5.36).
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Table 5.36: Additional maternal leave without pay 
per year.
Number of days Number %
No additional maternal leave 119 59.5
Less than 15 days 10 5.0
30 - 60 days 43 21.5
6 1 - 9 0  days 1 0.5
No female employees 25 12.5
No answer 2 1.0
Total 200 100.0
There were some 22 establishments providing maternity 
grants to the working mother in addition to cash sickness 
benefit and medical benefit. The survey found that this 
maternity grant, paid in a lump sum amount, ranged from 100 
Baht per case to 6,000 Baht per case. The average (median) 
maternity grant was 1,000 Baht per case.
There were 11 out of these 22 establishments providing 
maternity grants which did not limit the maximum number of 
children for which a working mother was entitled to receive 
the benefit. Limits on one child, 2 and 3 children were found 
in 2, 6, and 2 establishments respectively (see table 5.37).
Table 5.37; Number of children for which female employees 
are entitled to receive maternity grant.
>er of children Number %
1 Child 2 9.1
2 Children 6 27.3
3 Children 2 9.1
No limitation 11 50.0
No answer * 1 4.5
Total 22 100.0
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In principle, a female employee does not have a 
diminished capacity for work due to her pregnancy and so 
should not have to change her job or duties. However, if the 
conditions of work have a high risk of occupational injury or 
illness, she has a right to ask for a temporary change by 
presenting a medical certificate. This study found that 62.0% 
of establishments did not change the pregnant employees' job 
or duties because of a diminishing capacity for work. By 
contrast, there were 50 establishments or 25.0% of the sample 
that changed the employees' job or duties because of her 
pregnancy (see table 5.38). It is also to be noted that 
pregnant employees in 4 out of the 50 establishments (or 2% of 
the sample), received less wages or salary than before being 
pregnant due to the employers' perception of her diminishing 
capacity of work.
Table 5.38: Change of job or duties because of
diminishing capacity for work due to employee's 
pregnancy.
Change of job Number %
Yes
No
No female employees 
No answer
50
124
25
1
25.0
62.0 
12.5
0.5
Total 200 100.0
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2). The employers' perception of health benefit.
Answering the question of what were the advantages of 
providing health benefits to employees, employers in 37.3 % of 
177 establishments, regarded the benefits as providing an 
increase in employees' morale and security. There were 28.2% 
of them claiming that the benefit provision was leading to an 
increase in work efficiency and to their company's 
productivity. There were 26.6% employers perceiving that the 
advantage of health benefits was to save the employees' 
spending - in other words, it was an employee income support 
measure. There were 6.8% of employers who considered that the 
advantage of the benefit was to improve the relationship 
between themselves and the employee or promote their loyalty 
to the company. It is interesting that there were 1.1% of 
employers who found that the benefit would, in fact, reduce 
employers' total expenditure in the future (see table 5.39).
Table 5.39; Advantages of providing health benefits 
according to employers.
Advantages Number
Increase employees' morale 66
and security 
Leading to increase in work 50
efficiency 
Better relationship between 12
employers and employees 
Saving employees' spending 47
Reduce employers' expenditure 2
Total 177
%
37.3
28.2
6.8
26.6
1 . 1
100.0
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By contrast, the major disadvantage of providing health 
benefits, as seen by the employer and presented in table 5.40, 
was that they increase employers' expenditure (95.8% of 95 
establishments). There were 3.2% of them that felt a 
disadvantage of health benefits would come from a high cost 
due to over-demand and/or overtreatment. Finally, 1% of 
employers perceived that the employees' dissatisfaction with 
the low quality of care would be a major disadvantage.
Table 5.40: Disadvantages of providing health benefits by
employers.
Disadvantages Number %
Increase employers' expenditure 91 95.8
High cost of care because of 3 3.2
abuse
Employee dissatisfied with 1 1.0
quality of care
Total 95 100.0
3). Coverage of health benefits.
The survey examined the coverage of health benefits, 
especially the equality in receiving the benefit amongst the 
employees and, if the dependents of the employees were 
protected, whether or not the level of benefit received by 
them was equal.
Table 5.41 shows that 92.5% of the establishments 
provided the benefits for all of their employees, while 4.0% 
of them offered the benefits to some employees only. Table
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5.42 reveals that, out of 8 establishments, 4 of them provided 
health benefits to only their full-time employees. There was 
one each of the establishments that offered the benefits only 
to accountants, trainees, managers and senior staff. It is 
interesting to note that these were small establishments.
Table 5.41; The number of eligible employees for 
health benefits.
Eligible employees Number %
Everybody is eligible 185 92.5
Only some get benefits 8 4.0
No answer 7 3.5
Total 200 100.0
Table 5.42: The level or position of some employees who
are eligible to get health benefits.
Level or position of Number %
eligible person
Accountant 1 12.5
Trainee 1 12.5
Full-time staff 4 50.0
Manager 1 12.5
Senior staff 1 12.5
Total 8 100.0
Considering the distribution of benefits amongst 
employees, 85.9% of 185 establishments provided equal benefits 
to all employees. There was no equality in the distribution in 
14.1% of the establishments, where the senior staff were 
entitled to receive more benefit than the junior staff (see 
table 5.43 - 5.44).
192
Table 5.43: The level of health benefit coverage amongst 
the eligible employees.
Health benefit coverage Number %
Benefits are equal 159 85.9
Benefits are not equal 26 14.1
Total 185 100.0
Table 5.44; Discriminating factors for health benefits.
Discriminating factors Number %
Senior executives 12 46.1
Senior staff 4 15.4
Full-time staff 2 7.7
Trainee 1 3.9
No specific rule 2 7.7
No answer 5 19.2
Total 26 100.0
Employees only were eligible to receive health benefits 
in 85.1% of 188 establishments. Their dependents were also 
entitled to receive the benefits in 14.9% of the 
establishments (see table 5.45). However, the dependents were 
defined differently. In 12 out of 28 establishments, 
dependents were defined as the employee's spouse, children and 
parents, similar to those in the government employees' scheme. 
This definition reflects social welfare values in Thai society 
of the extended family where the parents live with their 
eldest daughter or eldest son. There were only 9 out of 28 
establishments that defined dependents to be only the 
employee's spouse and children (see table 5.46).
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Table 5.45: Coverage of health benefits.
Person covered Number %
Employees only 160 85.1
Employees and their dependents 28 14.9
Total 188 100.0
Table 5.46: Dependents of employees who are eligible to 
obtain health benefits.
Dependents Number %
Their spouse, children & parents 12 42.9
Their spouse and children only 9 32.1
No answer 7 25.0
Total 28 100.0
In general, Thailand has national policies to encourage
families to have no more than two children, applied in the
education and child benefit programmes of the government
employees' scheme. This survey found that this population
policy did not widely limit the number of dependents in this
situation. No limit on the number of children in a family who
were entitled to receive health benefits was found in 15 out
of 20 establishments. Where there were maximum numbers of 3
and 2 children entitled to receive benefits, were found in 3
and 2 establishments respectively (see table 5.47).
Table 5.47: The maximum number of children for which health 
benefits can be obtained.
Maximum No of children Number %
2 children 2 10.0
3 children 3 15.0
No limitations 15 75.0
Total 20 100.0
194
Thus, the maximum number of eligible persons in a family 
including the employee in 180 establishments were; 1 person 
(88.9%), 7 persons (1.7%), and 5 persons (1.1%). There was no 
limit on the number of eligible persons in a family in 8.3% of 
the establishments (see table 5.48).
Table 5.48: The maximum number of persons eligible to 
receive health benefits in each family(1>.
eligible persons Number %
1 person 160 88.9
5 persons 2 1.1
7 persons 3 1.7
No limitations 15 8.3
Total 180 100.0
Note : (1) Including employees themselves.
Dependents of employees are entitled to receive the same 
level of benefit as employees in 11 out of 24 establishments. 
There were 13 establishments where the employees' dependents 
received lower benefits than the employees themselves. The 
lower level of benefits was such as entitlement to receive 
only out-patient care but not in-patient care or to receive 
about 50 - 75% of the full benefit (see table 5.49).
Table 5.49: Levels of health benefit which dependents 
of the employees are entitled to receive.
Levels of health benefits Number %
A part of the employees' benefits 13 54.2
The same benefits as employees 11 45.8
Total 24 100.0
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The waiting period before a new employee becomes entitled 
to receive health benefits varies. However, 53.0% of the
establishments did not require a waiting time; employees were 
entitled to receive health benefits on the first day of 
working. There were 21.5% of establishments that required 
their employees to have a probation period of less than 180 
days before they were entitled to draw benefit. Those who 
required a waiting period of 180 days or more than 180 days 
were 14.0% and 10.0% respectively (see table 5.50).
Table 5.50: The waiting time before a new employee becomes 
entitled to health benefits.
The waiting time Number %
No waiting time (eligible to 106 53.0
health benefits on the first day 
of working)
After probation of 43 21.5
less than 180 days 
After 180 days of probation 28 14.0
After probation of 2 10.0
more than 180 days 
No answer 21 10.5
Total 200 100.0
4). Method of paving providers.
The sole method of paying providers in Thailand was by 
retrospective payment. The common practice was for employees 
to pay for medical services and drugs and to be reimbursed 
later by their employers. From table 11, it can be seen that 
employees at 80.0% of establishments were reimbursed after
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using public hospitals, 69.0% were reimbursed after using 
private hospitals and 67.5% were reimbursed after using 
private clinics.
a). Paying the doctor.
Amongst 35 establishments which had contracted doctors to 
provide a regular medical service for employees, there were 
19 establishments that paid the doctor by the fee-for-service 
method at the customary private practice rate. Only one 
establishment managed to negotiate the rate and paid the 
doctor's fee-for-service at the negotiated price. The 
customarily negotiated rate was at a 10 - 20 percentage
discount from the market price. These doctors were general 
practitioners who worked full-time in public or private 
hospitals and part-time in their own clinics or polyclinics. 
The normal arrangement for general practice services was that 
employees came to the clinic and paid a fee-for-service at the 
discounted price and were later reimbursed in part or in full 
by their employers. An alternative arrangement was for the 
doctor to send the bills to the employer and to collect the 
fees later. However, the trend in a big establishment was to 
employ a full-time or part-time doctor to provide regular 
health services in the workplace. There were 11 establishments 
with full-time doctors and 4 establishments with part-time 
doctors (see table 5.51).
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Table 5.51: Methods of paying the general practitioner.
Payment methods Number %
Part-time salary 4 11.4
Full-time salary 11 31.4
Fee-for-service with a 1 2.9
negotiated rate
Fee-for-service at ordinary 19 54.3
private practice rate
Total 35 100.0
b). Paying the specialist.
In Thailand, it was difficult to distinguish between a 
general practitioner and a specialist because fee-for-service 
was the predominant mode of payment in private practice. These 
made general practitioners in private clinics work hard and 
sometimes beyond the loosely-defined border line between 
general practitioner and specialist. Another difficulty was 
that most of the general practitioners in private clinics were 
also full-time hospital doctors. However, a specialist or 
consultant could be defined as a senior doctor of high 
reputation who worked in a specialist unit of a large or a 
university hospital. In common with the general practitioner, 
some specialists also ran their own clinic, polyclinic or 
private hospital as well as work for the public sector in 
order to maintain their high reputation. At the same time, 
they could transfer some patients from public hospitals to 
their own clinics or hospitals. The survey found that 15 out 
of 20 establishments paid the specialist or consultant by
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fee-for-service with a negotiated rate. As with the GP 
services, the discount rates for the specialist services were 
around 10 - 20% of the market prices. There were 5
establishments that paid the specialist at the customary fee- 
for-service rate (see table 5.52).
Table 5.52: Methods of paying the specialist 
or consultant.
Payment methods Number %
Fee-for-service with a 15 75.0
negotiated rate 
Fee-for-service at ordinary 5 25.0
private practice rate
Total 20 100.0
c). Paying the nurse.
In many large establishments, there was a sick bay with 
a nurse to provide primary care at the workplace. It was 
required by industrial relations law to have a nurse in a 
large industry to provide first-aid, particularly for 
industrial accidents. The survey found that 22 out of 26 
establishments employed a nurse on a part-time basis. Only 2 
establishments employed a full-time salaried nurse. Payment 
per employee visit and payment per shift of 8 hours were found 
(see table 5.53).
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Table 5.53; Methods of paying the nurse.
Payment methods Number %
Part-time salary 22 84.6
Full-time salary 2 7.6
Payment per employee visit 1 3.9
Payment per shift (8 hours) 1 3.9
Total 26 100.0
d). Paying the hospital.
Many establishments had a direct contract with a 
hospital, mainly with a private one in Bangkok and to a lesser 
extent, with a public one. This development was a further step 
from the previous arrangement between establishment and 
hospital under the Workmen's Compensation scheme. One 
difference between the Workmen's Compensation scheme and the 
ordinary sickness fringe benefit arrangement was that under 
the former, the contracted hospital sent their bills direct to 
the fund whereas, for the latter, they went directly to the 
employer. A similarity was that on each visit, an employee 
must present a letter from the employer specifying that he or 
she was entitled to receive the medical benefit.
In general, as shown in table 11, the survey found that 
the predominant method of paying the hospital in Thailand was 
the itemized billing reimbursement method. There were 29 out 
of 42 establishments that paid the contracted hospital by 
itemized billing at rates determined by the hospital. Payment 
by itemized billing at rates negotiated by the establishment 
were found in 9 establishments. Only 2 establishments paid the
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contracted hospital at the daily charge rate determined by the 
hospital. Lastly, there was one establishment that paid the 
contracted hospital by an annual premium (see table 5.54).
Table 5.54: Methods of paying the hospital.
Payment methods Number %
Itemized billing at rates negotiated 9 21.4
by the establishment or organization •
Itemized billing at rates determined 29 69.0
by the hospital
Daily charge at rates determined by 2 4.8
the hospital
Annual premium 1 2.4
No answer 1 2.4
Total 42 100.0
The frequency of paying the contracted hospital is 
displayed in table 5.55. Some 29 establishments paid the 
contracted hospital every month. One each of the 
establishments paid every 2, 3 and 12 months. Finally, 10 
establishments paid the contracted hospital irregularly 
depending on the number of bills sent to them.
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Table 5.55: The frequency of paying the hospital by
employer.
Frequency of payment Number %
Every month 29 69.0
Every 2 months 1 2.4
Every 3 months 1 2.4
Every 12 months 1 2.4
Irregularly, depends on the bills 10 23.8
Total 42 100.0
5. CONCLUSION
This chapter described the general characteristics of the 
establishments. The findings and analysis presented are based 
on the existing provision of welfare and health fringe 
benefits. These findings then form the background for the 
costing of the existing health benefits in the next chapter.
The provision of a total of 32 types of welfare and 
health fringe benefits were found in Thailand with its 
generally low-wage conditions. However, to view them as income 
support measures would not present a full picture. The major 
effect of the fringe benefits was that the employees tended 
to work with employers for a long time, as they provide 
benefits for them. The employer, therefore, does not need to 
worry about a high training cost and lower productivity 
arising from an unskilled labour force. Another major 
advantage of health benefits is that healthy employees lead to
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an improvement of efficiency in working, especially in the 
labour intensive jobs. Finally, this survey presented the 
types and coverage of health benefits. Also, the methods of 
paying providers were explored and found that fee-for-service 
and itemized billing were the predominant methods of paying 
the doctor and the hospital respectively.
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CHAPTER 6
COST OF HEALTH BENEFITS
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the cost of existing health benefits 
will be analyzed, as well as the employers' opinions on 
national health insurance for Thailand. The aim of this 
section is to explore what the cost might be if the state were 
to take an active role in the health care market by 
introducing compulsory health insurance. Two methods of cost 
analysis were used. First, the total cost of the existing 
health benefits were computed from data given by employers on 
what they had spent in 1987. Second, the cost was analyzed by 
a "willingness to pay" approach. Employers were asked their 
opinion on national health insurance and how much they would 
be willing to pay as a percentage of employees' pay-roll. The 
costs, derived from both methods, were then compared to find 
out the character of establishments which would be most likely 
to join the scheme.
2. THE MEASUREMENT OF COSTS
A. The existing cost of health benefit provision.
From the point of view of this study which was being 
designed to examine the employers' potential for joining a
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statutory health insurance scheme, there is a focus on 
analyzing only the total cost to employers of providing the 
existing health benefit, excluding any costs borne by the 
employee such as transport cost, meals and opportunity cost. 
The basis of the calculations was entirely on employers' 
direct tangible costs, excluding direct intangible costs such 
as the regret of employers from the sickness or death of 
employees, because these costs would be based on value 
judgments. The employers' indirect tangible costs were 
excluded because of the complexity of calculation. These would 
include the reduction of employers' productivity due to 
sickness, maternity and the death of employees, as well as the 
administrative cost of benefit payment. Finally, this survey 
also omitted the complexity of valuation of the indirect 
intangible cost; for instance, the social cost borne by 
society due to disabled employees. Therefore, the explicit 
valuation of the total cost to employers was enumerated, by 
using the expenditures between 1 January and 31 December 
1987, as follows;
1. Contributions to the Workmen's Compensation Fund to 
cover industrial injury benefits, as was the case in some 
provinces, in some establishments with more than 20 employees.
2. Cost of hospitalisation and out-patient visits both in 
hospitals and private clinics. These included both the amounts 
that were reimbursed to employees and the direct payments to 
the contracted providers.
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3. Cost of drugs and pharmaceutical products which the 
employer kept in establishments for minor accidents and 
illnesses.
4. Cost of part-time or full-time salaried doctors and 
honorarium for doctors who came to provide medical care in 
establishments.
5. Cost of nurses providing primary care in 
establishments.
6. Maternity grant which was paid in a lump sum to the 
working mother, when the child was newly born. This was a 
benefit separated from medical care cost, due to the maternity 
condition and the cash maternity benefit.
7. Cost of providing family planning for employees.
8. Cash sickness benefit which was calculated from days 
lost or the total number of days for which employees were paid 
during their absence from ordinary sickness, multiplied by the 
average daily wages.
9. Cash maternity benefit which was calculated from days 
lost or the number of paid days of maternity leave, multiplied 
by the average daily wages.
10. Cash sickness benefit from accidents not related to 
work, calculated in the same way as in 8 and 9, above.
11. Cash sickness benefit from accidents related to work 
were as compensated by the Workmen's Compensation Fund.
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B. The opinion of employers on statutory health
insurance and the cost from the "willingness to 
pay" approach.
This part of the survey attempted to analyze two 
components; the opinion of employers on statutory health 
insurance for their employees and the cost of their 
contribution by the "willingness to pay" approach. Also, their 
opinion on the potential of employees' contributions was 
asked. Then, the supportive and unsupportive groups of 
employers were compared with their existing costs of health 
benefit provision, derived from part A, in order to find out 
the character of establishments which were most likely to join 
the scheme. Finally, the cost derived from the "willingness to 
pay" approach was compared with the cost of existing health 
benefit provision to find out the acceptable amount for the 
employers' contribution.
3. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. Cost of existing health benefits •
1. Median total cost of existing health benefits.
Table 6.1 illustrates median total costs for 
establishments in two broad groups; namely, health benefit 
expenditure and other expenditure. Other expenditures were 
shown here for a comparative purpose. They were comprised of
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personnel costs and administrative costs. Personnel costs were 
subdivided into normal wages and salaries (hereafter called 
pay-roll), and extra wages. Usually, the pay-roll was the 
normal parameter to determine the basic contribution. This 
survey found that the data was highly skewed in every item 
because the sample represented the very small and the very 
large establishments. Thus, the median was chosen to represent 
the average cost rather than mean. The yearly median personnel 
costs and administrative costs for each establishment were 
720,000 Baht and 576,200 Baht, respectively. The median pay­
roll were 609,700 Baht an establishment a year. Finally, the 
median total cost of health benefits, for each establishment, 
was 18,300 Baht a year.
In addition, this survey found 4 cases of death from 
accidents related to work and 12 cases of death from accidents 
not related to work. Thus, the proportion of deaths from 
accidents related to work and from accidents not related to 
work was 1:3. In the former situation, the employers who paid 
a regular contribution to the Workmen's Compensation Fund did 
not have to pay more than they had paid to the fund. However, 
in the small establishment the compensation had to be drawn 
directly from the company account which employers were always 
keen to avoid. In the case of death from accidents related to 
work, the family of the employee would received compensation 
from the Workmen's Compensation Fund or the employer (if it 
was a small firm). By contrast, the dependents of those who 
died from accidents not related to work would received
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nothing. However, this study did not try to calculate the 
economic loss due to the death of employees working for the 
remainder of their working life, because their deaths were, in 
fact, economic losses for their families not for the employer 
as there was a plentiful supply of labour in Thailand. Only a 
small reduction in productivity may have occurred when the new 
employee was not as experienced as the previous one. This is 
especially so when, as in many developing countries, the 
labour supply in Thailand is unlikely to be particularly 
highly skilled. Therefore, the cost to the employer from an 
employees' death is small, and omitted from the calculation 
in this study.
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Table 6.1; Median total expenditure on health benefits by 
establishments (1 January - 31 December 1987).
Type of Median 
expenditure (Baht)
Skewness Kurtosis S.D.
(Baht)
Range
(Baht)
a) Other expenditures
1. Personnel 720,000 5 30 - -
costs
2. Pay-roll 609,700 5 31 - —
3. Extra wages 172,600 5 34 - -
4. Admin.cost 576,200 8 78 - -
b) Health expenditure
5. Premium for 20,400 2 
Industrial injury benefits
7 165,100 888,600
6. Hospitals 5,500 6 43 820,900 6,999,800
and clinics
7. Drugs 1,500 5 28 89,400 699,900
8. Doctors 100,000 3 16 1,175,100 -
9. Nurses 125,000 4 16 2,594,300 -
10.Maternity 4,100 1 - 32,600 94,600
grant
11.Family - - - -
planning
12.Sick pay 4,150 8 84 293,300 3,127,800
13.Maternity pay 6,9 00 4 26 148,700 939,100
14.Opportunity 1,460 6 47 14,500 109,300
cost from accidents 
not related to work.
15.Opportunity 2,120 7 60 33,900 280,500
cost from industrial 
accidents
Median total 18,300 6 54 1,577,400 16,043,200
cost on health 
benefits
(Excluding 1-4)
2. The median total cost of existing health benefit 
provision as a percentage of pay-roll and 
other expenditure.
When comparing the total cost of existing health benefit 
provision in 1987 with pay-roll, the median total cost of 
health benefit was 2.5% of pay-roll. However, this percentage 
was slightly decreased to 2.2% of pay-roll if the total health 
benefit is compared with the total personnel costs due to the 
inclusion of extra wages as with the personnel costs. In 
comparison with the total administrative cost, the median of
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total expenditure of health benefits was 3.2 per cent. Due to 
the highly skewed data, the median was used to represent the 
average cost in all cases (see table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Median total expenditure on health benefits 
as a percentage of other expenditures.
Health benefit 
as the % of
Median
<%)
Mean
<%)
Skew­
ness
Kurto­
sis
S.D.
<%)
Range
<%)
Pay-roll 2.5 5.9 8 82 16 185
Personnel cost 2.2 6.6 6 54 20 185
Administrative 3.2 18.5 13 171 485
cost
The finding here was relevant to policy formulation on 
the question of how much the employers would be willing to pay 
as their contribution to statutory health insurance. Since the 
median total cost of health benefits was 2.5% of pay-roll and 
the average contribution to the Workmen's Compensation Fund 
was 1.0%, the amount that employers paid on account of 
ordinary sickness benefit was the difference between the two. 
Thus the answer to the policy question was the optimal amount 
of contribution which employers would pay would be 1.5% of the 
pay-roll. This amount would make the employer in the same 
position as the status quo, if not better when inflation from 
1987 to 1991 is taken into consideration, because the cost of 
provision for ordinary sickness alone was 1.5% in 1987.
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3. The median cost of existing health benefit and
percentage of pay-roll spent on health benefit, 
classified by size of establishment.
When taking the size of an establishment into 
consideration, it was found that the structure of health 
benefit in a larger establishment was more complicated than 
that in a smaller one (see table 6.3). In establishments with 
employees of 300 or more, a full range of health benefits was 
provided (with the exception of family planning which was not 
provided in any size of establishment). There was no legal 
requirement for establishments with less than 20 employees to 
make a contribution to the Workmen's Compensation Fund for 
industrial injury benefit. In this circumstances, they were 
responsible for health care cost and usually made direct 
payments to health care providers. However, establishments of 
all sizes reported that they kept a nominal amount of drugs on 
their premises. Sickness cash benefit was also provided in all 
establishments.
The survey found that the percentage of pay-roll spent on 
health benefits varied. As presented in table 6.3, 
establishments with less than 10 employees spent the most on 
health benefit (3.21 per cent of pay-roll). Establishments 
with 10-19 employees spent 2.77 per cent of their pay-roll on 
health benefits which was more than the national median 
expenditure of 2.50 % (refer to table 6.2). One explanation of 
their disproportionate spending is because they were not
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protected by the Workmen's Compensation Fund or any other type 
of health insurance. Employers had to pay out of their pocket 
for accidents to or illness of their employees.
Establishments with 20-99 employees spent 2.40 per cent 
of pay-roll on health benefit which was close to the national 
median of 2.5%. Establishments with 100-299 employees paid 
the smallest proportion of 1.89 per cent of pay-roll on health 
benefit. Both of these latter sizes of establishment managed 
to pay a smaller proportion because employers paid a regular 
contribution to the Workmen's Compensation Fund to protect 
against their financial loss from industrial accidents. At the 
same time, they provide other simple forms of health benefit.
Establishments with 300-999 employees spent 2.98 per cent 
of pay-roll on health benefit. The more expensive arrangement 
arose because they provided a more comprehensive form of 
health benefit than establishments of a smaller size. Their 
sickness benefit included a health clinic with full-time or 
part-time nurses and doctors service on the premises. 
Maternity grant and maternity cash benefit were provided in 
addition to industrial injury benefit and sickness benefit.
The largest size of establishment, which employed 1,000 
or more employees, paid a relatively small proportion of pay­
roll in providing health benefit for employees on account of 
an economy of scale. Though they offered a comprehensive 
system of health benefits, similar to that of establishments
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with 300-999 employees, they spent only 2,29 per cent of pay­
roll on health benefit because their benefits protected a 
larger number of employees. They could spread out the cost of 
health service provision by nurse and doctor, to protect a 
larger number of employees than those of establishments with 
300-999 employees.
Table 6.3: Median expenditure on health benefits and
median percentage of pay-roll spent on health 
benefit by size of establishment.
Type of Median cost on health benefit by size of establishment 
expenditure 1-9 10-19 20-99 100-299 300-999 1000+
a) Other expenditures
1. Personnel 180,450 373,400 1,275,000 6,028,600 15,178,000 76,876,000
costs
2. Pay-roll 166,500 334,800 1,236,000 5,867,000 12,690,000 61,280,000
3. Extra wages 2,850 20,000 44,730 381,600 30,000 4,710,800
4. Admin.cost 127,000 225,000 1,048,000 4,320,000 685,454 13,029,900
b) Health expenditure
5. Premium for - - 4,367 20,000 107,050 245,656
Industrial injury benefits
6. Hospitals 1,500 3,000 8,500 16,640 73,500 259,800
and clinics
7. Drugs 200 500 1,440 2,570 10,180 75,000
8. Doctors - - - - 352,580 75,300
9. Nurses - - - - 694,960 71,170
10.Maternity - - - - 500 20,820
grant
11. Family - - - - -
planning
12.Sick pay 273 1,500 3,366 10,658 4,126 370,000
13.Maternity pay - - - 1,400 3,037 51,200
14.Opportunity - - - - 1,462 16,800
cost from accidents 
not related to work.
15.Opportunity - - 630 2,047 14,120
cost from industrial 
accidents
Median total 3,995 7,850 33,227 101,100 762,700 1,240,000
cost on health 
benefits
(Excluding 1-4)
Health benefits 3.21 2.77 2.40 1.89 2.98 2.29
as percentage 
of pay-roll
A policy implication of these findings, with regard to 
size of establishment, was that at the initial stage of
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implementing health insurance only establishments with 300-999 
employees would benefit from the statutory health insurance 
scheme. To join the scheme, they could reduce the cost of 
health benefit from 1.98 per cent of pay-roll (1% going 
towards the Workmen's Compensation Fund) to 1.5% of pay-roll. 
Similarly, those with less than 20 employees would also 
benefit from the potential cost reduction. Unfortunately, 
establishments with less than 20 employees would be excluded 
from the scheme in the first three years of implementation. By 
contrast, establishments with 20-299 employees would feel a 
financial burden in joining the scheme. However, more 
information, an educational programme, as well as a compulsory 
requirement would make them later understand and co-operate 
with the social policy. The most difficult cases are 
establishments with 1,000 or more employees because to join 
the scheme would mean they have to pay a higher cost than the 
amount they already pay. They would be the first group who 
would apply to opt out of the scheme and argue that they have 
provided a better health benefit than that specified by the 
Law.
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4. The differences between mean ranks of total cost
of health benefit between different locations, 
type and size of establishments.
The study applied the Kruskal-Wallis Test to compare the 
differences between mean ranks of total cost of the existing 
provision of health benefit and the different locations, type 
and size of establishments. The results were as follows;
a). The mean rank of total expenditure on health benefit 
provision of establishments located in different geographical 
areas of the country was not significantly statistically 
different, because the P value was more than 0.05 (see table 
6.4) .
Table 6.4; Compare the mean rank of total expenditure on 
health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by location of establishment.
Location Rate Mean ranks
Bangkok 60 100.08
5 Provinces 22 118.02
surrounding Bangkok
Central region 25 96.76
North region 28 100.61
Northeast region 33 73.65
South region 22 85.32
Total 190
X2 = 10.325, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.067
b). Table 6.5 revealed that differences in the mean rank 
of total cost of health benefit provision in every type of
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establishment was not statistically significant (P value was 
more than 0.05).
Table 6.5: Compare the mean ranks of total expenditure on 
health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by type of establishment.
Type of establishments Rate Mean ranks
Food, drink and tobacco 17 107.74
Textiles, clothing and leather 15 77.93
Woodworking and construction 9 86.22
Paper, printing and publishing 6 117.50
Chemical and allied industries 5 143.20
Metals and non-metals manufacture 14 96.96
Mining and quarrying 6 112.17
Miscellaneous manufacturing 10 124.60
Transport and communications 4 70.50
Energy and water supply 6 134.50
Business, finance and banking 6 117.17
Professional and scientific 6 129.00
services
Tourist services and hotels 14 91.36
Distribution trades, wholesale 48 77.35
and retail
Miscellaneous services 24 88.04
Total 190
X2 = 23.461, d.f. =14, P-value = 0.053
When comparing the different sizes of establishments, the 
mean rank of total expenditure on health benefits was 
statistically different at the 0.001 level of significance, as 
shown in table 6.6. This meant that the larger the size of the 
establishment, in terms of the number of employees, the 
considerably larger the amount that was spent on health 
benefits in 1987.
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Table 6.6: Compare the mean ranks of total expenditure
on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test,
classified by size of establishment.
size of establishments Rate Mean ranks
(No. of employees)
1-9 42 46.77
10-19 46 64.64
20-99 52 105.35
100-299 20 138.65
300-999 16 157.56
1000 and more 14 173.93
Total 190
X2 = 110.293, d.f. = 5, P-value < 0.0001
5. The differences between mean ranks of health benefit 
as a percentage of pay-roll between different 
locations, type and size of establishment.
The total expenditure is not the best parameter to 
differentiate between health benefit provision amongst 
different sizes of establishment because, obviously, the 
larger the size of establishment the more they spend on the 
total cost of health benefit. Thus, for further analysis, the 
percentage of pay-roll spent on health benefit is used as a 
better parameter to identify whether there were any 
statistical differences between different locations, type and 
size of establishment. Therefore, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was 
applied to compare the percentage of pay-roll spent on health 
benefit by their mean ranks. The results were as presented 
below;
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a). Table 6.7 shows that apparently the Northeast region, 
the North region and five Provinces surrounding Bangkok had a 
higher mean rank of percentage of pay-roll spent on health 
benefit than the rest of the country. However, the 
differences were not statistically significant (because the P 
value was more than 0.05).
Table 6.7: Compare the mean rank of percent of pay-roll
spent on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by location of establishment.
Location Rate Mean ranks
Bangkok 63 98.85
5 Provinces 23 108.74
surrounding Bangkok
Central region 26 82.79
North region 28 115.32
Northeast region 34 115.47
South region 26 79.38
Total 200
X2 = 10.523, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.061
b). When comparing the different types of establishments, 
the mean rank of expenditure on health benefits as a 
percentage of pay-roll were not significantly statistically 
different, as shown in table 6.8.
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Table 6.8: Compare the mean ranks of percent of pay-roll
spent on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test,
classified by type of establishment.
Type of establishment Rate Mean ranks
Food, drink and tobacco 17 94.12
Textiles, clothing and leather 16 86.88
Woodworking and construction 9 106.11
Paper, printing and publishing 6 133.50
Chemical and allied industries 6 116.33
Metals and non-metals manufacture 15 112.97
Mining and quarrying 6 122.83
Miscellaneous manufacturing 10 81.70
Transport and communications 5 46.40
Energy and water supply 7 119.14
Business, finance and banking 7 69.71
Professional and scientific 5 139.60
services
Tourist services and hotels 14 107.54
Distribution trades, wholesale 49 106.09
and retail
Miscellaneous services 27 83.39
Total 199
X2 = 18.774, d.f. = 14, P-value = 0.174
c). When using the percentage of pay-roll spent on health 
benefit as a parameter to compare the differences between size 
of establishment by Kruskal-Wallis Test, the result was not 
statistically significantly (as presented in table 6.9).
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Table 6.9; Compare the mean ranks of percent of pay-roll
spent on health benefits by Kruskal-Wallis Test,
classified by size of establishment.
size of establishments Rate Mean ranks
(No. of employees)
1-9 50 97.66
10-19 46 100.90
20-99 52 100.18
100-299 20 89.00
300-999 18 120.50
1000 and more 14 104.86
Total 200
X2 = 2.943, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.708
In conclusion, there were no significant statistical 
differences in health benefit expenditure by location, type, 
or size of establishment when using the percentage of pay-roll 
spent on health benefit as the comparison parameters. 
Therefore, there will be no significant difference in 
potential to join the compulsory health insurance scheme, by 
location, type or size of establishment.
The policy implication of this finding is that the 
decision to include or exclude establishments in different 
locations, type and size was not statistically importance.
It is worth noting that the results arising in this 
section conflict with those from the cost study as presented 
in table 6.3. (The previous results indicated that some sizes 
of establishment would benefit more than other if joining the 
scheme, particularly the smaller sizes and those with 300-999
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employees). However, an alternative conclusion here may be 
that the reliability of the results in this section are 
questionable because of a comparing of mean ranks based on 
highly skewed data.
6. The differences between the average earnings of 
employee working in different locations, types and 
sizes of establishments.
The potential of employees to join a statutory health 
insurance scheme and their ability to pay insurance 
contributions were analyzed by using the Kruskal-Wallis Test. 
This survey examined the average pay-roll earnings of non- 
manual and manual employees and the findings are presented in 
separated sections, as follows;
a). Non-manual employees.
1) . The average monthly earnings of non-manual employees 
who worked in establishments located in different geographical 
areas of the country had a statistical difference at the 0.05 
level of significance. This finding demonstrates that non- 
manual employees who worked in 5 provinces surrounding Bangkok 
had an average monthly income higher than those who worked in 
Bangkok, Central, North, and South regions. Those who worked
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in the Northeast region had the lowest average monthly 
earnings in the country as shown by the lowest score of mean 
rank in table 6.10.
Table 6.10: Comparison of the average monthly income of 
non-manual employees by the Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, classified by location of establishment.
Location Rate Mean ranks
Bangkok 60 106.11
5 Provinces 23 111.15
surrounding Bangkok
Central region 24 96.40
North region 24 96.30
Northeast region 30 68.97
South region 26 89.77
Total 191
X2 = 11.241, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.047
2). Apparently, according to type of establishment, those 
who work in business, finance and banking had the highest 
average monthly earnings, as demonstrated by the highest mean 
rank in table 6.11. The second highest earnings were those who 
worked in mining and quarrying, and the third were employees 
in energy and water supply industries. The lowest average 
earnings were received by those who worked in textiles, 
clothing and leather. However, when applying the Kruskal- 
Wallis Test, the results indicated that non-manual employees 
in different types of establishments were not statistically 
different in their average monthly earnings.
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Table 6.11; Comparison of the average monthly income of
non-manual employees by the Kruskal-Wallis
Test, classified by type of establishment.
Type of establishment Rate Mean ranks
Food, drink and tobacco 15 107.67
Textiles, clothing and leather 15 50.33
Woodworking and construction 8 110.88
Paper, printing and publishing 6 76.75
Chemical and allied industries 6 90.42
Metals and non-metals manufacture 15 106.17
Mining and quarrying 6 120.33
Miscellaneous manufacturing 10 98.80
Transport and communications 5 93.20
Energy and water supply 7 115.86
Business, finance and banking 7 154.43
Professional and scientific 6 89.00
services
Tourist services and hotels 14 92.25
Distribution trades, wholesale 46 95.57
and retail
Miscellaneous services 25 87.04
Total 191
X2 = 23.315, d.f. = 14, P-value = 0.055
3). When comparing the average monthly income of non- 
manual employees who worked in different sizes of 
establishment, the results from the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
identified the statistical difference at the 0.01 level of 
significance (see table 6.12). This indicated that, in 
general, the employees who worked in the larger establishment 
received average monthly earnings higher than those who worked 
in the smaller establishments. As indicated by the highest 
mean rank, those who worked in establishments with 1,000 or 
more employees received the highest average monthly income. 
The second highest income rank comprised those who worked in 
the establishments with 100-299 employees. The third and the
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fourth highest income group were those who worked in 
establishments with 20-99 employees and 300-999 employees, 
respectively. The lowest average monthly income group were 
employees of the very small establishments with only 1-9 
employees. Finally, the second lowest average monthly income 
group were those who worked in establishments with 10-19 
employees.
Table 6.12; Comparison of the average monthly income of 
non-manual employees by the Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, classified by size of establishment.
Size of establishment Rate Mean ranks
(No. of employees)
1-9 47 78.10
10-19 45 81.07
20-99 50 104.99
100-299 20 120.88
300-999 16 104.41
1000 and more 13 129.23
Total 191
2 = 18.653, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.002
b). Manual-employees.
Similarly to the non-manual employees, the survey 
compared the differences between average monthly earnings of 
manual employees who worked in different locations, types and 
sizes of establishment by application of the Kruskal-Wallis 
Test. It was found that;
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1). There was a statistical difference at the 0.01 level 
of significance when comparing the average monthly earnings of 
manual employees who worked in different geographical areas. 
For instance, those whose jobs were located in 5 provinces 
surrounding Bangkok had the highest average monthly income. 
The second highest average income group were those whose 
places of work were located in Bangkok. The third highest 
monthly earners were manual employees of establishments in the 
Southern region. The lowest income group comprised those who 
worked in the Northeast region (see table 6.13).
Table 6.13; Comparison of the average monthly income of 
manual employees by the Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by location of establishment.
Location Rate Mean ranks
Bangkok 45 83.16
5 Provinces 19 101.71
surrounding Bangkok
Central region 16 63.47
North region 25 68.50
Northeast region 24 50.10
South region 18 70.72
Total 147
X2 = 19.189 , d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.002
2). When types of establishment were used as a parameter 
to compare the differences between the average monthly income 
of manual employees, a statistical difference, at the 0.05 
level of significance, was found. This indicated that manual 
employees of business, finance and banking received higher 
monthly earnings than those who worked in other types of
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establishment. The second highest average income group were 
those who worked in transport and communications, and the 
third highest average income group were employees in energy 
and water supply types of establishment. Lastly, the lowest 
earning group were employees of miscellaneous services (see 
table 6.14 ) .
Table 6.14: Comparisons of the average monthly income of 
manual employees by the Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by types of establishment.
Type of establishment Rate Mean ranks
Food, drink and tobacco 14 86.86
Textiles, clothing and leather 11 65.14
Woodworking and construction 8 68.50
Paper, printing and publishing 6 83.25
Chemical and allied industries 5 92.90
Metals and non-metals manufacture 14 80.11
Mining and quarrying 6 89.33
Miscellaneous manufacturing 7 89.71
Transport and communications 2 114.25
Energy and water supply 5 109.20
Business, finance and banking 2 138.75
Professional and scientific 2 66.75
services
Tourist services and hotels 12 65.38
Distribution trades, wholesale 32 68.52
and retail
Miscellaneous services 21 46.93
Total 147
X2 = 24.574, d.f. = 14, P-value = 0.039
3). Table 6.15 reveals that the average monthly earnings 
of manual employees in different sizes of establishment were 
statistically different at the 0.001 level of significance. As 
presented in mean rank scores, the highest earners were 
employees of establishments who employed the largest
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workforce. By contrast, the lowest earners were those who 
worked in the smallest size of establishment.
Table 6.15 s Comparison of the average monthly income of 
manual employees by the Kruskal-Wallis Test, 
classified by size of establishment.
Size of establishment 
(No. of employees)
Rate Mean ranks
1-9 31 46.69
10-19 38 63.17
20-99 38 78.29
100-299 18 96.67
300-999 10 99.80
1000 and more 12 109.75
Total 147
X2 = 32.825, d.f. = 5, P-value < 0.001
Concerning the employees' ability to make a contribution 
to their health insurance, as measured by their average 
monthly income, the geographical location and size of 
establishment were of particular importance in both non-manual 
and manual employees. The highest and second highest average 
income, for both manual and non-manual employees, were those 
who worked in the 5 provinces surrounding Bangkok, and in 
Bangkok itself, respectively. By contrast, the lowest average 
earnings for both manual and non-manual employees were those 
who worked in the Northeast region which is the poorest region 
of the country. A policy implication of this is that employees 
who worked in the 5 provinces surrounding Bangkok, and in 
Bangkok were of the highest potential to join the scheme due 
to their higher average monthly income and thus greater
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ability to pay the contribution unless this was counteracted 
by higher rents. Those with the least potential and therefore 
likely to suffer from paying the contribution, at the moment, 
were those who worked in the Northeast region of Thailand 
because their level of income was the lowest. There are two 
possible policy solution. First, to exclude the Northeast 
region at the beginning of the scheme making a gradual 
extension plan for them later on. Second, to apply cross­
subsidy or compensation for them in the process of annual 
resource allocation. In addition, a similar approach could be 
worked out for those who worked in the smaller establishments.
Although type of establishments was not a determining 
factor for non-manual employees' income, it was an important 
parameter for manual employees' monthly earnings. In both 
cases, however, the common finding was that those who worked 
in business, finance and banking had the highest income and 
therefore the highest potential to join the scheme. Finally, 
the least potential group to join the scheme or those who 
would need some kind of compensation and support was manual 
employees in miscellaneous services because they were the 
poorest amongst the other group of employees.
B. Accessibility of health care and availability of 
transportation .
Before introducing any statutory health insurance, it is 
also important to find out the accessibility and availability
229
of the existing health services. For accessibility of health 
care, this survey examined the distance and travelling time of 
employees, when using the customary means of transportation, 
to visit the nearest doctor, hospital and pharmacy.
Furthermore, this study was designed to explore the 
availability of doctor's services for it was the most 
fundamental service in the field of health insurance.
1. Accessibility of health services.
a). Distance.
The survey found that the nearest health service 
providers which were the most convenience for employees to 
visit were located at a physical distance of less than 1/2 
Kilometre. Within this distance, the most accessible of health 
services were the pharmacy, the doctor and the hospital, 
respectively. The median distance to visit the pharmacy was 
less than 1/2 Kilometre, to visit the doctor was 1/2 to 1 
Kilometre, and to the hospital was 1 to 2 Kilometres. However, 
a distance of more than 3 Kilometres was found in 8.0%, 12.5% 
and 18.5% of the sample in visiting the pharmacy, doctor and 
hospital, respectively (see table 6.16).
b). Travelling time.
All of the three kinds of health care could be visited 
at a median travelling time between 1 to 15 minutes. There
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were 90.5% of establishments where employees had access to the 
pharmacy within 15 minutes, 87.5% had access to the doctor, 
and 83.0% had access to hospital (also see table 6.16).
Table 6.16; Accessibility of the nearest health care.
Accessibility to Doctor Hospital Pharmacy
health care No. % No. % No. %
.stance
Less than 1/2 Km. 80 40.0 38 19.0 115 57.5
1/2 Km. to 1 Km. 33 16.5 47 23.5 32 16.0
1 to 2 Km. 31 15.5 40 20.0 19 9.5
2 to 3 Km. 22 11.0 31 15.5 5 2.5
More than 3 Km. 25 12.5 37 18.5 16 8.0
No answer 9 4.5 7 3.5 13 6.5
Total 200 100.0 200 100.0 200 100.0
['ravellina time
1 to 15 Minutes 175 87.5 166 83.0 180 90.0
16 to 30 Minutes 16 8.5 23 11.5 8 4.0
31 min. to 1 hour 1 0.5 3 1.5 1 0.5
More than 1 hour — — 1 0.5 1 0.5
No answer 8 4.0 9 3.5 10 5.0
Total 200 100.0 200 100.0 200 100.0
2. The availability of means of transport.
a). Distance
The availability of the nearest means of transport was 
measured in order to find out the most convenient mode of 
transport when using health services. Three types of means of 
transport were evaluated; bus-stop, railway station and pier. 
This survey found that the nearest distance to any means of 
transport was less than 1/2 Kilometre. There were 55.0%
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establishments within this distance, to the nearest bus-stop, 
5.5% to a railway station, and 4.5% to a pier. However, 
employees in some establishments might have difficulty in 
travelling to health services because the establishments were 
located more than 3 Kilometres from means of transport - 18.0% 
to the nearest railway station, 8.5% to the pier, and 3.5% to 
the bus-stop (see table 6.17).
b). Travelling time
The travelling time to the nearest means of transport was 
also explored. It was found that 73.0% of establishments had 
the nearest bus-stop within a travelling time of 1 to 15 
minutes. Similarly, twenty three per cent of establishments 
were also located within a travelling time of 1 to 15 minutes 
from the nearest railway station and 9.5% from a pier. There 
were 1% of establishments in each case which were one hour's 
journey from the nearest bus-stop and pier, (see table 6.17).
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Table 6.17; The availability of the nearest means of 
transportation.
Means of Bus-stop Railway station Pier
transportation No. % No. % No. %
Distance
Less than 1/2 Km. 
1/2 Km. to 1 Km.
1 to 2 Km.
2 to 3 Km.
More than 3 Km.
No answer
Total
110 55.0 11
18 9.0 2
11 5.5 15
2 1.0 13
7 3.5 36
52 26.0 123
200 100.0 200
5.5 9 4.!
1.0 1 0.5
7.5 5 2.5
6.5 1 0.5
18.0 17 8.5
61.5 167 83.5
100.0 200 100.0
Travelling time 
1 to 15 Minutes 
16 to 30 Minutes 
31 min. to 1 hour 
More than 1 hour 
No answer
Total
146 73.0 46
4 2.0 22
2 1.0 7
2 1.0 —
46 23.0 125
200 100.0 200
23.0 19 9.!
11.0 9 4.5
3.5 7 3.5
—  . 2 1.0
62.5 163 81.5
100.0 200 100.0
For the availability of doctor's services, when employees 
used the customary means of transport, the median time spent 
during a visit to the nearest doctor including waiting time 
was between 31 minutes and 1 hour. Within the average time 
spent of less than half an hour were 45.5%, and more than one 
hour 16.0% of the total establishments (see table 6.18).
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Table 6.18: The average time spent during a visit to the 
nearest doctor when using the customary means 
of transportincluding the time spent in the 
waiting room.
The average time spent Number %
1 to 15 Minutes 40 20.0
16 to 30 Minutes 51 25.5
31 min. to 1 hour 26 13.0
More than 1 hour 51 25.5
No answer 32 16.0
Total 200 100.0
In conclusion, the employee's accessibility to the 
nearest health care was high due to the high availability of 
health services and transport. The median distance to visit 
pharmacy, doctor and hospital were less than 2 Kilometres and 
the median travelling time for all visits was 15 minutes or 
less. The customary methods of transport to visit health 
services was by bus: the bus-stop was located within less than 
1/2 Kilometre and travelling time of 15 minutes or less. When 
special attention was placed on visiting the nearest doctor 
by using the customary means of transport and the time spent 
in the waiting room was taken into account, the average time 
spent was between half an hour to one hour. The policy 
implication of the high accessibility to health care was that 
it was unnecessary to create new health care facilities for 
the compulsory health insurance scheme.
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C. Causes of illness.
Information on causes of illness was based on data 
reported by employers. If, however, there was a nurse's 
services in a sick bay which was usually the case in a big 
establishment, records on employees' diseases or symptoms of 
illness were used instead. Next, the diseases or symptoms of 
illness were grouped according to the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). As in table 6.19, this 
survey found that the five leading groups of employees' 
illnesses were? diseases of the respiratory system (34.1%), 
diseases of the digestive system (27.2%), diseases of the 
nervous system and sense organs (16.4%), symptoms and ill- 
defined conditions (3.7%), and diseases of musculoskeletal 
system and connective tissue (3.4%). The first, second and 
fourth causes of illnesses reflected that of national 
prevalence (as presented in chapter 1). It showed that 
employees' major causes of sickness were, as reported by 
employers, causes from ordinary sickness like the rest of the 
Thai population. Besides, diseases of the nervous system and 
sense organs, as well as diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system and connective tissue were likely to be occupational- 
related sickness. However, workers do not know the cause of 
their illness and even doctors could not be sure whether an 
illness was occupational-related or not. This made it very 
difficult for employees to obtain benefits from the Workmen's 
Compensation Fund.
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The policy implications of this pattern of illnesses 
would be that on the one hand employees should be treated in 
the same way as the rest of the population as their illnesses 
were not different from others. Also, for equity purpose, 
health care facilities should be utilized by all types of 
population regardless of occupation and income level. On the 
other hand, as some of the employees had a high risk of 
illnesses from their job, a special preventive and treatment 
programme for occupational-related sickness should be 
provided within the existing health care facilities. A policy 
of unified and equitable treatment could then be formulated 
and implemented according to the pattern of illnesses.
Table 6.19: Frequency of illness of the employees as 
reported by employers.
Rank Causes of illness Number %
1 Diseases of respiratory system 183 34.1
2 Diseases of digestive system 146 27.2
3 Nervous system and sense organs 88 16.4
4 Symptoms and ill-defined conditions 20 3.7
5 Musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue
18 3.4
6 Dental health 13 2.4
6 Allergic fever 13 2.4
6 Eye diseases 13 2.4
6 Diseases of urinary tract and 
sex organs
13 2.4
7 Accidents 9 1.7
7 Skin diseases 9 1.7
8 Diseases due to obstetric causes 4 0.8
9 Infectious diseases 3 0.6
10 Endocrine, nutritional and 
metabolic diseases
1 0.2
10 Complication of pregnancy, 1 0.2
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D. Opinion on statutory health insurance.
Employers' attitudes about statutory health insurance 
were also evaluated. Although not all of the respondents were 
the owners of the establishment but were managers, their views 
might as well represent the employers' opinion. As shown in 
table 6.20, 35.0% of all respondents were the owners, the
remaining respondents were general manager (38.5%), personnel 
manager (18.0%) and financial manager (8.5%). Amongst these, 
68.0% of them were male and 32.0% were female (see table 
6.21).
Table 6.20; Position of respondents in the establishment.
Position of respondents Number %
Employer 70 35.0
General manager 77 38.5
Personnel manager 36 18.0
Financial manager 17 8.5
Total 200 100.0
Table 6.21: Sex of the respondents.
Sex Number %
Male 136 68.0
Female 64 32.0
Total 200 100.0
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1. Overall attitude.
When a likert scale was applied to a set of questions 
about health insurance, as presented in Appendix 2 
(questionnaires 3), the overall scores of respondents were 
ranged between 40-60 marks. Therefore, the score of 50 was 
used as the point to discriminate between those with 
favourable and unfavourable attitudes towards statutory health 
insurance. Subsequently, the chi-squared test was used to 
compare whether there was statistical significance between 
their opinions or not.
Table 6.22 shows that there were not significant 
statistical differences between the attitude of the employers 
in different location of establishments about statutory health 
insurance.
Table 6.22: Compare the differences of respondents'
attitude towards national health insurance 
scheme for all employees, classified by 
location of establishment.
Location Unfavourable Favourable Total
attitude attitude
Bangkok 19 44 63
5 Provinces 4 19 23
surrounding Bangkok
Central region 11 15 25
North region 3 25 28
Northeast region 9 25 34
South region 11 15 26
Total 57 143 200
X2 = 10.75835, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.0564
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Similarly, the attitudes of employers in different types 
of establishments towards statutory health insurance were not 
statistically significant (see table 6.23).
Table 6.23: Compare the differences of respondents' attitude 
towards the national health insurance scheme for 
all employees, classified by type of establishment.
Type of establishment Unfavourable Favourable Total
attitude attitude
Food, drink and tobacco 5 12 17
Textiles, clothing and leather 1 15 16
Woodworking and construction 1 8 9
Paper, printing and publishing 2 4 6
Chemical and allied industries 2 4 6
Metals and non-metals manufacture 4 11 15
Mining and quarrying 1 5 6
Miscellaneous manufacturing 4 6 10
Transport and communication 2 3 5
Energy and water supply 2 5 7
Business, finance and banking 1 6 7
Professional and scientific 3 3 6
services
Tourist services and hotels 4 10 14
Distribution trades, wholesale 18 31 49
and retail
Miscellaneous services 7 20 27
Total 57 143 200
X2 = 10.55119, d.f. = 14, P-value = 0.7209
Likewise, as shown in table 6.24, there was not a 
significant statistical difference when comparing the 
attitudes of employers in different sizes of establishments 
towards national health insurance for all employees.
239
However, more employers of establishments of small size 
( 1 - 9 9  employees) and of size 1000 and more employees had a 
favourable attitude towards statutory health insurance than 
those of medium size (100 - 999 employees). This result from 
employers in small sized establishments having a favourable 
attitude was consistent with what they spent on health 
benefit ( see table 6.3). It is understandable that employers 
in smaller sized establishments (particularly those with 1-19 
employees) would benefit financially in joining the scheme. By 
contrast, establishments with more than 1000 employees had a 
relatively low level of spending on health benefit, but still 
had a favourable attitude towards health insurance. Thus, the 
cost of health benefit may be associated with the employers' 
attitude towards health insurance only in a small sized 
establishment. In the larger establishments, the favourable 
attitude was derived from other factors such as the higher 
level of education of the employers.
Table 6.24: Compare the differences of respondents'attitude 
towards the national health insurance scheme 
for all employees, classified by size of 
establishment.
Size of establishment Unfavourable Favourable Total 
(No. of employees) attitude attitude
No . % No . % No. %
1 - 9 16 32.0 34 68.0 50 100.0
10 - 19 11 23.4 36 76.6 47 100.0
20 - 99 11 21.2 41 78.8 52 100.0
100 - 299 8 38.1 13 61.9 21 100.0
300 - 999 7 43.8 9 56.2 16 100.0
1000 and more 4 28.6 10 71.4 14 100.0
Total 57 28.5 143 71.5 200 100.0
X2 = 5.05149, d.f. = 5, P-value = 0.4096
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2. Opinion of employers compared with the percentage
of pay-roll spent on health benefits.
In order to find out the character of establishments keen 
to join the scheme, levels of respondents' attitudes towards 
statutory health insurance were compared with the percentage 
of pay-roll spent on health benefits. The respondents' 
attitude, classified into favourable and unfavourable groups, 
were compared with the percentage of pay-roll spent on health 
benefits which also divided into high spending and low 
spending. The results of those who had favourable attitudes 
and high spending (35.5% of the total) were ranked as the 
highest potential to join the scheme. The moderate group who 
had also potential to cooperate with the scheme were those of 
favourable attitude but low spending (35.0%), and of 
unfavourable attitude but high spending (14.0%). In total, 
there were 84.5% of the total establishments which were likely 
to support the statutory health insurance scheme.
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Table 6.25; Compare levels of respondents' attitude with the
percent of pay-roll spent on health benefits,
classified by location of establishment.
Favourable Favourable Unfavourable Unfavourable
..ocation attitude attitude attitude attitude Total
high cost low cost high cost low cost
Bangkok 20 24 9 10 63
5 Provinces 10 9 3 1 23
surrounding 
Bangkok 
Central region 5 10 5 6 26
North region 14 9 3 2 28
Northeast region 15 10 6 3 34
South region 7 8 2 9 26
Total (No.) 71 70 28 31 200
Total (%) 35.5 35.0 14.0 15.5 100
The character of those who were likely to cooperate with 
the scheme, as shown in table 6.25, were classified by 
location of establishments. There were 95.7 per cent of 
establishments located in 5 provinces surrounding Bangkok,
92.9 per cent in the North region, and 91.2 per cent of those 
located in the Northeast region were likely to join the 
scheme. Of those located in Bangkok, Central and South 
regions, 84.1%, 76.9% and 65.4% of the total establishments in 
their regions, respectively, were also likely to cooperate 
with the scheme (see table 6.26).
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Table 6.26: Character of establishment likely to support the
scheme, classified by location of establishment.
Location Likely to support Unlikely to support
Number % Number %
Bangkok 53 84.1 10 15.9
5 Provinces 22 95.7 1 4.3
surrounding Bangkok
Central region 20 76.9 6 23.1
North region 26 92.9 2 7.1
Northeast region 31 91.2 3 8.8
South region 17 65.4 9 34.6
Total 169 84.5 31 15.5
To analyze in a similar way, types of establishments 
which were likely to support the scheme namely; woodworking 
and construction; paper, printing and publishing; chemical and 
allied industries; and transport and water supply (see table 
6.27).
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Table 6.27: Compare levels of respondents' attitude with the
percent of pay-roll spent on health benefit,
classified by type of establishment.
Type Favourable Favourable Unfavourable Unfavourable
of attitude attitude attitude attitude Total
establishments high cost low cost high cost low cost
Food, drink 5 7 1 4 17
Textiles 7 8 — 1 16
Woodworking 3 4 2 - 9
Paper, printing 3 1 2 - 6
Chemical 3 1 2 — 6
Metals and 10 1 2 2 15
non-metals
Mining 4 1 - 1 6
Miscellaneous 1 5 2 2 10
manufacturing
Transport - 3 - 2 5
Utilities 3 2 2 — 7
Financial 1 5 — 1 7
Professional 2 — 2 1 5
Tourist 5 5 3 1 14
Trades 17 14 7 11 49
Miscellaneous 6 13 3 5 27
services
Total (No.) 70 70 28 31 199
Total (%) 35.2 35 .2 14.1 15.5 100
In terms of size of establishment which were likely to 
support the scheme, data is presented in table 6.28. When 
computed further, there were 90.4% of establishments with 20- 
99 employees with a higher potential to cooperate in the 
operation of the scheme. The percentage of establishments 
which were likely to support the scheme went down to 87.2 , 
85.0, 82.0, 76.2 and 75.0 as the size changed from 10-19, 
1000 and more, 1-9, 100-299, and 300-999 employees,
respectively (see table 6.29).
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Table 6.28: Compare levels of respondents' attitude with the
percent of pay-roll on health benefits,
classified by size of establishment.
Size of Favourable Favourable Unfavourable Unfavourable
establishments attitude attitude attitude attitude Total 
(No.of employees) high cost low cost high cost low cost
1 - 9 21 13 7 9 50
10 - 19 20 16 5 6 47
20 - 99 16 24 7 5 52
100 - 299 5 7 4 5 21
300 - 999 6 3 3 4 16
1000 and more 3 7 2 2 14
Total (No.) 71 70 28 31 200
Total (%) 35.5 35.0 14.0 15.5 100
Table 6.29: Character of establishment likely to support the 
scheme, classified by size of establishment.
Size Likely to support Unlikely to support
Number % Number %
1 - 9 41 82.0 9 8.0
10 - 19 41 87.2 6 12.8
20 - 99 47 90.4 5 9.6
100 - 299 16 76.2 5 23.8
300 - 999 12 75.0 4 25.0
1000 and more 12 85.0 2 15.0
Total 169 84.5 31 15.5
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When comparing the size of establishment combined with 
their percentage of pay-roll spent on health benefit (table 
6.3), establishments with 20 - 99 employees were most likely 
to support the scheme though their existing health benefit 
spending was relatively low. For this group, to join the 
scheme implied that they would have to pay a higher cost than 
the existing provision. Thus, cost of health benefit provision 
alone was not a key element in determining their likelihood in 
supporting the scheme. Similarly, establishment with 1000 and 
more employees followed this pattern. By contrast, the small 
establishments with 1 - 1 9  employees which were also likely to 
support the scheme had a high level of spending on health 
benefit (see table 6.3). For the small size of establishment, 
to join the scheme would imply that they could reduce their 
level of spending. Therefore, the existing cost of health 
benefit provision was associated with their likelihood in 
supporting the scheme.
The policy implications of the findings in this section 
are that initially, the scheme would be better covering those 
with a higher potential for joining. The scheme may cover 
those establishments with those located in 5 industrial 
Provinces surrounding Bangkok, the North region and the 
Northeast region and later, expand to cover the rest of the 
country. Alternatively, the scheme may start with some types 
of establishment, such as woodworking and construction, paper 
and printing, chemical and allied industries, and energy and 
water supply. When taking the size of establishment into
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account, the scheme may start with establishments with 20 or 
more employees but should aim to include the smaller size in 
a relatively short time.
3. Opinion about the administrative organization of 
statutory health insurance.
a) Provider of health insurance.
The question of who should provide health care under the 
national health insurance scheme for private employees was 
asked. As shown in table 6.30, there were 49.0% of 
respondents who answered who preferred the public and private 
mixed option of provider. Those who favoured the public sector 
provider only showed up at a percentage of 38.4. Meanwhile, 
there were 12.6% of respondents who answered this question who 
chose private provider only.
Table 6.30: Attitude towards who should provide health
care under the national health insurance 
scheme for employees.
Health care provider Number %
Private sector only 25 12.6
Public sector only 76 38.4
Both public and private sectors 97 49.0
Total 198 100.0
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b) Administrative organization.
A favourable attitude to the Ministry of Public Health 
administrative organization of the statutory health insurance 
was evident from this survey. There were 68.2% of the 195 
respondents who favoured the Ministry of Public Health as the 
responsible unit for the health insurance scheme. A new 
governmental body as an administrative agency was chosen by 
14.9% of respondents. A joint venture between the Ministry of 
Public Health and the Ministry of Interior was favoured by 
9.2% of the respondents. Those who preferred the Ministry of 
Interior were 4.1% of respondents. The Office of the Prime 
Minister was desired by 2.6%. Lastly, the Ministry of Finance 
was named in combination with other governmental bodies (see 
table 6.31).
Table 6.31: Attitude towards the government unit which
should be responsible for organizing the 
national health insurance scheme for 
employees.
Responsible unit Number %
Ministry of Public Health 133 68.2
Ministry of Interior 8 4.1
Ministry of Public Health and 18 9.2
Ministry of Interior
Office of the Prime Minister 5 2.6
A new governmental body 29 14.9
Ministry of Public Health and 1 0.5
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Public Health, 1 0.5
Ministry of Interior and
Ministry of Finance
Total 195 100.0
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E. Cost of health insurance derived from the 
willingness to pay approach.
1. Who should contribute ?
The main response to the policy question of who should 
pay the contribution were from both employers and employees 
(66.3%). However, there were 28.0% of the 193 respondents who 
specified the employer only, while 5.7% of them indicated the 
employee only (see table 6.32).
Table 6.32; Attitude towards who should pay for the 
scheme.
Who should pay Number %
The employers only 54 28.0
The employees only 11 5.7
Both employers and employees 128 66.3
Total 193 100.0
2. The eligible persons.
Most of the respondents thought that the person to be 
protected by the scheme should be the employee only - 55.8% of 
197 respondents. However, 44.2% thought that dependents should 
be included (see table 6.33).
249
Table 6.33: Attitude towards who should be covered by the 
scheme.
Persons covered Number %
Employees only 110 55,8
Employees and their 87 44.2
dependents
Total 197 100.0
Amongst 87 of those who specified that the scheme should 
protect the dependents of employees, the details of dependents 
were given. Of these, there were; the employees' spouse and 
children (59.8%), their spouse, children and parents (31.0%), 
and finally only the employees' spouse (9.2%), as shown in 
table 6.34. It was evident that about one third of the 
participating respondents thought that employees' parents 
should be included in the benefits. This was because, in Thai 
tradition, most parents live with their children and the care 
for the elderly is a financial burden on the extended family.
Table 6.34: Attitude towards which dependents should be 
covered by the scheme.
Eligible dependents Number %
The employees' spouse 
Their spouse and children 
Their spouse, children 27 31.0
and parents
8 9.2
52 59.8
Total 87 100.0
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3. Cost of statutory health insurance.
The respondents were asked to give their opinion on what 
should be the maximum amount of their contribution to the 
statutory health insurance scheme as a percentage of the 
average pay-roll. Two possibilities were presented; when the 
beneficiary of the scheme was employee only; and when the 
beneficiaries were the employee and his dependents. In 
addition, their opinion on the amounts of employee's 
contribution was also asked to be quantified in the same way. 
The results were that, when only the employee was to be 
protected, the average of total cost of the statutory health 
insurance would be 7.8 per cent of pay-roll. Of this employers 
were willing to pay a maximum contribution of 4.9 per cent of 
the employees' pay-roll, while they thought that employees 
should pay only 2.9 per cent. If the employees' dependents 
were to be protected too, the median total cost of the scheme 
would then be 8.9 per cent of pay-roll. In this circumstance, 
employers were willing to pay contributions at the same figure 
of 4.9 per cent of pay-roll, but thought that employees should 
pay a higher contribution of 4.0 per cent (see table 6.35). 
This was because the employers considered that it was the 
employees' responsibility to look after the welfare of their 
dependents rather than the employers'.
The policy implication of these figures was that 
employers were willing to make a substantial contribution to 
the scheme - a median of 4.9 per cent of pay-roll. If the
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mean was taken into account rather than the median, the lower 
figure of 4.6 per cent was found (see table 6.35). When 
compared with a contribution of only 1.5 per cent of pay-roll 
laid down in the Social Insurance Law of 1990, they would 
accept the scheme as very good value for money
Table 6.35: Attitude towards the average percentages 
of pay-roll which employers and employees 
should pay for the insurance contribution.
Employers' 
contribution 
Employees' 
contribution
If benefits covered 
employees only
(% of pay-roll)
Median Mean
4.9 4.6
2.9 3.2
If benefits covered 
employees and their 
dependents 
(% of pay-roll)
Median
4.9
4.0
Mean
4.7
4.2
Total 7.8 7.8 8.9 8.9
F. Compare cost from existing health benefits
provision with cost derived from the willingness 
to pay approach.
To compare the cost of existing health benefits provision 
(as presented in table 6.2) with the cost of employers' 
contribution and the total cost of the scheme derived from the 
willingness to pay approach, the t-test was applied. The first 
part of table 6.36 shows the result that, when the benefits
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cover the employee only, there was not a significant 
statistical difference between the actual cost of health 
benefits provision and the cost derived from the willingness 
to pay approach. However, the second part of table 6.36 
reveals that, if benefits covered employees and their 
dependents, the actual cost of health benefits provision and 
the cost from the willingness to pay approach showed 
statistical differences at the 0.05 level of significance. 
This finding reveals that not only was the existing provision 
of health benefits not sufficient to cover the employees' 
dependents, but also employers were unwilling to pay for 
dependents. Therefore, at the initial stage of implementing 
the scheme, the dependents of employees should be excluded to 
secure the political acceptance of employers. However, the 
scheme should plan step by step to include them in the 
foreseeable future.
Table 6.36: Compare the actual expenditure on health benefits 
as a percentage of pay-roll with the opinion 
figures by t-test.
Condition n He- Mean S.D. d.f. t-value P-value
Benefits covered dian 
employees only
Actual cost 190 2.5 5.9 16.518 302.69 1.4979 > 0.05
Opinion figures 146 4.9 7.8 8.916
Benefits covered 
employees and 
their dependents
Actual cost 190 2.5 5.9 16.518 314.55 2.3857 < 0.05
Opinion figures 144 4.9 8.9 9.731
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4. CONCLUSION
In looking at what should be the cost of a health 
insurance scheme to be implemented in March 1991, the existing 
cost of health benefit provision and the cost derived from 
the "willingness to pay approach" were compared. The average 
existing cost of ordinary sickness benefit, provided as a 
fringe benefit by employers in a large establishment, was 1.5% 
of pay-roll, in 1987. However, the employers were willing to 
pay 3.9% of pay-roll (1.0% was subtracted for the contribution 
to the Workmen's compensation fund). Thus, the employers' 
contribution to the ordinary sickness insurance would be 
somewhere between 1.5 to 3.9% of pay-roll. For the total cost 
of the statutory health insurance scheme, after subtracting 
1.0% for the Workmen's compensation fund, the employers 
perceived that it would be 6.8% of pay-roll.
The issue of the method of paying providers will be one 
of the challenges of the plan for a national health insurance 
scheme. As detailed in the previous chapter, the survey found 
that fee-for-service and itemized billing were the predominant 
modes of paying the doctor and the hospital. It would be 
useful in the next step to review both the theory and the 
practice, from international experience, of how to organize 
statutory health insurance. That is, of course, if the 
historical development of health insurance around the world 
has any useful lessons for the development of Thai national
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health insurance. In practice, the decision-making for 
detailed planning and implementing of the scheme is a matter 
for local political choice.
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PART TWO
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
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CHAPTER 7
FORMS OF HEALTH INSURANCE
1. INTRODUCTION.
There are two main forms of health insurance. First, 
voluntary health insurance, is a method by which individuals 
in a community contribute regularly to an insurance fund to 
protect themselves from risk or the uncertainty of having to 
pay the cost of financially catastrophic illnesses in the 
future (Mills, A.,1985; Barr, N.,1987; Akin, J.S, 1987). 
Second, compulsory health insurance, is an important method of 
health financing or health provision (Abel-Smith, B., 1990).
Both forms of health insurance involve risk-sharing but 
under social security this is compulsory. The risk-sharing 
concept, endorsed by the World Bank, is based on the 
individual's "willingness to pay" (Akin, 1987, p.5). However, 
the Bank states that (compulsory) health insurance is one 
strategy to mobilize additional resources for the health 
sector to cope with less financial resources in developing 
countries (World Bank, 1987).
There was also a perspective, under the risk-sharing 
concept, that health insurance should be combined with "user
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charge" for cost recovery in the health care sector. As de
Ferranti, D. (1984) expressed it
" serious consideration should be given to using a 
combination of coverage charges and user charges, 
rather than coverage charges alone, in risk-sharing 
schemes. The user charge - sometimes called co­
payment fees or cost sharing in this context - would 
be set high enough to serve as a modest disincentive 
to overutilization. In this way, the co-payment fee 
would foster efficiency goals on the demand side, 
compensating for the inability of the coverage 
charge to do so? yet unlike some other forms of user 
charges, co-payment amounts would be small enough 
not to raise major equity concerns (e.g., can the 
poor afford to pay?), or at least not to the same 
degree. At the same time, the major part of the cost 
recovery needed would be accomplished by user 
charges.1
(De Ferranti, 1984, p.438)
In addition, de Ferranti concluded that...
" in view of the possibilities for schemes that 
combine coverage charges and user charges, any new 
initiatives in the risk-sharing field that contain 
no co-payment provision, or that would lead to 
diminishing or eliminating user charges, should be 
avoided. Where possible, co-payment should be 
introduced into existing schemes that have none."
(De Ferranti, 1984, p.438)
Under the social security approach, the position adopted 
by the ILO, compulsory health insurance is an integral part of 
social security. Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi (1990) 
considered that health insurance is a social security 
undertaking. It is worth noting that the terms social 
insurance and social security are interchangeable. However, 
Midgley, J. (1984, pp.89-90) remarked that the term social
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insurance is not used in all countries, for example; the USA 
and France.
2. VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE.
Voluntary health insurance, sometimes referred to as non- 
statutory health insurance, balances the individual's 
willingness to pay against his or her risk of financial loss 
in the event of sickness.
A) Historical development.
As early as around the 14th or 15th century, guilds of 
the same craft had organized and assisted their members in 
case of sickness or injury. But, there are not many records of 
their activities. In Britain, there was a movement of working 
class people called the "friendly society" in the 18th-19th 
centuries, which organized the provision of their own 
welfare, medical care, social insurance and housing loans. In 
1804 there were about a million members of friendly societies 
in Britain (Abel-Smith, B., 1965) and the number had increased 
noticeably to at least nine million by 1911 (Green, D., 1985, 
pp.95-96). Later, the existence of the friendly societies and 
their activities from the mid-nineteenth century to the 
creation of the national health service (1948) in Britain was 
well documented by Green, D. (1985). The voluntary health 
insurance movement was extensively developed and widespread in
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Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia, though they 
may have had different names, such as; sick clubs, sick funds, 
or medical cooperatives. The movement in Central and Southern 
Europe (in countries such as Germany, Austria, and France) was 
normally developed on an occupational basis and was encouraged 
by government. In Britain and Northern Europe (in countries 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium), the 
geographically or community based societies were founded by 
the working-class. Most friendly societies' health insurance 
was consumer-sponsored and developed prior to the doctors 
being well organized. Apart from consumer-sponsored health 
insurance, there was also some doctor-sponsored health 
insurance in some countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Spain, Canada, and on a smaller scale in Germany and Britain. 
Doctor-sponsored pre-payment insurance was developed because 
the medical professions would like to free themselves from 
being servants of funds which were controlled by lay 
committees, as well as to ensure their regular and higher 
income. In some cases, this was to attract members to join 
societies which operated on principles laid down by the 
profession. The benefits offered, were usually provided in 
cash and thereafter in kind (through health services). 
Nevertheless, cash benefits were customarily provided to 
reimburse patients for part of their medical bills in France 
and Sweden. Later, the voluntary health insurance movement 
was operated on a smaller scale in Australia and New Zealand 
(Abel-Smith, B., 1976). The case history of the Australian
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friendly society movement, started in 1830, was reported by 
Green,D. and Cromwell, L. (1984).
In Britain, there were several forms of voluntary health 
insurance, but only four of them were the most popular (Green, 
1985);
1. The local dividing society, sometimes called a slate 
club or tontine, was the simplest form. They divided any 
surplus money amongst the members once a year, typically 
before Christmas.
2. The large federations or affiliated orders; such as, 
Manchester Unity and the Ancient Order of Foresters, were the 
most popular forms. They had autonomous local branches which 
united under a common set of rules.
3. The deposit societies were national organizations with 
no branches. They combined saving with social insurance. 
Around two-thirds of the medical benefits were reimbursed to 
their members from the society's accumulating sick funds. The 
remaining third was paid off from the member's personal 
interest-earning savings account.
4. The centralized societies without branches; for in­
stance, the Hearts of Oak Benefit Society, paid sick pay from 
an accumulating fund.
With reference to the supply of medical care, amongst the 
variety of them, there were three most popular arrangements 
(Green, 1985);
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1. The lodge practice was the traditional system in the 
large federations which employed a single medical officer to 
work in each branch. The doctor was paid by a fixed annual 
capitation fee to provide medical care and medicines for each 
lodge member, not their families. At the same time, doctors 
were allowed to practice privately.
2. The medical institutes were started around 1869 to 
merge groups of lodges for serving the whole family of the 
members. Doctors were usually employed on a full-time basis 
and paid by fixed salaries and given free accommodation. 
However, doctors were not responsible for the dispensing of 
medicine.
3. The approved panel or closed panel was the system 
whereby members could choose from the so-called "panel 
doctors" who agreed to work under terms of reference set by 
the society and accept prescribed fees.
At present, traditional voluntary health insurance of a 
non-profit nature, as mentioned above, has evolved into 3 
types; a) private non-profit insurance, b) private for-profit 
insurance and c) modified private insurance.
a) Private non-profit insurance or traditional voluntary 
health insurance.
Currently, the role of voluntary health insurance in 
developed countries has declined and the more profit-oriented
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insurance has grown serving the higher income groups. In many 
developed countries including the eastern bloc, the role of 
the conventional non-profit voluntary health insurance has 
declined, or even been terminated. Instead, they have been 
superseded by compulsory health insurance, or in many cases - 
by the universal health service. The active role of the state 
in these countries is as the regulator, if not as the direct 
controller, of health insurance. This is due to the so-called 
"market failures" in health and health insurance. The lessons 
learned from the British friendly society movement are
"attempts by ordinary people to obtain health care 
for themselves, without help from the state, are 
bound to suffer from a number of serious 'market 
failures'."
(Green, D., 1985, p.3, emphasis in the original).
In fact, the market failures in health care which call 
for state intervention according to Green (1985) are well 
documented elsewhere and are also applicable to the current 
situation. Contributors to this argument are:- Le Grand, J. 
and Robinson, R., (1976); Barr, N., (1987); Nolan, B.,
(1988); McGuire, Fenn and Mayhew (1989), amongst others. The 
main market failures are;
1. Uncertainty of demand. That is, the nature of health 
care is uncertain and unpredictable. In general, people cannot 
predict when or how much health care they will need.
263
2. Imperfect consumer information. There is generally no 
information about choice of medical intervention and partic­
ularly, the cost of health care. In the case of health 
insurance, the consumer might know about the price of premia 
or insurance contributions, but lack information on the cost 
of each type of treatment. They have a weak (or no) incentive 
to know, consider, and choose the most cost-effective option.
3. Imperfect competition or monopoly on supply. The 
patient is unable to "shop around" and choose the most cost- 
effective doctor. This is because, on the supply side, there 
are usually significant barriers for perfect competition to 
operate; such as, a limit on entry to the profession and bans 
on advertising. Also, doctors can organize against the 
consumer to raise prices as well as to protect their 
profession from medical malpractice.
4. Free-rider. In voluntary health care insurance, those 
with low risk and the more healthy may not buy health 
insurance and may not pay for preventive measures associated 
with insurance. Rather, they desire to get external benefit 
from other people's premiums.
5. Inequity. The private insurer, in particular, can 
apply "adverse selection" to the applicants for insurance. 
Those of high risk with pre-sickness conditions will be 
excluded from the private insurance market, or would be 
charged a higher premium. Thus, the sick and the poor are 
those who are excluded from the insurance, and feel 
discriminated against.
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6. Moral hazard. The moral hazard problem occurs when 
individuals have no incentive to control the number of visits 
they make. Third party payment, in particular, leads to a high 
cost of care due to free service at the point of consumption.
Several developing countries arranged some form of volun­
tary health insurance for rural populations, while only a few 
countries offered this option for urban citizens. However, the 
forms of voluntary health insurance existing in the 1980s, in 
developing countries, are not the same as the friendly society 
type of health insurance that existed in developed countries 
in the previous century. Also, their operational arrangements 
vary from country to country according to their economic 
development, politics, culture and other local circumstances. 
For instance; in china, the rural cooperative insurance based 
on a decentralized approach to health care was put into action 
in 1968 on a voluntary basis. The decision to join was made at 
the community level on the basis of "all in" or "all out". In 
1973, this scheme covered approximately 70 per cent of China's
50,000 communes (Hu, T.,1981). Unfortunately, it collapsed 
during the recent economic reforms (Akin, J.S., 1987).
Recently, a voluntary health insurance for the urban 
population was set up in Indonesia. There was a scheme for 
private employees and their dependents started as a pilot 
project in 1985 in Jakarta. By 1988 the scheme was expanded to 
16 cities in eight provinces (Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi, 
1990).
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1) The case for private non-profit voluntary health insurance
is based on the following:-
a). To insure against the costs of medical care and loss 
of income from interruption of work due to illness. Moreover, 
price discrimination according to ability to pay, within 
private practice, before completion of the insurance 
arrangements, is eliminated.
b). To emphasize the pooling and solidarity amongst mem- 
bers. The individual member is charged a common premium based 
on the average cost of all members. Pooling is quite different 
from individual risk rating as it leads to solidarity 
amongst the insured.
c). The self help or the self reliance approach to 
primary health care promoted by the WHO is growing. In early- 
capitalist Europe or in developing countries, where the 
resources are particularly limited, to organize themselves in 
assuming responsibility for their own health development 
encourages a most congenial society.
2) The case against non-profit voluntary health insurance.
a). It cannot work well in a marketplace without state 
intervention, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of market 
failure. Voluntary health insurance has a limited role in the
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early-capitalist society, as in early-capitalist Europe, the 
traditional, or agricultural sectors of a developing country. 
Without state intervention, it cannot operate well in an 
advanced capitalist country or highly competitive market as 
the "market failures" problem is more severe in advanced 
capitalist societies.
b). It has the nature of horizontal distribution, or dis­
tribution amongst the insured only. Only those who have the 
ability to pay can afford the insurance, whilst the poor 
cannot. Thus, the insurance benefits are pooled and 
distributed amongst the better-off citizens, only. It is not 
based on vertical redistribution (or distribution between 
different social classes) as it is in the case of universal 
benefits. Therefore, there is an inequity in the distribution 
of benefits from voluntary health insurance.
c). The efficiency of a voluntary scheme is low. First, 
there is a gap of coverage from the inability of the voluntary 
scheme to guarantee full coverage. Also, most schemes are 
risk-related or family-related. Premiums of those with a high 
risk or large family, are high. Thus, there is poor coverage 
of dependents. Second, the society has to pay the external 
cost of relief suffering of the non-insured. Therefore, the 
total cost of health care falling upon society is high.
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b) Private for-profit insurance or commercial health 
insurance.
There are a number of countries which rely on private 
for-profit financing and provision of health insurance as a 
dominant means of funding health care such as the USA and 
Switzerland. Several countries in the market economy for 
instance; the Netherlands, the U.K. and Germany have also some 
forms of private health insurance as a subordinate system to 
their public ones.
The main argument for private insurance is that of 
consumer preference or consumer sovereignty (Nolan, B., 1988). 
The patient is normally free to choose the provider of care 
and can control the amount of money they spend (Green, D.G, 
1988). It is argued that competition between 
providers leads to greater efficiency and control of costs.
The major argument against private insurance are problems 
of "market failure" as described in the previous section. 
However, the focus is on adverse selection and the moral 
hazard which was underlined by Barr (1987). As a result of 
adverse selection, the low income sector of the population may 
not be able to afford insurance. In this case, the gap of 
coverage is a serious problem. The moral hazard is another 
problem increasing in severity with lower cost at the point of 
consumption. In most cases, the high cost of care, brought on 
mostly by the moral hazard, is the common problem of 
commercial health insurance particularly when there is third- 
party payment. Also, a high cost of care is nearly always the
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case with commercial health insurance which negotiates 
favourable terms with providers.
c) Modified private insurance systems.
Forms of private non-profit voluntary health insurance, 
have long been used in western countries outside of America, 
and have been used only to a limited extent in the USA. This 
system was promoted in the USA under the new title of "Health 
Maintenance Organizations" (HMOs) from 1973. With the rapid 
development of medical technology along with a high level of 
capitalism, this form was slightly modified to exist in the 
more competitive marketplace. The third party payment problem 
of commercial health insurance is removed because HMOs act as 
both insurer and provider. Thus, the efficiency provision of 
health insurance is likely to persist because HMOs would try 
to provide health care in the most cost-effective manner. In 
addition, information on the cost-benefit of each health 
insurance plan is available in the market for consumers to 
choose from. The real competition in health insurance plans 
between HMOs and those plans with more choice for consumers, 
would lead to efficient provision.
The general trend of health insurance development in 
countries outside Europe has changed towards universal 
coverage through the more organized state health and welfare 
provision. But the USA is still protecting the unorganized and 
more competitive medicine in a more advanced capitalist
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environment. The growth of HMOs and Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs) in the 1970s and 1980s was the result of 
preservation of capitalist medicine in the new environment. 
Drawing from lessons learnt from Europe and Australia, Abel- 
Smith, B. (1988) questioned whether the HMO might be destroyed 
when it grows large enough to be a matter of professional 
concern. It is noted that the term conventional health 
insurance in the USA refers to commercial, third-party, health 
insurance. A discussion of some HMOs and PPOs follows;
1. The Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).
The dramatic rising cost of health care, particularly in 
the USA - where commercial private health insurance dominates, 
led to a modification of the system. The Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) were seen as a competitive alternative to 
"traditional" (in American terms) private health insurance. 
The HMO is considered to be a more efficient strategy to 
contain cost than direct control, (Ellwood Jr., P.M., 1971). 
This strategy is later on referred to by Enthoven, A.C.(1978, 
1988a, 1988b) and his followers as "managed competition".
HMOs were first developed on a large scale in the USA 
around the turn of the twentieth century. They were not then 
known as HMOs, but called prepaid group practices. The first 
example, begun in 1906, was the Western Clinic in Tacoma, 
Washington, which offered medical care for the lumber industry
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at the cost of 50 cents per member per month (Mayer and Mayer,
1985). Later, the Ross-loos Medical Group in Los 
Angeles(1929), the Elk city co-operative in Oklahoma (1929) 
and the Kaiser-Permanente scheme (1933), to mention a few, had 
developed on the same lines. Although the ideas were not new 
in the USA, the term HMO was only officially accepted by the 
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, based on the most 
successful and the largest of the prepaid group schemes; the 
Kaiser-Permanente (Elliott, A., 1982, pp.652-3). The Act
provided for $375 million in loans and grants from the federal 
government over a five year period to develop HMOs (Marwick,P. 
1985, p.10). Although the grants were abandoned in 1983, the 
office of the HMO under the Department of Health and Human 
Services remains active as a catalyst for this concept. Over 
a decade of promotion, these funds produced some 115 
operational HMOs or 35.60 % of the total. Twenty seven HMOs, 
or 8.35 % of the total, failed. These organizations defaulted 
on federal loans of $42 million. Iglehart, J.K.(1984) observed 
that the impact of this policy was that the HMO movement had 
grown largely from a non-profit base to a for-profit basis. 
However, in the three states of California, Massachusetts and 
Minnesota, this trend was not visible. The Kaiser Foundation- 
Permanente Programme, The Blues in Massachusetts and the 
Harvard Community health Plan have achieved a substantial 
market share. Moreover, the state law in Minnesota promoted 
the non-profit HMO by ruling that all HMOs must be non-profit 
organizations. Overall, the HMOs share of the insurance market 
was 16 % in 1987. Nevertheless, the rate of growth of HMOs
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declined from 25.2% in 1986 to 20.8% in 1987 (Salter, B., 
1988) .
Enthoven, A.C. (1988b, p.42) defined an HMO by saying 
that it provides (arranges and pays for or provides directly) 
its voluntarily enrolled members with a comprehensive list of 
health care services for a fixed periodic payment that is 
independent of the member's actual use of the services. Luft,
H.S. et al (1980) viewed HMOs as modified forms of traditional 
commercial health insurance because they integrate the func­
tions of insurer and providers of health insurance. In 
addition, they have the potential for the efficient delivery 
of care and controlling of the cost with limits on government 
involvement. Abel-Smith, B.,(1988, p.694) explained that HMOs 
combine the indirect and direct types of insurer, categorized 
by the International Labour Office (ILO) many years ago.
There are four quite different forms of HMOs (Enthoven; 
1988b, pp.46-53). These are (1) the prepaid group practice 
(PGP), (2) the individual practice associations (IPA), (3) 
primary care networks and (4) network models. He explained 
that in the USA history of HMO development, the PGP has its 
origin in the "Kaiser Permanente" in the 1930s and during 
World War II. By the end of 1986, there were nearly 10 million 
enrolled members of the 139 PGPs (including 12 Kaiser 
Permanente plans). The PGP, a "staff model" or sometimes 
referred to as a "close panel", is the largest type of HMO. 
Doctors are organized as employees and paid by salaries with
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or without bonuses. Enrollees are limited to these doctors and 
facilities•
The second largest group of HMOs is the IPA. Although 
some IPAs had developed since the 30s and 50s, this movement 
only became significant in the 1970s, It started as several 
medical societies in California noticed that their fee-for- 
service solo practices were being threatened by the growth of 
Kaiser-Permanente. They decided to form the IPAs and organized 
themselves in such a way that the solo practice doctors could 
continue to practice on a fee-for-service basis for both IPA's 
enrollees and other insurance arrangements. Doctors accept the 
IPA's fee schedule (generally below the prevailing levels of 
fee) and various forms of utilisation control. In a typical 
scheme, they might be paid 80 per cent of the monthly billed 
fees. The remainder is withheld as a "risk pool" to be paid at 
the end of the year, if the funds are sufficient. In the 
1980s, with an over-supply of doctors, some IPAs were 
purchased by profit-oriented investors/companies. This brought 
more of a business line to IPAs, for example, they became 
selective in their contracts with doctors, and restrictive in 
utilization control.
The third type of HMO is the primary care network.
Similar to the IPA, it is based on the primary care doctors 
who continue to practice individually in their own office. The 
fundamental difference between them, however, is that the 
primary care doctors accept capitation payment whilst the
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IPA's doctors receive fees-for-service. In December 1986, the 
IPAs and primary care networks together served about 10 
million enrolled members.
The fourth type of HMO is a network model. Enrollees sign 
capitation contracts with two or more independent multi­
specialty or single specialty group practices to provide 
identified health care services.
The cases for the HMOs are;
(1) their ability to contain costs by altering incentives 
to providers. In the case where providers are employees, the 
organization has a direct control over provider behaviour. 
When the service is contracted out, the incentive to control 
the cost of treatment can be passed on to the provider.
(2) They have the incentive to avoid overtreatment, espe­
cially in the hospital setting. HMOs have a hospitalization 
rate up to 40 per cent lower than the fee-for-service practice 
( Manning, W.G. et al, 1984).
(3) The administrative cost of providing care is somewhat 
lower than the fee-for-service (third party system). This is 
because HMOs are both the insurer and provider of services.
The cases against the HMOs, apart from the common argument of 
market failures they share with other types of voluntary 
insurance, are;
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(1) the introduction of the HMOs does not solve the
problem of gaps in coverage. The HMOs may still be reluctant 
to take the high risk group or those with pre-existing
illnesses.
(2) While the HMOs alter incentives to providers in order 
to promote cost control, a side effect is that it encourages 
undertreatment or a lower quality of care. This is because 
each activity of care will directly reduce the profit.
(3) The relatively low cost of care because there is
"adverse selection". They are able to skim the healthier and
wealthier population, which can cut their cost down, and leave 
the state to subsidise the "expensive" cases.
(4) The dissatisfaction of consumers reported on account 
of a "lock in" provision. The consumer's choice of providers 
is limited to only their closed panel providers which 
sometimes does not suit their needs.
(5) HMOs are not able to contain the total cost of care. 
The overall impact of HMO strategy is too low. Luft, H.S. 
(1980) reported that, during a 1961-74 period, the rate of 
cost increase from HMOs was similar to that in the fee-for- 
service system. HMOs have not been able to alter the national 
pattern of medical inflation and increasing resource use. In 
any case, this trend continued to hold for the 1976-81 period 
(Newhouse, J.P. et al, 1985).
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2. The Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).
The Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) have 
ancestors that can be traced to the 1920s and 1930s, but they 
were forced out of the market by organized medicine through 
legislation, boycotts and other tactics. They were actually 
illegal until 1982 ( Enthoven, A.C., 1988b). Since then they 
became the fastest growing alternative business to the HMOs. 
The members and dependents eligible to use PPOs rose from 1.3 
million in 1984 to 16.5 million in 1986, compared to a growth 
rate of around 25% annually in HMOs (Rice, T. et al, 1989). 
They also reported that employers were very satisfied with 
almost all aspects of PPOs but less so with HMOs. In addition, 
PPOs did not appear to be cheaper than their alternatives, but 
the consumers' higher satisfaction may have contributed to the 
high rate of growth. In 1987, the market share of PPOs was 11% 
(Gabel, J. et al, 1988). In fact, there were regional 
preferences amongst PPO and HMO enrollees. Both PPOs and HMOs 
were most popular in the region of their birthplace. PPOs are 
well accepted in the west but not in the east, while HMOs are 
well accepted everywhere except in the south. Finally, the 
increasing supply of doctors in the foreseeable future, will 
tend to make people join PPOs (Freeh III, H.E. and 
Ginsburg,P.B., 1988). Therefore, the growth of PPOs is still 
very much on the agenda.
PPOs are contracts amongst insurers, providers and 
consumers on preferential terms with lower prices or more
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benefits than the market (fee-for-service) price. The doctors 
offered the lower, fee-for-service price while the hospitals 
accepted the utilization review restrictions. By contrast with 
HMOs, the providers of PPOs do not share the "risk" of 
financial loss with the organization. In addition, PPOs' 
enrollees have more choice of providers compared with those 
of the HMOs. For instance, they can purchase a PPO health plan 
in addition to their regular (fee-for-service) insurance 
policy. They are given financial incentives such as reduced 
co-insurance and additional services, to favour PPO providers. 
At the same time, consumers are not limited to use only PPO 
providers, but they have to pay more if they use the providers 
out of the PPOs' list (Freeh III, H.E. and Ginsburg,P.B., 
1988).
The prospect of an increase in the volume of service, 
because providers do not share the financial risk with the 
organization or insurers, leads to stringent cost control. 
Cost control of PPOs can come about in four ways (De Lissovoy,
G. et al, 1988; Rice, T. et al, 1989) ;
1. PPOs obtain discount from providers. In this respect, 
they received a 9-19% discount rate from their contracted 
doctors compared to a 12-17% rate from their network hospi­
tals .
2. They can choose only cost-effective providers. By the 
end of the year, the PPOs can evaluate the performance of 
providers and they can choose to renew the contract only with 
the cost-saving and high quality service providers.
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3, They pay providers in such a way that encourages the 
conservation of resources. Some PPOs may negotiate to pay the 
doctors by capitation and to pay some hospitals by the 
prospective DRGs.
4. The most common form and the most efficient way to 
contain cost is by direct control of utilization. 
Particularly, all PPOs require pre-admission certificates for 
in-patient care. In addition, concurrent review during 
hospital stay is typically employed, except when hospitals are 
paid by DRGs.
However, De Lissovoy, G. et al (1988) compared their own 
surveys of 1985 and 1986 and concluded that PPOs relied on 
paying doctors by the discounted fee-for-service method 
instead of by capitation. Similarly, they continued to pay 
the hospitals per diem instead of by DRGs. To some extent, 
cost containment measures 1,2, and 4 can achieve their 
objectives, but not the third measure. Furthermore, Diehr, P. 
et al (1987), and Hester, J.A. et al (1987) found that the 
incentive inherent in the system resulted in an increase in 
ambulatory care (especially within the first six months after 
the benefit was offered), but the rate of hospitalization was 
stable. Besides, PPOs had a standardized cost per user lower 
than the Blues but higher than HMOs.
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Proponents of the PPOs could argue that;
(1) PPOs have the potential for consumers to create cost- 
consciousness when he/she visits the PPOs' doctors and 
hospitals.
(2) A free choice of providers is possible (though PPO 
enrollees have to pay extra for exercising the freedom). They 
are not locked in to use only closed panel providers as in 
HMOs.
(3) A free choice of practices is preserved. Solo 
practice or group practice doctors can continue working in 
their own premises and charge fees-for-service of the other 
insurance plans or private patients.
By contrast, opponents of PPOs would argue, in addition 
to the general market failures, that;
(1) PPOs are costly. The nature of open-ended fee-for- 
service practices creates a high cost of care situation (all 
the weak points of fee-for-service will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8).
(2) It is not possible to create cost-conscious practices 
from the supply side because providers do not share the risk
with the organization as in some types of HMOs.
(3) The total cost of care is not reduced regardless of
the lower cost per user, even compared to the Blues and more
stringent utilisation control mechanisms.
(4) Despite the change from their regular source of care 
to using PPOs, it does not stop the consumer "shopping 
around". PPO enrollees are still trial-and-error users, in
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visiting their doctors and in their minor illnesses (Hester, 
J.A. et al, 1987).
(5) Adverse selection is evident. In general, PPO members 
are younger and healthier than non-PPO users.
(6) PPOs create a gap in coverage because poor consumers 
cannot afford to buy premiums to cover hospitalization and pay 
a reduced cost for ambulatory care.
(7) A PPO is a complex system with high administrative 
costs. In spite of the simplicity in concept of a PPO, its 
operating plan is difficult to implement and is not easy to 
understand. After all, benefits and restrictions have to be 
worked out in detail.
3. COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE.
Compulsory health insurance or statutory health 
insurance, the terms are interchangeable, is sometime referred 
to as medical care, and/or sickness benefit under social 
security. There are 83 countries in the world which have this 
programme as part of their social security or social insurance 
programme (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
1986). It is interesting to learn from countries in the 
western and eastern blocs, as well as the newly industrialized 
countries and developing countries which have gone through 
this approach. Most of them shared a common experience in the 
process of development of statutory health insurance, as 
follows;
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A) Historical development.
a) Western Europe.
Historically, with some years experience with the volun­
tary schemes, Germany was the first country to adopt 
compulsory health insurance for industrial workers in 1883. 
The scheme was extended to cover commercial and agricultural 
employees in 1885 and 1886 respectively (ILO, 1927, p.10). 
This process must be seen in conjunction with the economic, 
social and political changes. The very rapid growth of 
population, urbanization, industrialization, as well as the 
capitalist political/economic system contributed to the 
adoption of this concept. There were also an increasing 
number of working class, workers' associations, trade unions, 
sick clubs and political organizations. In an attempt to 
dissolve the socialist or communist movement, the government, 
under Bismarck, imposed the anti-socialist law of 1878. 
Realising that the labour question could not be encountered 
with repression alone, Bismarck subsequently passed the 
compulsory sickness insurance law of 1883 to satisfy "those 
socialist demands11, in other words; to "bribe" the working 
class for their loyalty (Zollner, D., 1982). Zollner believed 
that Bismarck's idea of providing welfare benefits (including 
sickness benefit) was learnt from Napoleon Ill's regime during 
visits in 1855 and 1857 and as an ambassador in Paris in 1861. 
Afterwards, when the Act of 1883 came into force in December
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1884, Germany had had substantial experience of organizing and 
administering the scheme. This is because, prior to 1883, 
Germany had compulsory insurance schemes (including sickness 
benefit) for all mine workers by the law of 1854 (Leichter, 
H.W., 1979, pp.117-8). The fundamentals of the compulsory
sickness insurance Act of 1883 remained the basis of the 
national health care policy of that country (and was emulated 
by many other countries) for over a century. The German model 
was originally known by the name of "National Health 
Insurance" which implied that the benefit is attached to 
"employment". This is because the benefit is provided to those 
in the employment sector of the economy. The insurance 
contributions are paid by employees, their employers, and in 
some cases by the government.
Subsequently, similar provisions were adopted in many 
countries. To name only a few of the first generation coun­
tries, these are; Austria (1888), Hungary (1891), Norway 
(1909), Britain (1911), Russia (1912), and Bulgaria (1918).
The evolution of the British National Health Insurance 
(1911) from lessons learnt from Germany, to the National 
Health Service (1948) reflected the diffusion of health policy 
adjusted to suit local circumstances (Leichter, H.W., 1979). 
At the beginning, the industrial revolution in Britain 
produced the growth of the middle and working classes, with a 
simultaneous growth in their political power leading to 
further change. Besides, the National Health Insurance plan
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untied the medical profession away from the "lay control" of 
the friendly societies (Abel-Smith, B., 1965). Also, there was 
pressure from the commercial insurance industries to secure 
their leading role in the scheme. Thus, the National Health 
Insurance Act of 1911 was clearly a result of the political 
pressures amongst the friendly societies, the commercial 
insurance industry and the British Medical profession 
(Gilbert, B.B., 1966). Moreover, the creation of National
Health Insurance in 1911 was a result of a study visit of 
Lloyd George's, to Germany in 1908 (Leichter, H.W., 1979), 
although his primary objective was to study only the 
contributory pension scheme (Gilbert, B.B., 1966).
The period between 1911 and 1948 was one which Leichter 
referred to as the adjustment period, according to local 
needs. The creation of the National Health Service (1948), 
providing a universal benefit, came from the change of social 
policy values towards "the rights of citizenship" in British 
society and had been proposed by the British Medical 
Association. The central problems of poverty and the gap of 
coverage from the National Health Insurance scheme were the 
major issues raised. The workers' dependents were not covered 
by the scheme. In addition, hospital benefits were not 
included in the plan. Workers had to rely upon the charity of 
hospitals and means-tested local authority hospital and the 
poor law for in-patient care. But the public hospitals 
(mainly for the poor) and charity institutions were 
overcrowded and of low quality. The inefficiency and inequity
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of the National Health Insurance system needed a structural 
change (Doyal, L., 1979). The National Health Service was
created in 1948 from the Acts of 1946 and 1947 (for Scotland). 
It provided universal coverage for hospitalization, GP 
services, ophthalmic services, dental care and pharmacy under 
a unified administration. However, sickness cash benefit was 
provided by a separate unit (previously they were provided by 
the same organization). Since then, it has been modified 
several times but the fundamental of universal provision has 
remained unchanged. This institution is well-known worldwide 
just as is British democracy.
Each country provides medical care systems in different 
ways depending on the political and economic situations in the 
country. However, their common target is to attain "Health 
for All by the year 2000" as their commitment to the WHO in 
1977. Some of them might achieve the global target before the 
others, but more work has to be done to achieve equity and 
efficiency. New Zealand and the United Kingdom have achieved 
universal coverage for hospital insurance since 1938 and 1948 
respectively. After World War II many countries followed, 
such as; Scandinavian countries in the 1960s, Japan in 1961 
and Canada in the 1970s, Italy in 1980, Portugal, Spain, and 
South Korea in the 1980s (Abel-Smith, B. 1990). Most of them 
have gone through a transitional period of providing 
compulsory health insurance for some segments of the popu­
lation (Roemer,M.I•, 1971? Abel-Smith, B., 1990). Currently, 
the nomenclature of national health insurance and national
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health services as known in the traditional senses, seems to 
be diluted. Now a system of universal health provision may be 
called a national health service, national health insurance or 
national health system depending on the politics of the 
State (Abel-Smith, 1990). For instance, national health 
insurance in Japan, Korea, and Canada, or national health 
services in Taiwan and Italy, or national health systems in 
Spain and some other countries have the same meaning.
b) Eastern Europe.
The USSR and Eastern Europe followed the same pattern of 
health insurance development as that of western capitalist 
Europe (Kaser, M.,1976). However, the difference in most 
Eastern Europe countries was that all doctors were salaried. 
This was not the case in the UK, Sweden or Denmark. In 
addition, private practice was theoretically abolished in 
Eastern Europe, while it was common practice in Western 
Europe.
In 1917, within a week of revolution, the USSR adopted 
compulsory health insurance which was partly based on the 
German model and partly on the "zemstvo", pre-revolution 
medicine. For two decades, the scheme was largely restricted 
only to wage-earners and their dependents but excluded 
peasants. It was not until 1937 that the scheme provided free 
care to all citizens with a priority given to the working
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class, and particularly, to industrial workers (Leichter,
H.W., 1979). Czechoslovakia launched her compulsory health 
insurance for the industrial labour force long before the 
scheme could be extended to all citizens in 1966. A compulsory 
health insurance system for wage-earners and their families 
was introduced in Poland in 1919 and enlarged to serve all 
inhabitants in 1972 (Kaser, M., 1976). The Hungarian health 
insurance scheme excluded about 15% of the population in 1960, 
but this was reduced to 1% by 1972 and finally gave universal 
coverage in 1975 (Deacon, B., 1984).
c) Japan and the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).
Japan and her allies of the Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) adopted statutory health insurance as a 
result of industrialization and urbanization. Japan was the 
first non-western country to introduce statutory health insur­
ance. After having a long-established relationship with 
Germany for medical development since 1870 (Leichter,H.M., 
1979; Powel, M. and Anesaki, M., 1990), their concept and
pattern of health insurance development was copied almost 
without change. The difference lay in the care given to the 
elderly and infirm, being based on the family institution and 
influenced by Chinese medicine, which Japan also inherited 
(Ikegami, N., 1989; Powel, M. and Anesaki, M., 1990). Japan's 
first Act of compulsory health insurance, passed in 1922 (and 
enforced in 1926), protected only workers in factories and 
mines. After that, the national health insurance Act of 1938
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extended cover to the self-employed and their dependents. 
Meanwhile, special schemes were set up separately for some 
other specific groups when the circumstances demanded them, 
such as; salaried employees, seamen, day labourers, private 
school teachers, public servants and the employees of public 
corporations. Eventually, the national health insurance 
scheme, after several reorganizations were undertaken, 
achieved universal coverage in 1961 (Ikegami, N., 1989, pp.l, 
9-10).
Other countries in Asia followed the Japanese pattern of 
occupational based insurance development, particularly the 
NICs like South Korea and Taiwan. The method of paying the 
doctor under health insurance in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
are based on the fee-for-service system which they inherited 
from Germany.
Korea, historically, had been occupied by Japan. It was 
the Japanese National Health Insurance model which was adopted 
22 years after the occupation ended. With a rapid increase in 
industrialization in South Korea in the early 1960s, the 
introduction of a statutory health insurance in that country 
was unavoidable. To start with, South Korea launched a 
compulsory health insurance Act of 1976 (implemented in 1977) 
to protect the workers in corporations of 500 or more. Contin­
uously, the scheme was extended to cover employees in smaller 
firms, with at least 300 workers in 1979, more than 100 
workers in 1981, and with 16 or more in 1983, and finally to
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those with at least 5 workers in 1988. In the meantime, 
separate schemes were operated for civil servants and private 
school teachers in 1979 and for military personnel and 
pensioners in 1980 (Kim, Y., 1987? Ron, Abel-Smith and 
Tamburi, 1990). Lastly, schemes for self-employed persons were 
experimented with in three designated areas in 1981, for the 
self-employed in the same occupation in 1982, and expanded in 
1988 to cover self-employed workers in all rural areas. Until
1988, the total coverage of insured persons under compulsory 
schemes in South Korea was over 66 per cent, compared to only 
8.8 per cent in 1977 (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 1990). In
1989, the scheme became universal.
Taiwan, the Republic of China, once colonized by Japan, 
also followed the Japanese tradition. The Labour Insurance of 
Taiwan was promulgated in 1950 and put into effect in 1958. 
The "Government Employees' Insurance Scheme" was also 
established in the same year. Finally, after a long wait, the 
Farmers' Health Insurance scheme was set up in 1989. In 
total, 45 per cent of the Taiwanese population were protected 
by statutory health insurance by 1989. Further, the government 
of Taiwan energetically declared a most ambitious plan to 
achieve universal coverage by 1995 (Chiang, T., 1989? Yaung,
C., 1989).
The remaining NICs, namely Hong Kong and Singapore, have 
developed their ’statutory health insurance system in different 
forms. Hong Kong has a national health service system while
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Singapore has a "Medisave" scheme which combined personal 
saving with hospital insurance. In Singapore, the insured 
person and his/her employer each pay 3% of pay-roll into the 
employees's Medisave account for hospital insurance. Moreover, 
the scheme allows its members to utilize savings for the 
purchase of private housing and approved private investment. 
However, over the retirement age of 55 the insurer is required 
to maintain a balance of S$6,000 (1986 prices) for future
hospitalization cost (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1986).
d) Developing countries.
Surprisingly, statutory health insurance schemes in a 
total of 48 out of 90 developing countries have expanded well 
during recent decades. They were operated in all 20 Latin 
American, 2 Caribbean, 14 African and 12 Asian countries 
(Zschock, D.K., 1982). They were first introduced in Latin
America, and later in Asia and Africa. The reasons to adopt 
statutory health insurance were diversified from the 
influences of colonial administration, decolonization, social 
revolution and industrialization. At any rate, it expanded 
gradually in most developing countries. However, countries 
with social revolutions such as Cuba(1979), the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya(1980), and Nicaragua (1982) transformed their 
statutory health insurance at a more rapid rate. In any case, 
they retained payroll-related contributions of employees and 
their employers (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 1990). In this
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respect, Cuba is a particular example in her approach to 
universal coverage (excluding domestic servants), achieving 
this in 1970, compared with 62.6 per cent coverage in 1960 
(Mesa-Lago, 1986).
1. Latin America
In Latin American countries, compulsory health insurance 
was transplanted from Europe without modification to the 
local circumstances (Arroba, G., 1979). The arrival of
statutory health insurance in Latin America occurred when 
countries in that region had just developed to only the early 
stage of industrialization. Thus, only a minority of the 
working population and privileged persons received the 
benefits, which led to the problems of inequity remaining 
unchanged until now. The main reason to adopt statutory health 
insurance came from the so-called "social security movement" 
imported from Europe. The historical development of statutory 
health insurance in Latin America and its consequences is well 
documented, for example; in ILO (1958); Roemer, M.I.(1973); 
Arroba, G. (1979); Zschock, D.K. (1986); Mesa-Lago, C.(1978; 
1983; 1985(ed); 1986); and Beirute, L.A.(1988).
In 1924, Chile was the first country in Latin America to 
adopt statutory health insurance. The initial legislation 
applied only to wage-earners, accounting for around 10-15 per 
cent of the population. The Chilean model of health care 
provision was referred to as the "direct method" s it employed
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its own staff and set up its own hospitals. This model was 
widely emulated in this region. Afterwards, Chilean health 
insurance underwent gradual expansion and attained 69.5 per 
cent coverage by 1970 (Mesa-Lago, 1983). Notwithstanding, 
this figure declined slightly to 67.3 per cent in 1980 (Mesa- 
Lago, 1986). It was due to the changing of health financing 
policies of the Pinochet government since 1973, towards a free 
market, the privatization of provision, and the cutting of 
public funding (Viveros-Long, A., 1986).
Three relatively high income countries, amongst a total 
of twenty in this region which have more than 80 per cent of 
their inhabitants insured under their national compulsory 
health insurance schemes are: Brazil, Costa Rica, and
Argentina (Zschock, 1986). In 1934, Brazil introduced 
statutory health insurance schemes for commercial workers and 
bank employees. Subsequently, in 1938, separate schemes were 
set up to cover industrial and transportation workers. 
Afterwards, schemes for railway and public utility service 
workers were organized in 1953. In the meantime, the 
government employee scheme was operated separately. It was not 
until 1963 that a scheme for agricultural workers was put into 
effect. Lastly, a unification of all previously separated 
schemes, for greater efficiency in provision, occurred in 1966 
(Bastos, M.V., 1971). Regardless of the exceptionally high
cost to run (McGreevey, W.P., 1988), Brazilian statutory
health insurance increased its population coverage
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significantly from 23.1 per cent in 1960 (Mesa-Lago, 1983), to 
96.3 per cent in 1980 (Mesa-Lago, 1986).
Costa Rica has also achieved a very high statutory health 
insurance coverage. The Costa Rican compulsory health 
insurance Act of 1941 came into force in 1942 (ILO, 1958). It 
followed the Chilean, direct method of service (Mesa-Lago,
1985) and protected both public and private employees. The 
scheme was extended to cover the insured's dependents in 1955. 
In 1961 a constitutional amendment paved the way for the 
universalization of health care coverage and the Act of 1973 
ordered the integration of health care facilities. Next, the 
pensioners and their dependents were insured in 1976. By 1982, 
a total of 86.1 per cent of Costa Ricans were insured compared 
with only 15.4 per cent in 1960. Eventually, the programme to 
achieve universal coverage of health care began in 1983 (Mesa- 
Lago, 1985) with the aim of achieving universal coverage in 
1990 (WHO, 1987).
Compulsory health insurance in Argentina came into opera­
tion in 1974 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
1986). Its development expanded rapidly in parallel with rapid 
economic growth. By 1980 the population coverage of the scheme 
was estimated at 80 per cent (Zschock, 1986).
Comparing the experiences of Latin American countries it 
can be seen that the relatively low income countries could not 
extend their statutory health insurance to protect the
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majority of their population. Below 25 per cent of population 
coverage by statutory health insurance in ten relatively poor 
countries (accounting for half of all Latin American coun­
tries) has remained unchanged since the inception of the 
schemes several decades ago (Mesa-Lago, 1986). According to 
Mesa-Lago (1986), these countries and their percentage of 
population coverage in 1980 were; Colombia(11.6%), Ecuador 
(7.9%), El Salvador (6.2%), Guatemala (14.2%), Haiti (0.8%), 
Honduras (7.3%), Nicaragua (9.1%), Paraguay (18.2%), Peru 
(17.4%), and the Dominican Republic (7.9%). Thus, the critique 
of Mesa-Lago (1978) on account of inequity in the provision of 
statutory health insurance as a result of social 
stratification and efforts to protect those with more power 
seems to be justified in the circumstance of low income 
nations in this region (Zschock, D.K., 1986).
Referring to Latin America, however, Abel-Smith (1985, 
p.959) argued that the high coverage did not really mean that 
there were services locally available for use. Some of this 
was "paper coverage" due to the inaccessibility of care 
arising from a lack of doctors or hospitals nearby and/or no 
transportation cost for the poor to visit. Also, the 
population coverage for the comparison did not mean the same 
things in terms of service coverage, or range of services 
provided. For instance; the service coverage for the covered 
dependents only included maternity and paediatric care in some 
cases and with a limitation in the use of hospital care in 
others.
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2. Asia and Africa.
Many countries in Asia and Africa have had direct 
experience of statutory health insurance since the colonial 
period. Although some countries such as Nepal, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Ethiopia and Thailand were never ruled by Europeans, to 
some extent they had an indirect influence from the west and 
from international aid agencies. Before the second World War, 
statutory health insurance schemes in Asia and Africa were 
unusual. Only employer liability and medical assistance 
schemes existed. In the post-war period, India(1948) and 
China(1951) were pioneers in compulsory health insurance in 
Asia while in Africa, the scheme made its debut in Algeria in 
1949 (Roemer, M.I., 1987).
India, after a few years of preparation for a health 
insurance plan with some modifications suggested by two ILO 
experts, promulgated the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Act 
in 1948, soon after India achieved independence (Singh, H.M., 
1982). It has been in operation since 1952 (Singh, H.M.,1983, 
p.53) and provided full comprehensive medical care and cash 
benefits to the insured and restricted medical benefits to 
their families. Health insurance under the ESI started as an 
integration of five benefits in the same package. 
Concurrently, there were separate schemes for government 
employees, railway workers and military personnel (Ron, Abel- 
Smith and Tamburi, 1990). Initially, the statutory and 
contributory Employees' State Insurance applied to non-
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seasonal power-using factories employing 20 or more workers. 
Later, three areas of gradual extension were made, namely, by 
geography, by industry, and by wage group (Singh, 1982). On 31 
March 1988, the scheme covered 27 million beneficiaries (Ron, 
Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 1990) or around 4 per cent of the 
entire population compared to 12.6 million in the 1960s 
(Rajan, R.V., 1968, p.7). Even though India is a vast
country, this coverage was not very impressive, particularly 
when compared to countries of the same size like the USSR and 
China. Some criticism of the Indian scheme (Hasan, S.Z., 
1969; Banerji, D., 1986) went along the same lines as
criticism on Latin America, namely that health insurance under 
the social security approach, and its low coverage, 
intensified social inequality.
China, in comparison with India, had done reasonably well 
in providing compulsory health insurance since 1951. It was 
comprised of two statutory schemes, namely; government health 
insurance and labour insurance (Prescott, N. and Jamison,
D.T., 1984). The former, a non-contributory scheme, protected 
government employees, college teachers and college students 
but not their dependents (nor did it provide meals in 
hospitals). It accounted for about 2 per cent of the 
population in 1980 (Hu,T.,1981). The latter was a contributory 
scheme covering workers in urban areas and their dependents 
which accounted for around 10-12 per cent of the whole 
population (Hu, 1981; Prescott and Jamison, 1984). Similar to 
the ESI scheme of India the workers' dependents were entitled
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to restricted benefits of only 50 per cent of health care 
costs. To sum up, the population coverage of the Chinese 
statutory schemes was around 14 per cent, or close to 3-4 
times more than the proportion in India.
Other countries in Asia are in the early stages of 
development of compulsory health insurance. In Indonesia, a 
scheme for civil servants, retired civil servants and 
military personnel and their dependents was started in 1968. 
In 1988, the population coverage of the scheme was 15.5 mil­
lion (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 1990), or about 9 per cent 
of the total population. Pakistan's statutory health insurance 
scheme was started in 1967. Initially, it covered only the 
textile industry in three cities but was gradually extended to 
other areas and industries. After two decades of operation, 
the population coverage of the scheme was close to 2.25 
million in 1987 (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 1990), 
accounting for only around 2 per cent of the population. In 
contrast, the statutory health insurance of the Philippines, 
after its first implementation in 1971, covered around 21 
million inhabitants in 1987 (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 
1990) or approximately 36 per cent of the entire population.
The last group of developing countries which adopted 
compulsory health insurance was Africa. Algeria, the ex- 
French colony, was a pioneer in this continent in introducing 
the scheme in 1949. Several countries have gradually developed 
their statutory health insurance in addition to their public
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health programmes, particularly since becoming independent. 
But the extent of statutory health insurance service and 
population coverage was very limited and diversified in
comparison to Latin America (Dunlop, D.W., 1983). At any rate, 
Roemer, M.I.(1987) noted that schemes were being implemented 
in Guinea(1952) Libya(1957), Tunisia(1960), Kenya(1966),
Egypt(1975), Senegal(1975) along with a few other countries.
B) The major argument for compulsory health insurance.
(1) To protect the insured (and his family) from 
financial disaster due to sickness and income loss, with 
financial contributions from the employer, the employee, and 
(in some countries) from the state.
(2) To prevent the externalities caused by the non­
insured. This is to limit the free-riders and protect those 
with chronic illnesses or congenital conditions. It is the 
most efficient way to provide health care to increase coverage 
in the most equitable way.
(3) The price of the insurance contribution, if related
to ability to pay as a proportion of income, leads to an
equitable redistribution of income.
(4) It is the prologue to health for all. The premium 
collected, namely payroll tax, is earmarked for the provision 
of health care to a section of the population. The benefit of 
an earmarked tax is that the health sector does not have to 
compete so directly with other government programmes, such as 
the defense budget, to take an extreme example. The health
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sector, in general, is able to mobilize additional resources 
from the money which would otherwise have been used to support 
the insured, to give priority to the poor, to attain health 
for all.
(5) Emphasis on self reliance. Self reliance or self help 
is a central characteristic of statutory health insurance. 
Part of the insurance fund comes from the employees who pay 
for their own health care with financial support from their 
employers and in some cases from the state. However, the 
subsidy from the state is likely to be insignificant in 
relation to the total amount of general taxation.
(6) The emphasis is on social solidarity. The risks and 
resources are pooled for the insured persons regardless of 
their income or health status. However, in some countries 
statutory health insurance does not apply to those with a very 
high level of income because they do not need to get financial 
support from the employer (or the state).
C) The major argument against compulsory health insurance.
(1) Experiences in developing countries show that only a 
small proportion of the population receive the benefits. The 
regular employees in the modern sector of the economy in the 
urban areas enjoy the benefits, whilst the rural poor, the 
self-employed, agricultural farmers, and domestic servants, 
etc. are excluded.
(2) Discontinuity of protection. Because compulsory 
health insurance's benefits are employment-related, the
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insured is likely not to be protected, if they lose their 
job. This is a particularly severe problem in developing 
countries which have a very large and mobile supply of cheap 
labour.
(3) Lack of competition and choice. Generally, there is 
less competition amongst providers. It is typical to find a 
standard health insurance plan which may offer choice of 
providers. However, the consumer's choice is limited to 
providers who work under the framework of cost generating 
incentives.
(4) The monopoly of the provider. Doctors are often the 
primary decision makers in the health insurance system. Most 
compulsory health insurance schemes do not provide strong 
financial incentives for cost-saving doctors. Most doctors are 
not aware of the economic consequences of their decisions. 
Where this is the case, the system is a long way from being 
cost-effective.
(5) The consumer lacks full information on the cost of 
each medical intervention and so has a weak incentive to 
contain it. The consumer relies on his doctor's advice which 
may not be for the most cost-effective option but for that 
which gives a financial benefit to himself.
(6) Underserving. In the situation of being able to 
impose cost-saving measures through compulsory health 
insurance, the provider may receive financial benefit from 
underserving his patient.
(7 ) The employers' contribution is regarded as employees' 
income foregone. In some cases, the average pay rise of
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employees under health insurance is found to be lower than 
before statutory insurance. In other cases, the employers may 
increase the price of their products or services, so that the 
consumer bears the final costs.
(8) It is unfair to use the state budget, if any, to 
susidize the better-off. Particularly, it is worse when the 
budget comes from regressive taxation, when the poor support 
the rich.
(9) It creates a two-tier health service system, 
particularly in developing countries. First, the insurance 
system creates higher standards of medical care and curative 
oriented services for a minority of the population in the 
modern sector of the economy. Second, it is only a poorly 
funded system of public health care that provides for the 
majority of the population.
4. REFORMS AND INNOVATIONS.
There have been several attempts to reorganize national 
health insurance around the world, regardless of the form of 
insurance and governmental regime. The most well known 
contemporary reform strategies are;
A) Decentralization and self-management.
Yugoslavia, for example, embarked on a course of 
decentralized health care in 1953 and gradually obtained more 
and more financing through communal insurance associations
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(Parmelee, D.E., 1985). In the early 1980s, Hungary began
health care reforms with three themes; decentralization, 
patient co-payments and a voucher system (Csaazi, L. and 
Kullberg, P., 1985). Similarly, Poland, in 1984, considered 
implementing decentralized self-management health care 
(Deacon, B., 1984).
B) Emphasis on preventive medicine.
The Gabrovo health service development project of 
Bulgaria, started in 1972, demonstrated a successful 
experiment of preventive mass screening and active follow up 
of the individual at risk. The model was based on the concept 
of "dispensarization" (being preventive, systematic, 
comprehensive, and with active follow up), as pioneered in the 
USSR (Apostolov, E. et al, 1980; Sokolov, D.K.et al,1980).
C) Deregulation and more of a market-oriented approach.
The reforms with a pro-market strategy namely "managed 
competition" or "regulated competition" are more welcome in 
the USSR than in the U.K. This is because in the USSR, reforms 
are associated with more funding while in the U.K. they are 
not. Moreover, the problem of under-funding in the NHS is 
widely accepted. Recently, the USSR under Gorbachev, has 
advocated a policy of "glasnost"(openness) and "perestroika" 
(restructuring) which extended to the health services. In 
April 1988, a "Leningrad experiment" was introduced in
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Leningrad, Kujbychev and Kemerovo to provide health care by 
using the market mechanism. That is, hospitals were given zero 
budgets and a set price list for specific items of care and 
made to compete with each other to get customers. State funds 
went to the primary health care sector, to polyclinics, which 
functioned as the purchasers of hospital services at "market 
prices" for their local population (Mortimer, S., 1989;
Robert, J., 1990).
Similarly, the "managed competition" approach to create 
the "internal market" in the reform of the NHS in the U.K. is 
to be implemented in April 1991. The District Health Authority 
(DHA) and/or the groups of GPs with lists of at least 9,000 
patients, will be the "budget holders" to buy the (private 
and public) hospital and other services for their patients in 
the most cost-effective way. Hospitals with over 250 beds will 
be encouraged to form a Trust and become self-governing. 
Hospitals will have to set their own prices and compete with 
each other and with the private sector to sell their services 
to budget holders. Under (internal) market competition, the 
money saved would be an incentive to providers and used, 
partly, to improve services. However, if GP budget holders 
fail to achieve the saving, they will face financial penalties 
(U.K., 1989; Beardshaw, V. et al, 1989).
The reform in the Netherlands by the "regulated competi­
tion" approach, as proposed by the Dekker Committee (Neth­
erlands, 1987), plans to introduce a "basic insurance scheme"
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for every citizen. The coverage of the basic insurance is to 
be determined by law and the contribution for basic coverage 
is income-related and collected through the tax system. In 
addition, the supplementary insurance scheme is a nominal flat 
rate contribution paid directly by the insured to his/her 
insurer. Each insurer has to compete with other insurers by 
offering a lower price or more service coverage on the 
supplementary plan. Moreover, the Dekker plan indicated that 
the insured would be free to make a choice, but that the 
insurer would be obliged to accept him/her as in the basic 
coverage. Moreover, according to the plan, the previous bond 
between the insurer and the providers is abolished. Under the 
regulated competition, only the good performance provider can 
sign a contract with the insurer (Netherlands, Ministry of 
Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1988; Lapre, R.M., 1988; 
Van de Ven, W., 1989; Elsinga, E., 1989). Afterwards, the new 
coalition government in 1990 proposed the so-called Simons 
plan (named after the Health Minister from the Labour party). 
The new plan is, in fact, a modified version of the Dekker 
plan and changes the coverage of basic insurance to satisfy 
the needs of certain interest groups, particularly the trade 
unions.
D) Collaboration between Health Ministries and social 
security schemes.
Costa Rica provided a new model of functional integration 
between the Ministries of Health and Social Security, by a
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scheme launched in February 1987. Under this scheme, the 
patient registered with a doctor of his/her choice. The doctor 
received a basic salary for promotional and preventive 
activities, in addition to a capitation fee. The scheme also 
integrates and co-ordinates the promotive and preventive 
health services involving more than one institution through 
health and social security boards, in which the local 
community plays an active role (Beirute, L.A., 1988).
E) Substituting ambulatory for hospital care.
Attempts to contain the high cost of a statutory health 
insurance scheme were made in Germany, between 1979 and 
1983/84. They set up the so-called "Bavarian Contract" which 
was an agreement between Bavarian sick funds and the office- 
based doctors of Bavaria. The contract involved a simple 
shifting of in-patient cares to out-patient cares; i.e., from 
hospital to GP service. After a few years of experimentation, 
however, it was concluded that there is no evidence that 
expanding ambulatory care may help to contain the growth of 
health care expenditure (John, J. and Potthoff, P., 1987).
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5. SALIENT ISSUES.
A) Provision of medical care.
Direct and indirect methods comprise the classical 
typology of medical care provision. The direct method refers 
to the way in which the insurer owns hospitals and health 
centres and employs health professionals on a salaried basis. 
This model of health care provision is found in many countries 
of the Eastern bloc, Latin America, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
Under the indirect method, the insurer purchases medical 
services from the existing public or private facilities and/or 
contracts self-employed health professionals (Zschock, D.K., 
1982; Abel-Smith, B., 1988,1990). Under the terms of contract, 
the methods to pay the doctor are fee-for-service and 
capitation while the methods to pay the hospital are diverse 
(see chapter 9). In most cases, the government plays a major 
role as active regulator or direct controller, to contain 
costs and secure equitable provision.
However, the most crucial point is that to choose which 
is the most suitable method depends on the existing social 
resources available. In Latin America, direct provision was 
set up when there was little public health care available, nor 
a strong, private medical market. In addition, there was an 
oversupply of doctors in private practice. They welcomed the 
scheme and were delighted to receive an assured salary instead 
of the bad debts of the poor. In this situation, direct
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provision seemed to be the most economical decision 
(regardless of the abuse and high cost later). In some Asian 
and North African countries, by contrast, the situation was 
quite different. There were networks of hospitals, clinics, 
health centres and primary health care centres run by the 
Ministry of Health and the private medical market was well 
established. In these circumstances it seemed to be an 
economic rationale to apply indirect provision (Roemer, M.I., 
1987).
B) Types of funds.
There are a number of funds, diversified in type and 
arrangement, in different countries, dependent mostly upon 
political structure and historical development. According to 
Abel-Smith (1990), there are 4 main types of classification:-
a) A unified and centralized fund at national level 
covering all of the insured population. This type of fund 
provides for those who have to change job or their place of 
residence. The most controversial point is, as found in the 
USSR and her allies, over the high degree of centralization 
and control. Inefficiency is almost bound to arise from the 
monopoly and bureaucracy of managing a large fund. However, 
the inefficiency can be minimized by decentralization and 
support of self-management at local branches.
b) There are a series of multiple funds available 
locally which work independently to serve local needs. They 
may be organized by geographical area? for instance,
306
provincial funds, village funds, etc., or by occupational 
groups; such as funds for teachers, fanners, and white collar 
workers. This system, although bringing control closer to 
local needs, is usually accompanied by the inefficiency of 
duplication or gaps of coverage. The major argument is, 
however, on the inequity of the level and service coverage of 
the benefits. Some rich funds serving in the prosperous areas 
or the wealthy sectors of population may offer a better deal. 
This needs state control and a national health plan of cross­
subsidiaries. Furthermore, there is an administrative problem 
associated with cross-boundary cases which may end up with 
discontinuity of care. Some countries have a very complex 
system of organizing multiple funds. As in France, there is a 
large general scheme protecting about 75 per cent of the 
population, special schemes for some occupations, autonomous 
schemes for the self-employed and agricultural schemes for 
agricultural workers and farmers. Each scheme has several 
regional funds and/or local funds (Abel-Smith, B. (ed), n.d., 
pp.43-44).
c) There are occupationally based multiple funds as in
Germany, Japan and South Korea. The German prototype is highly 
decentralized and pluralistic but not highly competitive 
amongst the funds. It had a total of 1,645 funds in 1988 
(Dopson, L., 1988), compared to 1,950 in 1970 (Pflanz, M., 
1971) and as many as 18,942 funds in 1885 (Leichter, H.M., 
1979). This trend shows that the funds have been merged to 
achieve economies of scale. Amongst them, about 1,200 funds 
belong to the statutory health schemes, so-called ROV funds
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(Brennecke, R., 1986, p.l). The funds are organized by
occupation, enterprise or geographic district. They are self­
governed, private, non-profit organizations and are able to 
collect contributions directly from their members. Each fund 
is independent of government control but is controlled 
jointly by an equal number of employees and employers' 
representatives under regulations laid down by law. The 
advantage of joint control is that it may bring a closer 
relationship between the workers and managers. Also, trade 
unions can negotiate for more benefits than those required by 
law. Nevertheless, the most serious disadvantage found in 
Germany is that it is a most expensive scheme with much waste. 
A lesson learnt here is that to control the price but not the 
volume of services does not help in reducing total costs. 
Instead, the state intervention in the previous years only 
achieved cost shifting rather than cost reduction (Deppe, H., 
1989). Besides, this system was also found to be rather rigid 
and inert (Altenstetter, C., 1986).
d) There are competitive multiple funds as proposed in 
the Dekker plan for the Netherlands (mentioned above). These 
funds are private non-profit organizations and, in practice, 
act as quasi-governmental institutions. There has been a 
gradual process of consolidation amongst the funds so that 
there is only one fund in many parts of the country. 
Currently, there are about 45 funds (Ham, Robinson and 
Benzeval, 1990, p.37), compared to about 60 in the early 1980s 
(Abel-Smith (ed), n.d., p.47). The basic insurance is
financed by income-related contributions collected by a
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central fund and paid to the consumer-chosen insurers by the 
risk-adjusted capitation fee. For instance; the central fund 
pays the capitation fee for an 80 year old person, around ten­
fold the capitation fee for a 20 year old person. The 
competition of insurance is, therefore, derived from the 
supplementary part. Because the basic and supplementary 
insurance has to be bought from the same insurer, the consumer 
would choose the best buy (Van de Ven, 1989).
C) Administrative organization.
Responsibility for the administration of statutory health 
insurance programmes in most instances rests with various 
types of semi-autonomous agencies or sickness funds. These 
funds are usually subject to general supervision by a 
government agency. But in some cases they are self-governing 
boards headed by a tripartite of employers, employees and the 
government or bipartite consisting of employers and employees. 
In some countries, the administration of health insurance is 
placed directly in the hands of a government agency (U.S. 
DHHS, 1986). There are 4 types of government agencies who are 
directly responsible for administering health insurance 
programmes;
a) National social security institutions. An institute of 
social security to provide various forms of social security 
benefits including health insurance. They have various names 
such as; Department of Social Welfare (New Zealand), Ministry
309
of Social Security (Luxembourg, Turkey, Libya), Ministry of 
Social Affairs and National Solidarity (France), Ministry of 
Social Administration (Austria), Institute of Social Security 
and Welfare (Nicaragua).
b) Several government institutions coexist and coordinate
several aspects of health insurance. They may work closely on 
the basis of having a clear division of labour or be fully 
integrated. For example; Australia has a Department of
Social Security to provide cash sickness benefit while a 
Department of Health provides medical benefits. In Argentina, 
the Ministry of Health and Social Action is responsible for 
general supervision, while the coordination of programmes is 
under the accountability of the National Institute of Social 
Services. Besides, the duty of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security is to administer maternity benefits. 
Similarly, the outcome of such coordination in Panama was that 
half of the population is under the Ministry of Health and the 
other half under the Ministry of Social Security (Ugalde, A., 
1985).
c) The Ministry of Labour (Ministry of Interior or Home 
Office in some countries) has a major responsibility for 
statutory health insurance. This system is used in such 
countries as India, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Venezuela and 
Romania. They may be responsible for more than the provision 
of health insurance such as employer liability schemes and 
pensions. These are the Ministries of Labour and Social
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Affairs in Germany and Israel, or the Ministries of Labour and 
Social Security in Portugal and Uruguay. In Peru it is known 
as the Ministry of Labour and Social Promotion, whilst in 
Poland it is labelled as the Ministry of Labour, Wages and 
Social Affairs.
d) The Ministry of Health administers statutory health 
insurance. Some countries merge all health care agencies into 
one; such as the Department of Health and Social Security 
until recently in the U.K. It is called Health and Welfare in 
Japan and Health and Social Affairs in South Korea. However, 
it is customary to provide cash benefits in a separate agency 
as in the U.K. and the USSR. Particularly in the USSR, unions 
of workers instead of a government agency, control cash 
benefits.
In some countries of Latin America, there is some concern 
over the collaboration between statutory health insurance and 
public health. In some countries, public health care seems to 
play a subordinated role or is incorporated in a social 
security institution. As is the case in Mexico and Brazil, 
which provide public health care in their rural social 
security health centre networks. However, in the relatively 
lower income countries of Latin America and Asia with only a 
small coverage of statutory health insurance, public health 
services play a dominant role.
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An attempt to answer the question of whether medical care 
under social security weakens public health programmes or not 
was made by Roemer, M.I. and Maeda, N. (1976). They found that 
there was no statistical evidence that spending on health 
insurance under social security had a negative impact on 
public health services or on the strength of Ministries of 
Health. Rather, coordination or complete amalgamation can 
create effectiveness and greater distribution of health care.
International efforts to motivate coordination between 
the two sectors in Latin America occurred in a series of 
meetings in 1959 and after (Zschock, D.K., 1986). It seems 
that coordination has been achieved more in the richer 
countries (and those now with a higher insurance coverage) 
than in the relatively poorer countries. In 1970, a joint 
ILO/WHO recommendation was that coordination should be applied 
globally (WHO, 1971). However, a number of international 
meetings on this subject still focus on Latin America (PAHO, 
1977; 1981? 1987).
In the meantime, since 1970, 12 out of 15 countries
around the world who launched statutory health insurance 
schemes have a good relationship between Ministries of Health 
and Social Security. Four of them have close coordination, 
while eight of them are placed fully under the Ministry of 
Health (Roemer, M.I., 1987). Therefore, a general trend of
cooperation and unification is likely to ensue.
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6. CONCLUSIONS.
The emergence and evolution of health insurance in both 
voluntary and compulsory forms has been examined from the 
global perspective. However, the diversity of arrangements 
between countries makes it difficult to make comparisons. In 
order to understand and learn the lessons from a comparative 
health insurance policy analysis, one must understand the 
local history, culture, politics and economic development. 
There are so many actors involved in the insurance subject, 
namely; health professions, consumers, employers and 
politicians who need to gain from the insurance business or at 
least maintain the status quo. Thus, it is truly the case 
that, as Abel-Smith put it,
"Introducing health insurance is essentially a 
problem of political salesmanship."
(Abel-Smith, B., 1986, p.10)
That is because, to develop health insurance not only 
secures health services and shares risk, but also 
redistributes social resources. Therefore, it is also true to 
say that to manage and develop it further is a matter of 
politics rather than economics. In practice, there is no one 
perfect or ideal model health insurance system, or no one 
optimal structure. Many alternative configurations and 
modifications exist in many countries in the world. Each form 
has its own advantages and disadvantages, depending on the
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local circumstances, but there is always a call for local 
experiments to be successful.
Usually, internal politics play a very important role in 
health insurance development, while the structure of a 
political regime is of less importance. Countries of advanced 
capitalism, of the welfare state, newly industrailized 
countries, and developing countries have experiences in common 
with insurance development seen in countries of the socialist 
bloc. They have a common path of insurance development, not 
only from voluntary to compulsory insurance, but also from 
limited extent to comprehensive and universal coverage.
A considerably important factor in the development of 
statutory health insurance, is the level of economic 
development in the country. European countries developed their 
voluntary health insurance several decades ago, if not 
centuries ago. Its role declined when the state intervened in 
the health care market by introducing statutory health 
insurance in 1883. After that, country after country adopted 
statutory health insurance programmes. However, only countries 
with relatively high income and determined political regimes 
can expand the coverage to the entire nation. It is clear that 
the number of the regular work force in the modern sector of 
the economy is a contributory factor in this achievement.
Finally, there is a dilemma over whether or not 
developing countries should follow the west, because insurance
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systems have been very costly to implement. In addition, there 
are initial problems of inequity where only a small proportion 
of the population are protected. In the meantime, there is a 
call for health for all by the year 2000 which is not too far 
away. Health insurance offers a challenge of applicability to 
achieve this common goal.
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CHAPTER 8
PAYING THE DOCTOR
1. INTRODUCTION.
A doctor's remuneration has become a fundamental policy 
issue associated with new medical development and changing 
technology. The historical development of national health 
insurance and/or national health services in several countries 
has shown that the method of paying the doctor has had to be 
carefully worked out and negotiated between the profession and 
the parties concerned. Recently the major concern of several 
governments on cost, quality, quantity, attitude and incentive 
of medical care is leading to the reform of the organising and 
financing of health services. Several authors for example; 
Roemer, M.(1962), Abel-Smith, B.(1963,1972,1976,1989), 
Hogarth, J.(1963), Glaser, W.(1970, 1986), and Sandier,
S. ( 1989) reveal that the method of payment has a large 
influence on doctor's decisions and it is one of the 
contributing factors to the cost and quality of care.
The method of paying the doctor here refers to the way in 
which a doctor is compensated for his services, and not the 
method used by the patient to pay for services received, nor 
the method by which funds are raised to pay for the medical 
care. Also, it refers to the method of paying a doctor
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working outside a hospital. A hospital under health insurance 
usually receives compensation directly from the insurer and 
the specialist is paid out of the hospital payment (details of 
paying the hospital will be described in the next chapter).
Basically, methods of paying the general practitioner are 
usually described as (a) fee-for-service, (b) salary and (c) 
capitation. Some authors like Hogarth, Glaser, and Sandier 
consider (d) payment per case as another payment method. 
However, Roemer(1962,1978) includes payment per case of 
illness, without stating the number of medical acts performed 
especially found in surgical or obstetrical cases, in the fee 
for service method. By contrast, Abel-Smith(1972, p.226) 
argues that payment per three-monthly case, as operated in 
Austria, is a modified capitation system. To avoid 
misinterpretation, therefore, the analysis of the method of 
paying the doctor here is based on the three main principal 
ones.
Historically, all three basic methods of paying the 
doctor have been used in different societies in different 
periods of time. In the day of Hippocrates, salaried doctors 
were appointed by the community to treat the sick without a 
fee. The Romans employed many of their doctors on the same 
basis (Titmuss,R., 1963, p. 16). As part of the poor law or 
public assistance services, doctors in Europe were employed on 
a part-time or full-time salaried basis (Abel-smith, 1972, 
p.222). On the other hand, in ancient times doctors charged
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for their services on a fee-for-service basis which the 
patient might pay in cash (if available) or in kind. 
Likewise, doctors in Britain, Germany, Norway, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands have been paid by the capitation method from 
the voluntary insurance movement of the Mutual Aid or Friendly 
Societies (Abel-Smith, 1972, pp.224-5). At the present time, 
a combination of all three methods to pay the doctors are 
found in different countries or in the same country at 
different points of time. The following are the three 
principal methods of paying the GP under health insurance with 
their advantages and disadvantages;
2. THE FEE-FOR-SERVICE METHOD.
Fee for service is payment for each unit of medical 
procedure, in other words paying on a piece-work basis. It has 
been one of the traditional methods of paying the doctor since 
the early stages of the development of medicine. It is still 
in use in many countries as a major mode of payment and/or as 
a supplement to the other methods. Doctors in England and some 
European countries, have been working as private
entrepreneurs (in a solo practice) for several centuries. The 
patient paid the doctor on an "item of service" basis, for 
visits, medicine, surgical procedure, midwifery and (since the 
early nineteenth century) vaccination. Roemer (1962) and Abel- 
Smith (1976) stated that a doctor traditionally adjusted the 
fees according to the patient's ability to pay. This is called 
the "sliding scale of fees". Nowadays, in developing countries
318
this pattern still exists. In addition, Glaser(1986) pointed 
out that as medical practice became more complex, the fees 
became more varied. Also, price discrimination is found to be 
associated with social class and the education of the doctor. 
Although competition amongst doctors might limit the range of 
fees in a community, the more famous and popular doctors could 
still charge more.
Competition amongst the profession in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries reduced medical fees (Loudon, 1986). 
Broadly speaking, today the simple economic analysis of demand 
and supply cannot be applied any more. Davis, K. (1984) 
pointed out that several econometric studies of the market for 
doctor services in Canada and the USA in 1970s have found that 
doctor's fees tend to be higher, not lower, in areas with more 
doctors. Davis writes
" In areas with a greater supply, physicians 
maintain or raise fees, convince patients to return 
more frequently, perform more tests and procedures, 
and in general act to achieve a target level of 
income."
( Davis, K., 1984, p.38 )
Similarly, Raskin, I.E. et al (1982) argued that the 
real issue of the high total cost of medical care in society 
is on the effect of total doctors' earnings and not just 
simply on prices. Although the two issues are interrelated, my 
main analysis is focused only on the method of payment - not 
on the doctors' incomes.
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Medical service has become organized in the form of a 
compulsory health insurance system since its origin in Germany 
in 1883 and spread to other countries such as Austria(1888), 
Hungary(1891), Norway(1909), Britain(1911), Russia(1912) the 
Netherlands(1941) and many more. In many cases except the 
USA, fee-for-service payment has been standardized after the 
negotiation between the insurer (or third party) and the 
provider. Moreover, the third parties are able to negotiate 
for a lower price than in the private market because the 
insurers are bulk purchasers (Ron, Abel-Smith and Tamburi, 
1990, p.54). Thus, the fee schedule under an insurance system 
has somewhat limited the arbitrary price discrimination as 
applied now in several countries, for instance, France and 
Switzerland. On the other hand, in the early period after 
health insurance was introduced in 1939, doctors in New 
Zealand continued to charge the usual fees by accepting the 
balance and/or the "tip" from the patients (Lovel-Smith,J.B., 
1966). In the same way, patients in the USA (Medicaid 
programme between 1966-76) had to pay the doctors out of their 
own pockets for the additional cost above the standard fee 
schedule of the state (Starr, P., 1982). Likewise, in Canada 
prior to 1984, the "over-billing" or "extra-billing" practice 
which allowed the doctor to charge the patient above the 
negotiated fee was very common. At the present time, the U.K., 
Denmark and the Netherlands are using fee-for-service as an 
additional way of paying their GPs, but only on a small scale 
in the U.K. The United States, Canada, Japan, France, 
Switzerland and Germany are paying their out-of-hospital
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doctors by the fee-for-service method, although the cost- 
sharing and cost containment measures are different. The fee- 
for-service payment system, operating in different social 
settings, is described below:-
A. Operational experiences.
Several countries have applied fee-for-service in various 
degrees from the major (or the only) mode of payment to the 
supplementary mode. The reason for adopting and/or continuing 
to use the fee-for-service method varies. In general, it is 
based on the history of the medical development of the country 
which has determined how strong the organized profession is. 
The medical association in most countries has opted for this 
particular method of payment.
In practice, there are five different methods of paying 
the doctor by fee-for-service under health insurance. The 
first method is a reimbursement to the patient by the sickness 
fund at standard rates when the fee is set by doctor. The 
second method is a reimbursement of the negotiated fee. The 
third method is that of the insurer paying the doctor 
directly at the negotiated fee without any co-payment from the 
patient. Lastly, is the system which the doctor not only 
receives payment from the insurer but also co-payment from the 
patient. The following are experiences of some countries which 
apply the fee-for-service system as a method of paying their 
GP.
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1. Reimbursement at standard rates of which doctor sets 
the fee. Under this method, the patient pays fee-for-service 
at rates set by the doctor and is reimbursed by the insurer. 
Usually, the charges are set by the doctor according to his 
market position. Under this method, the patient has to pay 
direct to the doctor in full at the point of services. The 
insurer has less control on cost because the doctor sets the 
prices. However, the insurer tries to contain health care cost 
and the doctor's practice indirectly with some sets of rules 
on the reimbursement amounts which the patient will receive. 
The patient would receive a total or partial reimbursement 
after his/her medical bills are sent to the insurer, checked 
and a calculation made on the basis of the rules. At the end, 
the reimbursement amounts would theoretically discourage the 
patient from going to the partial reimbursable doctor and 
encourage use of the fully reimbursable doctor. In practice, 
however, a famous doctor can still receive high rates and the 
patient has to pay the co-payment. This arrangement is found 
in the Medicare and Medicaid Programmes of the USA.
The USA has a long established fee-for-service system as 
the predominant method of paying the doctor under free market 
medicine. The USA developed the HMO type of insurance with the 
capitation or salary method of paying the doctor in the period 
between the two world wars, but only to a limited extent. By 
contrast, many European countries were used to paying the 
doctor by salary or capitation methods under the HMO form of 
health insurance with the high coverage of one-third to one-
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half of the population in some countries by 1933 (Abel-Smith,
B., 1988). In addition, neither the voluntary insurance
movement, nor the insurance of doctor services had developed 
in the USA to as full an extent as in the early period in 
Europe. Above all, the American Medical Association has 
successfully stopped attempts to create national health 
insurance several times. For decades, doctors in the USA 
charge the patient according to the "usual, customarily and 
reasonable" fees. Today, they are still free to establish 
their own fee schedules. Changing from private financing to 
social financing by third party payment under Medicare, 
Medicaid or private insurance was not able to limit their 
ability to charge. Patients still have to pay a substantial
amount above the fee level reimbursed by these funds (Starr,
P., 1982).
2. Reimbursement at the negotiated fee . This method of 
payment also involves a direct payment to the doctor in full 
by the patient at the point of services, but the patient may 
receive a full or partial refund from the insurer. The
fundamental difference between this method and the previous 
method is that a standard fee-for-services here is set
(usually at below the market prices) as a result of the 
negotiation between the insurer and the provider. In this 
system, the doctor charges the patient in full and the doctor 
will not receive any money from the insurer. Similar to the 
previous system, it seems that the insurer has lost control 
over the doctor's practice. However, in fact, the amount of
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reimbursable cost to the patient is the indirect factor to 
control the doctor's behaviour. France provides an example of 
this method.
France is an example of a country with a strong medical 
profession opposed to state regulated medicine. Also, France 
has a long development of the mutual benefit which better off 
employees formed amongst themselves. The voluntary health 
insurance movement in France tended to be restricted to cash 
benefits. The reimbursement system was adopted when compulsory 
health insurance developed later (Abel-Smith, 1972). When the 
first compulsory health insurance Act was introduced in 1928, 
doctors in France objected to its proposals for the payment by 
a third party and not by the patient. They advocated "liberal 
medicine" which was based on four principles - the patient's 
freedom to choose his doctor; the doctor's freedom to 
prescribe treatment; medical confidentiality; and direct 
payment of medical fees from the patient to the doctor 
(Bridgman,R.F., 1971, p.332). As a result, the Act was amended 
drastically. When the scheme was introduced in 1930, the 
medical profession maintained their clinical freedom to charge 
directly as in the private market (Hogarth,J., 1963, p.132). 
Their autonomy has remained unchanged until now. At present, 
they can choose to work as full contractors or partial 
contractors with the statutory health insurances. The former 
are obliged to accept the official fee schedule while the 
latter can charge what they wish (the extra has to be paid by 
the patient). Patients have to pay the full fees to the
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doctors and can be refunded from the funds for around 70-80 
per cent of what they have paid (Lacronique, J., 1984),
Finally the patient has to pay the co-payment (or "ticket 
moderateur") about 20-30% of the total bill. Recently, 
according to Cullis and West (1985), the French government has 
exerted more control on the medical profession. Since the 1960 
reform and the strike by doctors in the Paris area, fees are 
now generally set by negotiation between the insurers and the 
medical profession rather than privately between doctor and 
patient. Also, the rate of reimbursement has varied for some 
services to encourage a different pattern of service. Services 
are divided into several sub-categories called the 
"Nomenclature" of item-of-services which serves as a tariff 
framework. Each of the items, also, is assigned an attached 
flexible "code letter" depending on how complicated the 
services are. In addition, a coefficient of each code letter 
is assigned. Then, the monetary values are worked out 
according to the code letters and the coefficient of service 
(Glaser, W., 1970). However, the continuing freeze in doctors' 
fees and proposals for reform of the tariffs led to a large 
and strong doctor demonstration in 1981 (Lacronique,J., 1984).
3. The insurer pays the doctor directly at the negotiated 
fee without co-payment from the patient. Under this system, as 
operates in Canada and Germany, the full cost is paid directly 
by the insurer. Patients are not obligated to pay when 
visiting their GPs. Patients do not know the cost of their 
visit, nor are they aware of the economic consequences of
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their health care consumption. However, this payment system 
brings greater control from the insurer over the doctor's 
activity and remuneration (Sandier, S., 1989). Examples of
countries using this system are Denmark (for three quarters of 
the doctor's remuneration), Canada (Quebec), Germany and 
Australia. The following are some operational experiences of 
Canada ,Germany and Australia.
Canada has been successful in implementing a national 
health service system financed largely by taxation. Most 
doctors continued to be paid on a fee-for-service basis. 
Previously, there was a practice of "over-billing" or "extra 
billing" which allowed the doctor to charge the patient over 
and above the negotiated fee scale. However, regardless of a 
25 days doctors' strike in Ontario, the over-billing was 
finally abolished nationwide by the enactment of the Canada 
Health Acts of 1984. In practice, in Quebec and British 
Columbia the over-billing had already been banned prior to 
1984 (Stevenson, Williams and Vayda, 1988). Today, a doctor's 
source of income is almost entirely fee-for-service payments 
from the provincial public insurer. The patient is not 
required to pay a fee or make any other financial contribution 
(Evans, R.G., 1989). However, a provincial variation is
allowed for the level of fees.
In Germany, the fee-for-service payment is the only 
method used for paying GPs and specialists out of hospital. 
Historically, German doctors under the voluntary sickness
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insurance movement were paid mainly by capitation under the 
control of a consumer organization. After the 1883 Insurance 
Act was compulsorily extended to cover a section of the 
population, the medical profession not only fought against lay 
control but also fought against capitation and salary. The 
Medical Association was set up in 1900 and went on strike in 
1903 to negotiate higher levels of payment and the right for 
every doctor to participate in the insurance plan. Later on, 
the method of payment was placed on the agenda for negotiation 
in favour of fee-for-service. There are two possible 
explanations given by Abel-Smith (1963); to make it easier to 
negotiate for higher remuneration; and to allow the younger 
and less established doctors to attract patients from the 
well established practitioner. In the end, the German doctors 
obtained the fee-for-service system of payment for which they 
fought (Abel-Smith, 1963). Nowadays, doctors under the 
statutory schemes are paid on the basis of the official 
tariffs. The German system is simpler to that of France. After 
the list of services is sent in, the "point" of each item is 
quantified. This schedule of services and relative values of 
each item are negotiated nationally but the monetary value 
per point is now determined by the provincial budget for 
doctor services. The money received from sick funds is 
"pooled" and reallocated to the individual doctor every three 
months. Payment is by the fee-for-service method according to 
the aggregated value of points. At the end of each day, 
doctors do not know for sure how much they are going to be 
paid for each act. Above all, the cash value per point which
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each doctor received from the local Association of Sick Fund 
Doctors (K.V.) is not necessarily the same as the negotiated 
scale. In order to contain the cost, the total budget is 
fixed or sometimes called "capping". If the total services 
provided exceed the total budget, the monetary value per point 
is reduced accordingly (Eichhorn, S., 1984).
The paying of GP services under the Australian Medicare 
scheme is not much different from Canada and Germany for there 
is no co-payment from the patient if the doctor chooses to 
bulk-bill. There are official fees namely the "Medical Benefit 
Schedule" attached to the Health Insurance Acts which is used 
to determine the Medicare rebate of 85 per cent of the 
services performed outside hospital. The GP can choose between 
"bulk-billing" or charging the patient according to the full 
official fees. Under bulk-billing, the doctor receives the 85 
per cent rebate directly from the Medicare scheme but forgoes 
the 15 per cent from the patient. The second option is that 
the doctor can collect the full amount of the fee from the 
patient and send the patient to Medicare for the rebate. Most 
of the doctors in Australia choose to bulk-bill because it 
simplifies the paper work and eliminates the risk of bad debts 
(Logan, J., Green, D.G. and Woodfield, A., 1989).
4. The system in which the doctor not only receives 
payment direct from the insurer but also co-payment from the 
patient. The doctor's activity under this payment system is 
to some extent controlled by the insurer. In addition, the
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demand for GP visits will theoretically be kept down due to 
cost-sharing from the patient. Some experiences of this 
payment system is to be found in New Zealand, Japan and South 
Korea.
Outside Europe and Northern America, New Zealand launched 
universal coverage for health services in 1939. There are no 
private insurance carriers involved. The health service system 
is generally financed by general taxation. Again, at the 
beginning of the scheme doctors went on strike in order to 
exclude the higher income groups and maternity benefits. 
Later, after a long term of negotiation between the New 
Zealand branch of the British Medical Association (BMA) and 
the government, the fee-for-service payment method came into 
being. Capitation and salary were proposed by the government. 
Several mechanisms of fee-for-services such as payment 
through a third party, and direct payment by the patient 
including cost-sharing were also considered. Meanwhile, the 
system allowed doctors to practice both capitation and fee- 
for-service at the same time. In other words, a patient under 
a capitation scheme can visit any other doctor on a fee-for- 
service system. As the result, the income of a GP increased 
sharply and much more than that of the specialist. The system 
of what were originally "token" co-payments from the patient 
also operated. In the end, the capitation system has been 
eliminated. Only the reimbursement scheme of direct fee-for- 
service payment from patient to doctor has been adopted. The 
desire of the medical profession who advocated the
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preservation of the doctor-patient relationship to the fullest 
extent has been met (Lovel-Smith, J.B., 1966).
There is substantial co-payment from the patient at the 
time of use of the GP services to deter unnecessary visits. 
Bernstein, A.H. (1972, p.109) stressed that the co-payment 
requirement is important in New Zealand for reducing the 
government's obligation and for increasing the patient's cost- 
awareness. Bernstien also concluded that the New Zealand 
experience demonstrated that where the co-payment is very low, 
patients might abuse the system by over-utilising it. In 
contrast, Maynard, A. (1990, p.237) argued that an effect of 
significant co-payment in the primary care sector is a 
reduction in use, particularly by poorer groups like Maoris 
and Islanders. However, the issue of paying the doctor to 
reduce inequality and generate greater efficiency will be 
reviewed under a reform of the health care system in 1990 
towards more control instead of decentralization and 
competition.
The first health insurance Law in Japan was enacted in 
1926 and expanded to attain a universal coverage in 1961 
(Ikegami, N., 1989, p.l). South Korea implemented her first 
health insurance Law in 1977 and aimed at universal coverage 
in 1989. The method of paying the GP by fee-for-service 
according to the German style was imitated in both countries. 
Japan had long developed her relationship with Germany since 
the official adoption of western medicine in 1871. Payment of
330
medical practice is based on a fee-for-service system, 
calculated by a "point system" similar to that of the German 
prototype (Hashimoto, M., 1984). Similar to Japan, South Korea 
has used a so-called "point-unit" method of fee-for-service 
since 1977 (Kwon, S., 1988). To some extent, Japan has been 
able to control supply by limiting the overall budget or 
"capping" like that of Germany. In addition, in Japan and 
South Korea a substantial co-payment from the patient at the 
time of the visit is implemented. Doctors in Japan and South 
Korea receive co-payment from their patients at the time of 
service and the remaining portion is paid directly by the 
insurer. In Japan, Sandier, S., (1989) reported that cost-
sharing from the patient is relatively low at around 10-30 per 
cent in ambulatory care. On the other hand, Korea has not 
really managed to control the supply side. Rather, she relies 
on controlling the demand side by imposing extremely high co- 
insurance. The facts are that patients must pay 30 per cent 
of the fee in any out-patient clinic, and 55 per cent if they 
visit the out-patient department of a teaching hospital (Kwon,
S., 1988, p.37).
B. Advantages.
1. Free choice of the patient is preserved. For each 
illness or during the course of illness the patient has a 
completely free choice to visit any doctor.
2. The doctor's autonomy and clinical freedom is 
relatively high. However, in most countries now there is some
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interference from the insurer; such as, peer review, 
constraint from a budget limit and so on, to contain the 
overall cost of the scheme.
3. There is less abuse of health care by over-use from 
the patient in the reimbursement scheme. In this situation, as 
the patient pays the doctor directly, it creates cost 
consciousness at the point of consumption.
4. No under-investigation. There is a financial incentive 
to investigate the patient as the payment is based on each 
activity or each investigation. It is apparent especially when 
the third party is meeting the cost.
5. No excess of referrals. Many GPs would avoid 
referring their patient to the specialist because some of 
their income would be foregone. This would be because the 
patient may not come back to be treated by him again.
6. Well equipped surgeries. The doctor has the financial 
incentive to undertake the investigation himself. Therefore, 
it makes sense for him to install good equipment on the 
premises.
7. High courtesy and prompt service. Because good 
practices attract more patients, the doctors are very 
courteous and provide prompt service to earn more income.
A doctor is supposed to be more attentive than if he were paid 
by a third party.
8. Good morale if fees are adequate. Fee-for-service is 
most favoured by doctors especially if fees are adequate 
because they lead to a higher income than other methods of 
payment.
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9. The doctor's income reflects work done. The reward of 
paying doctor by fee-for-service under health insurance is 
related to the actual amount of work the doctor performs. A 
doctor will often be prepared to work long hours, do extra 
work and encourage patients to make repeat visits. As a 
result, doctors in Canada, Germany, France and New Zealand, to 
mention a few, obtained initially a higher income from fee- 
for-service under health insurance than in the pre-insurance 
period. This is because insurance eliminated the inability of 
the patient to pay.
C. Disadvantages.
1. Lack of continuity of care. In fee-for-service 
systems, the patient goes to visit any doctor he likes. 
Therefore, it is less likely to be a family doctor who knows 
all the medical history of an individual patient.
2. No integration of services. Usually, fee-for-service 
is mainly for curative services. To provide preventive 
measures in order to reduce some diseases in the future is not 
a major concern of a doctor because there is no financial 
incentive to do so. However, some countries such as the United 
Kingdom until recently paid the doctor to provide preventive 
services by fee-for-service. Overall, the medical care system, 
with predominated by the fee-for-service, fragments.
3. Delay in seeking care. Visiting a doctor may be 
postponed, if the patient has to collect a large sum of money
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to pay the doctor. In the end, the poor are the ones who 
suffer most from this.
4. Short consultation time. Since rapid work leads to a 
high income, doctors tend to shorten their consultation time 
for each patient.
5. Poor geographic distribution of medical services. 
Particularly when compared with salary and capitation, doctors 
in a country with the fee-for-service system of payment tend 
to work according to market mechanisms. Doctors tend to work 
in rich areas rather than poor areas. In addition, there are 
several personal incentives to work in particular urban areas; 
such as, higher opportunity to keep up with professional 
practice, more affluent patients and opportunities to do 
private practices, better education for their children, etc.
6. High cost of diagnostic tests. The diagnostic test 
leads to more precise diagnosis and treatment. Usually, there 
is a separate fee for each diagnostic test under a fee-for- 
service system. Therefore, doctors use many diagnostic tests 
because the more diagnostic tests they use, the more they 
earn. Another reason is that they would like to gain a good 
reputation from precise treatment to attract more patients.
7. High drug use. In some countries with fee-for-service, 
such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, doctors also sell drugs 
and the volume of drugs used is high. The more drugs the 
doctor prescribes the more profit he will receive.
8. High administrative cost for both doctor and insurer. 
The doctor has to produce a record of the work for individual 
patients not just the number of visits but every single item
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of service rendered. The amount of paper-work for the doctor 
to make a claim from the insurer or provide bills on which the 
patient can claim reimbursement is massive. Besides, the 
insurer has to review, analyse and make the payment according 
to each item of services.
9. High total cost of care. There are economic incentives 
for the doctor to over-prescribe and maximize the services 
rendered. Hence, the burden of the total cost of care which is 
falling on society, is high.
10. Little continuing education and holiday for the 
doctor. Because of the high competition in the profession, 
doctors must make themselves available for much of the time. 
Not working for continuing education or for a long holiday 
means a loss of income.
11. Unpredictable cost. The fee-for-service system leads 
to open-end expenditure. The insurers find that they
are unable to predict and control the budget efficiently.
3. THE SALARY METHOD.
The salary method is a fixed payment for service rendered 
over a stated period of time, such as a year, or a month. It 
is the payment of the doctor for his time, regardless of the 
number of units of service provided or the number of persons 
cared for. The salary may be paid on a full-time or a part­
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time basis. The salary level is based on the doctor's 
professional qualifications, his education, experience, skill, 
rank, job title, or other factors. The salary is usually 
associated with employment in an organisation or in a medical 
group rather than in an individual practice. It is generally 
confined to doctors working in clinics, health centres or 
group practices; for example, maternal and child care clinics 
in France, community health centres in Canada, etc. (Sandier,
S., 1989).
Historically, sick clubs in many parts of the world have 
remunerated doctors on a salaried basis to persuade them to 
work in remote, sparsely-populated or poor areas of the 
country. In European countries, there is a long history of 
publicly employed salaried doctors to give service to the 
sick poor. France and the USA have provided occupational 
medical services for those who work in remote areas. Norway 
and Sweden from the seventeenth century and Russia from the 
nineteenth century have paid their doctors salaries for 
working in remote areas (Abel-Smith, 1963, pp.31-2).
Paying the doctor by salary as the predominant mode is to 
be found in the USSR, other Eastern European countries, and 
developing countries. Doctors in the USSR and many Eastern 
European countries are regarded as full-time state-salaried 
employees with low status in society and low pay. However, 
there has been a recent development in the Eastern bloc in the 
1980s towards decentralization and privatization. Private
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practices become legally allowed on a part-time basis while 
illegal part-time private practices are common. Medical care 
in Spain, Portugal and some developing countries (particularly 
in Latin American countries) is provided by part-time salaried 
doctors in the direct pattern of delivery of health service 
administered by the Ministry of Social Security (Roemer, M.I., 
1987). Doctors are salaried under health insurance in Israel 
and some low-income countries of Africa and Southeast Asia 
(Abel-Smith, 1972).
A. Operational experiences.
Norway has had a system of district medical officers 
appointed by the national government for more than 350 years. 
They have a strong sense of pride in the tradition of the 
service. In 1979, there were more than 600 district medical 
officers working in 390 districts. These doctors are employed 
half-time in public health work and half-time in clinical 
practice. The public health segment of the work is paid for by 
salary from the national Ministry of Social Affairs. The 
clinical service is remunerated on a fee-for-service basis by 
the health insurance system in the same way as other GPs (or 
family doctors) are reimbursed. In practice, the district 
doctors spend more time in curative services than in public 
health service. If the patient requires a specialised service, 
he is usually referred to a salaried hospital specialist. If 
the patient wants to see a famous or a specific specialist, he 
can be referred to one in private practice which can be found
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only in large cities. The salaried hospital doctor is allowed 
to spend up to six or seven hours per week in private 
practice (Roemer and Roemer, 1981, pp.173-216).
The salaried doctor in the USSR is rooted in the 
"Zemstvo" doctor working in the rural areas in nineteenth 
century Russia. After the Russian revolution, the system of 
the full-time salaried doctor was extended to cover the entire 
population (Abel-Smith, 1963, p.32). Despite a dramatic 
increase in the number of doctors and hospitals, the USSR kept 
the same level of allocation of the total national income to 
health at about 4 per cent of GNP per year for more than 
twenty years. However, with the health care reform under the 
"Perestroika" plan, the USSR expects to double its allocation 
to 8 per cent of GNP by the year 2000 (Khan, N., 1989). And 
yet, the distribution of doctors amongst the republics, and 
between urban and rural areas, has remained a problem. The 
incentive measures, for example, higher pay, better living 
conditions, automobiles, early retirement and so on, have not 
significantly altered the situation. Doctors' salaries and 
prestige vary according to experience, specialisation and 
nature of work. Private medical practice is not forbidden but 
rather discouraged. Thus, some form of bribes such as tipping 
or unofficial payments to the doctor are common. However, 
industrial enterprises often give bonuses of up to 40 per cent 
of doctors' salaries and some establishments pay them an extra 
month's salary. The average of a doctor's salary is less than 
that of an engineer (Raffel, N.K., 1984, pp.488-519). The
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income from informal fees, such as the fee for a house call 
and the cost of a return-fare taxi in the course of official 
duties, rank the social status of the doctors as being equal 
to those of school teacher rather than above them as in most 
Western countries (Kaser, M., 1976, pp.64-5). Similarly, in 
Bulgaria a junior doctor's earnings are about half that of a 
bus driver (Searle, D. and Power, M., 1990).
The integrated health service (or ZOZ) in provincial 
Poland pays the doctor by the salaried method. Rural health 
stations and primary care centres are providing general 
ambulatory care by one or more doctors, aided by other health 
personnel. Polyclinic and out-patient departments of a 
hospital are providing specialised care on an ambulatory 
basis. After working 40 hours per week in the public medical 
system, the doctor is free to provide a private practice. He 
may see the patient at his own or the patient's home, but not 
in a public facility. Recently, medical cooperatives have been 
formed by groups of doctors to provide private services after 
their official hours of duty. A contributing factor for 
doctors to work in private practice is the relatively low 
salaries paid to doctors in the public system. In Poland, a 
top consultant's salary is equivalent to that of a cloakroom 
attendant (Sheldon, T., 1990, p.1033), which implied that a 
GP's salary would be even less than this. On average, the co­
operative doctors' income from their part-time work is more 
than their salaries (Roemer and Roemer, 1981, pp.217-80).
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In Latin American countries, a social security programme 
providing medical care was developed before the services of 
the Ministry of Public Health were well developed. Chile 
(1924) and Brazil(1934) are amongst 12 out of 20 countries in 
the region that established health insurance as part of social 
security, after World War II. During that time, the private 
medical market was not strong. Doctors were quite happy to 
work for full-time or part-time salaries as against the 
uncertain receipts of medical fees (Roemer, M.I., 1987). After 
some years of implementing the programme, the coverage of the 
programme was limited to a small percentage of the 
economically active population (with some exceptions in Cuba, 
Chile and Costa Rica). The emphasis of the service was on a 
curative basis. There was a problem of lack of coordination 
of medical care programmes amongst the multiple social 
security organizations serving different population groups and 
the ministry of public health. Moreover, the cost of medical 
care has been rising steeply, more than per capita income. 
Doctors were enjoying their prosperity from the rapid increase 
in their salaries (Roemer,M.I.,1973). What is more, their 
income rose sharply from fee-for-service payment in their 
private practices.
B. Advantages.
1. Costs are predictable. The insurer can predict and 
control personnel costs. Thus, the prospective annual budget 
can be estimated and relied upon.
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2. Supervision by senior doctor. The salaried senior 
doctors in the organisation are available to provide the 
supervision to maintain the minimum acceptable level of 
medical services, in both quality and quantity of care.
3. Continuing education. The doctor can leave the 
premises to attend continuing education without the penalty 
that he will lose income. In addition, the doctor can learn 
from his colleagues when working together.
4. Emphasis on prevention. If preventive medicine and 
curative medicine are under a unified organisation, it is 
possible to assign the salaried doctor and his team to place 
an emphasis on preventive services in the hope that this will 
reduce his curative work in the long run.
5. Good premises. Usually salaried doctors work in a 
large health centre, dispensary or clinic which is financed by 
the government or the insurer. Many health centres provide all 
preventive medicine such as immunization, family planning, 
nutrition, health education and so on, as well as curative 
practice with pathology tests, X-rays, dental care, etc.
6. Encouraging team work. The doctor has no constraints 
with competition as he does when paid by the fee-for-service 
method, so he can share experiences with his colleagues. Also, 
it is possible to take time off for leisure and a holiday 
without penalty.
7. No incentive for unnecessary work. There is no 
unnecessary work because the doctor has no incentive to do 
more work.
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8. Guaranteed income. Salaried payment can be made 
attractive to a doctor because it can guarantee a stable 
income at an acceptable level, with regular work. 
Particularly in low income countries, the salaried doctor does 
not have to worry about the uncertain conditions of bad debt 
or unpaid bills from the poor. The financial burden falls on 
the enterprise, not on the salaried employee.
9. The salaried system provides for consistent services. 
There is no accident or bankruptcy occurring with large 
organizations which adopt a bureaucratic structure.
C. Disadvantages.
1. Lack of continuity of care. The patient can only see 
the doctor on duty who may not be the same as that originally 
consulted. In addition, the patient might feel it is an 
impersonal service because of this. An impersonal service is 
given because the doctor is loyal to the organisation or his 
boss (who would give him promotion
or economic incentives) and not primarily, to the patient.
2. Long waiting time and delay of service. The doctor has 
no economic incentive to provide additional units of patient 
care. He, therefore, tends to work just above the minimum 
acceptable level or spend time doing the administrative work 
instead. The result can be delay in service and a long waiting 
time for the patient.
3. The total cost of care might be high. There is no 
economic incentive for doctors to monitor the cost of each
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medical practice or the total cost of care. Furthermore, there 
is likely to be a long consultation time since there is no 
incentive to provide a quick service and to see more patients. 
This raises the cost.
4. Excess referral. There is no incentive to treat the 
patient by himself. In addition, the doctor does not know 
the patient very well so he may make excessive referrals to 
the specialist.
5. Poor time keeping. The doctor may arrive late and 
leave early, especially when the system allows him to practice 
privately during unofficial hours.
6. Bribes and tipping. When the level of income from 
salary is not sufficient to maintain a high social rank in the 
society, bribes and tipping are likely to occur.
7. Cost may be uncontrollable. Salaried payment could 
encourage the unionisation of doctors leading to an increase 
in their ability to bargain over the rate of pay. This could 
affect the insurers or government's inability to control 
health care costs through salaried payment.
4. THE CAPITATION METHOD.
Capitation is a method of paying the doctor by the number 
of persons "on his list" whether or not a service is actually 
rendered and regardless of the number or units of service 
rendered. This method of payment has long been used for paying 
the general practitioner (GP) in Germany, the United Kingdom,
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Denmark, and the Netherlands, but at present Germany has 
abandoned this method. The best known application of this 
method is in the United Kingdom (Roemer, M.I., 1978, p.199). 
The Danish system was one of the earliest in Europe, and 
provided a model, when the framework of national health 
insurance was being worked out in Britain. The Dutch system is 
relatively recent, and was influenced by the British system 
(Hogarth, J., 1963, p.24). In Italy, from 1980 onwards all 
general practitioners are paid on a capitation basis to 
replace the fee-for-service method (Abel-Smith, B., 1984).
Currently, it operates under some Health Maintenance 
Organisations in the USA. In the case of developing countries, 
it has recently been introduced in Costa Rica and Indonesia 
(Ron, Abel-Smith, B. and Tamburi, 1990).
Capitation payment has been applied to the service of 
general practitioners, including drugs, under some forms of 
health insurance. The need of the population to go to visit 
the specialist is too unpredictable to permit its application. 
Therefore, the specialists are remunerated by other methods 
(Roemer, M.I., 1962). In general, payment by capitation
requires a health service system with a clear division between 
the general practitioner (or family doctor) and the specialist 
(Abel-Smith, 1976). Also, the system does not permit the 
patient to go to visit a specialist directly without referral 
from a GP. Meanwhile, the system assumes that the GP is 
working, to a considerable extent, independently with less 
interference with his clinical freedom from the insurer.
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A. Operational experiences.
The friendly societies in Britain have paid their doctors 
by the capitation payment method since the nineteenth century. 
The reason for adopting this method by a number of the mutual 
aid organisations was because of its simplified budgeting and 
administration. In addition, it enabled them to predict and 
control their expenditure (Abel-Smith, 1972). In fact, during 
the course of preparation for national health insurance in 
1911 the issue of the method of paying the doctor was not a 
key issue for the British Medical Association (BMA). Doctors 
were freed from the lay control of the previous friendly 
societies and "statutory insurance committees" were set up. 
Meanwhile, two experiments of fee-for-service payment were 
undertaken in Manchester and Salford but the Commissioners of 
1926 reported unfavourably on the system (Abel-Smith, 1963). 
Likewise, during the creation of the National Health Service 
in 1948 the BMA preferred capitation to the bureaucratised 
salaried system that it believed was being planned by a Labour 
government (Glaser, W.A., 1970, p.82). In 1989, the total of 
31,071 GPs in The United Kingdom are independent contractors 
under contract with 90 family practitioner committees (FPCs). 
GPs are remunerated from the NHS through a combination of 
capitation fees, allowances (such as basic practice allowance, 
designated area allowance, group practice allowance, seniority 
allowance and so on), and (until recently) fee-for-service for 
preventive medicine (Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' 
Remuneration, 1991). The proportion of the earnings from the
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NHS varies between GPs. On average, the capitation fee 
accounts for about 55% of the NHS earnings, while fee-for- 
services, and various practice allowances account for 45%. 
GPs can provide private practice. In addition, they can be a 
medical adviser for an organization, do occupational health 
work, provide deputising services for colleagues or work part- 
time in a hospital. The average GP receives about 6 per cent 
of gross income from private practice (Schulz, R. and 
Harrison, S., 1986). GPs have unlimited financial control 
over their diagnosis and treatment though the hospital and 
community health service parts of the NHS (holding about 75% 
of the total NHS budget) are controlled by cash limits. 
Nevertheless, the government proposes that after April 1991 
that GP groups with at least 9,000 patients should be budget 
holders and controlled by cash limits. The Regional Health 
Authority will allocate the cash limited budget to the GPs 
while the FPC will continue to hold the GPs's contracts and be 
responsible for monitoring expenditure against the budget 
(Working for Patients, 1989).
Denmark had a long history of voluntary sickness funds 
for the working class. The general practitioner and the 
specialist in Denmark each have clearly defined roles. The GP 
provides mainly the family medical service traditionally 
practised more consistently than in any other country 
(Hogart, J. 1963, p.400). The Danish health insurance scheme 
offered a choice for GPs between two different methods of 
remuneration. They were payment based mainly on capitation,
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and payment based exclusively on fee-for-service. In practice, 
the capitation was widely used in towns and fee-for-service in 
country areas. Also, the older doctors tended to prefer the 
capitation system and the younger ones the fee-for-service 
method. In general, the rate of remuneration is adjusted twice 
yearly according to the retail price index (Hogarth, 1963). At 
the end of 1979, there were 2,700 GPs and 1,900 specialists in 
Denmark. The area of approximately 500 islands of the kingdom 
of Denmark does not allow provision for full-time private 
practices in most disciplines (including the GP).
As far as the rights of the patient are concerned, they 
can choose to be insured by one of two insurance groups. The 
group 1 patients are covered for all medical expenses and have 
to be registered with one particular GP. They have no direct 
access to the specialist without being referred by their GPs. 
The group 2 patients are not obliged to be registered with any 
particular doctor, nor do they need to be referred by the GP 
to see a specialist. However, they have to pay their GPs by 
fee-for-service (according to a standard fee scale issued by 
the Danish Medical Association) and obtain full reimbursement 
from their sickness fund (Hogart, 1963, p.396). In 1979, group 
1 patients accounted for around 93% of the population and the 
remaining 7% belonged to group 2 (Sondergaard, W. and 
Krasnik, A., 1984, pp.153-96).
Similar to that of the U.K. and Denmark, the historical 
development of the Dutch health insurance system emerged from
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the mutual aid of the working class in the nineteenth century. 
However, the sickness funds in the Netherlands were often 
based on the co-operative principle. The payment system for 
the "contracted doctor" was fee-for-service until 1906. After 
1906 the payment to the GP was changed to a salary. However, 
around 1912, a group of doctors proposed payment by the 
capitation system. As a result, the capitation system was 
introduced as an experiment.
Parallel to the sickness funds administered by the 
insured persons themselves, doctor's funds or "sick clubs" 
were set up in the nineteenth century to arm doctors against 
the risk of uncertainty of income (Glaser, W., 1970, p.10). In 
addition, doctors played a leading role to set up these
funds to have inside control of their policy (Abel-Smith, B., 
1988, p.697). The insured patients paid contributions to the 
doctors'fund, on a capitation basis. In the beginning of the 
twentieth century the Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) set up 
the institution of "Society Sickness Funds" which replaced the 
previous doctors' funds and the insured persons were
represented on the boards. Afterwards, strong conflicts 
between the KNMG and the mutual sickness funds of the working 
class occured from time to time. When the Sickness Funds 
Decree of November 1941 came into operation (Hogarth, 1963, 
p.442), the voluntary form continued to exist. In 1947, the 
benefits and limits of the compulsory and voluntary sickness 
insurance were set at the same level. It was not until 1964
that both systems were unified. In 1988, 60% of the total
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cost of health care was financed by compulsory health 
insurance, about 30% came from voluntary private health 
insurance, 5% came from general taxes and the remaining 5% was 
directly out of pocket (Lapre, R.M., 1988, p.22).
At the present time, GPs receive payment for services in 
two ways; a capitation fee for the insured person and fees- 
for-services for private patients. In addition, the fee for 
obstetric services is on a case basis. Direct access to the 
specialist without a referral card from the GP is prohibited 
(Tiddens, H.A. et al, 1984, pp.371-418). The public insurers 
will pay the specialists according to the number of patients 
referred by the GPs at a fixed amount of money (official 
tariff) per case per month. Moreover, for major operations, 
specialists are paid on a fee-for-service basis. There is also 
an official tariff for each operation (Abel-Smith, n.d.,
p. 88).
B. Advantages.
1. Flexibility. The arrangement of health services 
provides for flexibility; clinics may open late. A doctor may 
offer home visits, or decide to accept installments from the 
patients or from insurers for the capitation fee. All of which 
may be different from his fellow doctor.
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2. Administrative simplicity. The doctor need not produce 
complicated paperwork to claim from the insurer as under the 
fee-for-service method.
3. Predictable cost. Cost of care is predictable and 
controllable. The basis of calculation for total cost is also 
simple, based on the capitation fee multiplied by the total 
number of insured persons.
4. Maintaining the doctor-patient relationship. The GP is 
likely to develop his personal relationship with his client in 
the long term. This is because there is a financial incentive 
to have that person remain on his list.
5. Continuity of care. The patient has one family doctor 
to look after him continuously.
6. Provide regular income and reduce the pressure of 
competition. Doctors can get a certain amount of regular 
income from the number of persons in their lists. The pressure 
ofcompetition amongst the profession for patients is less than 
in the fee-for-service method.
7. Less abuse through over-treatment. The capitation 
system does not provide special incentives for doctors to 
provide additional treatment. Therefore, the abuse through 
over treatment is minimal.
C. Disadvantages.
1. Standards vary and are less well controlled. Quality 
of services may differ markedly dependent on the personality
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and qualifications of the GP. Standard setting is often a 
problem with the independent contractor.
2. It may be troublesome for a patient to change his 
doctor. Once the patient has registered with a doctor, in some 
countries, it is quite difficult to change the doctor until a 
certain period of time has elapsed, for example, three months, 
four months or more often, once a year. However, in the U.K., 
the patient is allowed to change the GP at any time. The 
administrative process may cause a delay, when compared to the 
fee-for-service method, before the patient can actually see 
the new GP.
3. GPs lack additional incentives to treat the patients 
themselves. Hence, their work may be at the least acceptable 
level and the referral of cases to specialists or to hospitals 
may be more than necessary. In addition, excessive prescribing 
might occur when GPs have no responsibility for the prescribed 
drug costs.
4. There may be unnecessary visits. The patient may 
visit the doctor for minor illness more than in the situation 
when he/she has to pay out of their own pocket at the point of 
service.
5. CONCLUSION.
Any payment system has some advantages as well as 
disadvantages, but some methods seem better than others. Fee-
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for-service has dominated the system of payment especially in 
countries with free market oriented economies like the USA, 
Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Korea. Some market oriented 
countries, which tried to implement universal health coverage 
were faced with strong opposition from the medical 
professional and continued to pay their doctor by fee-for- 
service, for example Canada and New Zealand. The socialist 
government in France, to some extent, could nationalise some 
industries but had to compromise with the medical associations 
in favour of fee-for-service. The free choice of the patient 
and the doctor's autonomy are the strongest arguments for this 
method. By contrast, the strongest argument against this 
method are the discontinuity of care and high cost compared 
with other methods.
Salaried payment is used widely in countries which have 
a strong government able to provide health care out of 
taxation and able to control the medical profession. The 
example of the countries falling into this category are those 
of three groups. There are (1) the socialist countries for 
example; the USSR and their allied Eastern European countries 
and Cuba. (2) The countries with a less organized medical 
profession such as the Latin American countries. (3) The very 
poor countries where doctors agree to accept a stable income 
for instance; some Asian and African countries. Furthermore, 
district doctors in Sweden and hospital doctors in most 
Western Europe maintain their salaried tradition. The case for 
the salary is that it is simple and to some extent the cost
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can be controlled. Though, the case against salaried method 
rests with the quality of care and the cost is not necessarily 
low when there is no system of controlling the cost and 
expensive technology being used.
Capitation is used in The U.K., the Netherlands, Denmark, 
on a small case in India and some Health Maintenance 
Organisation in the USA. Also, it is being tried out in Costa 
Rica and Indonesia. The reasons for adopting this system are 
based on tradition and familiarity as in the cases of the 
U.K., the Netherlands and Denmark. The strengths of the method 
are that it is simple, economical and maintains the doctor- 
patient relationship. However, the weaknesses of this method 
may be in the quality of care.
The reasons for adopting any method of payment vary. It 
depends on the political and economic background of the 
country, the ethical standard of the professional as well as 
the cooperation of the medical professions. The combination of 
several methods seems to be an attractive option. As in the 
U.K., capitation is paid for curative medicine while fee-for- 
service was used for preventive and promotive medicine. Costa 
Rica pays capitation for curative, and salary for preventive 
medicine. However, a pilot project is needed before any major 
change.
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CHAPTER 9
PAYING THE HOSPITAL
1. INTRODUCTION
Total national health expenditure has grown rapidly in 
most industrialized countries within the last 20 years, par­
ticularly countries which are classified as market oriented 
economies and which provide medical care under some form of 
social insurance. The USA, in particular, spent the highest 
national per capita health expenditure in the world, 
amounted to $2,051 per person in 1987 (OECD, 1990) which is 
approximately one hundred times the per capita expenditure on 
health services in developing countries (Sorkin, A.L., 1986)
Hospital expenditures have been well documented as being 
the largest item of total health care expenditures (Glaser, 
W.A., 1979, 1980a,b; Maxwell, R.J., 1981; Abel-Smith, B., 
1984; Raffel, M.W. (ed), 1984; OECD, 1987). The reasons for 
this particularly high rising cost of hospital service in the 
market oriented economies are as follow;
1. There are more admissions due to the ageing of the 
population. Older people reqire more hospital care than 
younger people do.
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2. In some countries, there is an oversupply of beds 
resulting from economic growth, urbanization and expansion of 
hospitals or the "development effect". This surplus of beds 
can cause longer stays in hospital and more admissions in 
order to keep a high occupancy rate. However, this trend is 
down in most Western European countries as a result of the 
implementation of some cost containment systems.
3. Higher wages are a major component in rising hospital 
costs. This is because hospital care is a labour intensive 
service.
4. There is inefficient practice and poor management in 
hospitals, for example identical medical examinations carried 
out by different departments.
5. The trend of using more sophisticated medical 
technology resulting from better science and technology being 
available.
6. There is a large increase in the number of doctors in 
most countries, despite some regional and specialty shortages, 
often associated with some form of over-prescription in order 
to maintain their high income.
7. In several developing countries, high hospital care 
cost caused by inefficient screening and poor referral system.
8. Some hospitals provide excessive services because of 
financial incentives attached to payment mechanisms.
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2. METHOD OF HOSPITAL PAYMENT
The methods by which the hospitals are paid for services 
rendered is not only seen as one of the main causes for 
increasing hospital costs, but it can have a major influence 
on access and the quality of care. Moreover, the payment 
method within the overall limits still influences the 
allocation of resources for hospital services (OECD, 1987). 
The following are 2 descriptions of methods of paying the 
hospital.
A. DIRECT AND INDIRECT METHOD OF PAYMENT
1. THE DIRECT METHOD OF PAYMENT is the payment the 
insurance funds make direct to the hospital. Direct payment is 
often described as an expensive method, when compared to the 
indirect one, particularly when it is associated with 
malpractice from providers. This is because where insurance 
funds pay all hospital care cost, neither doctor nor patient 
is constrained by the patient's ability to pay. This situation 
is referred to as the third-party payment problem.
Many countries use a direct third party payment to the 
hospital without burdening the patient with out-of-pocket 
payments, for instance; the U.K., West-Germany, Japan and some 
Latin American Countries.
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2. THE INDIRECT METHOD OF PAYMENT is the method by which 
the patient pays the medical provider and is reimbursed by the 
insurance fund.
Medical providers are pleased with the indirect method 
because no third-party is involved in the payment mechanism, 
which means less direct control from the sick fund. This 
method, therefore, is applied in countries with powerful 
medical associations, for example in France and Belgium. 
However, it is argued by several public authorities that 
patients should not be compelled to advance cash.
The advantage of the indirect method is seen as making 
the consumer cost-concious and therefore discouraging 
unnecessary use of services (ambulatory services in 
particular). However, when this is applied to the in-patient 
services, because large amounts of money are involved, the 
sick funds often pay the hospital directly. The patient, 
however, still has to share costs to generate consumer 
awareness and reduce excessive demand, for example; 30% of the 
first thirty days of hospitalization as it applies in France. 
For many French patients, this co-payment is reimbursed by an 
extra mutual aid fund or for those with low incomes is covered 
by social assistance (Lacronique, J., 1984).
Based on the experiences of developing countries in Latin 
America in particular, which provide medical services under 
social insurance with both direct and indirect payment
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methods, Zschock, D.K.(1986, pp.113-116) found that the three 
countries which primarily use direct payment (from the sick 
fund) to the hospital - Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama - 
allocate relatively larger shares of their GDP to the health 
sector, while the three countries using the indirect pattern - 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay - allocate a relatively smaller 
share of their GDP to the health sector. Moreover, his 
calculation for the cost of medical care in 11 Latin American 
countries is derived from the Basic Table of ILO (1981) which 
has strong evidence to support this argument. Eight countries 
using the direct method have a tendency to spend larger 
proportions of their social insurance receipts on medical care 
than do three countries that rely primarily on the indirect 
method.
B. RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE METHOD OF PAYMENT
Another way to classify the method of payment is by its 
retrospective or prospective nature.
1.THE RETROSPECTIVE PAYMENT METHOD is a method of cost- 
based reimbursement of health services. It means rendering the 
service to the patient and the insurer and/or the patient will 
pay the hospital after the fact (Herkimer Jr., A.G., 1978).
Historically, as earlier mentioned, medical service 
charges are not fixed before purchase. Medical providers may 
vary the price according to the income of the consumer.
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However, currently, the trend is for standard medical service 
charges to be established prior to the rendering of service 
everywhere especially in a country with itemized charges of 
services in the hospital.
In the American experience under Medicare, Medicaid and 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield before 1983, the U.S. 
government schemes and private insurance companies paid 
hospitals the cost incurred in delivering care to the 
beneficiaries. Without an overall limit, it is claimed that 
this unstructured method of payment encouraged rapid and 
continual increases in hospital expenditures.
However, the argument in favour of retrospective payment 
method is that it eliminates the risks of cost for third-party 
payers from hospital inflation or from other intangible costs.
2. THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT METHOD
In contrast to the retrospective method, the prospective 
payment method is a method of paying the hospital in which; 
firstly, the amount or rate of payment is established in 
advance for the coming year. And, secondly, hospitals are paid 
these amounts or rates regardless of the costs they actually 
incur (Dowling, W.L., 1987).
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Dowling (1987) also notices that prospective payment 
clearly shifts some of the risk of costs for the third-party 
payer to hospitals, in contrast to retrospective payment where 
payers assume the risk for whatever a hospital spends.
Herkimer Jr.(1978) argued that this risk factor is only 
one element involved in prospective payment. He gave three 
basic knowledge requirements for setting rates of prospective 
payment; the true cost of services, competitor's prices and 
the amount of profit required to satisfy management.
Therefore, hospitals under the prospective system have 
been encouraged to provide care while ensuring quality for 
less than the set price. Clearly this method of payment 
provides incentives for a hospital to make cost-concious 
decisions in contrast to retrospective reimbursement in which 
the hospital incentive is to expand and to provide more 
services for more people.
An attempt to find out whether prospective payments are 
more or less costly than retrospective methods was made by 
Glaser, W.A. (1978) by comparing Canada, France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, West-Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the U.K. with 
the USA. None of them but the USA used retrospective methods 
of paying providers under national health insurance. As a 
result, every country's fees usually rise at about the same 
rate as the consumer price index while the USA's Medicare fees 
have gone up faster. For the very high cost of health care in
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USA in relation to other highly industrialized countries Abel- 
Smith concluded that
" ... any attempt to explain why the experiences of 
the United States is so different form that of 
Europe. Moreover, as one looks at trends and 
experiences throughout all highly industrialized
nations - not just Europe but also Canada, Japan,
and Australia - one is left asking the question,
'Who is the odd man out?' "
(Abel-Smith, B., 1985c, p.16)
Since 1983 , to contain the sharp rise in the Medicare 
cost, the USA has changed the retrospective open-ended method 
of hospital payment into the reimbursement system based on the 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) prospective standard rate
setting for all its inpatients.
Glaser (1978) concluded that an important aspect of a 
prospective payment system is that everyone knows the price in 
advance. All uncertainties are eliminated. Therefore, it
reduces conflict among the parties involved.
3. UNITS OF HOSPITAL PAYMENT
Sick funds or sometimes government agencies pay 
hospitals under national health insurance by different 
methods. Paying hospitals can be done generally in four 
different ways. These units of payment are:
1. Global budget.
2. Daily charge.
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3. Itemized charges for services.
4. Case payments.
These units of paying hospitals are described below with 
their advantages and disadvantages.
A. Global budget.
Global budget means the allocation of a block sum of 
money to an institution, service or department for usually a 
year. This block sum should be used by management to cover the 
whole cost of administering and financing services falling 
within the ambit of the department or institution. In the 
hospital setting, a block sum of money could be allocated to 
hospitals and the management of such hospitals, i.e. boards 
and administrators would have the responsibility to decide how 
best to allocate the funds within the institution (Levy, V.M., 
1985) .
This type of payment is mainly used when government gives 
budgets to the hospitals which may be owned by government at 
national or at local levels. Financing of hospital care 
generally comes from taxation. This method reflects a 
different degree of commitment of the state to provide health 
care facilities to its people. It varies from nearly full 
support from the government to hospitals as in the U.K., 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Canada, to support only 
for the capital cost of hospitals as in West-Germany.
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a). Operational experiences
In Britain, the NHS spent 85% in 1987 from general 
taxation; 11% from the NHS contribution paid weekly by
employees with National Insurance Contributions; and the 
remaining 4% from patients' charges and the sales of surplus 
property and land (DHSS, 1988). Hospitals in Britain receive 
over half of the NHS budget and until recently this proportion 
has been increasing. Between 1977/78 and 1989/90, the 
government of the U.K. allocated resources geographically on 
the basis of needs on a formular laid down by the Resource 
Allocation Working Party (RAWP). Needs were measured in terms 
of population and adjusted by age and sex structure.
Standardized Mortality Rates (SMRs) were used as a key
determinant to reflect morbidity. The expense of training 
medical students and the expense of providing high cost 
services in London and at regional level were also included. 
Moreover, the British government imposed so-called "cash 
limits" regardless of future inflation and other uncertainties 
in order to contain costs (Mays, N. and Bevan, G., 1987).
From 1990/91, financing hospital services in the U.K. is 
to be based on the "internal market" strategy as proposed in 
the government White Paper "Working for the Patient" (1989). 
The U.K. government believes that it would encourage
competition between hospitals and more efficient budget 
allocation. From 1 April 1991, some hospitals in the U.K. will 
be operated as a self-governing hospital under NHS Hospital
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Trusts. In this case, the main sources of the self-governing 
hospital revenue will be from the services as specified in 
contracts with Health Authorities. The other sources of the 
self-governing hospital revenue will be obtained from services 
they sell to GP budget holders, private patients, private 
insurance companies, private hospitals, employers and other 
NHS Hospital Trusts.
In Canada, it has become customary to pay hospitals on a 
"global budget" basis. This means that hospitals will receive 
regular funds for providing services based on a precalculated 
budget. After Canada launched the universal hospital insurance 
system in the late 1960's, the Canadian government (although 
it had never used the retrospective payment method) found that 
hospital expenditures had been rising steadily and thus began 
to contain its cost. At the beginning of the hospital 
insurance programme the federal government shared roughly 
fifty percent of the hospital expenditure. Negotiations 
between federal and provincial governments were begun so that 
the system of funding from the federal government could be 
brought under stronger control and replaced by a block grant. 
Later on the federal government decentralized control and 
handed the ability to collect taxes over to the provinces. Now 
the provincial government became responsible for most of their 
own hospital costs within their local taxes and share of 
federal taxes. At the early stages of hospital insurance, the 
government payer controlled individual hospital expenditures 
by line-by-line budget review. Afterwards realizing that the
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line item budget caused inefficiency, the government shifted 
from line item budgets to global budgets. This means that 
instead of limiting individual input costs the government 
limits total costs by the global budget system. However, 
some provincial governments still find the information of 
line-by-line budget useful to help in calculating the 
hospital's total cost (Hatcher, G.H. et al, 1984). Canada has 
been relatively successful in holding down the cost of 
hospital care since the late 1960 's (Crichton, A., 1984).
Similar to the cash limit principle applied in the U.K., the 
Canadian government contains its hospital costs by applying 
a ceiling to the global budget (Filochowski, J., 1983).
Hospital financing system in West-Germany can be 
classified into two main categories: the capital account (or 
investment cost) and current account (or operating cost). The 
investment costs of hospitals in West-Germany under the 
"Laender" hospital plan between 1973-1985 were fully financed 
by public funds out of taxation, whereas operating costs are 
covered fully by cost reimbursement from a sick fund and/or by 
the patients. Originally, the federal government was to 
finance about one-third of the investment cost leaving two- 
thirds to be paid by the provinces ("Laender"). In practice, 
the federal subsidy decreased to about 16% by 1983 and finally 
withdrew its subsidy in 1985 (Altenstetter, C., 1986). In
1985, the provinces financed about 10% of hospital investment 
costs (Neubauer, G. and Unterhuber, H., 1985). Short term
capital goods were financed by lump sum grants, which were
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calculated according to the number of beds and the age of the 
hospital. These grants prevented the reduction of excess 
capacity because they were bound to the number of beds. 
Moreover, long-term hospital capital planning was not based on 
rational planning but on competition for state subsidies and 
lobbyism (Neubauer, G. and Unterhuber, H., 1985).
Because of the autonomous position of the provinces in 
West Germany, each province has had its own structure and plan 
of hospitals which is comparable only partially with those of 
other states. However, the plan of individual hospitals must 
fit into the framework of the regional hospital plan. 
Hospitals cannot get money from the state to finance
depreciation, to buy or lease equipment (for an existing
hospital), or to finance the investment cost for a newly
planned hospital if they are not included in the regional
hospital plan (Eichhorn, S., 1984). In addition, Neubauer, G. 
and Unterhuber, H., (1985, p.165) argued that the nature of
state financed capital costs led to an over-capitalization or 
a false economy. However, hospitals which are not enrolled in 
the state hospital plan can also include depreciation and 
interest rates from capital user costs in their operating 
costs, as long as they do not exceed those of a comparable, 
publicly subsidized hospital (Abel-Smith (ed), n.d.).
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b) Advantages
1. Predictable budget. It is useful and convenient to 
calculate the next year's prospective budget. The hospital 
budget under the National Health Services of Britain is in 
this category. Recently, the RAWP system has been used to 
allocate the resources of the NHS to Hospital and Community 
Health Services. Hospital and community health services in 
England spent about 75% of the NHS budget. It is found that 
over 50% of the NHS budget is spent on running the hospital 
alone. (Allen, D.,1984)
2. Accurate budgeting and ease to control within its 
limit. Canada and Britain set a spending target for the year 
to come which has to be adhered to. In Ontario province of 
Canada, for example, it has been regularly given budget 
increases slightly below the inflation rate since it has 
adopted a system of global budgeting for hospitals. Hospital 
services in Montreal have also been cut by 6% in 1981 and 
1982. Similarly, the British system of cash limits in public 
expenditure including hospital services are an accurate budget 
in money terms. It is seen as one of the useful methods to 
control over high spending hospitals.
3. Can enforce a fair distribution of funding to 
hospital and make it more equitable. The distribution of 
hospital revenue under the "Crossman Formula” in Britain 
during 1971-1975 was an attempt to remove regional
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inequalities in the hospital services within 10 years. Later 
on, a revised method of allocation was worked out by the 
Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP).
4. Built in incentives for hospitals to increase 
efficiency. Global budgeting encourages efficiency and cost 
saving for hospitals. In a hospital, the unused funds or the 
surplus achieved through efficiency and cost saving may be 
channelled into new services or programmes when the need 
arises.
5. Increased cost-conciousness of providers. Hospital 
service providers including health administrators and doctors 
decide how funds are to be allocated within their department 
or institution. Therefore, the service providers are 
encouraged to exercise managerial skill to reduce expenditure 
by using more efficient working methods.
6. Administrative simplicity. It is recognised that the 
administrative work under global budgeting is quite simple. In 
Canada, after the preparation of the budget, the statutory 
authority allocates a certain amount of money to the hospital, 
and leaves the management to decide how it is to be 
appropriated departmentally. It saves time and paper work when 
compared to the reimbursement by case, by unit of service, or 
by inclusive daily charge.
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c) Disadvantages
There are a number of disadvantages inherent in global 
budgeting. These includes
1. Lack of information on individual patient and 
procedural costs. Records are kept on the previous years 
performance of each hospital and budgets are allocated 
accordingly. Similarly each hospital may keep records of each 
department and allocate a budget direct to each department 
unit. Although some countries, for example Canada, may use the 
more detailed line item budget to help in allocating resourses 
to hospitals, it is still crude and does not provide 
information on individual patient costs. Under the global 
budget, it is difficult to work out the cost of an individual 
patient in relation to his/her disease. Also, there is no 
information on the cost of a particular procedure.
2. It needs good reporting and information systems. In
many countries, the incompleteness of reporting and 
information systems of hospital services tends to be a major 
problem for the better allocation of resources. Global 
budgeting relies on information support to help allocate 
budgets which have to be accurate one year in advance. 
Otherwise, an organization, group or individuals that are more 
powerful and more articulate may win a larger share of funds. 
In addition, lack of information may facilitate the 
disguising of poor estimation and financial mismanagement.
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3. No incentive for individual doctor. The global budget 
fits well with the salaried structure because the hospital 
needs to calculate and fix the amount of money to be used in 
the coming year. The hospital finds the other methods of 
paying the doctor cannot be easily controlled and are not 
appropriate under the fixed budget system. Doctors in many 
societies tend to avoid the salaried method of payment and 
welcome fee-for-service methods in particular. The incentive 
which is achieved through efficiency and cost saving is a 
direct benefit for the hospital not for the individual doctor. 
Doctors may try to find incentives in his own ways, for 
example; spending their official time running their private 
clinics as has happened in many Latin American Countries; or 
creating a long waiting list as in the U.K.
4. Hospitals get an incentive for underserving. Under 
global budgeting, hospitals cannot obtain additional money by 
admitting more patients, prolonging stays, extending wards, or 
generating additional services. In fact, the hospitals tend to 
cut down their services both in terms of quality and quantity. 
Hospitals in Canada, during 1980-81, claimed that they were 
underfunded, the result being their services have declined 
in quality (Glaser, W.A., 1987). Also several of the British 
hospitals are closing down units: they also complain that 
they are underfunded. Hospitals in Britain have no incentive 
to reduce the length of stay and thus admit further patients 
from the waiting list. As a result, there are a long waiting 
list in British hospitals (particularly when compared with the
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scheme which is funding the hospital by the Diagnosis Related 
Group method in the USA).
B. Daily charge.
Daily charges means the allocation of money to the 
hospitals per day of in-patient care. Under the agreement 
between hospitals and the organized payers, the fixed price 
per patient day or a standard daily charge for all patients is 
agreed. In some cases, the hospital might decide its charges; 
the patients and sick funds have to pay accordingly. By 
contrast, in some cases, the organized payer might decide its 
payment, and the hospital must accept it.
The inclusive daily charge can be classified as a 
standard payment per patient day for all patients or there can 
be different rates varying by specialty or by department. If 
the doctors are salaried, the doctors' salaries are always 
included but in some cases the addition of separate rates for 
the principal clinical services are required. If the doctors 
are not salaried, the doctors's fees are not included in the 
daily charge. However, regardless of the different details of 
costing the per diem for hospitalized patients in different 
communities, the prospective rate-setting of the standard 
daily charge needs to be set in advance.
371
a) Operational experiences
Hospitals in West-Germany, between 1973-1985 were 
reimbursed their operating cost in full from the sickness fund 
in the form of a global comprehensive daily rate or at a 
lump sum daily rate identical for both insured and non­
insured patients. A global comprehensive daily rate is 
charged for each day an insured patient is hospitalized. This 
rate covers all necessary and economically justified operating 
costs for all services. From 1986, a flexible and prospective 
hospital budget was introduced calculated on the anticipated 
occupancy rate in the forthcoming year. Rates fall into three 
categories: general rates; special rates; and, rates for
specialized treatment and surgery. All rates involved a 
uniform sum per day for the entire duration of hospital stay. 
Instead of a general rate, special rates can be set for 
different patient groups. If some services are delivered on a 
semi-out-patient basis, different rates will have to be set. 
Rates for specialized treatment and surgery, for example, 
cancer treatment, thorax surgery, heart and other transplants 
etc., are not included in the prospective hospital budget nor 
are they subjected to adjustment (Altenstetter, C., 1986). For 
additional services, for example; single room, television, 
extra food, treatment by a doctor of one's free choice, etc., 
patients are charged directly.
The daily rate to be paid for the insured person by the 
sickness fund is negotiated with regional groups of hospitals
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or with the individual hospital. In Bavaria, for example, 
hospital rates are directly negotiated for each of the over 
500 hospitals based on a complex hospital accounting form. 
Hospitals in any one region are grouped into 20 categories, 
and expenditures are compared only with those of hospitals in 
the same group in the same region (Altenstetter, C., 1986). 
However, the state official has the final determination of the 
standard daily rate. Neubauer, G. and Unterhuber, H., (1985, 
p.165) expressed the view that rate setting in Germany was a 
matter of political decision-making which the state 
authorities tended to decide in favour of the hospitals rather 
than the health insurance organizations.
Each patient has to have a referral to a hospital from a 
doctor and may select a hospital of his/her choice, but if the 
per diem costs are higher than those of a comparable hospital 
nearby, the patient will run the risk of paying the difference 
(Brennecke, R., 1986). In addition, these official rates of 
charge are applied to the private patient also. But the 
private non-insured person has to pay out-of-the pocket.
The inclusive daily charge, as applied in France before 
1984 called ,fprix de iournee" was applied at different rates 
for each patient according to specialty or by principal 
clinical services. The complicated prix de iournee in France 
for several decades set different rates for different classes 
of patients. Eventually, standard daily charges with different 
rates in each hospital were set for everyone. Furthermore,
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price discrimination by the size and function of each hospital 
was established. Hospitals with more clinical complexity might 
have a higher rate (Glaser, W.A., 1987).
Although France has made many experiments in alternative 
ways of paying hospitals, the prix de iournee has been seen as 
the most popular one. However, because of the increase in the 
complexity of costing and the inaccuracy of data, from 1985 
onward the prix de iournee was replaced by the global budget 
for the public hospitals and the non-profit hospitals, now 
assimilated into the public service. But for those who do not 
belong to a French sickness fund, there is still the 
traditional system of the daily charge.
To pay hospitals by the prix de iournee. the sick fund 
managers and the private hospitals negotiated the daily charge 
annually, while the daily charge for public hospital 
inpatients was fixed every year by a regulation of the 
national Ministry of Health. It was quite common to find that 
the prix de iournee in a public hospital was higher than the 
prix de iournee in a private clinic because of the differences 
in their complexity. The prix de iournee in public hospital 
included the costs of basic housing, nursing, administration, 
food, basic medical supplies, the operating room and drugs. A 
prix de iournee in private practice excluded the cost of the 
operating room and a part of drug costs. The fee for the 
operating room, the flat rate of cost-sharing for drug cost, 
and other fees for services were sent out directly to the
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sickness fund to which the patient belonged. Also, the 
amortization and interest charges for investment costs were 
allowed to be included in the prix de iournee both in public 
and private hospitals. France is a country that has an 
efficient "carte sanitaire" (health map) or a National Plan of 
medical facilities to control the expansion of medical 
facilities including beds, buildings, and heavy equipment. 
However, the expansion of medical facilities and 
equipment purchase have to be screened according to the carte 
sanitaire. Also, when an attempt was made to compare the cost 
per admission between the two sectors for the same condition 
of sickness it was not clearly higher in one sector than the 
other. In general, France is a good example of the 
coordination between public and private hospitals and the 
division of labour between them.
Free choice of hospital is a fundamental principle and 
practice in the French health care system as well as free 
choice of doctor. This was a result for which the French 
medical professions had fought for, to retain their status 
and avoid tight control from the state. The patient has the 
right to choose to go to a public hospital or to a licensed 
nonprofit or for-profit private hospital. Patients can be 
treated and covered in full under national health insurance, 
but in French tradition, patients have to pay out-of pocket 
30% co-payment for the first thirty days of the 
hospitalization. In most cases, this co-payment is reimbursed
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by an extra mutual-aid fund or is covered by a public sick 
fund reserved for low-income persons (Lacronique, J., 1984).
b) Advantages
1. Predictable budgeting. The system of the daily charge 
can fit in well with the prospective budgeting mechanism. The 
hospital can project the total number of patient-days for the 
next year by using past experience and calculate the 
demographic changes. The predicted budget of the next year is 
based on the total projected number of patient-days multiplied 
by the standard daily charge of that coming year which has to 
be set in advance at the beginning of the year.
2. Simple for calculation. The daily charge is simply set 
by dividing the expected total budget for the forthcoming year 
by the expected total number of patient-days. After the 
standard daily charges are fixed by the hospital and organized 
payer in negotiation (or by regulation at the start of the 
year) the result is clear that a hospital will be paid by that 
hospital's standard daily charge multiplied by the number of 
patient-days over a period of time. Because the daily charge 
is an average cost for all patients, it saves time not to have 
to calculate the detailed cost of each individual patient.
3. Administrative simplicity. When compared with itemized 
charges for services, the daily charge is simpler to 
administer. The hospital can send the aggregated bills of the
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patients to their sick funds and be reimbursed at once. The 
sick fund can also send money to the hospital account quickly 
without taking time to scrutinize each patient's claim form. 
The Netherlands developed a computerized programme and made 
this reimbursement method very efficient. The hospital sent 
the patients' information to their sickness fund and made sure 
that the patients were covered. When the patients are 
discharged, the hospital computer sends a notice to the 
sickness fund. They both can work out the length of stay of 
each patient immediately and then the computer of the sick 
fund instructs a transfer from the sickness fund's bank 
account to the hospital's bank account. Thus, when compared 
to the itemized charge for service method, the daily charge is 
simpler and saves effort in billing and collection.
4. Costs can be comparable. The standard daily charge of 
a hospital can be used as a proxy indicator of input cost to 
compare the performance of that hospital with another hospital 
so that hospital spending should not exceed that of a 
comparable hospital. Switzerland was one of the first 
countries making computerized peer group comparisons of 
hospital prospective budgets and of retrospective cost 
reports, in order to spot exessively expensive individual 
organizations. France has different daily charges for
different services in the same hospital, so that it is 
possible to compare the cost of clinical departments in 
different hospitals. The daily charge can also be used for
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internal statistics about hospital costs and comparisions made 
with previous years.
5. Flexibility. The daily charge is flexible enough to 
fit into a health insurance system with many small sickness 
funds as well as with a few big ones. Many of the small 
sickness funds made any other method of payment difficult. For 
example in the experiment in France with global budgeting 
during the 1980s, it was quite difficult to manage with many 
third parties. The result was that many small sickness funds 
had to be pooled (Glaser, W.A., 1987).
c) Disadvantages
1. Lack of information on individual patient treatment.
The daily charge provides little information about 
utilization. It cannot compare the cost of individual 
treatments, nor can it compare the cost of medical procedures. 
Also, it is not possible to estimate the cost of treating 
cases under different payment systems. (Glaser,W.A.,1987, 
p.54)
2. Prolonged stay in the hospital. Because the daily 
charge is based on the "average" cost, the hospital has an
incentive to prolong the length of stay to keep the occupancy 
rate high. Usually the patient cost is high in the early days 
because it involves the tests and expensive treatment, and 
his/her last days are less expensive. The hospital can earn a
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profit by keeping the patient after the time when the cost of 
hospitalization of that patient is less than the "average” 
cost.
3. Some patients subsidize others. Again, the "average" 
cost for the hospital as a whole which is the nature of the 
daily charge causes inequity amoungst patients. In fact, some 
patients are more expensive than average, and some patients 
are less expensive. Therefore, in principle, the daily charge 
is an unfair system because some patients subsidize others.
4. Administrative complexity. If a hospital has a dif­
ferent rate of daily charge to prevent the problem of patients 
subsidizing each other and to prevent the problem of prolonged 
stay as in France, the administrative work will be 
complicated and results in delays of payment. For example if 
a patient stayed in different departments with different daily 
rates, the more complicated system of billing based on the 
individual patient would have to be taken into account. The 
whole system of billing and collecting would become slow and 
cumbersome. French hospitals, before 1984, dealt with the 
problem of the complexity in calculation of the several daily 
rates. In fact, their calculation was based on guess work and 
inexact information.
5. Unable to contain costs by motivating lower 
utilization. Costs can be reduced by discouraging tests and 
treatments that are excessive in volume or in complexity. In
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medical practice, in most countries, the autonomy and the 
supremacy of the doctor is a basic principle. Therefore, to 
control the cost from a doctor's malpractice is very 
difficult. If the doctors are paid by salary and their costs 
are part of the daily charge, the cost of their medical 
practice is unforseeable. Also their clinical records are not 
available, making it difficult to learn whether medical 
practice in any hospital is wasteful or not. Therefore, it is 
impossible to contain costs by lower utilization.
C. Itemized charges for services.
Itemized charges for services or itemized billing means 
that the allocation of money from sick funds to a hospital is 
based on the detail of each clinical service which the 
hospital can bill them for seperately. Itemized charges for 
services can be used for paying both for inpatient care and 
for outpatient care.
Some European and Canadian hospitals have itemized price 
lists for charging in-patient costs not covered by national 
health insurance, but more often price lists are used in the 
outpatient department for self-paying and privately insured 
patients. In all European hospitals, the cost of a first class 
room and extra services such as extra food, flowers, and 
telephone are billed seperately.
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The method used to set charges varies with the philosophy 
of paying the hospital in each country. It varies from the 
market-oriented mechanism of price setting in the USA to more 
state involvement in Europe and Canada. The United States 
hospitals enjoy being able to collect user charges that they 
themselves set except for Medicare who did not collect user 
charges. The countries in Europe and Canada use the price 
schedules resulting from negotiation between hospitals and or­
ganized payers, or as the result of the state intervention on 
behalf of the public interest.
a) Operational experiences
In France, Glaser, W.A. (1987, p.55) found that the 
private clinic has always been accustomed to billing by each 
item of service. Usually the billings are for;
1. Prix de iournee (basic housing, nursing, 
administration, food and basic medical supplies)
2. Each medical service, by each doctor. Laboratory 
tests and radiological examinations as well as 
treatments.
3. Use of special equipment (for example; the 
operating theatre, the delivery room)
4. Special clinical supplies (such as drugs, blood, 
and prostheses)
5. Supplements for a private room.
6. Extra services (for instance, telephone, 
television, flowers, special food)
The public hospital in France has additional charges to 
the prix de iournee. Usually their itemized charges for 
services include a fee for the surgeon, fee for anesthetist, 
laboratory tests, X-ray examinations and other fees.
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In Switzerland, as in many other countries in Europe, 
they do not itemize all services or try to bill the patient 
exactly. Rather, they adopt the system of an inclusive daily 
charge, with some hospitals billing patients for doctor's fees 
and drugs, in addition. Other hospitals may include 
everything in an inclusive daily charge.
Sick funds in most cantons in Switzerland, although 
varied in detail, pay for basic ambulatory care, in-patient 
care, and several other benefits for their subscribers. If 
the patient has requested additional services from the 
hospital, or if he has selected his own doctor rather than 
relying on the salaried medical staff, he is liable for all 
hospital charges and medical fees, when the hospital and 
doctor send him itemized bills. To cover these contingencies, 
the Swiss subscribe to additional voluntary policies offered 
by sick funds or by for-profit insurance companies. Examples 
of chargeable items are:- a private or semi-private room, 
private medical treatment, extra comforts (such as additional 
food beyond the hospital's basic diet, personal telephone, a 
television set, etc.), nursing beyond what is medically 
necessary, and so on. The patient may pay the hospital and be 
reimbursed by the carrier; or the carrier may take his bills 
and pay the hospital and doctor directly (Glaser, W.A., 1979).
Itemized charges for services in the United States 
developed long before World War II. Each patient was billed 
individually. Charge lists have become very extensive.
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Patients are either expected to pay the itemized charges 
themselves or arrange for payment to be made by commercial 
insurance companies. For those who can afford to pay, charges 
are higher than cost because the lower income self payers 
leave bad debts and the charges take this into account. Most 
commercial insurance policies reimburse the patients in large 
part but not in full. Each hospital in the USA has its own 
arrangement, and is secretive about pricing, collection and 
income (Glaser, W.A., 1987).
b) Advantages
1) Political Acceptability. The patient pays for his own 
cost, not for the average patient cost in the hospital. The 
insurer is also happy to pay for its own subscriber's cost, 
not the average patient cost at the hospital. This system of 
itemized charges is welcomed by the provider; if a hospital is 
free to create its own facilities and set its own prices, it 
can earn a good profit.
2) Accurate information for a manager. The itemized 
charges for services provides a record of resource consumption 
for each patient. This information can be used to improve the 
management of the hospital. The modern accounting and cost 
finding technique of "cost centre" accounting is feasible to 
apply in a hospital by using the data based on individual 
records of itemized charges for services. Switzerland and 
France are examples of countries which have developed cost-
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centre accounting and reporting in their hospitals. The cost- 
centre accounting implies that the separate services of a 
hospital can be distinguished. Therefore, they will be 
organized so that their activities can be counted and priced. 
The quasi industrial parts of the hospital, such as 
laboratories and radiology, can have more accurate knowledge 
of their expenses and income. When clinical and financial 
information on each patient is linked, the management will 
know the cost of care in different ways and this cost finding 
enables the hospital manager to control and improve their less 
efficient services. Examples of different cost-of-care uses 
include the following
- Cost comparisons among services
- Trend of costs over time
- Cycle of costs by month
- Comparison among diagnoses
3) Control over the medical profile is possible. The
insurer can compare the data file from the itemised charges 
for services of one doctor's profile with another's. If one 
doctor's prescriptions are substantially above the norm, that 
doctor can be told to reduce his excessive prescribing.
b) Disadvantages
1) Administrative complexity. Hospitals have itemized 
price lists in detail and the patients and insurers have to 
pay according to the fee schedule. The more clinical services 
and laboratory tests the patient has, the more complex
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administratively, for both hospitals and insurers. It is also 
difficult to aggregate information for each patient. In many 
large hospitals, a computer system is needed to help in the 
administrative work.
2) High cost of care from over-prescription. When the 
insurer pays the hospital by itemized charges method, there is 
less concern to keep costs down both by the hospital and by 
the patient, because health care is free to the patient at the 
point of consumption and the hospital is not constrained by 
the patient's ability to pay. Patients and the hospital face 
zero private costs. Thus, there is a tendency for more 
services to be charged to the insurer. The hospital tends to 
do more tests and treatments in inpatient departments and 
particularly in out-patient departments, and send more bills 
to the sickness funds. The patient gets private benefit by 
being able to consume all health care resources offered. 
This is called the "moral hazard" problem of over 
prescription resulting in over consumption of health services.
D) Case Payment
Case payment, such as the "Diagnosis Related Groups" 
(DRGs), is a system of paying the hospital by a sum 
prospectively determined according to the diagnosis of the 
patient at the time of discharge from a general hospitals.
385
The DRGs were, constructed from statistical and clinical 
input and cost information extracted from the individual 
patient's medical record. Jenkins, L., McKee, M. and 
Sanderson, H.( 1990, p. 11-15) explain the information needed 
to assign DRGs for each patient as the following
1. Principal diagnosis
2. Secondary diagnosis
3. Principle procedure
4. Secondary procedures
5. Destination on discharge/discharge status
6. Sex
7. Age
8. Other information about the patient such as 
admission and discharge dates, type of admission, 
ward, consultants, length of stay, etc.
The current version of the groups contains 475 DRGs 
(Jenkins, McKee and Sanderson, 1990). The groups were 
designed to reflect a similar pattern of resource usage 
(Bardsley, M. et al (eds), 1987).
a) Operational experiences
The USA is the first country which developed and 
implemented DRGs nationwide. The system has been used, since 
1983, to pay for all Medicare in-patients, covering about 40% 
of hospital patients. Beginning in early 1975, Yale University 
was awarded funds to develop a case payment reimbursement 
system based on a diagnosis specific payment unit, or at least 
leading to techniques for taking case-mix differences into 
account in a prospective payment system. By the end of 1975, 
317 DRGs were identified and tested for several years for
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effectiveness in managing a hospital, A statewise 
demonstration programme was experimented with in Maryland and 
New Jersey. The prospective payment rates based on the earlier 
work of Yale University were fully developed in New Jersey.
A set of 383 DRGs was refined. By 1982, the new version of 
the DRGs, with its 467 groups, was actually implemented in the 
state of New Jersey. Originally, the programme of DRGs was to 
apply to certain payer systems only; Blue Cross, Medicare, and 
Medicaid, but legislation was passed to enforce application to 
all payers (Esposito, A.D., 1983).
When a patient is discharged, the records of his clinical 
and financial information are examined and assigned a 
computerized code appropriate to a particular diagnostic 
group. Under the DRG method, the cost of each patients 
direct care arises from the sum of cost-finding procedures 
within each hospital, while the hospitals fixed costs are 
spread over all individual patients (Glaser, W.A., 1987, p. 
59) .
Research on DRGs is spreading to some countries in Europe 
such as France, Belgium, the U.K, Portugal, the Netherlands 
and Italy. Many countries in Western Europe, Canada and 
Australia are also experimenting with DRGs (Rodrigues, J., 
1987). Outside the USA, it is seen as a measure of case-mix 
with cost attached. The definition of the iso-resource group 
also makes the DRG attractive as an information system for 
managers at different levels of government. For example:-
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- At National level, it can be used as a tool
for estimating global budgets.
- At regional level, it can help in allocating 
resources.
- At hospital level, it is useful for budgeting
and performance reviews in both quality and
utilisation aspects.
In Italy DRGs have been used for reviewing hospital 
performance rather than for prospective payment. In the U.K., 
they have been recommended for use in hospital resource 
management (Jenkins, McKee and Sanderson, 1990). There were 
6 hospitals in the U.K. which piloted DRGs with the potential 
for further expansion to 250 major acute hospitals in England
alone, as anticipated in the NHS White Paper. However, the
achievement of the plan depends on a training programmme and 
the availability of data.
b) Advantages
1) Hospital's incentive to minimise resource usage. The
incentive inherent in the DRG system is to encourage efficient 
hospitals to earn more than their costs on the case and use 
their profit to improve other services. Inefficient hospitals 
earn less. Usually, hospitals gain on some patients and lose 
on others, but if they are inefficient, they lose on many 
patients. Thus, the DRG system encourages the hospital to 
minimise resources used for example; using fewer personnel, 
fewer tests, shorter stays, and, possibly, abandoning care of
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certain conditions that other hospitals can treat more 
cheaply.
2) Reduce hospital length of stay. The DRG payment 
mechanism is based on a regional average cost of that case 
calculated from the historical data of resource consumption. 
Therefore, the hospital loses money if they keep the patient 
stay longer than the average. American hospitals, during 
1984, a year after implementing the DRGs in the Medicare 
programme, found that the average length of stay was reduced 
from 7 to 6.7 days for all patients, and from 9.6 to 7.4 days 
for Medicare patients (Glaser, W.A., 1987).
3) Reduce wastes. The DRGs system encourages the 
hospital to reduce waste and become more efficient. A 
comparison of expenditure for supplies, services, and related 
non-labour expenses between 1983 and 1984 (the year of 
implementing the DRGs in American hospitals) showed that the 
rate of growth of such expense dropped sharply from 10.2% in 
1983 to only 3.5% in 1984.
4) Closer collaboration between managers and doctors. The
DRGs provide a diagnosis or procedures language for clinicians 
and other managers. It produces a closer collaboration 
between managers and doctors in order to understand and to 
control the hospital's costs. It forces the lay manager to 
appeal to overspending doctors to become more conscious of 
their practice style and try to work within each DRGs price.
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c) Disadvantages
1. Early discharge and many readmissions. DRGs give 
hospitals a strong incentive for early discharge of patients 
needing long-term care. Too early discharge can worsen their 
health status. Also, patients are often admitted as 
inpatients rather than ambulatory patients when they could 
receive the same care, because they cost less than the full 
DRG rate for the hospital. Discharging and readmitting the 
same patient in order to collect two DRG payments for the same 
case is commonly found as well.
2. Adverse selection. Some hospitals have denied ad­
mission to very serious and high cost patients. Meiner, M.S. 
and Coffey, R.M. (1984, p.12) studied the effect of DRGs in 
Maryland's hospital in 1980 and found that the hospital 
would have an incentive to refuse admission to
certain types of patient that providers expect to be 
too costly to treat. This "adverse selection" problem against 
chronic illness or multiple serious conditions creates 
inequity in the health care system as a whole.
3. High cost of reimbursement. The DRGs rely on 
discharge abstracts which often include classification and 
coding errors, failure to include all diagnoses and 
procedures, and variations in the documentation of the 
attending doctor and the conventions of the individual coder. 
The DRGs grouping of the performance of a surgical procedure
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often categorises a patient into a more complex DRG. The 
hospital is encouraged to identify that patient as a complex 
case and may offer surgical procedures to the patient because 
they result in higher reimbursement.
4. Delay of payment. The inability to assign a DRG ac­
curately before the patient is discharged causes serious 
problems in management and delay in payment.
5. Meaningless information. DRGs are not clinically 
meaningful because they fail to sub-divide some broad 
diagnostic groups and to differentiate between patients in 
different stages of the same illness. Moreover, DRGs do not 
address the problem of death and undiagnosed cases which 
also use hospital resources. This creates inequity in a DRG- 
based reimbursement scheme. DRGs are not statistically 
meaningful when applied to populations other than that from 
which they were originally derived.
4. CONCLUSION.
Many countries choose to pay hospitals with mixed 
methods. The international trend towards capital cost payment 
is payment by global budget out of taxation. France, 
Switzerland and the U.K. are amongst countries which have 
facility planning control for capital costs. Countries in 
Europe have long been familiar with paying the hospital's 
operating costs by a mix of systems between a standard daily
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charge and the itemized charges for services (especially for 
the doctor's fee). The UK's and the Canada's operating costs 
of hospitals are funded by a global budget which is an example 
many countries can follow to contain their costs.
Recently, the USA, which had long been using 
retrospective arbitrarily itemized charges for services for 
Medicare in-patients found them unattractive and costly and 
developed the new system of case payment (DRGs) and, in 1983, 
began to use DRGs for Medicare's inpatients for the whole 
country. The DRGs have now spread into Europe as a useful aid 
in the management and financing of hospital services.
In conclusion, all the methods of payment have their 
strengths as well as their weaknesses. To apply any system of 
payment in a particular country depends on the historical 
development of health economics, and the political situation 
of a country. Although the international trend is towards the 
most cost-concious system of payment - the global budget - 
strong government intervention in the free market in medicine 
is needed to follow this trend.
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POLICY OPTIONS
FOR HEALTH INSURANCE IN THAILAND
1. INTRODUCTION
Thailand adopted her first social insurance law in 1954, 
during the military regime led by Field-Marshal Phibun 
Songkhram, but it was never implemented due to the 
interruptions of several coups d'etat. The Law which included 
compulsory health insurance for employees was originally 
drafted during the military regime, with help from two 
civilian consultants of the government (Chandaravitun, N., 
1990, p.12). To apply the Law, supportive legislation was 
required which was never introduced. However, successive 
governments tackled the problems of political instability and 
economic development without being seriously concerned with 
applying the Social Insurance Law of 1954.
A later military government created the Workmen's 
Compensation Scheme in 1972 in response to the emerging 
problems of industrial accidents associated with 
industrialization. Meanwhile, the country developed several 
statutory health insurance schemes to protect other groups of 
the population, namely; civil servants, military officers, 
public enterprise employees, school teachers and so on. Also,
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a network of public health services for the rest of the 
population was created nationwide.
Politically, the country has gradually moved towards more 
democracy with an elected Constitutional Government since the 
student uprising of October 1973. However, it was not until 
11 July 1990, that the House of Representatives finally passed 
unanimously the "Social Insurance Bill" although it was 
rejected by the Senate on 6 July 1990 (Chandaravitun, N., 
1990). But under the Thai Constitution, the Law will come into 
force in March, 1991.
This chapter explains why Thailand is able to adopt its 
statutory health insurance plan for private employees, as part 
of the Social Insurance Law in 1990. Secondly, the contents of 
the health insurance plan and its consequences will be 
analysed. Finally, the policy options for health insurance in 
Thailand and the transition to a universal and comprehensive 
National Health Insurance Plan are discussed.
2. THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS
There are nine reasons to explain why Thailand is able to 
adopt statutory health insurance in 1990, after 35 years of 
being unable to apply its first social insurance law of 1954. 
The complexity of the issue of social insurance involves 
several theoretical analyses which are derived from different 
disciplines, as follows;
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1) The level of economic development of the country.
Between 1987 and 1989, Thailand was moving towards being a 
Newly Industrialized Country with a growth rate of about 10 
per cent per year. The real gross domestic product has 
expanded more than fivefold from around 47,000 million Baht 
in 1960 to 247,000 million Baht in 1986 (at 1953 prices). 
Meanwhile the real per capita income increased 2.6 times, from 
1,746 Baht in 1960 (at 1953 prices) to 4,564 Baht in 1986 
(Kiranandana, T. et al, 1989, table 6.1). Also, there was 
rapid urbanization and demographic changes, with more working 
people living in urban and industrial areas. This created a 
demand for some form of social protection, including health 
insurance.
2) The country is gradually moving from military rule 
towards democracy. The government which passed the Law in 
1990 was an elected government. The government and political 
parties under the constitutional democracy are more concerned 
about the social needs and benefits of their constituency of 
voters. The employees and their wives (for maternity benefits 
only ), the beneficiaries of this scheme, amounting to around 
2 million persons, are their voters. Thus, the concerted 
efforts of several political parties resulted in the 
submission of 5 social insurance proposals (a coalition 
government's proposal was included), and the Social Security 
Bill was unanimously passed in the House of Representatives, 
although it was rejected in the Upper House. The objection 
from the Senators was largely due to personal conflict between
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two ministers and the military. There was also some 
disagreement on the coverage of the plan and the thought that 
the government should not contribute to the Fund.
3) Class relations. Since Thailand developed to be more 
capitalist, a larger working class has emerged. Previously, 
the labour movement in Thailand, dominated by the trade unions 
of public enterprises, was not very strong because it was 
divided into 4 National Labour Congresses. In the past, they 
worked separately and almost always disagreed on policy 
issues. In 1988, for the first time in the history of the Thai 
labour movement, they joined forces to campaign for the social 
security Law. It is evident that the pressure from the labour 
movement was a major force in the social insurance policy­
making process.
4) The role of the state in a capitalist society which 
represents and protects the benefits of the capitalist class.
It is true that several Thai cabinet ministers belong to the 
capitalist class themselves, or at least their parties are 
supported financially by the capitalist class. Thus, a reason 
for introducing statutory health insurance in Thailand is to 
help them control the cost of health benefits. It is because, 
in the production process, employers need to increase their 
productivity. Therefore, they would like to employ a healthy 
work force and to keep skilled labour working with them. In 
1987, as shown in chapter 5 and 6, some employers had already 
arranged and paid for fringe health benefits and other welfare
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benefits for their employees. According to their previous 
experiences of paying providers in Thailand, statutory health 
insurance under social security is likely to be a more 
economical arrangement for them in the long run. They will 
also be able to control health insurance costs by paying 
regular and predictable contributions to the insurer without 
having to worry about the open-ended cost of their existing 
medical benefits.
Along the same lines, it can be said that through 
statutory health insurance, the State will help some groups of 
the Thai medical profession who belong to the capitalist 
class. The peculiar situation in Thailand is that private 
hospitals are owned by the leading doctors. Recently, private 
hospital investment has grown rapidly. But, the bed-occupancy 
rate is only around sixty per cent. Therefore, when the scheme 
comes into effect, private hospitals hope to welcome private 
employees as their regular customers, and fill their empty 
beds, without having to worry about the patients' ability to 
pay.
5) The "market failure" in health insurance. A further 
reason for the Thai government introducing statutory health 
insurance is, on the one hand to prevent medical monopoly and 
private medical oversupply and, on the other, to assist 
employees to obtain health care even when they suffer from 
chronic illness and poverty.
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6) The pluralist theory of power in the decision making 
process. There were several interest groups that interacted 
equally and put pressure on the government to introduce the 
policy. These groups were politicians, trade unions, the Union 
for Civil Liberty, academicians, the medical profession, 
bureaucrats and so on.
7) The elite theory. The elite in this case were the 
Prime Minister's advisors on labour affairs, Nikom 
Chandaravitun, and the political advisory team of the 
Pisanulok House which played a major role in political 
lobbying and providing advice to the Prime Minister on this 
particular policy.
8) The influence of the International Labour Organization 
of which, Thailand is a member. It cannot be denied that the 
International Labour Organization played an important role in 
giving technical support, including the provision of experts 
such as Brian Abel-Smith, Aviva Ron to advise about the 
content of the plan. In addition, to exchange visits to other 
countries, various international aid agencies, such as WHO, 
the World Bank, and so on, supported bureaucrats in attending 
seminars and study visits, etc.
9) The leadership theory. It was the ability of the 
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan himself, to exercise his 
legitimate power and support until the Bill passed through 
Parliament. Finally, the effort of key bureaucrats in the
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Labour Department, such as Amporn Junnanon and her colleagues, 
who carefully worked out the details of the plan and how it 
would operate, must be acknowledged.
3. CONTENTS OF THE STATUTORY HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Coverage.
Under the Social Security Act of 1990, an insured person 
is a private employee who works in a private establishment 
with twenty or more employees. After three years of operation, 
the scheme will be extended to protect private employees in 
establishments with at least ten employees. Agricultural 
workers and some public enterprise employees's are also 
included in this scheme. However, the scheme is not designed 
to protect private employees who work in foreign countries, 
teachers, students, and domestic servants.
In general, the dependents of employees are not 
protected, but wives of insured persons are covered for 
maternity benefit only (up to two deliveries).
In addition, self-employed persons will be able to join 
the scheme on a voluntary basis, after four years of the 
scheme's operation.
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B. Types of benefit.
Health benefits comprise ordinary sickness, maternity, 
invalidity and death benefits. They include both benefits in 
cash and benefits in kind. Cash benefits will provide 50% of 
earnings for up to 365 days of sickness, maternity benefit for 
60 days, and invalidity benefit for 15 years. Death benefits 
will provide a lump sum payment of 100 times the maximum 
national minimum wage to the insured's dependents.
Benefit in kind will provide a wide range of services, 
both ambulatory care and hospital care. Costs for diagnostic 
tests, drugs, medical supplies, meals, room, and 
transportation are included, while medical appliances, 
prostheses and dental care are excluded. The cost of 
rehabilitation for accidents not-related to work is also 
provided.
C. Source of revenue.
Revenues for the statutory health insurance for private 
employees will come from three main sources; employer, 
employee and the government. Each of them pay a contribution 
of equal amount - 1.5% of pay-roll. In total, the revenue of 
the scheme would be 4.5% of pay-roll which will be around 
1,500 million Baht a year. However, if the fund runs a 
deficit by the end of the year, the government has to pay the
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additional amount to cover the deficit. Other sources of 
revenue may come from donations, interest, fees and so on.
Temporarily unemployed persons can apply to continue 
membership with the scheme. However, their contribution rate 
would be 3% of their last earnings and the remaining 1.5% will 
be subsidized by the government.
The ceiling of income up to which an insured person 
has to pay his/her contribution is fixed at 500 Baht a day.
D. Administration.
The scheme will be centrally administered by the National 
Committee on Social Security. This is a tripartite standing 
committee with 15 members, 5 of which represent each 
contributor - the government, employers and employees. There 
is also a Medical Committee and a Tribunal or Review Body at 
the national level. An Office of Social Security will be 
established within the Ministry of the Interior and will be 
responsible for the operation of the programme. A fixed amount 
of ten per cent of the total cost will be allocated for the 
administrative cost of the scheme.
E. Payment to providers.
The Law did not give details of the type of health 
service providers to be used, nor of the methods of paying
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hospitals and doctors. It only specifies a broad range of 
benefits as mentioned earlier. The type of providers will be 
announced by the Chairperson of the tripartite committee. 
Criteria and rates of payment to providers will be worked out 
at medical committee level.
4. EFFECTS OF THE SCHEME
A. On employees.
Generally, employees will benefit enormously from the 
scheme because previously the comprehensive health benefit was 
to protect employees in the larger establishments on a 
voluntarily basis only. After implementation of the scheme, 
smaller establishments with 20 or more employees will be 
comprehensively protected. Later, establishments with less 
employees will be covered along with the self employed. 
Employees will not have to worry about inability to pay for 
the cost of health care on each visit. Labour unions need not 
bargain for health benefits, enabling them to move on to other 
industrial relations issues. At the national level, they have 
their representatives to reflect their views and problems to 
the tripartite committee. There is also a mechanism to appeal 
to a tribunal.
The scope of the scheme is designed also to cover the 
State Enterprise's employees. Most of them and their 
dependents have already been protected by the non-contributory
402
schemes belonging to each enterprise. The benefits of the 
individual schemes vary but some have the highest standards of 
provision and the highest cost per beneficiary in the 
country. Thus, there will be a problem of merging these 
schemes under the umbrella and central control of the new 
scheme. This is because the new scheme is likely to arrange 
benefit in a more economical way and to apply stringent cost 
containment measures compared with the previous ones. State 
enterprise's employees could not accept being made to pay 
contributions to the scheme but get less benefits and have 
their dependents excluded as well. However, to avoid this 
problem, the Social Security Law provides an option for 
employers, now providing better health benefits than those of 
the new scheme, to contract out. They will have to pay a 
reduced contribution rate to cover only the cash benefits or 
any other benefits from which they are not contracting out. 
This provision will be very complicated to operate because 
each establishment provides health benefits differently and it 
is thus difficult to make comparisons. In addition, the scheme 
stands to lose a large amount of its target income because the 
State Enterprise's employees include those in the higher 
income groups. Overall, the scheme is likely to produce 
deficits because employees who will join the scheme, will be 
specifically those with relatively low incomes who are likely 
to be a relatively high-risk group.
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B. On employers.
As mentioned earlier, employers of establishments with 20 
or more employees will know that the cost is better controlled 
than under the previous individual arrangements of fringe 
benefits. They will know the amount of their insurance 
contribution in advance, and will be able to compare it with 
the past experience of open-ended fee-for-service payments and 
itemized billing. However, employers of establishments with 
between 10 and 19 employees have three years to prepare 
themselves before the scheme is expanded to cover them.
C. On the government.
The scheme is to be subsidized by the government at 1.5% 
of pay-roll or around 33.3% of the total cost. This is 
considered an acceptable amount of subsidy especially when 
compared with the subsidy of 57.5% for an out-patient visit 
and 66.4% for an in-patient stay at a public hospital (Health 
Planning Division, 1989b, p.43-45). Thus, the government is 
better off subsidising employees who would otherwise visit the 
public hospital, providing the scheme is self-sustainable at 
this level of contribution. However, the scheme is designed to 
receive more money from the government if it runs into 
deficit. And, experience abroad shows that the situation of 
running into deficit is likely to happen if an open-ended 
system of paying providers is chosen. Therefore, the method of 
paying providers must be carefully worked out to avoid
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uncontrollable costs. In addition, if the scheme is skimmed 
off by excluding the state enterprise's employees or the 
employees of large establishments which have higher incomes on 
average, the chance of running deficits is likely to be high. 
This is the most vulnerable element in the scheme. To 
provide an unlimited government subsidy will not solve the 
problem. Rather, it will create inequitable redistributional 
effects, particularly if the Thai government has to rely on 
general taxation which is regressive in Thailand (Krongkaew, 
M., 1979).
D. On the providers.
The scheme did not provide details on the methods of 
paying the doctor and hospital before the Bill was passed 
through Parliament. Presumably this is a tactic to postpone 
conflict with the medical profession to the implementation 
stage. The experiences of doctors'strikes in France, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand against statutory health insurance 
could be emulated in Thailand if they are not satisfied or 
feel threatened. Thus, there will need to be difficult 
negotiations between the funds, the medical profession and the 
labour unions periodically. In addition, lessons from abroad 
warn that there may be an excessive demand for health services 
at the beginning of the scheme's implementation. Providers 
will have to be prepared to cope with the effects of the over 
use of health services.
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5. POLICY OPTIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance should have the effect, to a large 
extent, of reforming health care financing and delivery while 
preserving cultural and customary practices to some extent. It 
is difficult to compromise between these two conflicting 
objectives. However, this section will discuss the possible 
options for a statutory health insurance which combines both 
reform and some conservation within the health system. Also, 
the policy options should try to achieve the criteria set out 
below:-
A. Criteria for health care provision.
1. Economy. The scheme must be cheap and keep costs under 
control so that in the long run it can be expanded to cover 
the dependents of employees. It must have a self-sustaining 
financial system and be linked with effective cost containment 
measures to prevent cost escalation. There must be no 
incentives to provide unnecessary services or unnecessary 
visits. Any form of fraud or abuse from both providers and 
users, must be prevented. This is an important criterion 
because Thailand cannot afford an expensive scheme such as 
those found in some developed countries.
2. Simple. The scheme should be simple administratively 
for both the Fund and providers. This is of particular 
importance because the country has a shortage of trained
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personnel to deal with the complexity of insurance management 
and administration. It will take some years to develop human 
resources to implement and manage a more complex arrangement.
In addition, the benefit structure and the conditions of 
use should not be too complicated for employees to understand.
3. Quality. The system must guarantee the quality of care 
provided to the employees. The quality of personnel, drugs 
used, and equipment must reach a minimum medical standard. 
There should be no under-investigation and under-treatment.
4. Consumer choice. The statutory insurance scheme should 
not limit the consumer's ability to choose a health care 
provider. Consumers should be allowed to choose their primary 
providers and change, if they are not satisfied. However, 
continuity of care must be encouraged.
5. Competition. The system should encourage
competition between health care providers to induce providers 
to offer courteous care of good quality but in a cost- 
effective manner. The scheme must be designed to give 
incentives to efficient providers.
6. Consumer satisfaction. The scheme should be arranged 
to ensure that both employers and employees are satisfied with
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the level of benefits. Hospitals and doctors should be located 
in a convenient place for them to be used with a short waiting 
time. The scheme should be arranged so that the consumer feels 
it is justifiable to pay the insurance contribution.
B. Options for health care provision.
Option 1. Direct provision (Full-time salaried doctor and 
global budget for the hospital).
The first option is for the Fund to construct its own 
hospitals for the use of employees in Bangkok or its 
neighbouring provinces. The Fund would employ doctors and 
other health personnel to work on a full-time salaried basis. 
The hospital would receive an annual global budget from the 
Fund. If this option is to be used in Thailand, general 
practitioner services and specialized services are to be 
provided in their own hospitals or health centres (which may 
be those of the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, under the 
Ministry of Interior), to provide care.
Advantages.
1. Medical records of individual patients are kept. 
However, the continuity of care is worse than in a system 
which pays the doctor by a capitation fee. Patients will not 
see the same doctor throughout the course of their illness, 
but meet the doctor on duty.
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2. The scheme is simple to run. The administrative work 
in paying doctors and hospitals is minimal.
3. Quality of care may be high, depending on the 
technology used.
Disadvantages.
1. Consumer satisfaction may be low because patients can 
use only a hospital owned by the Fund which may be far from 
their home or their workplace. It is likely to have a long 
waiting time because hospitals can control their costs by 
increasing the length of stay rather than the turn over rate. 
This is because the first few days of hospital care are more 
expensive than the later days.
2. The salary scale of the doctor, in particular, must be 
high to attract doctors from existing government hospitals to 
work full-time for them. This will make the cost of the scheme 
high. Thus, the first criteria will not be met. In addition, 
it may attract a young rural hospital doctor to work in an 
urban setting. In the long term, it worsens the distribution 
of doctors.
3. It is an expensive option as new hospitals would have 
to be built.
4. It is curative-based. The integration between 
curative and preventive care is difficult because they are 
provided by different organizations.
5. There is no competition between providers. It is less 
responsive to consumer's needs.
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6. Operating costs of health services may be high 
because there is no incentive for individual doctors to work 
at a fast pace.
Comments
This option is not appropriate for the situation in 
Thailand because:-
1. There are several public and private hospitals in 
Bangkok and surrounding provinces. To create a new hospital is 
merely a duplication of health services with more costs 
falling on society. It is not an efficient way to use the 
country's limited resources.
2. It will create a double standard in health services; 
the expensive, curative-based system for employees and the 
public health system for the rural, self-employed farmers.
Option 2. Part-time salaried doctors and global budgets 
for public hospitals.
Under this option, the Fund would pay its health budget 
to the government providers, mainly the Ministry of Public 
Health and the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority. Doctors would 
be paid on a part-time basis for opening a special clinic in 
the evening and/or week-end to serve employees. Hospitals 
would be paid according to a global budget calculated 
according to the use made by insured persons.
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Advantages.
1 - 3 .  As in option 1.
4. It is convenient for employees to visit a doctor in 
the evening or at week-ends. The net-work of health care 
providers is wider spread than in option 1.
5. It is more economical than option 1 because it uses 
existing facilities. The country's resources tend to be used 
efficiently.
6. It is easy to integrate services between preventive
and curative care because they run under the same
organization.
Disadvantages.
1. Consumers may not be fully satisfied because their
choices are limited to only the government facilities,
particularly when compared to the benefits under the Workmen's 
Compensation scheme which allows the use of private services.
2. As there is no competition between providers, it is 
less responsive to consumer preferences.
3. Cost of care may be high due to the lack of economic 
incentives for doctors to save costs or work rapidly.
4. There may be a long waiting time because doctors would 
tend to see less patients to keep the costs within a limited 
budget, particularly when high technology equipment is used. 
Also, the hospital may choose to close down some wards, 
prolong stay rather than increase turn over rates, or reduce
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services such as community medicine, or health education, to 
lower its costs.
Comments
This option is simple to run and has the capacity to 
integrate with the existing services rendered by the Ministry 
of Public Health and expand towards a national health 
insurance in the long run. However, it is not the best option 
to be chosen because employees in Bangkok and neighbouring 
provinces may not be fully satisfied with only the public 
hospital arrangement. They tend to prefer private health 
services, rather than government services.
Option 3. Fee-for-service for the doctor and 
itemized billing for the hospital.
This arrangement is based on the existing pattern of 
health care provision in Thailand under the Workmen's 
Compensation scheme, the government employees scheme, and the 
public enterprise schemes. Patients pay medical bills and are 
reimbursed by their insurers in part or in full depending on 
the set of rules of the individual scheme. The Fund reimburses 
the employee for out-patient visits and pays the hospital for 
in-patient care by itemized bills sent by the hospital. In 
the long run, the method of paying the hospital should be 
based on the Diagnostic Related Groups. However, under this 
option, cost-control measures must be imposed such ass-
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1. There must be a negotiated fee structure used by every 
participating hospital and doctor.
2. The national essential drug list must be adhered to.
3. The patient must pay a considerable amount of co­
payment, particularly if visiting the out-patient department 
of a large hospital without a referral letter.
Advantages.
1. There is free choice for patients. Employees will be 
pleased to have a wider choice of both private and public 
hospitals.
2. Private hospitals and doctors would welcome this 
system because they would have regular customers. They would 
not have to worry about unpaid bills.
3. Quality of care may be high because there is an 
incentive attached to the service rendered. There would be a 
tendency to use high technology, and an excess of services.
4. The system encourages competition amongst providers 
and response to the consumer's preferences.
Disadvantages.
1. The scheme is complex to understand with its fee 
structure, set of rules and several cost control measures.
2. It is expensive to administer. This is because a 
statistical mean of health care usage must be kept for
413
comparison. The claims of providers and patients would need to 
be reviewed and analysed before a payment is made.
3. The system is open to abuse, such as over­
investigation, unnecessary services and false claims. Thus, 
the total cost of the scheme would be high.
4. Co-payment measures would make the scheme unpopular 
and the lower income group of employees will suffer more than 
the higher income group. Employees will not like having to pay 
extra when they have already paid a monthly contribution.
5. The care of an individual patient is not continued 
because the patient can visit several doctors, even during the 
course of his/her illness.
Comments.
This option should not be used in the statutory insurance 
for employees because of the tendency for cost escalation due 
to its open-ended nature. The system is open to abuse and 
when trying to control cost it becomes complex and expensive 
to administer.
Option 4. Fee-for-service for the doctor and daily charge 
for the hospital.
Out of hospital doctors are paid by the fee-for-service 
method, under a negotiated fee structure. Patients need to pay 
a considerable amount of co-payment to prevent unnecessary 
visits. For in-patient care, the Fund will pay the hospital by
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a standard daily charge. Public hospitals and private 
hospitals with the same size and area will receive the same 
daily rate from the Fund. However, private hospitals may be 
allowed to charge the patient about 10-30% of its standard 
daily rate.
Advantages.
As in option 3, above.
Disadvantages.
1. Under this option, the hospital has an incentive to 
keep a high occupancy rate by prolonging the length of stay.
2. The system of a hospital daily charge is not fair for 
some patients because it is based on average costs. Some 
patients subsidize others.
3. The system is complex and expensive to administer. It 
is more complicated when linked with cost containment measures 
such as utilisation review for hospital use and claim review.
4. Co-payment for out-patient services would affect the 
use of services by poor employees. They may wait until their 
health conditions are chronic before visiting the doctor.
5. The care is not continuous because the patient is free 
to visit any doctor. There is no family doctor who keeps a 
patient's records continuously.
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Comments.
This option is not suitable for use in Thailand because 
there is a tendency for costs to rise. The system is 
expensive to administer and, when cost containment measures 
are imposed, it becomes more complex.
Option 5. Capitation for the doctor and global budget 
for the public hospital.
A doctor is paid by a capitation fee for each registered 
patient whether the service is used or not. Drugs are also 
included in the doctor's services as is the customary practice 
in Thailand. The patient must visit the doctor he or she 
chooses to register with in the doctor's private clinic before 
being referred to the hospital. The hospital under this system 
receives a global budget from the Fund annually. Thus, only 
public hospitals can participate in the scheme because the 
amount of the budget will be too low to include private, for- 
profit hospitals.
Advantages.
1. There will be continuity of care and the patient can 
choose to register with any doctor for a certain period of 
time.
2. The scheme is simple to understand and economical to 
run. The administrative cost is also at a minimum.
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3. The cost of the scheme is predictable and 
controllable.
4. In some areas, there is competition between doctors 
to attract more employees to register with them. Thus, to some 
extent, it leads to efficient health care provision and is 
responsive to patients' needs.
Disadvantages.
1. Employees, particularly those who live in Bangkok and 
neighbouring provinces, may not be fully satisfied with 
this option because they can use only government hospitals.
2. There is no competition between hospitals. The 
hospital may be less responsive to the needs of the patient.
3. Referral rates from doctors to hospitals may be high 
because doctors need to minimise their costs.
4. The hospital waiting lists may be long because the 
hospital controls its budget by cutting down on some services 
or reducing its activities.
5. The quality of doctor and hospital services may be low 
in order to keep the cost down.
Comments.
This is not an ideal option although it is simple and 
cheap to run. This option may lead to inefficiency from long 
waiting times, excessive referral, and lack of competition
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between providers. In addition, consumers may not be satisfied 
when their choice is limited only to public hospitals.
Option 6. Capitation for the doctor and daily charge 
for the hospital.
Similar to option 5, the Fund pays the doctor by 
capitation according to the number of registered employees. 
Patients need a referral letter before visiting a hospital. 
Under this option, the patient can visit a public or private 
hospital of his or her choice with the consent of the doctor. 
However, if the patient chooses a private hospital, he or she 
must accept some form of cost-sharing which should be around 
10-30% above the daily charge of a public hospital of the same 
size and location as the private hospital.
Advantages.
1. There is a family doctor, with whom the employee 
choose to register, and who looks after him or her 
continuously. Medical records of the patient are kept and care 
is continued.
2. There is competition between public and private 
hospitals, as well as between doctors. The system of health 
services, to some extent, reflects consumer preferences and 
tends towards efficiency.
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Disadvantages.
1. Doctors may refer their patients to the hospital more 
than necessary to lower their costs.
2. Patients may make unnecessary visits. However, co­
payment may be imposed to reduce unnecessary visits but the 
poor patients will suffer. Co-payment is not welcomed by 
patients.
3. The hospital has an incentive to prolong the length of 
stay to maintain a high occupancy rate. The hospital tends to 
keep the patient longer so that the hospital can make profits. 
This is because the cost is higher than the average daily 
charge in the first few day of stay when more medical 
procedures are involved, and below the average daily charge 
in the following days.
4. It is difficult to control the cost of hospital care. 
Hospitals may expand their capacity to keep more patients.
5. The quality of services is likely to be low because 
providers want to maximise their profits.
Comments.
This is not the best option because it is likely to be 
expensive and inefficient from the long length of stay. To use 
private hospitals is somewhat more expensive than option 5. 
Consumers prefer to use private hospitals but will not welcome 
the extra cost.
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Option 7. Capitation for the doctor and itemized billing 
for the hospital.
Similar to option 5 and 6, the insurer pays the doctor 
according to the number of employees on his/her list whether 
or not the employees use the service. The fund will negotiate 
witii the hospital a standard tariff of charges and costs will 
be reimbursed accordingly. Employees can use public or private 
hospitals but must be referred by their family doctors. 
However, cost-sharing is applied to those who choose to visit 
private hospitals. Cost control measures would be implemented 
to reduce excessive use. In the long term, cost per case 
according to Diagnostic-Related-Groups for in-patient care 
would be developed.
Advantages.
1. There is a continuity of care by a family doctor who 
knows the medical history of the patient.
2. Consumer choice is preserved. Employees have the 
choice of both public and private hospitals.
3. Quality of care is likely to be high for hospital 
services because the hospital's income depends on the services 
rendered.
4. Doctors compete with each other for their patients. 
Similarly, there is competition between the hospitals. 
Therefore, consumer needs are responded to and the scheme is 
likely to be efficient.
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Disadvantages.
1. It is a complicated system, particularly in hospital 
services. It is more complicated when cost containment 
measures are imposed. Statistical means are needed to compare 
hospital performance and costs.
2. The administrative cost of the scheme is high because 
the Fund needs to deal with claims and hospital reviews.
3. This scheme is expensive because of an uncontrollable, 
open-ended hospital cost structure.
4. The doctor has incentives for under-serving and 
excessive referral for hospital care. The quality of the 
doctor's care is likely to be low.
5. The cost-sharing mechanism for using private hospitals 
is not likely to be welcomed by employees.
Comments.
This option is not suitable for Thailand because it is 
inefficient. The cost of hospital care is expensive and 
uncontrollable. Also, there is likely to be a low quality of 
doctor's service and excessive referral. Moreover, the 
administrative cost and complexity of payment for hospital 
care is considerable.
421
Option 8. Capitation for contracted (budget holder)GPs.
This option is to pay the doctor by capitation to cover 
all the health service needs of the patient whether the 
patient uses the services or not. After screening, the doctor 
will purchase hospital services by a variety of methods as in 
option 5, 6 and 7 but based on the market mechanism. The
fundamental strength of this option is that it eliminates the 
problems of third party payment by contracting a group of 
family doctors to be gate-keepers as well as budget-holders 
for hospital services. Thus the amount of capitation fees and 
the number of registered patients to a group of GPs must be 
large enough to cover the risk of financial loss. This option 
is in favour of, and encourages, group practice (equivalent to 
a polyclinic in Thailand) rather than a solo clinic. For some 
exceptional cases, the Fund would pay extra money to alleviate 
the financial burden of the doctor.
Advantages.
1. The problem of excessive referral is removed because 
doctors have to purchase hospital services for their patients.
2. There is competition between hospitals. The hospital 
must then be of a high quality and offer a low cost to attract 
more patients. The needs of patients are responded to.
3. Cost is controllable. The problem of third-party 
payment vanishes. Doctors have to take the risk of financial
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loss. Thus, the system encourages doctors to provide services 
in a cost-effective manner.
Disadvantages.
1. It is a complex system. To make this system work 
efficiently, hospital costing and hospital performance must be 
available for making comparisons.
2. The administrative cost is high for both the doctor 
and the hospital.
3. The quality of care from doctors may be low because 
their financial incentive is to under-serve.
4. Consumer choice of hospital services is rather 
limited. Doctors would compare the cost of hospital services 
and choose the best buy on behalf of their patients which may 
not be the most convenient place for their patients. For 
instance, patients may prefer a hospital which is not the 
cheapest but one which is near their workplaces or near the 
school for their children, etc. Also, some patients may be 
loyal to a particular hospital which may not be the best buy 
option.
Comments.
This is not a recommended option for Thailand in 1990 
although there are some advantages in the elimination of the 
third party payment problem so that the scheme is economical 
and the cost is controllable. However, the weakness of this
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scheme is that it is complicated. It needs an accurate 
information system to enable the market mechanism to work. 
Thailand does not have a good hospital information system (on 
costing and performance) both in public and private hospitals. 
In addition, most doctors are working as full-time government 
employees and open their private clinics in the early morning 
or evening. Traditionally, the Thai doctor's reputation is 
bound to his/her government post. The country is not really 
prepared for having budget-holders and whole-time independent 
doctors.
Option 9. Capitation for the contracted hospital.
Hospitals are paid on a capitation basis regardless of 
visits from registered employee. Hospitals (public or private) 
which meet some medical standards are contracted with the 
Fund to provide out-patient and in-patient services. Hospitals 
may subcontract other hospitals or buy some services from 
other hospitals as well as subcontract a group of doctors. A 
first point of contact is assigned at the doctor's clinic, 
health centre, the out-patient department of a hospital, or at 
the employee's workplace. Methods of paying the participating 
doctors vary, depending on the individual net-work. After all, 
several net-works of providers are formed and compete to serve 
the registered patients. The patient can choose to register 
with any contracted providers for a certain period of time. To 
prevent adverse selection, providers cannot deny any patients 
who apply to register with them. For special cases, the Fund
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will pay extra money to relieve the financial burden of 
providers.
Advantages.
1. The scheme is simple and the cost of administration is 
low, particularly from the insurer's point of view.
2. The cost of the scheme is predictable and 
controllable. Overall, the scheme is cheap to run. The insurer 
does not have to worry about financial deficits because the 
risks are passed to providers.
3. This system creates efficiency in provision from the 
competitive conditions between networks of providers. Also, 
to make providers responsible for the risk of financial loss 
would encourage providers to reduce unnecessary services.
4. Employees can use public or private hospitals of their 
choice providing the hospital meets the standards laid down by 
the Fund.
5. There is continuity of care. In some net-works, 
primary care is provided by a family doctor, but in some 
arrangements care may be provided by the doctor on duty.
Disadvantages.
1. Consumer choice is limited. In some areas, there is a 
limited number of network providers available for patients to 
choose from. Also, once employees choose a net-work provider,
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they are bound to use only hospitals and doctors belonging to 
that particular net-work.
2. Quality of services may be of a low standard because 
providers would like to keep their costs down. Thus, under­
servicing is likely to happen.
Comments.
This is an option suitable for use in Thailand for a 
compulsory scheme for employees because of the following 
reasons:-
1. It has the capacity for running economically and the 
cost of the scheme is controllable.
2. It is simple to understand. The administrative work is 
minimal particularly from the insurer's standpoint. It is 
particularly important to start a simple scheme because 
Thailand is short of human resources to deal with the 
management and administration of insurance.
3. The providers have incentives to minimise the cost and 
are responsible for financial losses if they provide 
unnecessary services. At the same time, competition between 
providers exists. Thus, efficiency of provision is likely to 
be the result.
4. Fundamentally, patients can use private or public 
providers. In fact, there is a wider choice of providers in 
Bangkok and its neighbouring provinces than the rest of the 
country.
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However, the only remaining criterion this option does 
not meet is that of quality of care, which is likely to be 
low. In practice, several regulations and quality assurance 
mechanisms can be implemented as part of the contract. In the 
following years, if providers fail to meet the standards or 
fail to satisfy the consumer, the Fund will not continue the 
contract. Also, naturally, employees will not choose to 
continue registration with substandard providers. There should 
also be a mechanism to deal with complaints from the consumer 
and consumer satisfaction reviews should be undertaken.
C. Organization.
The official status of the Fund shall be a semi- 
autonomous body under the policy direction of the National 
Committee. To be more responsive to local needs, in the long 
term, Provincial Funds should be established. A modern 
management system should be applied for efficiency, without 
being tied to bureaucratic rules.
A Quality Assurance committee (or sub-committee) should 
be established, to look after the quality of care, the quality 
of drugs, technology assessment, and to compare medical 
profiles. There are many retired prominent professors or top 
executive doctors available to be nominated. Their experiences 
of medical practice and administration can be enormously 
useful. It is to be noted that the retirement age of Thai 
civil servants is sixty years. So the not-so-old retired
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person would be respected as part of an efficient, mobile 
quality assurance team to visit private hospitals as well as 
public hospitals.
A committee for resource allocation also needs to be set 
up. Every year, the capitation rate will need to be adjusted 
for inflation or renegotiated.
6. THE TRANSITION TO A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
The transition to full coverage, for the whole population 
is expected in 8 years. By the year 2000, the country should 
enjoy a national health insurance programme protecting the 
entire population . The benefits of each scheme should be 
standardized, if the several programmes are not unified. 
During the first 4 years, it must introduce several models of 
development. Alternative forms of health insurance, methods of 
paying providers, and within different population groups, 
should be tested as pilot projects. A feasibility study of 
assimilation between the Fund and the existing schemes should 
be explored with the aim of decentralizing and strengthening 
the role of Provincial Funds. A cross-subsidy mechanism must 
also be implemented.
The National Health Insurance Programme should be 
planned, implemented and monitored under the Ministry of 
Public Health. In the future, if a new Ministry of Welfare is 
to be established, both Ministries should work closely or
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merge into a Ministry of Health and Welfare. However, the 
autonomous, semi-government status of the Fund should be 
maintained for efficiency.
Health care prevention and promotion should be 
integrated. In the long term, care for the elderly should be 
planned to cope with the increasing number of elderly persons.
The preparation, implementation, and management of the 
National Health Programme could not be done without human 
development. The country should be prepared for international 
training and local training, as well as conducting research 
for development in health insurance-related fields.
Health insurance is a new area of knowledge, so Thailand 
needs to bring in know-how from abroad. International 
collaboration for training and research development should be 
developed. Experts from abroad are needed at the initial stage 
of development as Thailand lacks its own experts. Study visits 
to the UK, the Netherlands, the USSR, the USA, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, Costa Rica and so on should be arranged.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Statutory Health Insurance scheme for private 
employees, as a branch of social security, is in its initial 
stage of development and subject to modification, to serve 
local needs. The experience gained from implementing this
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scheme with incentives to reduce abuse, and to improve 
efficiency, in itself, will serve as a pilot project for 
national health insurance. Within the next few years other 
schemes should be studied and emulated. If possible the 
different schemes in Thailand should be merged. The final 
goal of national health insurance in Thailand should be for 
universal, economical, practical, portable, and equitable 
coverage. At present, there is an option which is simple, 
economical and leading to efficiency in organising a statutory 
health insurance scheme for employees, as described in option 
9 above. However, experience from abroad reveals that the best 
course of action is to conduct pilot projects and to make 
improvements from real experience. Real life is usually 
rather different but the politician cannot wait for a result 
from a pilot project before dealing with urgent demands from 
their voters. Finally, after some years of implementation of 
option 9, the country will learn from experience and gradually 
improve the scheme as part of the aim of achieving health for 
all, by the year 2000.
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APPENDIX 2
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix discusses the methodology and design of the 
survey of health benefits for private employees in Thailand 
whose objectives and detailed results are presented in 
chapters 5 and 6. The survey gave a better understanding about 
the pattern and costs of health benefit provision before a 
statutory health insurance is to be implemented. In addition, 
the survey explored overall fringe welfare benefits and some 
key charateristics of general industrial relation practices in 
Thailand. This is because, prior to the survey, there was a 
lack of national data on industrial relation practices 
particularly on health benefits for employees.
2. SECONDARY DATA
There are five major sources of existing data related to 
this subject which can be used as secondary information 
regardless of them being non health benefit specific. These 
are as follows;
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First, the 1981 socio-economic survey conducted by the 
National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister. It 
has been conducted every 4-5 years since 1958. It has been 
better developed since 1975/6, to provide more reliable data 
and to include general health information.
Second, the 1982 health and welfare survey which was 
previously conducted in 1976, 1977, 1978, by the National Sta­
tistical Office. It presents information on the health status 
and welfare of the Thai population and was used specifically 
for planning the health services and manpower development.
Third, the general household surveys of 1970 and 1982 
conducted by the Health Planning Division of the Ministry of 
Public Health providing information on the utilization of 
health care facilities and on health expenditure.
Fourth, the morbidity and mortality differentials survey 
conducted by Mahidol University in 1988. It indicated the 
morbidity and mortality pattern of the Thai population and its 
utilization of health services.
Fifth, a study on social insurance by Raviwong, V. et al 
in 1986 which presents more specific information on health 
insurance than other studies. It is comprised of 4 volumes; 
social insurance premium estimates, the tendency to join 
social insurance schemes by employers and employees,
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philosophy and comparative law, and finally, conclusions and 
recommendations.
However, there are some weak points in Raviwong et al's 
study which need further study, namely;
1. The classification of the benefit options is not based 
on the international standard grouping. The study offered two 
options for coverage and the estimates of the premium, 
accordingly. The first set of benefits are comprised of 
sickness, death, and invalidity benefits. The second set 
combines maternity and old age benefits. This classification 
is not based on international grouping such as those of the 
ILO, and the U.S. Department of Health and Social Services, 
making it difficult to administer and to make international 
comparisons. Customarily, sickness and maternity programmes 
are grouped separately from old age, invalidity and death 
programmes. However, in some countries, separate programmes 
are organized for each benefit.
2. The premium estimates are based on risk-rating which 
does not incorporate any consideration of equity.
3. The response rate of the mail questionnaires from 
employers was 25.4 per cent which is low. However, a more 
significant issue is that the respondents were not fully 
representative of the employer population.
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3. KEY FEATURES
The survey collects information on the following basic 
areas:
1. Type of business.
2. Type of health and other fringe benefits.
3. The cost of existing health fringe benefits.
4. Coverage of health benefits.
5. Limits on health benefits.
6. Cost of transportation, cost of drugs, and other 
costs.
7. The cost of health care provision as a percentage 
of pay-roll.
8. Methods of paying the doctor.
9. Methods of paying the hospital.
10. Accessibility to health services.
11. Causes of illness of employees as perceived by 
employers.
12. The opinion of employers about health insurance 
and their willingness to pay.
4. THE SAMPLING FRAME AND THE SAMPLE
The sampling adopted was quota sampling because it is 
easy to use, has a high reliability of data, and is 
economical.
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The registration of employment information kept by the 
Ministry of Industry was found to relate to manufacturing 
industries only, and was kept in card form as opposed to 
computer storeage media, as was the case with the information 
kept by the Ministry of Interior. This Ministry held more up- 
to-date information covering both manufacturing and service 
industries. Therefore, the sampling frame was the census of 
employment obtained from the Ministry of Interior.
The unit of analysis was the establishment or workplace.
That is an individual place of employment at a single address 
and covering all the employees at the address of the same 
employer. In this survey, a total of two hundred 
establishments were targeted, out of a population of 139,445 
establishments. This sample represents 1 in 697 or 0.14% of 
the total.
The size, type, and geographical location of 
establishments selected were chosen to obtain a good 
representative cross section of the sample. Different 
sampling fractions were used for sample selection within six 
size bands as presented in Table A.I. Similarly, quota 
sampling classified by 6 industrial relation regions and 15 
types of establishment was used with differing sampling 
fractions, as shown in Table A.2 and A.3 below:-
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Table A.l: Quota of establishments, classified by size of
establishment.
Size of establishment Establishments Sampling Quota
(No.of employees) fraction
(1 in...)
1 - 9 110,527 2210 50
10 - 19 13,937 302 46
20 - 99 12,377 238 52
100 - 299 1,836 91 20
300 - 999 640 35 18
1000 and more 128 9 14
Total 139,445 697 200
Source ; The total number of establishments from the
Technical and Planning Division, Department 
of Labour, Ministry of Interior, 1987.
Table A.2; Quota of establishments, classified by location 
of establishments.
Location of Establishments Sampling Quota
establishment fraction
(1 in...)
Bangkok 54,640 867 63
5 Surrounding 9,437 410 23
provinces of Bangkok
Central region 18,940 728 26
North region 17,846 637 28
Northeast region 22,919 674 34
South region 15,663 602 26
Total 139,445 697 200
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Table A.3: Quota of establishments, classified by type of
establishment.
Types of establishment Establish Sampling Quota
-ments fraction 
(1 in...)
Manufacturing sector
Food, drink and tobacco 11,182 657 17
Textiles, clothing and leather 10,214 638 16
Woodworking and construction 4,729 525 9
Paper, printing and publishing 2,321 386 6
Chemical and allied industries 2,865 477 6
Metals and non-metals manufacture 11,337 755' 15
Mining and quarrying 952 158 6
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3,791 379 10
Service sector
Transport and communications 3,304 660 5
Energy and water supply 544 77 7
Business, finance and banking 5,016 716 7
Professional and scientific 3,541 590 6
services
Tourist services and hotels 10,299 735 14
Distribution trades, wholesale 50,454 1029 49
and retail
Miscellaneous services 18,896 699 27
Total 139,445 697 200
5. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION
The questionnaires used to guide interviewers were 
constructed with care including both pre-coded and open-ended 
questions. Altogether, there were three questionnaires which 
are shown in Appendix 3.
During the interview period, the interviewer started with 
questionnaire 2 which is mainly about types of welfare benefit 
and health benefit provision, followed by questionnaire 1, on 
the cost of health benefit, sent to the respondent before the 
interview took place. Finally, questionnaire 3, about the
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opinion of employers towards health insurance, was presented. 
The following are summaries of the questionnaires.
Questionnaire No.l.
This questionnaire provided factual information for the 
calendar year 1987 and consisted entirely of open-ended
questions. This questionnaire was sent to the respondent one
or two weeks before the interview to allow extra time for some 
of the information to be obtained. Examples of the type of 
question in this questionnaire ares-
9. What was the total personnel cost for employees of 
this establishment spent last year ? (1 January - 31 December
1987)   These
included, for normal wages and salaries, an amount
of______________________________________ Baht. And extra wages
an amount of____________________________Baht.
13. What was spent on drugs kept at the establishment 
last year? _______________________________________________
17. What was the total cost of health benefit that you 
spent last year? _________________________________
Questionnaire No.2.
Concerning the make-up and operational details of the 
employer's health benefit scheme(s), this questionnaire 
comprised two parts:-
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1) General information not included in questionnaire No. 
1; such as, the type of establishment, the main activity of 
the establishment, ownership, working conditions, pay-roll 
method, and the provision of fringe benefits.
2) Questions concerning the health benefits provided for 
employees (five parts);
a) The type of benefit employees are entitled to receive.
b) Coverage of benefit; e.g, Do all employees receive the 
benefits? Do any of their dependents receive the benefits?
c) Method of payment, to the health service provider, 
doctors and hospitals in particular.
d) Also, if private health insurance is arranged in the 
establishment, the method and cost of paying the premium.
e) Finally, some related questions on sickness and 
maternity cash benefits were asked, in order to ease the task 
of analyzing the total health benefit.
Questionnaire No.3.
Attitude towards health insurance; it was asked whether 
employees had access to health services or not and if not, 
what were the limitations. If they had access, it was asked 
whether they considered them to be adequate, inappropriate or 
discontinuous. Respondents were asked who, they felt, should 
be responsible for the provision of health care services under 
the National Health Insurance scheme and who should organise 
the health insurance fund.
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Employers were also asked about their willingness and 
preparedness to pay for health insurance. What was an 
appropriate price for employees to join the scheme, and what 
proportion of the employees' income would they be prepared to 
contribute ?
6. PILOT SURVEY
After the questionnaires were developed as specified 
above, they were sent to consultant experts in the fields of 
medicine, public health, health economics, health insurance, 
and social security and industrial relations, in order to 
obtain their views. Feedback received from them was 
demonstrated to be of value in shaping the questionnaire 
structure at an early stage.
The pilot survey was conducted between 13th June and 1st 
July 1988 among nineteen establishments in Bangkok, of 
differing sizes and kinds. The differences were taken in the 
same proportions as for the full survey in order to maximise 
its validity. During the course of the pilot study, three 
versions of the questionnaires were tried out. The basic 
structure of the questionnaires remained the same, while the 
detailed questions were changed.
Initially, the interview time was one and a half to two 
hours. However, after final modifications, the interview time 
was reduced by forty five minutes to one hour and fifteen
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minutes, depending on the complexity of the health benefits of
each establishment.
The pilot survey was a test for, not only the content and 
length of questionnaires, but also the procedures for 
contacting the employer. The first step in approaching an 
establishment, was to telephone to explain briefly the 
objective of the survey and to arrange for an appointment for 
a personal interview. The next step was to send out an 
official letter from the Health Planning Division, Ministry of 
Public Health, confirming the interview date and enclosing 
questionnaire No. 1. This method of communicating with the 
employers was seen as the most effective and so was used as 
the method of communication and data collection in the later, 
main survey.
7. THE TRAINING OF THE INTERVIEWERS
Before the main survey was carried out, two days of 
intensive training was arranged for those who were to 
interview, in the Vieng-Tai Hotel, Bangkok, between 7th and 
8th July 1988. Most of the interviewers, ten in number, had a 
background in Public Health or Economics.
The content of this intensive training was as follows
a) Health problems in Thailand.
b) General concepts of health insurance and social 
security.
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c) Industrial relations laws.
d) The workmen's compensation fund.
e) Health benefit under the State's employees scheme,
f) Free medical care for the Indigents•
g) Private Health Insurance.
h) Guidelines for interviewers.
i) Questionnaires 1, 2, and 3. 
j) Group practices.
8. THE MAIN SURVEY
Before the interview took place, respondents were 
informed that the purpose of the survey was to provide 
information for policy making. Their information would help 
the government in trying to formulate the policy towards 
health insurance. However, their identity would be treated as 
highly confidential.
The main survey was conducted in sixty three 
establishments in Bangkok and neighbouring provinces, between 
11th July and 11th August, 1988. The interviewers were given 
five times the number of quota samples actually required so 
they could visit the next establishment on the list, if the 
first could not respond or were not contactable.
Between 15th and 19th August 1988, the research team was 
divided into three and sent to the Northern, Central, and the
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Northeastern parts of Thailand. Later they rejoined to go to 
the South between 29th August and 3rd September, 1988. During 
the course of the interviews, the questionnaires were edited 
on the spot by the team supervisors so that if any questions 
arose, they could be solved immediately. A common problem was 
a change in the size of the establishment since last reporting 
to the Ministry of Interior. The list obtained from the 
Ministry of Interior at the central level had to compare with 
that at the provincial level. If necessary, the list of 
establishments given to the interviewers was changed using the 
provincial list of establishments. In addition, the provincial 
staff of the MOPH were of great help in contacting the 
employers, particularly when changes had occurred.
After interviewing, a letter of thanks was sent from the 
Health Planning Division to the respondent in each 
establishment, while the interviewers were de-briefed and some 
checks were made to ensure that establishments had been 
visited.
For quality control of the quota sampling it was found 
necessary to keep up-to-date records of the sample quota, with 
special regard to size of the establishment. This was to 
permit exchange of target quotas between interviewers in order 
to keep the total target in line with the design. This was 
because the size of the establishment had changed and the 
owner or manager did not bother to inform the Ministry of 
Interior. The questionnaires were completed and returned to
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the office, with feedback, as soon as they were completed. The 
work was monitored and edited quickly for two reasons? first, 
to monitor the progress of the project by comparing the 
completed sample with the target quota, and second, to make 
sure that the performance of each interviewer was kept up to 
standard. If an incomplete questionnaire was found, it was 
sent back to the interviewer with discussion and support. 
Finally, team discussion took place regularly in order to 
receive feedback and provide support to the interviewers.
9. CODING. EDITING AND ANALYSING OF THE DATA
The overall coding and editing of the data took place 
between 12th September and 4th November 1988. The pre-coded 
part of questionnaires 2 and 3 were coded by the interviewer 
at the time of the interview and edited as soon as they were 
returned to the central office. The open-ended questions 
presented some difficulties in understanding and interpre­
tation. Therefore, some answers were referred back to the 
interviewers or respondents in order to obtain more infor­
mation and greater clarity.
Data coding sheets were developed in order to help key 
the data into the computer. Checks made by the computer found 
some errors which could be corrected by referring to the 
original data.
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The data analysis took place between 7th to 18th
November, 1988, followed by the writing of the preliminary 
report (in Thai) from 20th November to 20th December, 1988. 
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), was used 
for analysing the survey results. The Statistical Division of 
the Ministry of Public Health provided the technical support 
during the course of the analysis.
10. STATISTICAL MEASURES
The statistics used for analysing the data are as
follows:-
1) Descriptive statistics;
a) Numbers and percentages. Factual information about 
establishments, classified on nominal scales, are expressed in 
terms of actual numbers and percentages in each category.
Examples of categories are:- location, type of business,
fringe benefits , and limitation of benefits. In any case, if 
the total number of cases was small, say 50 or less, it was 
preferable to use the actual number rather than percentages. 
However, this study displays results in both actual numbers 
and percentages in order to make comparisons. The information 
display is as follows: tables 5.1 - 5.55 on general
information and fringe benefits, tables 6.12 - 6.17 on
accessibility to health services, causes of illness, and
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characteristics of respondents, • and tables 6.18 - 6.30 on 
attitudes towards health insurance.
b) Measures of central tendency by Arithmetic Mean, 
Median, and measures of dispersion by Standard Deviation, 
Range, Skewness, and Kurtosis. When data is obtained in 
interval scales, the statistical methods used are measures of 
central tendency with a comparison to measures of dispersion. 
These are as indicated in table 6.1 on costs of health 
benefits, and table 6.2 on the cost of total health care 
fringe benefits as a percentage of pay-roll. In this study, 
the data on costing demonstrates the abnormal distribution 
with extreme values as evidence of a high score of skewness 
and kurtosis and wide ranges of standard deviation and range. 
In spite of that, the median is generally more appropriate 
than the mean. Thus, for general purpose this study used the 
median rather than the mean. However, for furthur analysis, 
the mean and mean rank were used in t-test and Kruskal-Wallis 
test respectively, to compare between different types, size 
and location of establishment.
2) Chi squared test. This test is very widely used in 
social science research. It can be used to evaluate whether or 
not frequencies which have been empirically obtained differ 
significantly from those expected under a certain set of 
theoretical assumptions. Generally, it applies when two 
nominal scale variables have been cross-classified 
(Blalock,Jr., H.M, 1979). This study applies the chi square 
test in two situations. First, as shown in tables 6.3 - 6.11, 
it is used to represent "H" in the Kruskal-Wallis test because
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they are interchangeable. Second, as in tables 6.18 - 6.20, it 
is used generally to investigate whether or not these two 
groups of samples are significantly different.
3) The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by 
rank. Where there are a number of independent random samples 
and ordinal and nominal scale levels of measurement, the test 
used is the Kruskal-Wallis analysis. As in table 6.3 - 6.11, 
a comparison is made by using the mean rank of each 
independent variable. The statistic, chi square is computed, 
as it is approximately H, in order to measure the degree to 
which the various sums of ranks differ from what would be 
expected under the null hypothesis (Blalock, Jr., H.M, 1979).
4) Likert scales. It is a method to quantify attitude or 
opinion for comparative purposes and is the most widely used 
in social science today (Kidder, L. H. and Judd, C.M., 1986, 
pp.210-14). As in questionnaire number 3, the respondents 
indicate agreement or disagreement with each statement. Scores 
of 3 for a positive attitude, 2 for a neutral or undecided 
position, and 1 for a negative attitude are derived for each 
question. Next, the total score is summed from the responses 
to each question. Later, the respondents are classified into 
two groups of high and low score. Finally, a further 
comparison of these two groups are made as in tables 6.18 - 
6.20 by applying the chi square test to ascertain whether any 
differences are statistically significant or not. The chi 
square test could not be applied to tables 6.21 - 6.24 because 
the respondents were categorized into four instead of two 
groups.
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5) The t - test. To compare the difference of two means 
as in table 6.31, the statistical test used is the t-test.
11. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study focused on health benefits for 
private employees only. It does not include the State's or 
State-enterprise employees and private teachers because these 
groups already benefit under their own schemes.
Private industries were classified as one of two main 
types; manufacturing and service industries, respectively. 
"International Standard Industrial Classification", and "The 
Standard Industrial Classification (Thailand) B.E. 2515".
At the beginning, the survey was intended to include 
employees of the agricultural sector because of the gradual 
change from year-long, small-farm care to the agro-business, 
using landless, seasonal employees. Unfortunately, information 
on the total number of employees in this sector could not be 
obtained. There is no legal requirement to keep such records. 
Therefore, agricultural employees were not included in the 
survey. For the same reasons, some other groups of employees 
were excluded; these are, domestic servants, seamen and the 
self-employed such as shop-keepers, lawers, and taxi-drivers.
There are three types of bias that may arise from the 
survey. Firstly, a bias may arise from the quota sampling
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itself which tries to overcome the problem of a low response 
rate but may include a disproportionate number of employers 
with positive attitude towards health insurance instead. The 
second bias arises from the sponsorship for the survey; 
respondents may feel reluctant to project a negative attitude 
towards the organization which supports the survey. Thus, 
there may have been a highly positive attitude for the 
Ministry of Public Health which sponsored the survey. Thirdly, 
there may have been a bias in the employer's perception of the 
reasons for industrial accidents believing that they occured 
mostly because of the employees carelessness.
12. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
For the better understanding of operational terms used in 
this study, they are defined as follows;
a) Insurance: A person makes regular payments (the 
premium, or contribution) to an insurer to safeguard against 
the risk of illness, fire, or burglary etc. If a claim is 
made, for a period of ill-health, for example, the health 
care costs are covered by the insured person's, and 
possibly other person's, premium payments.
b) Health Insurance: Insurance specifically to safeguard 
against the risk of some or all of the following health 
care costs; hospitalization, medicines and doctor's fees. 
Because of the high costs involved and to prevent
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the insurer from going bankrupt, the premia must be high 
and a large number of people must make them. Subscribing to 
the insurance fund is voluntary under some employers' 
schemes and compulsory under others.
c) National Health Insurance system: A compulsory health 
insurance system to cover different groups of population by 
the same means. The government's role is to control the 
quality and standard of the health insurance system in order 
to attain social efficiency and equity.
d) Social Insurance: Sometimes known as Social Security, 
an insurance system operated by the State to safeguard against 
not having an income for times of unemployment, old-age etc. 
(some schemes include ill-health, as well). In general, Social 
Insurance requires compulsory contribution, since most
people will need, at least, pension payments for old-age. 
Since a large sector of the population are targeted in this 
way, the low-risk and high income groups are included, as 
well. Furthermore, the funding for Social Insurance can be 
collected at source by making a deduction from the pay-roll.
e) Health, or medical, or sickness Benefits: Benefits 
provided by employers for employees including benefits in cash 
and kind. Examples are:- health insurance, medical check-ups, 
hospital benefit, medical cost reimbursement, sick pay and 
maternity benefit.
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f) Establishment or workplace: A single location at which 
work of some kind is carried out and where accounts, 
personnel, materials and production records are kept. This 
requires that two separately located branches of The Bangkok 
Bank Ltd., for example, are classed as two establishments even 
though they are part of the same company. The same distinction 
would be drawn for the marketing and the production 
departments of the same company, if they are located at 
differing addresses. If an organisation consisted of more than 
one establishment, by this definition, care was made to 
interview only one of the establishments as the others of the 
same organisation are likely to have the same benefits.
g) Employer: A person, partnership or company that pays 
wages or salary to one or more other individuals.
h) Employee: An individual, apprenticed or otherwise who 
is paid wages or salary for working, regardless of whether 
contractually or not. Included are the full-time, part-time 
daily-waged, temporary staff, and those who are paid by 
results or on a piece-work basis. Excluded are State and 
State Enterprise employees and teacher who already have their 
own health schemes. Also excluded are the agricultural 
labourer and contractor whose working hours, location and 
conditions of work are not of great importance to the client 
and desires not to exercise control over these aspects. In 
addition, agricultural workers, contractors and domestic
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workers are excluded mainly because of information on the 
number of them could not be obtained.
i) Personnel expenditure: Monies which an employer pays 
to an employee, including regular wages, commission, bonuses, 
per-diem and overtime payments. Fringe benefits such as food 
or housing are not included.
j) Administrative expenditure: General expenditure which 
is not directly involved in the production process of the 
establishment, such as the salaries of administrators, 
telephone, postal, electricity, and water charges, 
depreciation, rental, or mortgage costs, maintenance, sta­
tionary, accountancy, and legal fees, donations, insurance 
for employees, membership and other taxes (excluding income 
tax) .
13. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED.
There were some methodological difficulties encountered 
during the course of the survey:-
1. Although the appointment was made by telephone and a 
letter was also sent before the interview, about 35% of 
interviewers had to make several visits. Therefore, a 
telephone call just before the interview time became the 
recommendation.
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2. Although questionnaire No.l was sent in advance with 
an appointment letter, about 40% of total establishments did 
not complete it before the visit. Because of this, the normal 
sequence of questionnaires presented in the interview of 2, 1 
and 3 was changed to questionnaires 2, 3 and 1. In a large 
organization, multiple respondents were asked to fill the gap 
in some of the information in questionnaire 1, particularly on 
costing. However, in some situations questionnaire 1 was sent 
back by post, or the interviewer had to re-visit to collect 
it.
3. The quota sample fraction was set with specific 
criteria by size, type and location of establishment. However, 
the size of establishment (particularly small establishments) 
had changed from that previously registered with the Ministry 
of the Interior. The interviewer was instructed to check that 
the establishment to be visited fell within their target 
quotas. Thus, close monitoring of the target quotas of the 
interviewers was essential. A weekly meeting to solve general 
problems and re-allocate target quotas was particularly 
useful.
4. The willingness to pay for the scheme was sometimes 
difficult to measure and translate into monetary terms. If 
this was the case, the respondent was asked a leading 
question. However, the interviewer was told not to ask this 
question unless it was necessary.
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A P P E N D I X 3
Q U E S T I O N N A I R E S
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FACTUAL INFORMATION (1 January - 31 December 1987)
1. Name of Establishment____________________________
2. Address (in full) No_________Street______________
______________________________District__________
Province______________________ Tel.______________
3. Address of the headquarters of this establishment
4. The total number of employees of this establishment at the
mome nt_____________________________________________ ________
Number of male employees_________________________________
Number of female employees_______________________________
Number of full-time employees____________________________
Number of casual employees______________________________
5. Taking both full-time employees and casual employees 
together, how many manual employees of this establishment do 
you have ?__________________________________________________
And how many non-manual employees of this establishment do you 
have ?_____________________________________________________
6. What is the total number of employees of this organization 
in the whole country ? (Including those in other branches and 
the headquarters)___________________________________________
7. How much is the average monthly income of manual employees 
of this establishment ?_____________________________
8. How much is the average monthly income of non-manual
employees of this establishment ?___________________________
9. What was the total personnel cost for employees of this 
establishment spent last year ? ( 1 January - 31 December
1987)
These included, for normal wages and salaries, an amount 
of_____________________________________ Baht.
And extra wages an amount of____________________________Baht.
10. What was the administrative cost of this establishment 
which you spent last year? _________________________________
11. How much did you pay as a contribution to the Workmen's 
Compensation Fund last year?________________________________
12. How much did you pay for the hospitalization and/or the 
cost of private doctors in clinics for your employees last 
year?_______________________________________________________
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13. What was spent on drugs kept at the establishment last 
year?_____________________________________________________
14. What was the total salary and honorarium cost for doctors
last year? ___________________________ And what was the total
salary cost for nurses last year ? __________________________
15. How much maternity benefit did you provide for the 
employees last year?_________________________________________
16. What was the cost of family planning spent last year for 
the employees?______________________________________
17. What was the total cost of health benefit that you spent 
last year?_____________________________________________
18. What was the total number of employees who were absent 
from work or who failed to attend to their normal duties, on
account of ordinary illness, last year ? _________________
And what were the total number of sick days ?
_____________________________________  (excluding absence from
industrial injury or work-connected illness).
19. What was the average number of your employees visiting a 
doctor per week?_________________________________________________
And what was the average number of employees who visited a 
nurse per week?__________________________________________________
20. How many employees have been absent from work because of 
child delivery last year ?___________________________________
And how many are the total maternity leave days last year?
21. How many employees have had accidents not connected to 
work last year?___________________________________________
How many total sick leave days resulted from the accidents?
And how many persons died from the accidents? _______________
22. How many employees in this establishment have had 
accidents related to work during the last year?_______________
How many total sick leave days resulted from the accidents?
And how many persons died from the accidents?
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23. What are the major causes of illness of the employees 
working
in this establishment? (Please give in priority order).
1.______________________________________________
2 .___________________________________________
3 .________________________________________________
4 .________________________________________________
5. ____________
24. What is the distance between this establishment and the 
nearest doctor?_______________________Km.
And how long is the travelling time?__________________ minutes
25. What is the distance between this establishment and the
nearest hospital? Km.
And how lonq is the travelling time? minutes
26. What is the distance between this establishment and the
nearest pharmacy? Km.
And how lonq is the travelling time? minutes
27. Please specify the distance and travelling time from this 
establishment to the nearest
27.1 Bus-stop____________Km. Travelling time_______minutes.
27.2 Railway station ______Km.Travelling time_______minutes.
27.3 Pier_____________Km. Travelling_time___________ minutes.
28. How long does it take the employees on average to visit 
the nearest doctor when using the customary means of 
transportation and including the time spent in the waiting 
room?
Hours. Minutes.
FINISH QUESTIONNAIRE I
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE INFORMATION 
YOU HAVE BEEN OF GREAT HELP TO OUR INVESTIGATION
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HEALTH BENEFIT ARRANGEMENTS
A: GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Name of establishment:
District
Province Tel
RING Bangkok 1
Samutprakan 2
ONE Phathumthani 3
Chonburi 4
CODE Nakornpathom 5
Chachaengsao 6
Chiangmai 7
Ubonratchathani 8
Khonkaen 9
Songkhla 10
3. Place of interview
4. Please could you tell me what is the title of your
job here?
RING ONE CODE Employer 1
Manager 2
Senior Officer 3
5. Sex of the informant. Male 1
Female 2
6. What is the formal status of this establishment?
(READ OUT)
RING Private Business 1
ONE Cooperative 2
CODE Non governmental 3
organisation
Religious organisation 4
Other ( specify)......... ___5
7. Is this establishment a SINGLE INDEPENDENT or is it 
part of a MULTI-ESTABLISHMENT organisation?
Headquarter with branches 1
Single independent organization 2
Branch of multinational company 3
Branch of national company 4
Other ( specify)............................ 5
8. Is this establishment Thai owned or owned by 
foreigners?
(READ OUT)
Thai owned 1
Owned by foreigners 2
(Specify)
51% Thai, 49 % foreigners
(Specify) ____________
Other
(Specify) ____________
1-3
4-5
10
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9. What is the main activity of this establishment?
Manufacturing sactor
Food, drink and tobacco 1
Textiles, clothing and leather 2
RINO Woodworking and construction 3
ONE Paper, printing and publishing 4
CODE Chemical and allied industries 5
Metals and non-metals manufacture 6 
Mining and quarrying 7
Miscellaneous manufacturing 8
Service sector
Transport and communication 9
Energy and water supply 10
Business, finance and banking 11
Professional and scientific 12
services
Tourist services and hotels 13
Distribution trades, wholesale 14
and retail 
Miscellaneous services 15
11-12
10. Are any of employees in this establishment a member 
of a trade union?
Yes 1
No 2...
13 
.skip 
to Q.13
11. If yes, how many full-time employees are members of 
a union? ____________ (total figure)
n/a 9 14
Low: less than a third of the total 1
Medium: less than 2/3 of the total 2
High: 2/3 of the total or more 3
12. Is this union recognized by management for 
negotiating pay, conditions of work, including 
health benefits?
n/a 9 15
Yes 1
No 2
13. Are there any committes between management and 
employees to discuss pay and conditions of work?
Yes 1
No 2,
16 
.Skip 
to Q.15
14. If yes, please specify the name of the committee
17
And the composition of the committee
RECORD
FULLY
18
15. What is the predominant system of working in this 
establishment?
Peiceworking 
Hourworking 
Shiftworking 
Daily working 
Full-time working 
Contracting
19
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16. How often do most of the employees in this 
establishment get pay for their work?
Every week 1
Every 2 weeks 2
Monthly payment 3
Piecework payment 4
Daily payment 5
Other (specify) 6
20
17. What are the arrangements for employees of this 
establishment?
(READ OUT IN TURN) Yes No
Food / Food allowances 1 2
Cloth / Clothing allowances 1 2
Accommodation 1 2
Social / Recreational activities 1 2
RING Transportation to work 1 2
ONE Bonus 1 2
CODE Productivity bonus 1 2
FOR Cheap loans 1 2
EACH Pension 1 2
ITEM Providence 1 2
Funeral benefit 1 2
Children's education 1 2
support
Child benefit 1 2
Wedding gift 1 2
Religious support 1 2
* Industrial injuries 1 2
benefit
Maternity benefits 1 2
Routine physical 1 2
check-up
Physical check-up 1 2
for new employee 
Life assurance and 1 2
accident insurance 
Private medical insurance 1 2
Contracted doctor 1 2
Contracted hospital 1 2
Reimbursement if 1 2
use public hospital 
Reimbursement if 1 2
use private hospital 
Reimbursement if 1 2
use private clinic 
Full-time doctor services 1 2
Part-time (public) 1 2
doctor services 
Part-time (private) 1 2
doctor services 
Sick room with 1 2
full-time nurse 
Sick room with 1 2
part-time nurse 
Hospital owned in the 1 2
business premise 
Hospital owned outside the 1 2
business premise
(specify the location)_____________________
RECORD 
FULL
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
ADDRESS
18. If you provide any of these benefits for your 
employees, which are you most proud of?
54
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19. Could you give the reason why?
RECORD
FULLY
If none of the * health benefit arrangements are 
provided for, terminate this questionnaire and 
move on to PAGE 488, PART 5.
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B: EXISTING MEDICAL BENEFIT PROVISION FOR EMPLOYEES
Part 1: Type of benefits.
1. Which of the following arrangements are provided for 
any employee?
(READ OUT IN TURN) Yes No Conditions
Occupational illness 
Ordinary sickness 
RING Industrial injury 
ONE Accident not related 
CODE to work
FOR Rehabilitation related 
EACH to work
STATE- Rehabilitation not 
MENT related to work
Family planning services 
Perinatal care 
Normal delivery 
Complicated delivery 
Mental care 
Dental care 
Eye test
Drug, medical supply 
Medical check-up 
Others ( specify)
M
2
2
2
2
56
57
58
59
60 
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
2. Are there any limits or restrictions on the type of 
sickness? ( specify)
Occupational illness.
1. Are there any health benefits for occupational 
illnesses of employees in this establishment ?
Yes 1 72
No 2
2. Please give reasons why employees should receive 
health benefits for occupational illness?
3. Also, please give the reason(s) why employees should 
receive health benefits for ordinary sickness?
4. State what are advatages and disadvantages of health 
benefits providing by employers?
Advantages are:_____________________________________
Disadvantages are:_
6. If yes, please specify the limit.
73
74
75
76
5. Is there any limit on occupational illness 
benefit ?
Yes 1 77
No 2
78
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Ordinary sickness.
1. State what are limits or restrictions on ordinary 
sickness benefits?
(READ OUT XN TURN)
Upper limit of.......Baht per year
Upper limit of.......Baht/OPD visit
Upper limit of.......Baht/IPD case
A fixed daily rate of......... Baht
Reimbursement of.....% if use any
public hospitals
Reimbursement of.....% if use any
private hospitals 
Reimbursement if only go to hospitals 
on the positive list ( specify)
Reimbursement if only go to clinics 
on the positive list ( specify)
Xes No Conditions
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Others ( specify)
2. What item/activity are covered by ordinary sickness 
benefits?
(READ OUT XN TURN)
Out-patient care 
In-patient care 
Doctor's fees 
Drugs
Laboratory test
Room
Meals
Appliances 
Prosthesis 
Dental care 
Eye-tests
Physical check-ups 
Transportation 
Maternity care 
Specialist's fees 
Family planning 
Others (specify)
Yes No Condition/limit
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Accident
1. Were there any accidents and poisonings which occured 
to employees last year ?
Yes 1
No 2
2. Please state causes of industrial accidents of 
employees in this establishment ?
79
80 
1 
2 
3
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21 
22 
23
24
25
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3. Also, please specify causes of accidents 
not connected to work of employees in this 
establishment ?
4. What are types of providers which employees are 
entitled to use when accidents not related to work 
occure ?
RING This benefit is not provided 9
MORE Public hospital 1
THAN Private hospital 2
ONE Private clinic 3
5. If the employees has to be admitted in the hospital 
because of an accident NOT connected to work, how much 
of the health care costs are covered ?
This benefit is not provided 9
Costs covered in full 1
Costs covered in part at % of 2
in-patient care cost (specify)
6. Please specify limits or restrictions on in-patient 
care because of accident not related to work.
7. If the employees are sick from an accident connected 
to work, do you pay the rehabilitation costs in 
addition to compensation from the Workmen's 
Compensation Fund?
Yes 1
No 2
Part 2: Coverage of benefits.
1. Is everybody who works in this establishment entitled 
to receive health benefits ?
Yes, all of them.. 1.......
Only some get benefits 2
2. If only some get benefit, please specify the rank of 
employees who are eligible to get the benefit.
RECORD _________________________________________________
FULLY _______  ________ _______________
3. Do all eligible persons receive the same level of
benefits ?
n/a 9
Yes, the same level 1
No, benefits are not the same 2
4. If employees do not receive the same level of
benefits, could you explain the differences ?
RECORD
FULLY
5. Could you please tell me, for those who can get 
benefit, do these benefits cover their dependents ?
Yes, their dependents are protected 1 
No, only employees are protected 2....
6. If yes, which dependents can obtain these benefits ?
READ OUT Yes No n/a
IN Wife 1 2 9
TURN Husband 1 2 9
Children 1 2 9
Parents 1 2 9
26
27
28
29
30
31
.skip 
to Q.3
32
33
34
35
.skip 
to Q.8
36
37
38
39
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7. If the benefits cover children, what is the maximum 
number of children who can obtain these benefits 7
n/a 9
One 1
Two 2
Three 3
Four 4
Others (specify no.________
No maximum limit 5
8. Therefore, in total, what is the maximum number of 
eligible persons in each family INCLUDING EMPLOYEE.
One 1..........
(only employee)
Two 2
Three 3
Four 4
Five 5
Six 6
Seven 7
Others (specify no.__________ )
No maximum limit 8
9. Do dependents receive the same level of benefits as 
employee 7
n/a 9
Yes, the same 1....
No. 2
10. If dependents do not receive the same benefits as 
employee, could you explain what is the differences 
of benefit received by employees and dependents.
RECORD _________________________________________________
FULLY
11. Are there any restrictions to the benefit which 
apply only to the dependents but not to the 
employees 7
n/a 9
Yes 1
No 2...
12. If yes, could you describe that kind of restriction, 
please.
RECORD ________________________________________________
FULLY
13. How is the waiting time before a new employee 
becomes entitled to the benefit 7
No waiting time 1
(Entitled to recieve benefits on the 
first day of working)
After probation of....... days 2
( specify)
40
.skip 
to Q.13
41
42
.skip 
to Q.ll
43
44
.skip 
to Q.13
45
46
Part 3: Method of payment.
a) Paying the doctor.
1. If employer has his/her own hospital or contracted 
doctor, what is the method of paying the doctor 
( general practitioner) 7
n/a 9 47
Part-time salary 1
Full-time salary 2
A fixed honorarium 3
Capitation 4
Fee-for-service with a 5
negotiated rate 
Fee-for-service at 6
ordinary private 
practice rate
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2. If specialist is needed to provide care for employees, 
what is the method of paying the specialist or 
consultant 7
n/a 9 48
A fixed honorarium 1
Capitation 2
Fee-for-service with a 3
negotiated rate 
Fee-for-service at 4
ordinary private 
practice rate 
Other ( specify) 5
b) Paying the nurse.
1. What is the predominant method of paying the nurse 
who works in the health clinic or hospital owned by 
the employer ?
n/a 9 49
Part-time salary 1
Full-time salary 2
A fixed honorarium 3
Capitation 4
Payment per visit 5
Other ( specify) 6
c) Paying tbs hospital.
1. If the employee is entitle to use the employer-owned 
hospital or the contracted hospital, what is the 
method of paying the hospital 7
n/a 9 50
Itemized billing at rates negotiated 1
by establishment/ organization 
Itemized billing at rates determined 2
by hospital
Daily charge at rates negotiated 3
by establishment 
Daily charge at rates determined by 4
hospital
Annual premium 5
Case payment (or per episode of illness) 6 
Other (specify)__________________________  7
2. How often does employer has to pay the hospital ?
n/a 9 51
Every two weeks 1
Every months 2
Every 2 months 3
Every 3 months 4
Every 4 months 5
Every 6 months 6
Every 12 months 7
Irregularly, 8
depends on the bills
3. Do you pay the hospital prospectively or 
retrospectively 7
Prospective payment 1 52
Retrospective reimbursement 2
4. If you reimburse the employee for his/her health 
costs, does the employee or the hospital present 
the bill for reimbursement 7
The hospital 1 53
The employee 2
Both 3
Part 4: Private insurance.
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Part 4i Private insurance.
1. If the employer buys group insurance from a commercial 
insurer for employees, what is the per capita premium 
cost, per year? _____________________________________
2. If the dependents of employees are protected, 
how much is the premium per family per year ?
3. How many eligible persons in a family ? 
(specify) _____________________________
4. How often do you make the premium payments to the 
insurance company ?
Monthly 1
Every 3 months 2
Every 6 months 3
Every 12 months 4
Other (specify) 5
54
55
56
57
Part 5 : Cash benefits.
a) Sickness benefit.
1. For how many days can the employee receive sick-pay 
for each period of illness?
n/a 9 58
3 consecutive days with a medical certificate 1
3 consecutive days without a medical certificate 2
2 consecutive days with a medical certificate 3
2 consecutive days without a medical certificate 4
1 day with a medical certificate 5
1 day without a medical certificate 6
Others (specify) ______________________________ 7
2. In a year, how many days can the employee receive 
sick pay? (excluding maternity benefits)
None 9 59
30 days per year 1
Less than 30 days per year 2
More than 30 days per year 3
b) Maternity benefits
1. How many days can the employee have for maternity 
pay? (excluding sick pay)
None 9
Less than 30 days 1
30 days 2
45 days 3
60 days 4
90 days 5
Others (specify) 6
2. For those who can receive maternity pay, how much 
do they get?
n/a 9
100 % of earnings for......days(specify) 1
and..... % of earning for days
Others (specify) _________________________ 2
3. Is there any maternity grant for employees?
Yes 1
No 2,
60
61
62
.Skip 
to Q.6
4. If yes, how much is the grant?
(specify)
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5. If the employee can obtain the maternity grant, for 
how many of her children is payment made?
n/a 9 63
One child 1
Two children 2
Three children 3
More than 3 children 4
No limit on the number 5
of children
6. Have any of the employees had to change their job 
or duties because of diminishing capacity 
for work on account of pregnancy. 64
Yes 1
No 2
7. If yes, have they received the same wages or salary 
as before being pregnant?
n/a 9 65
The same as before being pregnant 1 
Less than before being pregnant 2
FINISH QUESTIONNAIRE II
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE INFORMATION 
YOU HAVE BEEN OF GREAT HELP TO OUR INVESTIGATION
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TO INTERVIEWER
1. Assess the reliability of the information obtained?
Very unreliable 0
Rather reliable 1
Quite reliable 2
Any comments:_________________________________________
2. How long did the interview in this section take? 
____________________  Hour.____________________ Minutes.
3. Describe any disturbances or circumstances occuring during 
the interview which may have affected the validity of the 
responses?__________________________________________________
4. Who is the respondent of questionnaire no 1 ?
5. Date of interview _
6. Name of interviewer
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1.
3.
Do you consider that there are sufficient health care 
facilities in this area for this establishment?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
Do you consider that during the last year the 
employees of this establishment had adequate financial 
means to use the available health services?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
What do you think the employees would do if they did 
not have adequate finance to use the available 
health services?
(READ OUT IN TURN)
a). Seek aid from relatives or friends or incur debts?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
b). Avoid care for the illness?
Yes
No
Cannot say
4.
5.
6 .
Do you think it is desireable that every employee 
should be compelled to undergo a free medical 
check-up by the doctor, once every year?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
Do you think it is desireable that a doctor should be 
available, free of charge, to all citizens?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
Do you think an employee should visit a doctor if 
he/she had:-|
(READ OUT IN TURN) Yes No Cannot say
a). A temperature of 39 Degrees C. 1 2 3
b). A headache that has lasted 1 2  3
for 1 week
c). A bad skin eruption that has 1 2  3
lasted for 1 week
d). Fatigue and a lack of appetite 1 2  3
that has lasted for 1 week
7. Do you think an employee would visit a doctor more 
than necessary if he/she did not have to pay for the 
cost of care out of his/her own pocket, for every 
visit?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
8. Do you think that all of the employees in this 
establishment received sufficient treatment for their 
illnesses last year?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
9. Do you consider that all of the employees in this 
establishment received adequate, continuous care from 
the doctor, if they needed it?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
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10. What is the major reason why some employees,
nevertheless, are not receiving continuous care by 
a doctor? Is the major reason:-
(READ OUT ZN TURN)
a). Lack of funds
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
b). Distance to the doctor
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
c). Other reasons (specify) ._________________
11. M Health care services provided by the employer have
been said to have defects causing annoyance to the 
employees".
Do you agree with this statement ?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
12. State what you consider to be the most important 
defect(s) in the present health care provided by any 
employer.
13. Do you think that there is abuse of the present health 
care provided by employer ?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
14. State what form the abuse has taken:
15. State what you think an ideal health care system, for 
the employees, should consist of:
16. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages 
of Health Insurance?
16.1 The advantages are______________________________
16.2 The disadvantages are
17. Do you think it is desireable to have a National 
Health Insurance scheme to protect all private 
employees?
Yes 1
No 2
Cannot say 3
79
80 
1
2
3
4
(skip 
to Q15) 
(skip 
to Q15)
5
6
7
8
9
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18. If there is a National Health Insurance scheme in 
Thailand, who should be the provider of health care 
under health insurance?
The private sector 1
The public sector 2
Mixed 3
10
Please give the reason(s)
19. Within the government sector, who should be
responsible for organizing a National Health Insurance 
scheme?
The Ministry of Public Health 1
The Ministry of Interior 2
Both, Ministries of Health and Interior 3
The Office of the Prime Minister 4
A new governmental body 5
Cannot say 6
Others (specify) 7
Please give the reasons for your choice:
11
20. Who should pay for the scheme which covers curative, 
preventive, promotive, rehabilitativen and maternity 
care for employees?
(READ OUT IN TURN) Yes NO Cannot
RING a) .The employer 1 2 3
ONE b) .The employee 1 2 3
CODE c) .The government 1 2 3
FOR
EVERY ITEM
21. Who should be protected under the National Health 
Insurance scheme?
a). The employee only
b). The employees and their dependents
22. Who should be the eligible dependents?
a). The employees'spouse
b). Their spouse and children....(specify no.)
c). Their spouse, children.....(specify no.) 
and parents
23. If the benefits cover the employees only, how much of
the contribution as a percentage of pay-roll should
be paid for by the;
Employer .............. ( % of pay-roll)
Employee .............. ( % of pay-roll)
24. If the benefits cover the employees and their family
how much of the contribution as the percentage of
pay-roll should be paid for by the;
Employer .............. ( % of pay-roll)
Employee .............. ( % of pay-roll)
12
13
14
15
16
17-19
20-22
23-25
26-28
FINISH QUESTIONNAIRE III
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE INFORMATION 
YOU HAVE BEEN OF GREAT HELP TO OUR INVESTIGATION
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TO INTERVIEWER
1. Assess the reliability of the information obtained?
Very unreliable 9
Rather reliable 1
Quite reliable 2
Any comments s_________________________________________
2. How long did the interview in this section take? 
____________________Minutes
3. Describe any disturbances or circumstances occuring during 
the interview which may have affected the validity of the 
responses?_____________________________________________________
4. How many visit have you made until you found the appropriate 
respondent? ____________________ Time(s).
5. Who is the respondent of this questionnaires? ______________
6. Date of interview _
7. Name of interviewer
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